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 Scope of the Study  
 
 
1. The concept of (tax law) presumption in a national and European perspective 
The Presumption represents a concept that has been traditionally considered and studied 
from the national point of view, within the context of the theory of proof.  
In this study, the meaning of the concept will be extensively clarified, taking into 
consideration the wide academic literature on the topic. For the purpose of setting the stage 
of the research, it is suffice to say that, in general, it relates to the inductive reasoning that 
allows the inference from a known fact, an unknown fact
1
. 
According to a tradition which dates from the Roman law, presumptions are classified into 
presumptions of law and presumptions of fact. The difference between them lies mainly in 
the source of the presumption, which is the law only in the first case. By contrast, in the 
second case it is for the judge, for the purpose of the assessment of certain facts, to develop 
a logic operation by means of which the knowledge of an unknown fact is derived from a 
known (i.e. proved) fact. Furthermore, legal presumptions are distinguished as either 
irrebuttable (iuris et de iure) or rebuttable (iuris tantum), depending respectively on the 
prevention, rather than the possibility for the party against whom the presumption is 
provided to give proof to the contrary. 
The general notion of presumption has its roots in the civil law, which constitutes a 
necessary point of reference when (and before) dealing with presumptions within tax law 
and afterwards in an EU-wide perspective. In this regard, it is possible to outline a general 
theory of presumptions – in particular, of the legal ones - which keeps value regardless of 
the single national legal system’s structure and is based upon a common juridical European 
experience
2
. Therefore, the national civil law provisions taken into consideration in this 
                                                          
1
 H. De Page, La preuve par présomptions, in Traité élémentaire de droit civil belge, T. III, Bruxelles, 
Bruylant, 1967, 949, «‘Présumer’ signifie conjecturer. C’est acquérir une conviction, atteindre une certitude 
par la voie d’une induction ».  
2
 J. Wróblewsky, Structure and fonctions des présomptions juridiques, in Les présomptions et les fictions en 
droit, (éds.) C. Perelman, P. Foriers, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1974, 44, observed that «Indépendamment de 
l’analyse et des généralisations des textes formulés dans la langue juridique, la science juridique formule 
une questione fodamentale: «qu’est-ce qu’est la présomption?». Such question concerns the essence of the 
presumption, and according to the Author « la science juridique presque à l’unanimitè distingue 
praesumptiones hominis, praesumptiones iuris tantum et praeumptiones iuris et de iure. Les dernières sont 
souvent liées aux fictiones. Les présomptions sont parafois comparées à des définitions, à des dispositions 
iuris dispositivi, à des indices. Les constructions des présomptions sont traitées comme problémes 
concernant la preuve, car elles déterminent ce que l’on doit démontrer dans un procès». These issues will be 
dealt with in depth in Chapter I. 
  2 
study represent the basis for the purpose of the analysis of the concept at hand, but they 
cannot limit the following observations to a narrow range, by excluding the possibility to 
assign them a general character. 
In this study, the civil law framework precedes the examination of the same concept in the 
field of tax law. As a matter of fact, tax law presumptions do not embody a mere 
application of the concept of general theory. By contrast, in the domain of taxation legal 
presumptions show several peculiarities that justify a separate investigation. 
Generally speaking, such peculiarities concern the finality of tax law presumptions and the 
circumstance that they operate only in favour of one of the parties of the (tax) obligation. 
Indeed, they are introduced with the purpose of simplifying the assessment of the levy, of 
rendering certain, and speeding up the recovery of the latter and/or preventing tax evasion 
or tax avoidance. Or, said differently, in order to secure the Treasury interest, which on the 
other hand corresponds to the collective interest of the covering of public expenses. 
Accordingly, tax law presumptions are provided in favour of the tax authorities, that is the 
administrative body entitled to guarantee the application of the tax legislation
3
. Facing the 
deficit of knowledge on the side of the tax administration as to the relevant fiscal facts 
realized by the taxpayer, the national legislator intervenes to alter the division of the 
burden of proof among the parties. This, occurs so as to alleviate the probative burden that 
ordinarily rests upon the tax authorities, which may rely on tax law presumptions in issuing 
a tax decision. 
Notably, the alteration of the burden of proof does not operate only in a tax trial, which 
only possibly will take place. In fact, it may be relevant even before and irrespective of the 
latter, in the context of the assessment procedure run by the tax administration. The latter, 
as said, may rely upon tax law presumptions in order to motivate a tax decision, for 
instance a notice of assessment, concerning a certain taxpayer. 
The scenario offered by the analysis carried out in this study of two national legal orders, 
that is Italy and Belgium, shows the existence of several tax law presumptions, in the 
various fields of taxation, either addressed to the tax authorities and intended to alleviate 
                                                          
3
 This explains why the existence of presumptions in tax legislation has been considered as corroborating the 
fact that the burden of proof with regard to the tax claim lies on the tax authorities; a confirmation of the tax 
administration’s burden of proof with regard to the tax claim. In fact, by means of tax legal presumptions, 
such burden is shifted onto the taxpayer. As regards the rebuttable presumptions, E. Allorio, Diritto 
processuale tributario, Torino, Giuffrè, 1969, 389, who pointed out that the reversal of the onus of proof can 
be explained in the light, and at the same time is the demonstration, of the fact that the burden of proof is 
ordinarily put on the tax administration. If this was not the case, it would be without any sense providing in 
favour of the latter such a simplification. 
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3 
their probative burden during the administrative procedure, or affecting directly the 
position of the taxpayer (typically, with anti-abuse rules). Though the use of tax law 
presumptions by the national legislator is guided by similar finalities and needs 
(simplification, combating tax evasion or avoidance), the way in which tax presumptions 
are dealt with, particularly in the light of the Constitutional framework and parameters of 
Constitutional consistency, may differ. In this view, a comparative key offers the 
possibility to widen the perspective on tax law presumptions beyond a merely domestic 
one and to check if and to what extent a common national approach may be construed. 
On the other hand, the increasing role of the European Union law in the matter of taxation 
and its impact on national legislation, even through the rulings of the European Court of 
Justice, gives rise to the demand of considering the same concept from an EU-wide 
perspective. Tax law presumptions operate in favour of the tax authorities and to the 
disadvantage of the taxpayer. As such, they may hinder the exercise of a right or freedom 
conferred to individuals or legal persons by EU law or to jeopardize the principles, 
objective or regulation of a certain matter laid down at EU level. As a result, the use of tax 
law presumptions in the fields covered – albeit differently depending on the sector 
concerned - by EU law, needs to be investigated with a view of verifying if and to what 
extent they are consistent with the EU law framework. 
Under such framework, indeed, so far tax law presumptions have been discussed by the 
scholars in a merely fragmented way, either in the context of procedural matters or of the 
anti-abuse rules.  
In the light of the foregoing, the ultimate goal of this study is to construe the EU approach 
to tax law presumptions. This is in view of determining if and to what extent a common 
analytical framework may be identified and extracting certain criteria governing the 
evaluation of compatibility of tax law presumptions with EU law. In other words, the aim 
is to explore in which way tax law presumptions, which in national systems serve essential 
needs, are evaluated in the context of the European Union legal order. Once given an 
overview of the EU law relevant framework, the question to be answered is whether tax 
law presumptions provided for by the national legislators are ruled on by the EUCJ on the 
basis of a case-by-case approach, or it is rather possible to identify certain more general 
criteria or standards.   
In order to do so, the concept of tax law presumption is investigated under a twofold 
comparative perspective, so as the EU experience is confronted with the national one. The 
  4 
outcomes of the study are finally tested with regard to certain tax law presumptions 
provided for within the Italian and Belgian tax systems, with a view of verifying the 
possible concrete impact on the national legislation and on the protection of the European 
taxpayer. 
 
2. Brief note on the methodology 
In this study, the concept of presumption is firstly identified with special reference to the 
system and legal theory of some of the EU Member States: namely France, Italy, Belgium 
and concisely, also the United Kingdom. The choice has fallen on these Member States in 
view of them being representative, respectively, of the civil law systems for the first three 
and of the common law approach for the latter. Such an initial analysis is intended to verify 
the existence of a common core concept of presumption, and in particular of legal 
presumption,  in the European context. 
Afterwards, when dealing with legal presumptions in tax law, the focus is narrowed to two 
Member States, that is Italy and Belgium. This, in view of the different level of discussion 
reached by the relevant tax literature and of the involvement in several cases ruled by the 
EUCJ. The construction of their approach to the issue is addressed under a twofold 
direction. One the one side, the Constitutional framework and parameters of evaluation of 
tax law presumptions’ consistency are examined, as the control of Constitutional 
consistency is the sole limitation for presumptions which are provided for by the law. On 
the other side, after having drawn some consideration on the issues of the classification and 
the division of the burden of proof raised by certain estimated methods of assessment, the 
focus is on some presumptive provisions which are relevant under the EU law perspective 
and may create problems of conflict with EU law.  
The national approach to tax law presumptions construed in this way is then confronted 
with the European Union’s one. One can start to deal with presumptions by referring to the 
national concept as an “obligatory” step, because of the lack of common European civil 
law. More particularly, the EU law does not contain a complete and coherent set of rules of 
evidence, in line with the procedural autonomy of the Member States recognised by the 
EUCJ. Obviously, absence of rules does not turn into irrelevance of the concept at EU 
level. On the contrary, as many ius commune’s concepts, legal presumption is known in the 
EU experience. It follows the interest in exploring it from a broader perspective than the 
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traditional purely national one. This, exactly starting from beneath, i.e. from the national 
data, is in conformity with the Community ius commune experience. 
Therefore, the EU approach is construed by examining the relevant framework, in terms of 
rules and principles, and afterwards by giving an overview of the EUCJ case-law on the 
matter. In particular, the focus is on customs duties, VAT, and direct taxation, because they 
embody three different ways in which the EU law may impact on national legal orders. 
Moreover, the case-law on the issue of the repayment of taxes levied in breach of EU law 
is dealt with, because it is significant in the reading of the conditions of compatibility of 
presumptions with EU law. 
Two final remarks need to be made, with regard to the methodology adopted in this study. 
Given the comparative key of this dissertation, the focus is on presumptions established by 
and in the law and not even on presumptions of fact. The latter concern the acting of the 
(national) tax administration and of the courts; thus, they will be only mentioned with a 
view of underlining the differences with legal presumptions. Therefore, the investigation 
concentrates on the conditions of consistency of presumptions established by national legal 
orders (in their legislation) with the framework of the European Union legal order. 
The same comparative key justifies a discussion focused on national tax presumptions, as 
the aim is to test them against the rules and standards stemming from EU law. In this 
regard, only when dealing with customs duties a reference will be made to some 
presumptive provisions included in the Customs legislation on which the EUCJ has ruled 
on, but with the sole view of verifying if a different approach of the Court may be 
identified. 
 
3. Structure of the study 
This study concentrates on the concept of legal presumptions; first in general, afterwards in 
the context of the Italian and Belgian tax systems and in EU law. Accordingly, it is divided 
as follows. 
Chapter I deals with the notion of presumption, its role, constituting elements and effects. 
First, such issues are addressed by referring to the civil law systems of France, Italy and 
Belgium. Ultimately, the outcomes reached are confronted with the notion of presumption 
that emerges in a common law system; that is, the United Kingdom. 
Chapter II deals with the concept of tax law presumptions within two national tax systems. 
Thus, it is divided into two main Sections, concerning respectively Italy and Belgium. In 
  6 
each Section, first the stage is set by giving a brief overview of the question and illustrating 
the relevant Constitutional framework. The most significant Constitutional Court’s rulings 
on the matter are examined, with a view of extracting the criteria of evaluation. At this 
stage, a reference is made to the issues arising from some presumptive methods of 
assessment included in both the national legal orders. Ultimately, some legal presumptions 
in the field of VAT and income taxation are analysed, due to their potential relevance in 
the context of EU law. Finally, some general conclusions on the possible divergences 
between the two national approaches and common analytical framework are developed.  
Chapter III deals with tax law presumptions in EU law. First, an overview of the EU law 
framework, with particular regard to the principles of effectiveness and proportionality, is 
offered. Afterwards, two Sections follow, wherein  the EUCJ case-law is examined with a 
view to extracting the criteria adopted by the Court when ruling on tax law presumptions in 
the different fields of EU law. Section I concerns Customs duties and Indirect taxation and 
is in turn divided into three Parts. Part I concerns Customs law, and deals with both 
presumptions included in the Customs legislation and national tax presumptions. Part II 
concentrates on VAT, and both substantive and procedural tax law presumptions are 
examined. Part III deals with the issue of the repayment of taxes levied in breach of EU 
law. Section II concerns direct taxation, and deals with national tax law presumptions and 
presumptive regimes.  
In Summary and Conclusions an overview of this study is given. The outcomes with regard 
to the EU law approach to tax law presumptions in comparison to the national one are 
illustrated. Finally, some of the tax law presumptions included in the Italian and Belgian 
tax systems are tested against EU law. This, on the basis of the criteria set at EU level that 
can be inferred from the analysis conducted in Chapter III, with a view to verifying 
concretely the possible impact on the national legislation and on the degree of protection 
for the European taxpayer. 
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Chapter I 
Around a General Theory on (Legal) Presumptions: An 
Overview of their Main Features, Functions and Effects 
 
 
Introduction 
The aim of this first chapter is to offer an insight into the meaning and the relevance of the 
concept of ‘presumption’, based on the civil law tradition and legal theory, with a view to 
testing the existence of a common and shared notion, departing from this for a study on tax 
law presumptions in national contexts and in the EU law experience. Given that the 
perspective undertaken in this study concentrates on the relationship between legal orders 
(national and EU), legal presumptions will be addressed. It will be shown how, 
notwithstanding some (negligible) divergences, it is possible to deal with legal 
presumptions within national tax systems and in the context of EU law on the basis of a 
common ground. 
To this end, the main features, functions and effects of presumptions will be identified by 
referring to the national legal experience of some EU Member States. The choice has fallen 
upon France, Belgium and Italy, in view of them being representative of the civil law 
systems within the European Union and of the examination of tax law presumptions in the 
Italian and Belgian legal orders which will be conducted in Chapter II of this study. In this 
regard, it can be observed at the outset that the juridical experience of the 18
th
 century 
shows a homogeneous concept of presumption, mainly because of the common inspiration 
from the roman-canonical tradition, so that the Corpus Iuris is considered to be the pattern 
of the different European experiences, except for the English one. Moreover, the modern 
concept of presumption results from the doctrine and the legislation of the pre-
revolutionary juridical Enlightenment, and has been developed by the provisions of the 
Revolution and the Codifications. Indeed, the French Civil Code was used as a model for 
most of the subsequent codifications, including the Italian and Belgian Codes. The 
diffusion of the code Napoléon beyond France has in this way implied a general support 
for the concept of presumption, as stated in Article 1349 et seq. of the French Civil Code, 
which influenced even the German and Austrian juridical experiences during the second 
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half of the 19
th
 century
4
. In the light of this, the notion that can be extracted from the above 
national experiences will be ultimately tested against the notion which results from the 
experience of the United Kingdom, the latter being representative of the common law 
approach. 
The scope of this chapter has to be further delimited by underlying that, as said, the focus 
will be on legal presumptions, meaning those inferences that are laid down in the law 
rather than being the result of the judge’s reasoning. Though the general overview of 
presumptions given in this Chapter, which includes references to the concept as a whole, 
might suggest otherwise, the presumptions of fact will be analysed with the sole intent of 
underlining their different characteristics, role and relevance with respect to legal 
presumptions. In this regard, two further observations have to be made at the outset. 
From the provisions of a number of national civil codes the definition of presumptions and 
the distinction between presumptions of law (either rebuttable or irrebuttable) and 
presumptions of fact results. However, it has to be borne in mind that even irrespective of 
this, legal presumptions embody inferences drawn by the national legislator. In other words, 
they are expression of the Parliament’s power to select the interests worthy of protection 
and to introduce presumptive provisions in the national legal order as a result of a 
balancing between those interests. The exercise of the legislative power, though, may not 
be arbitrary and it is subject to the control of compatibility with the relevant Constitutional 
parameters. Under this perspective, legal presumptions are usually requested to be based 
on a rule of experience and in general to comply with the principle of reasonableness.  
Finally, it has to be reiterated that the concept of legal presumption finds its roots within 
the civil law, which is why in this study the general theory is the point of departure. 
Nonetheless, legal presumptions in the field of taxation do not embody a mere application 
of the general concept. On the contrary, they show a number of peculiarities which justify 
a specific study. Such peculiarities will be properly underlined in the following. At this 
stage, it suffices to say that legal presumptions in the field of taxation are entrusted with a 
function that is to a certain extent different from that played in the field of civil law
5
. In 
                                                          
4
 For a more detailed analysis of the evolution of the concept under discussion, with particular attention to the 
different role of the judge and the principle of free evaluation of the evidence, see F. Cordopatri, Presunzione 
(dir. proc. civ.), in Enciclopedia del Diritto, XXXV, Milano, 1986, in particular at p. 279 et seq. The Author 
distinguished two segments along the evolution of the concept of presumption: the first one goes from the  
Corpus Iuris to the end of the ancien régime, while the second one ensues from the Enlightenment and has 
been crystallized in the codifications and in the common law. 
5
 By way of exemplification, one of the most common legal presumptions provided either in civil law 
systems and in common law systems as well (where it was born as a common law principle and was then 
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fact, in the area of civil law they normally regulate the relationships between private 
parties in favour of one of them, depending on the interest to which the legislator chooses 
to give a particular protection by alleviating the burden of proof. In the domain of taxation, 
by contrast, they usually operate to the advantage of one sole party of the tax obligation; 
that is, the tax authority. 
 
Chapter I is divided as follows: firstly, the main features of the presumption, with 
particular regard to the constitutive elements and functions will be analysed, taking into 
special consideration the French, Belgian and Italian systems; secondly, the (probative) 
effects of legal presumptions will be examined, with particular reference to the impact on 
the ordinary division of the burden of proof; the effects of legal presumptions on the free 
evaluation by the judge will be then considered, and this will give the occasion for 
illustrating the characteristics of the presumptions of fact; thirdly, the question of the 
nature (whether substantive or procedural) of presumptions will be introduced, as it is still 
debated also in the field of taxation; ultimately, a brief overview of the concept under 
discussion in the experience of a common law system, that is the United Kingdom, will be 
briefly given. 
 
1. The constitutive elements of the general notion of presumption with particular 
reference to presumptions of law 
Pursuant to Article 1349 of the French Civil Code ‘Les présomptions sont des 
conséquences que la loi ou le magistrat tire d’un fait connu à un fait inconnu’6, and the 
                                                                                                                                                                                
codified), concerns the status of a child born by a married woman. It is the so-called ‘presumption of 
legitimacy’. Based on a rule of experience, the husband is presumed to be the father of the child conceived 
during the marriage. In this case, the goal attained by the legislator is manifestly the protection of the child’s 
interest. Another example: in several countries, legal presumptions of unconscionability with regard to 
certain standard clauses inserted into contracts are laid down, for the purpose of protecting the ‘weak party’ 
of the relationship. Cf. P.A. Thomas, Evidence, London, Butterworths, 1972, at p. 164.  
6
 ‘Presumptions are the consequences that a statute or the court draws from a known fact to an unknown 
fact’ (official English translation of the French Civil Code). This provision follows blindly the definition 
developed by R.J. Pothier, Trattato delle obbligazioni, new Italian version, Venezia, Antonelli, 1834, 122, 
(“un giudizio fatto dalla legge o dall’uomo intorno alla verità di una cosa mediante la conseguenza dedotta 
da un’altra cosa”) and Domat, Les loix civiles dans leur ordre naturel; le Droit public, et Legum delectus, 
Tome premiere, Paris, 1777, 177 (“le présomptions sont des conséquences qu’on tire d’un fait connu, pour 
servir à faire connaître la veritè d’un fait incertain, dont on cherche la prevue”). The definition included in 
the Italian pre-unitary codes (Article 1303 of the Codice per il Regno delle Due Sicilie, Article 2316 of the 
Codice Permense, Article 1462 of the Codice Albertino, Article 2391 of the Codice Estense), in the Italian 
Civil Code of 1865, and in some other national codes (Article 1199 of the Rumanian Code, Article 1952 of 
the Netherlandish Code, Article 282 of the Ticinese Procedural Civil Code, Article 288 of the 1891 Genevan 
Code) borrowed the cited Article 1349. The Spanish Code (Articles 1249-1253, repealed), the German 
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same provision is included in the Belgian Civil Code (Article 1349) as well as in the Italian 
one (Article 2727). 
From this general definition it can be inferred, at first glance, that the structure of every 
type of presumption implies three fundamental elements, namely: 
a) a known fact, which represents the basis of the scheme (see par. 1.1); 
b) an unknown fact, that is precisely the subject of the presumption, i.e. the 
theme of the proof (see par. 1.2); 
c) a logical inference between these two facts, whose ground lies in a rule of 
law or in a rule of experience, depending respectively on the source of the 
presumption; in both of the cases, however, it basically reflects (rectius, it should 
reflect) the id quod plerumque accidit
7
 (see par. 1.3). 
 
1.1. The known fact (a) 
The analysis of the first element at issue (i.e. the known fact) requests primarily to clarify 
that fact stands here for every circumstances or a set of circumstances to which the 
legislator connects the presumption. 
Obviously, its role in the context of a certain presumption depends on the nature of the 
latter, whether legal or hominis: in the first hypothesis, fact is the assumption on the basis 
of which the release from the onus of proof is provided, while in the second one, it is the 
foundation of the logical process conducted by the  judge. 
In any event, it is intended as a fact in its own historicity, so that it might include even a 
subjective element, like will
8
. 
More interpretative difficulties rise from the meaning of the adjective known referred to the 
fact, in the extent to which it is not clear whether, in order to benefit from the presumption, 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Procedural Civil Code of 1898 (S 292) and the Austrian Code (S 270) dealt with presumptions without 
defining them. See in this regard C. Lessona, Accesso giudiziale, intervento istruttorio, presunzioni, Firenze,  
F.lli Cammelli, 1924, 91 et seq. 
7
 This Latin formulation indicates the normal course of events. 
8
 See G. Gentilli, Le presunzioni nel diritto tributario, Cedam, Padova, 1984, 32, who pointed out that the 
distinction within the general theory of law between fact and act – the first being an entity that produces legal 
effects according to the legal system, the second being a phenomenon that shows a human will - is irrelevant 
for the purpose of identifying the meaning of the element which is the basis of the presumption. See on this 
point also H. De Page, La preuve par présomptions, in Traité élémentaire de droit civil belge, Bruxelles, 
Bruylant, 1967, 949-950, according to whom, within the practice, the presumption is a sign, any external fact 
(material or of a man) whose existence is not consistent with the inexistence of the unknown fact. The proof 
results through an inductive reasoning undertaken on incomplete materials, which are the known facts. “D’un 
fait connu, n’ayant aucun caractère probatoire direct, on infère, on induit le fait inconnu”. 
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a particularly rigorous demonstration of the fact-base is required, as some Authors seem to 
suggest
9
. 
Indeed, while it obviously refers to a fact that has been proved during the proceedings 
where the presumption is relied on, or that does not need to be proved as it is notorious
10
 or 
non-disputed
11
, the question arises as to whether it can be considered fully proved when it 
is the result of certain means of proof such as a presumption hominis. In other words, can 
the latter be the basis of a legal presumption without affecting the degree of certainty of the 
evidence so reached? One would say that the positive answer to this question ensues from 
the nature of means of proof assigned to the presumptions of fact by the statutory law, so 
that a different interpretation would introduce a distinction between the various means of 
proof that does not result explicitly from the relevant legislation, nor is it in line with the 
ratio of the discipline in the matter
12
.  
 
1.2 The unknown fact (b) 
The interpretation of the second pole of the presumptive mechanism has not created any 
particular problems. Indeed, the unknown fact can be easily identified as the fact that needs 
                                                          
9
 The same question underlined in the text with regard to presumptions hominis arises for the arguments of 
proof (see Article 116, paragraph 2, of the Italian Procedural Civil Code): can the behaviour carried out by 
the parties during the proceedings, which is considered by the law as the basis of an argument of proof, be the 
fact-base of a presumption? Indubitably, such question concerns mainly the presumptions of fact, and it 
might be relevant within the tax procedure. After having explained the different positions on the theme, G. 
Gentilli, Le presunzioni nel diritto tributario, cited above, 34 et seq., took the view of an extensive 
interpretation of ‘known fact’, especially taking into account the development of the administrative 
proceedings. 
10
 The notorious facts cover those (even potential) cognitions that belong to the set of knowledge of the 
average citizen in a certain moment and in a certain legal system. According to Article 115, par. 2 of the 
Italian Procedural Civil Code, they are ‘notions of fact belonging to the common experience’. See on this 
issue F. Carnelutti, Massime d’esperienza e fatti notori, Riv. Dir. Proc., 1959, 639 et seq.; V. Andrioli, 
Presunzioni (diritto civile e processuale civile), in Noviss. Dig. It., XIII, Torino, 1966, 766; V. Andrioli, 
Prova, in Noviss. Dig. It., vol. XIV, Torino, 1974, at 281; C. Mandrioli, Corso di diritto processuale civile, 
Torino, Giappichelli, 1985, II, 138. Clearly, they are relevant mainly as the premise of a presumption of fact, 
but also of a legal presumption crystallizing a rule of experience. 
11
 Meaning that has not been contested by the adversary. There are, though, some hypotheses when the non-
disputation is irrelevant, as pointed out by V. Andrioli, Prova, cited above, 274, that is when the written form 
is required, a matter that is not possible to dispose of is at issue, or the party who would suffer the 
disadvantage is absent in the proceedings. 
12
 In this sense, F. Laurent, Principes de droit civil, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1876, 636, who, disagreeing with 
Toullier, observed that the presumptions of fact are admitted when the law admits testimony. Since testimony 
can be relied on against a presumption of law, the same has to be regarding presumptions hominis, in 
accordance with the prevalent doctrine and jurisprudence. In the sense that against presumptions of law the 
proof can be furnished through all the means of proof provided for by the ‘droit commun’ (included 
presumptions of fact), E. Brunet, J. Servais and C. Resteau, Présomptions, R.P.D.B., 1951, 229. On the 
contrary, most of the authors (and the predominant national  jurisprudence) still deny the possibility to infer a 
presumption hominis on the basis of another presumption hominis (praesumptum de praesumpto).  
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to be proved in order to obtain the application of the relevant provision and the correlative 
juridical effects. 
When assisted by a presumption, the party who would normally bear the burden of proof 
according to the ordinary rules on the division of this burden, is exempted from furnishing 
the evidence of the presumed fact, being only requested to demonstrate the existence of the 
known fact on the basis of every means of proof. 
This makes evident that, as it will be clarified below, presumptions do not imply a 
complete exemption from any probative burden related to the theme of proof, but simply a 
partial release or an alleviation of the burden of proof. In practice, the party who relies on a 
legal presumption discharges the onus of proof by giving evidence of the fact a, from 
which the law infers the facts b and c (in hypothesis, the requirements for the purpose of 
the application of the provision claimed in the proceedings) while he is exempted from 
furnishing the evidence of the latter
13
.   
To illustrate this, it may be useful to make an example. The presumption of legitimacy of a 
child born by a married woman during the marriage or under a certain period of time prior 
to the marriage or subsequent to the end of the marriage, is included in several national 
systems, albeit under partially divergent forms. When, for instance, such status was 
contested, the defendant would be assisted by a presumption of legitimacy provided that 
the facts upon which the presumptive inference is based are proved, e.g. the birth 
certificate and the period of time envisaged in the relevant legislation.  
 
1.3 The source of the reasoning and the reasoning itself as criteria distinguishing 
presumptions of law from presumptions of fact ... (c) 
After having dealt with the first two components of the concept under discussion, we turn 
to the core of each presumption, that is, the logical inference linking the known fact and 
the unknown fact. 
                                                          
13
 A. Coniglio, Le presunzioni nel processo civile, Palermo, w.d., 47, with regard to the effect of legal 
presumptions on the onus of proof underlined that the different linguistic terms used, especially by the 
German literature – which has spoken of liberation and reversal of the burden of proof, distribution and 
facilitation of the proof - is simply the result of a different point of view. Thus, from the perspective of the 
presumed fact - i.e. a different point of view than that one held in the text (focusing on the position of the 
party) - it is possible to speak about liberation or exemption from the proof. Critical on the definitions of 
presumptions in terms of facilitation and alleviation of the burden of proof and of modification of the theme 
of proof,  G. Gentilli, Le presunzioni nel diritto tributario, cited above, 48, as in his view not every  
presumption has these effects. 
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Generally speaking, it consists of a connection based on a rule of experience, or in other 
terms on the plausibility that a certain circumstance implies the existence of another one 
according to the normal course of the events (the id quod plerumque accidit)
14
.  
This logical element, that characterises the presumption as a reasoning permitting to infer 
some consequences from a certain fact, is what legal and factual presumptions have in 
common and may justify their unitary legislative definition. 
However, many Authors have properly pointed out that the connection under discussion is 
not always based on a ‘calculation of probabilities’ when dealing with presumptions of law, 
as it is, on the contrary, possible to assert with regard to presumptions of fact
15
. As a matter 
of fact, besides the rational content of legal presumptions – so far emphasized - their 
legislative basis cannot be disregarded, as it denotes their general character in contrast with 
                                                          
14
 In the literature, there has been a wide debate as to whether the reasoning is inductive or rather deductive. 
While the common law doctrine believes that both of these schemes are applicable, R. Decottignies, Les 
présomption en droit privé, Paris, 1950, p. 11, observed: “La présomption suppose donc un double movement 
de pensée. On peut dire qu’elle combine les deux méthodes inductive et deductive par lesquelles l’esprit 
humain peut découvrir et démontrer ce qui semble la vérité”. In other words, the reasoning is inductive in the 
first phase and deductive in the second phase. In this perspective, the connection between two facts includes 
the finding of a general rule (induction) and then the passage to the unknown fact (deduction). Cf.  G. Aron, 
Théorie Générale des Présomptions Légales en droit privé, Paris, A. Pedone, 1895, 5 et seq. Within the 
Italian doctrine, see S. Patti, Della prova testimoniale e delle presunzioni (artt. 2721-2729), in Commentario 
del codice civile Scialoja-Branca, Zanichelli, Bologna, 2001, 81 et seq., who agreed that the first part of the 
reasoning requires the use of a rule of experience, because of the reference to what normally happens. See 
also C. Laurent, Principes de droit civil, cited above, 626, according to whom the proof resulting from 
presumptions consists of a simple reasoning, which is based on a probability touching the certainty. Despite 
the differences in terms of conditions for the application and effects, the procedure is the same both for legal 
and factual presumptions, since it consists of a reasoning developed by the legislator or by the judge. Alike, E. 
Picard, N. D’Hoffschmidt J. De Le Court, Présomption, in Pandectes Belges, Larcier, Bruxelles, 1904, 819 et 
seq.; R. Mougenot, La preuve, in Rép. Not., T. IV, Le obligations, (ed.) D. Mougenot, 2002, 282, says: “Le 
mécanisme de la Présomption suppose donc un raisonnement (…) habituellement qualifié d’induction”. In 
the case of legal presumptions, the legislator makes the inductive reasoning and accords preference to certain 
categories of subjects. H. De Page, La preuve par présomptions, cited above, 960, pointed out that the 
presumption of law is a generalization, imposed by authority, of the likelihood. Indeed, “Du fait que 
normalement, habituellement, telle circostance (fait connu) en implique telle autre (fait inconnu) la loi décide 
que l’induction (…) sera censée se produire toujours”. In the case of presumptions iuris tantum, the law 
considers the induction to be admissible generaliter, but not peremptory, while presumptions iuris et de iure 
are introduced when the induction is certain insomuch as it is held as peremptory or there are imperative 
reasons of public order or general interest. These considerations brought the Author to deem the presumption 
of law less reliable than the presumption of fact,  the former being an artificial generalization of all the 
specific cases of the same genus, rather than having value for a certain concrete case. Compare also R. 
Dekkers, Précis de droit civil belge, tome deuxième, Bruxelles, 1955, 419, who asserts, regarding the 
presumption of law, that “ne diffèr nullement de la présomption du juge par sa nature: même inscrite dans un 
texte, elle reste l’effet d’un raisonnement, d’une induction. La seule différence est que c’est la loi même qui 
fait l’induction. Dans certains cas, la loi considère l’induction comme à ce point probable, qu’elle ne 
l’abandonne plus ‘aux lumières et à la prudence du magistrat’ (C. civ., art. 1353): elle la consacre comme 
une règle générale”.  
15
 Contra, but only regarding presumptions iuris tantum, C. Lessona, Accesso giudiziale, intervento 
istruttorio, presunzioni, cited above, 312, who, dissenting from Ramponi, asserted that the not-
correspondence with the concept of probability becomes true only for the iuris et the iure presumptions, 
which in his opinion are not presumptions. 
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the reference only to the concrete case when facing presumptions of fact. There are several 
reasons leading the legislator to introduce presumptive criteria. They may correspond to 
the need of facing difficulties of proof or favouring one of the parties involved in a certain 
abstract situation, or they may simply reflect the preference for a certain regulation of the 
latter
16
.   
Especially in the domain of taxation, we will see how legal presumptions are at times the 
result of certain legislators’ choices intended to guarantee the application of the relevant 
provisions/regime rather than the pure codification of a settled rule of experience. 
Furthermore, a presumption manifesting the id quod plerumque accidit at the time when it 
was introduced, might then lose this logical basis as a consequence of the change affecting 
the context of reference.  It is particularly in these hypotheses, wherein the presumption 
does not seem to be inspired by the ‘consequential probabilities’, that it has to be justified 
in the light of the protection of deserving public interests, in order to positively overcome 
the test of reasonableness
17
.  
Setting the last consideration aside for the moment, as it will be investigated further in the 
second chapter, it can be concluded that the structure of the reasoning is likely to be partly 
different in legal presumptions as compared to presumptions hominis. Evidently, this is a 
corollary of the main difference between them, which concerns exactly the source of the 
reasoning. While in the first case the presumption often reflects a discretionary evaluation 
of the legislator, which is not rarely the result of a balance between several interests, the 
presumption of fact is rather the product of the intellectual process evolved by the judge, 
                                                          
16
A. Coniglio, Le presunzioni nel processo civile, cited above, 5 et seq., underlined that in the legislative 
definition of presumptions prevails the logical aspect of the definition, since the process of argumentation of 
a fact on the basis of the existence of another one is the only link between the two different categories of 
presumption; L. Ramponi, La teoria generale delle presunzioni nel diritto civile italiano, Tornino, F.lli 
Bocca, 1890, 20 et seq., asserted that legal presumptions and presumptions hominis have the same logical 
character, being both a ‘calculation of probabilities’, so that there is an accidental, rather than substantive, 
difference between them. However, he then admitted that this is not true in absolute, since sometimes the law 
presumes not what is likely, but rather what is possible and in case unlikely. In particular, this happens when 
a presumption is introduced because of the social need or the general interest in a certain regulation of a legal 
relation. In other hypotheses, the presumption is, according to the same Author, simply the form chosen by 
the legislator in order to express a legal concept, in accordance with a general rule of law. S. Patti, Della 
prova testimoniale e delle presunzioni (artt. 2721-2729), cited above, says that in some legal presumptions it 
is not to find the calculation of probabilities which is generally identified as the basis of the institute, but 
rather the need for rationalization and simplification. For a critical analysis of the theory of presumptions 
based on a mere calculation of probabilities, R. Decottignies, Les présomptions en droit privé, cited above,  
21 et seq.   
17
 G. Gentilli, Le presunzioni nel diritto tributario, cited above, 9, observed that notwithstanding that legal 
presumptions need to have a rationale in order to be consistent with the principle of reasonableness, they are 
not a logical discretion, but rather a deontological one, since they aim at providing obligations regarding the 
decision of the judge, and not at convincing him. On the contrary, the logical moment is the core of 
presumptions of fact, since they are the result of a mental process.  
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who cannot disregard the actual degree of plausibility concerning the existence of the 
unknown fact that is relevant in the pending case. 
 
1.3.1 ... and from the direct proof 
The nature of the reasoning and its object have been considered within the doctrine as 
marking out the difference between the presumption and those means of proof classified as 
direct proof
18
.  
In fact, when dealing with the ordinary proof, there is a direct connection between the 
means of proof and the disputed fact in the proceedings (thema probandum), so that the 
latter is exactly the object of the proof. Typically, this is the case of the documentary 
evidence: here the fact which is the probandum results directly from the content of the 
document.  
By contrast, facing presumptions a quid pluris is needed, which is the logical connection 
between the known fact (what is proved during the proceedings) and the unknown fact. 
The latter, despite being a necessary requirement in order to obtain the recognition of a 
certain right, is not demanded to be (directly) proved. It is assumed to be existent where the 
known fact is proved, by virtue of a logical inference, normally based on a rule of 
experience, which connects the known fact and the unknown fact
19
. 
                                                          
18
 See on this distinction, L.P. Comoglio, Le prove civili, terza edizione, Torino, UTET, 2010, 9, who gives 
an overview of the traditional classifications in the matter of the proof. In particular, the Author quotes the 
difference between ‘direct proofs’ and ‘indirect proofs’ that is located in the relation between the means of 
proof and the object of proof. The latter is the principal fact in the first case, while it is a secondary fact in the 
other case. A further distinction is between “historical proof” and “critical proof”, depending on the 
circumstance that the probative means represent directly or indirectly the factum probandum. Lastly, while 
“legal proofs” refers to proofs whose efficacy is fixed by the law so that the judge is legally bound, the ‘free 
proofs’ are submitted to the free valuation by the judge. 
19
 In other words, in the first case (direct proof), the burden of proof is fulfilled by giving evidence of the fact 
x, that is the probandum; in the second case (presumptions), after proving the existence of x (the probatum), 
it is further necessary to draw a logical connection, normally based on a rule of experience, with the fact y 
(the probandum), according to which, given x, y is supposed to be existent as well without being directly 
proved. An overview of the theories about the relation between proof and presumption is in Lessona, Accesso 
giudiziale, intervento istruttorio, presunzioni, cited above, 100 et seq. According to the Author, it is possible 
to identify the following positions: a) an opinion that considers the presumption a mere ‘surrogate’ of the 
proof (Duranton); b) the majority asserts that while dealing with the proof the disputed fact is determined by 
belief means drawn immediately on the experience (so that the known fact demonstrates ipse the unknown 
fact) and applied to the same fact, as regard presumptions the disputed fact is established throw an induction 
from other facts already proved (Pothier, Aubry and Rau, Toullier-Duvergier, Demolombe,  Garsonnet, 
Boileux-Poncelet, Larombièr, Bonnier, Thévenin, Bédarride, Baudry-Lacantinerie and Barde, Ramponi, 
Mattirolo, Scialoia, Borsari, Pacifici-Mazzoni, Scotti, Lomonaco, Framarino dei Malatesta, Chironi e Abello, 
Bolaffio, Lega, Planiol); c) a third opinion stresses the different role of the known fact, which in the case of 
presumptions has  the specific aim of establishing the existence of another fact (Demante, Ferrini, Carnelutti); 
d) some authors believe that a written or oral human declaration is always the basis of the proof, whereas the 
presumption is based on a different fact (Colmet de Santerre; Mourlon, Garsonnet); e) lastly, they are 
distinguished for the different probative effect: while the first one would guarantee the certainty, the second 
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For example, consider that the tax administration presumes the existence of a certain 
amount of taxable income of a taxpayer based on the expenditure met by the latter. The 
unknown fact (taxable income) is not proved directly, but through the evidence of the 
expenditure incurred in the tax year concerned and a rule of experience according to which 
expenditure met are proportionate to the income earned.   
Such considerations have brought some authors to ascribe to the presumption a minor 
probative efficacy in respect to the direct proof
20
. Arguing from the more complex process 
leading to the evidence (intended as result) it has been said that, unlike the other means of 
(direct) proof, the former is not able to lead to certainty, but rather to what is only probable. 
Notwithstanding that this assertion mostly relates to presumptions of fact, where the 
inductive reasoning is left to the ‘prudence’ of the judge, the general nature of 
presumptions of law has been considered a marker of their lower level of reliability as 
well
21
.  
As such, this interpretation is not in line with the relevant legislation, where no explicit 
distinction between direct/indirect means of proof can be found based on the degree of 
certainty
22
. This is not surprising, given the fact that every means of proof mainly leads to 
a degree of probabilities which can only tend towards certainty, regardless of the process 
                                                                                                                                                                                
one only the probability (Glück, Toullier-Duvergier, Marcadé, Laurent, and also Baudry-Lacantinerie and 
Barde). The Author agreed with the dominant thesis, which he considered to be codified by the code, while 
he criticized the other ones. According to L. Ramponi, La teoria generale delle presunzioni nel diritto civile 
italiano, Torino, F.lli Bocca, 1890, 1 et seq., the distinctive criterion between proof and presumption is the 
different nature of the logical relation by means of which the known fact is connected with the unknown fact. 
20
 See H. De Page, La preuve par présomptions, cited above, 952 et seq., according to whom “La preuve par 
présomptions est et reste une preuve dangereuse, à l’égard de laquelle la plus grande circonspection 
s’impose.”  
21
 See, for instance, H. De Page, La preuve par présomptions, cited above, 953 et seq., according to whom 
the presumption is an indirect proof, so that it is “inférieure à la preuve directe que constitue l’écrite, la 
preuve ‘préconstituée’”. This is not because of the degree of certainty resulting from the written proof, but 
rather because while in the latter the external sign forms the proof, in the other case the same sign is subject 
to interpretation and the reasoning is more conjectural. Moreover, the Author underlined how these 
considerations hold true even when dealing with presumptions of law, where the law does not always impose 
in an absolute way the induction introduced; S. Chiarloni, Riflessioni sui limiti del giudizio di fatto nel 
processo civile, Riv. Trim. Dir. Proc. Civ., 1986, 857, who argued the less persuasive vis of presumptive 
proof as compared to the direct/representative proof, on the basis of the fact that the truth of the latter implies 
automatically the truth of the principal fact perceived or represented, while this necessary relation does not 
exist for the former, in the extent to which the truth of the known fact and the validity of the rule of 
experience does not necessarily imply the truth of the unknown fact (id quod rare accidit). Contra, S. Patti, 
Della prova testimoniale e delle presunzioni (artt. 2721-2729), cited above, 80. Compare also C. Lessona, 
Accesso giudiziale, intervento istruttorio, presunzioni, cited above, but then the same Author seemed to 
contradict himself when he said that “the presumption can be – at equal circumstances -, less sure than the 
proof”. 
22
 Compare on this issue A. Coniglio, Le presunzioni nel processo civile, cited above, 167 et seq., with 
special reference to the logical activity of the judge and presumptions hominis, which clearly represent the 
core of the discussion about the degree of certainty achievable.  
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used in order to reach the evidence
23
. In other words, it can be surely recognised that the 
acquisition as a proof of the fact-theme of proof during a legal proceedings happens 
directly in the one case and in a mediate way in the other case. Nonetheless, a mechanism 
having an inferential character is inherent in every evaluation of proof, either direct proof 
or presumption
24
. Though, admittedly, this ‘inferential moment’ seems to concern the 
valuation of the proof alleged in the former case, and the forming itself of the proof in the 
latter. 
 
1.4 Brief outline on the more analytical definition of legal presumptions under the 
French and Belgian Civil Codes 
On the basis of what  has been said in the previous paragraphs, it is evident that the general 
definition of presumptions is identical in all the civil codes considered so far. 
However, when we turn to presumptions of law, it has to be noted that unlike the current 
Italian Civil Code, the French and Belgian ones include a further article that at first sight 
provides for a more analytical definition of them. 
This is, only apparently, because on the one hand the hypotheses listed are to be considered 
merely exemplifications. On the other hand, some of them are the heritage of obsolete 
views, as it is clearly the idea that at the basis of the authority of res judicata there is a 
presumption of truth.  
                                                          
23
 See R. Decottignies, Les présomption en droit privé, cited above, pages 18-19: “Que la preuve se fasse de 
l’une ou de l’autre manière, il importe de souligner qu’elle aboutit dans les deux cas à une simple 
vraisemblance. Il n’y a sur ce point aucune différence à faire entre la preuve par présomptions et la preuve 
directe. Celle-ci, en effet, ne signifie nullement certitude.” After having clarified that the direct proofs 
“établissent par eux-mêmes l’existence du fait litigieux” while the indirect proofs “repose tout entére sur 
l’idée de déplacement de l’objet de preuve et consiste à se servir de faits voisins ou connexes (…) pour 
remonter jusqu’à la preuve du fait litigieux”, he located the difference between them in the foundation of 
their probative force. 
24
 According to A. Carratta, Prova e convincimento del giudice nel processo civile, Riv. Dir. Proc., 2003, 43 
et seq., the valuation of the probative results consists of a gnoseological operation leading the judge to 
consider as ascertained the alleged fact X on the basis of the taking of the means of proof Y. This, through a 
rule of experience pursuant to which it can be considered as probably true, the former facing the second one. 
The result pursued by the system is the “likely truthfulness” of the factual production obtained as the 
outcome of an inferential process connecting the factum probans and the factum probandum through the rules 
of experience. Accordingly, the Author rejected the thesis of a minor persuasive vis of the presumptive proofs 
in respect of the direct proof, because in both of the cases the reasoning of the judge bridges the factum 
probans with the factum probandum by means of rules of experience, and the result is always the probable 
truthfulness of the alleged facts. What is important, in his view, is the rational foundation of such an 
operation – that normally comes together with the use of statutory parameters of judgment - in order to allow 
an external control. 
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Pursuant to Article 1350
25
 of the (French and Belgian) Civil Code, a presumption of law is 
that one which is “attached” by a special law to certain acts or certain facts. The same 
provision then makes reference to the four following hypotheses: 
1) acts which a law declares void, as presumed made in defraud of its 
provisions, by their very nature; 
2) cases in which the law declares the ownership or discharge results from 
certain definite circumstances
26
;  
3) the rule of res judicata27. 
4) the effect which a law attaches to the admission of a party or to his oath28. 
The importance of the provision at hand does not have to be overrated, and this is due to 
the reasons mentioned above. 
For our purpose, it is sufficient to highlight the reference, included in the first paragraph of 
Article 1350 of the French and Belgian civil code, to a ‘special law’, which makes evident 
that a legal presumption sine lege is not possible and moreover that it cannot be established 
by means of analogy
29
. However, the same conclusion holds true irrespective of the 
provision at hand, which is merely superfluous. And it could not be different, considering 
that the articles of the civil code under discussion represent the general definition of the 
                                                          
25
 The French version of the provision provides as follows: “La présomption légale est celle qui est attachée 
par une loi spécial à certains actes ou à certains faits; tels sont: 1° Les actes que la loi déclare nuls, comme 
présumé faits en fraude de ses dispositions, d’après leur seul qualité ; 2° Les cas dans lesquels la loi déclare 
la propriété ou la libération résulter de certaines circonstances déterminées ; 3° L’autorité que la loi 
attribue à la chose jugée ; 4° La force que la loi attache à l’aveu de la partie ou à son serment ». 
26
 This number refers to the cases when the law provides the ownership or the release from an obligation 
based on certain circumstances. 
27
 Literally, “the authorithy that the law assigns to the res judicata”. Only the French civil code gives space, 
among the provisions concerning presumptions, to an article (Art. 1351) that identifies the object of the res 
judicata: “L’autorité de la chose jugée n’a lieu qu’à l’égard de ce qui a fait l’objet du jugement. Il faut que la 
chose demandée soit la même; que la demande soit fondée sur la même cause; que la demande soit entre les 
même parties, et formée par elles et contre elles en la même qualité”. Clearly, this is the definition of res 
judicata, which is common to the other Member States, even though in some cases – like in the Italian 
system – it is not codified. The hypothesis of (irrebuttable) presumption of truth of the res judicata is 
definitively justified in the light of the certainty of the rights and the stability of the juridical order, L. 
Ramponi, La teoria generale delle presunzioni nel diritto civile italiano, cited above, 175, and widely 182 et 
seq.. For an exhaustive analysis of the presumptions of res judicata, see H. De Page, La preuve par 
présomptions, cited above, 967 et seq. A. Bayart, Peut-on Éliminer les fictions du discours juridique?, in Les 
présomptions et les fictions en droit, (éds.) C. Perelman and P. Foriers, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1974, at 29, 
believes that the ‘res judicata pro veritate habetur’ is not a presumptions, but rather a fiction. 
28
 The English translation of article 1350 of the French Civil Code is taken from H.S. Dahl and T. Bourdeau, 
Dahl’s Law Dictionary, third edition, Hein, 2007. 
29
 With regard to Article 1350 of the Italian civil code of 1865, which was identical to Article 1350 under 
discussion, except for the provision of number 4) mentioned in the text,  L. Ramponi, La teoria generale 
delle presunzioni nel diritto civile italiano, cited above, 144, where also some examples. Since the law which 
fixes a presumption belongs to the ius singulare, every analogical interpretation, which would imply the 
application of the same provision to similar cases and to analogous matters, has to be rejected. 
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matter, whereas every legal presumption obviously finds its origin from a specific statutory 
provision. 
A different question concerns then the boundary between legal and hominis presumptions, 
which cannot always be solved having reference to an explicit legislative provision. 
Especially in tax law, as we will see later on, the legal provision often generically entitles 
the tax administration to make use of presumptive criteria, by identifying parameters which 
the latter can refer to.   
 
2. Probative effects of legal presumptions...  
The analysis of the relevant provisions undertaken suggests  considering the probative 
effects assigned to legal presumptions in the perspective of the distribution of the burden of 
proof, before and in order to distinguish between irrebuttable and rebuttable presumptions. 
It is a crucial point not only to understand the role played by legal presumptions within the 
proceedings, but also because it is the pivot of the question concerning the nature of legal 
presumptions (if procedural or rather substantive). 
When dealing with presumptions’ probative effects, three different levels need to be 
considered: the consequences on the position of the party who benefits from the 
presumption, then on the position of the party who suffers it, lastly the effect (in terms of 
efficacy) on the evaluation conducted by the judge. 
 
2.1 ... under the perspective of the party who benefits from the legal presumption ... 
Under the first profile, there seem to be no distinctions between the two types of 
presumptions of law. According to Article 1352 of the French and Belgian Civil Codes, as 
well as Article 2728 of the Italian Code, legal presumptions dispense from any proof the 
party in whose favour they are established
30
. 
From a literal interpretation of this provision, one can at first glance infer that the typical 
effect of legal presumptions operates on the grounds of the distribution of the burden of 
proof, in the extent to which - as I have already illustrated - the party who normally bears 
that burden is exempted from furnishing the proof. 
                                                          
30
 Respectively, “La présomption légale dispense de toute preuve celui au profit duquel elle existe” (Art. 
1352, par. 1). “Le presunzioni legali dispensano da qualunque prova coloro a favore dei quali esse sono 
stabilite” (Art. 2728, par. 1). As  is evident, the formula used in the civil codes taken into consideration is 
identical. 
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However, the relation with the burden of proof has more facets when facing rebuttable 
presumptions. As a matter of fact, although the legislator uses a lone formula to fix the 
effect of each legal presumption, clearly its significance is very different depending on the 
type of presumption of law, i.e. whether rebuttable or irrebuttable, being possible for the 
party who suffers the presumption to furnish proof to the contrary only in the first case
31
.  
This having been specified, the analysis of the main doctrine on the matter shows that the 
‘dispense from any proof’ under discussion has not been unanimously interpreted as a 
mere reversal of the burden of proof, which evidently is suited only to rebuttable 
presumptions.  
Indeed, some Authors have even denied that legal presumptions imply any impact on the 
ordinary distribution of the onus of proof. It has been observed that, when is said that 
“presumptions lay on the adversary the burden of the proof”, the general effect of all the 
types of proof is expressed, since there are no  differences if it is furnished indirectly 
(through presumptions) rather than directly. Moreover, this formula does not adapt to 
irrebuttable presumptions of law. In other words, the shift of the onus of proof would be a 
mere consequence of the dispensing from the proof provided in favour of one party. Once 
the latter relies on certain facts which law confers probative value to, then it is to the 
opponent party (if possible) giving evidence to the contrary, according to the ordinary rules. 
The reversal of the onus of proof is, in this perspective, merely apparent
32
. 
Lastly, other Authors, with an interpretation that seems to be more in line with the 
comprehensive formula, have supported the thesis that we assist in a change of the theme 
of proof
33
. This does not consist of the fact which needs to be proved, but rather of another 
fact from which the existence of the latter is inferred. Such perspective permits  pointing 
out that the introduction of presumptive provisions of law does not entail that the party is 
                                                          
31
 According to S. Patti, Della prova testimoniale e delle presunzioni (artt. 2721-2729), cited above, 110, this 
provision refers to both rebuttable and irrebuttable presumptions, since it does not concern the admissibility 
of the counterproof (as the rubric of the article may suggest) but rather the sufficiency of each legal 
presumption in order to regard the presumed fact as proved. Contra, M. Taruffo, Presunzioni, sub Art. 2728, 
in Commentario al Codice Civile, (ed.) P. Cendon, Torino, Giuffrè, 1 ed., Vol VI, 1999, 211. 
32
 See L. Ramponi, La teoria generale delle presunzioni nel diritto civile italiano, cited above, 41 et seq.. 
This seems to be also the view taken by L. P. Comoglio, Le prove civili, cited above, 652, according to whom 
rebuttable presumptions imply a merely outward inversion of the onus of proof. In particular, the onus of 
proving the presumed fact is not shifted with the same object on the counterparty, but it rather ceases thanks 
to the exemption provided for by the law. The opposite party, on the other hand, bears the same onus of proof 
(to the contrary) that it would bear also in the absence of the presumption, being requested to give evidence 
of the facts which are able to hinder the efficacy of the presumed fact. 
33
  See G.A. Micheli, L’onere della prova, Padova, Cedam, 1966,  197. 
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wholly relied on from any evidential burden, as the evidence of the known fact has still to 
be furnished.  
 
2.2 ... and in the perspective of the relation with the ordinary rule on the burden of 
proof 
The choice between the theories referred to in the previous paragraph has not any real 
practical consequences in terms of the position of each party in the proceedings. 
Nevertheless, they raise the question of the interrelation between presumptions of law and 
the rule of the onus of proof. 
As is well known, according to this general rule,
34
 the plaintiff has to prove the constitutive 
facts of the right he relies on in the proceedings, while the defendant has to furnish 
evidence of the facts which his exception is based on. Such a rule is intended to avoid the 
non liquet
35
 by distributing the risk of the non-evidence between the parties. In fact,  the 
duty of deciding lies upon the judge even when he is not able to convince himself about the 
existence of the facts relevant within the proceedings. In doing so, it offers to the judge the 
criterion for a decision when the facts, on which the juridical effects claimed by one party 
depend, remain unknown (or, better, undemonstrated).  
From these initial considerations, it follows that presumptions and the rule on the onus of 
proof first of all diverge from the systematic point of view. 
While the former normally belong to the probative phase of the proceedings (i.e. to the 
phase of the forming of the judge’s conviction)36, the rule on the burden of proof is a rule 
of judgment. It operates after the end of the probative phase and only when the result of the 
latter was negative, i.e. the judge does not have enough probative elements furnished by 
the parties at his disposal. 
More particularly, when dealing with legal presumptions, it is possible to assert that their 
existence renders the ordinary rule on the burden of proof superfluous, in the extent to 
which the relevant facts in the proceedings are fixed according to the evaluation included 
                                                          
34
 “Onus probandi incumbit ei qui dicit”, which means that the burden of proof rests upon the party who 
asserts a certain fact. “C’est le grand principe qui règle la répartition de la charge de la preuve en justice”, R. 
Decottignies, Présomption en droit privé, 17 et seq.. Or, with another latinism that is often used to express 
the same rule: actori incumbit probatio. 
35
 Such formula, which literally means that ‘it is not clear’, refers to the absence of sufficient elements for the 
judge to decide. 
36
 This is, however, a generalization, because, as we will see later on, while it can be surely asserted with 
regard to presumptions of fact and rebuttable presumptions, it becomes questionable when dealing with 
irrebuttable presumptions. Their substantive nature as well as their efficacy makes the interpreter  incline 
towards a different view. 
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within the law. In this regard, while it seems to be obvious that legal presumptions 
derogate to the ordinary distribution of the onus of proof, it needs to be noted that there is 
no coincidence between the field of action covered by them and that one of other 
provisions which affect the ordinary distribution of the same onus as well. In other words, 
if it may be asserted that all legal presumptions affect the distribution of the burden of 
proof, not every distribution of this burden which is different from the general rule is the 
effect of a presumption
37
, as it was asserted during the ius commune. 
Indeed, the same result consisting in the alteration of the ordinary burden of proof can be 
reached through different legal as well as judicial mechanisms. In the first case, in view of 
the arrangement that the legislator wants to assign to the substantive interests in play and 
with the ratio of lightening the evidentiary position of one party through the simplification 
of the situation envisaged in the norm.      
The distinction between presumptions on the one hand, and other types of modification of 
the ordinary rule on the onus of proof on the other hand, is relevant in order to determine 
the object of the contrary proof that the inversion of the onus of proof puts on the 
counterparty. It has been argued, in this regard, that facing presumptions the counterparty 
has to furnish the contrary proof of a fact which is part of the constitutive elements of the 
relevant provision concerned and is presumed, rather than the “direct” evidence of an 
impeditive fact (i.e. a fact which is not part of the constitutive elements of the provision 
and is able to stop any effects of the same provision)
38
. 
In addition, while presumptions are normally requested to find their grounds in the id quod 
plerumque accidit (i.e. in the normal course of events), this is not the case  regarding a 
mere inversion of the burden of proof. 
                                                          
37
 About the distinction between presumptions iuris tantum and provisions laying down rules on the division 
of the burden of proof, compare Patti, Della prova testimoniale e delle presunzioni (artt. 2721-2729), cited 
above, 102 et seq. In his view, the former determine the change of the theme of proof, because they consider 
facts different from that one which normally produce the juridical effects. This is not the case when dealing 
with the second type of provisions, whose ratio, however, can be explained in the light of the normality of a 
certain situation as well, like for the presumptions of fact. In both of the cases, the party is relieved from 
giving evidence of a certain fact, on the one side because it is dispensed according to a particular rule on the 
distribution of the onus of proof, on the other side because the disputed fact is ascertained by virtue of a 
presumption. This having been said, the Author recognized that both the legal mechanisms affect the 
principle of the free evaluation of the proofs and both can be contrasted with the proof to the contrary. 
38
 In this way L.P. Comoglio, Le prove civili, terza edizione,  cited above.  
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However, similar to what we will see with regard to legal presumptions, the modification 
of the onus of proof has to be rational. This implies, as it has been highlighted
39
, taking 
into account the difficulties/impossibilities of proof that the other party – namely, the party 
who has to furnish the proof to the contrary - has to bear. Where, in particular, it is for this 
party to give the evidence of a negative fact, then the distribution of the onus of proof 
ceases to be a mechanism of proof, and it is able to integrate a mechanism of 
predetermination of the losing party. 
 
2.3 ‘Prima facie proof’, ‘pro-term truths’ 40 , ‘jurisprudential presumptions’: the 
modification of the ordinary division of the burden of proof as the effect of concepts 
other than presumptions of law 
A derogation from the general rule on the distribution of the onus probandi represents the 
main procedural effect of rebuttable presumptions of law
41
, in the extent to which they 
reverse the burden of proof. 
However, the same effect can arise from the substantial discipline of the matter, as well as 
from the operating of other mechanisms, such as the ‘prima facie proof’, the ‘pro term 
truths’ and the ‘jurisprudential presumptions’. These are solely some of the concepts which 
are similar to presumptions and result both from the judicial practice or from the doctrine 
within certain States. 
Having dealt with the relationship between presumptions and the onus of proof, it is 
suggested to define these categories at this point of the research, again under a merely 
functional perspective, in order to distinguish them from presumptions.  
The so-called prima facie proof represents a (jurisprudential) notion whose origin has to be 
found within the German system, and which is related to the prima facie evidence of the 
English law. 
Basically, the conditions which are to be met in order for this type of proof to apply are: 1) 
a party in a litigation meets difficulties in furnishing the direct proof; 2) it is possible to 
consider prima facie (i.e. at first sight) reached the proof according to certain rules of 
experience; 3) this, unless the counterparty is able to furnish proof to the contrary. Despite 
                                                          
39
 M. Taruffo, Presunzioni, inversioni, prova del fatto, Riv. Trim. Dir. Proc. Civ., 1992, 750, with special 
reference to the hypothesis in which the different distribution of the onus of proof is due to the judge and not 
to the law. 
40
 The so-called ‘verità interinali’ within the Italian doctrine. 
41
 With regard to irrebuttable presumptions, instead, it is more appropriate to speak of a release from the onus 
probandi. 
Chapter I 
 
 
 24 
the ordinary means of proof, its ratio is not permitting  the necessary proof to be reached, 
but rather allowing the judge to uphold a claim when it is in itself likely to be well-
grounded but difficult to prove
42
. 
In other countries, for instance within the Italian system, there were some applications of 
this type of proof by the jurisprudence, especially in the field of the Aquilian responsibility 
with reference to the culpa. In particular, in many proceedings regarding the compensation 
for damages,  the proof of the damaging fact has been considered as sufficient and on the 
basis of the latter, the culpa of the defendant has been presumed according to a rule of 
experience that a certain event is normally ascribable to the negligence of the defendant. In 
this way, the plaintiff is released from the onus of proving this negligence. 
For our purpose, it is not necessary to deepen the analysis of this concept, but rather to 
underline the boundary with presumptions (especially the legal ones)
43
. Indeed, despite a 
part of the German doctrine according to which the prima facie proof is the result of a 
presumption of law
44
, it is evident that the different source of the proof (the judge rather 
than the law), not to mention other aspects
45
, imposes the exclusion of such a conclusion. 
But even the thesis of the prima facie proof as the result of a presumption of fact is not 
convincing, as far as the argument of the different known fact (the rule of experience rather 
than the clues regarding the actual case) does not appear to be enough in order to identify a 
category different from presumptions
46
. In other words, if the concept of prima facie proof 
                                                          
42
 G. R. Pistolese, La prova civile per presunzioni e le c.d. massime di esperienza, Cedam, Padova, 1935, 15. 
On the same issue see also M. Taruffo, Presunzioni, inversioni, prova del fatto, cited above, 736 et seq., who 
considers the prima facie proof a modification/inversion of the onus of proof made by the judge instead of 
the law. 
43
 Boundary line which according to G.R. Pistolese, La prova civile per presunzioni e le c.d. massime di 
esperienza, cited above, 42-43, rested in the different nature of the known fact, which also affects the 
convincing of the judge and so the probative effects of the presumption, in the extent to which it keeps value 
only if the counterparty does not prove the inability of the experience to explain the concrete case.  
44
 In this regard, again see G.R. Pistolese, La prova civile per presunzioni e le c.d. massime di esperienza, 
cited above, 45, et seq., who explained – for the purpose of criticizing - that this view finds its basis in the 
nature of customary law assigned to the prima facie proof. 
45
 Such as the absence of a mandatory character. 
46
 Whereas this is the opinion of S. Patti, Della prova testimoniale e delle presunzioni (artt. 2721-2729), cited 
above, 92-94, according to whom in the prima facie proof the rule of experience represents the basis of the 
presumption (of fact) instead of the ‘grave, precise and concordant’ clues. Furthermore, the Author 
distinguished between the cited category and the ‘Anscheinsbeweis’ of the German experience, which would 
rather affect the evaluation of the proof: in this case the party has only to give evidence of the appearance of 
a certain (typical) situation. However, since he made reference to the rule of experience as the criterion on the 
basis of which the judge considers a fact as proved, the difference with the institute of the prima facie proof 
becomes unclear. Compare G.R.  Pistolese, La prova civile per presunzioni e le c.d. massime di esperienza, 
cited above, 42, on the issue. In his perspective, the prima facie proof is the result of a presumption. In 
particular, to be presumed would be the causal relationship between the known fact and the unknown cause. 
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is the result of a presumption, then there is not any logical reason to distinguish between 
the former and the normal result of the latter. 
The impression is that prima facie proof indicates a jurisprudential mechanism that is 
common in some sectors of the civil law, which determines the relief from the burden of 
proof for the plaintiff when dealing with a type-case, so that the fact that needs to be 
proved appears to be evident in the light of the experience. In this case, we do not have a 
change of the theme of proof, as the party is even released from giving evidence of the 
known fact. On the contrary, the persuasion of the judge is the result of a ‘likelihood 
judgment’, which is based on a rule of experience47. 
Doubt does exist about the utility of this category
48
, and the same remark holds true as 
regards the pro-term truths, in the extent to which there are not any differences worthy of 
special consideration in comparison with presumptions of law.  
According to some Authors, among the presumptions of law (in particular, the rebuttable 
ones) it is necessary to distinguish between the real presumptions and the improper 
presumptions. In the latter case, the law would not presume a fact on the basis of the 
existence of another one, according to the typical presumptive scheme, but it would 
consider as proved a fact as far as the proof to the contrary is not furnished
49
. The doctrine 
that has distinguished between proper and improper presumptions makes reference, for 
instance, to the bona fide presumption, as a case in which the law considers a certain fact 
as proved as long as it is not furnished proof to the contrary. In other words, the known fact 
is missing here, so that the provision seems not to reflect the normal course of events. 
The distinction is not meaningless. However, apart from the observation that the logical 
inference in presumptions of law very often ends up to be more an interpretative ratio than 
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 According to S. Patti, Della prova testimoniale e delle presunzioni (artt. 2721-2729), cited above, 122, the 
prima facie proof does not cause the inversion of the onus of proof, but rather a lowering of the degree of 
certainty related to the proof normally demanded,  the party being allowed to give evidence of the 
‘appearance’ of a certain (typical) situation. See also L.P. Comoglio, Le prove civili, terza edizione, cited 
above, 322, who assimilates jurisprudential presumptions and prima facie proof under the point-of-view of 
the results. The first ones are considered as the creation praeter legem of iuris tantum presumptions, which 
through the forming of judgment rules different from the one enshrined in Article 2697 of the Italian Civil 
Code, contributes to integrating the situation envisaged in the norm; pursuant to the second one, the burdened 
party is allowed to give evidence of the likelihood of the fact produced in the proceedings through 
convergent clues, while it is up to the counterparty to prove that the disputed fact is different from what 
appears or its inexistence. Both the jurisprudential mechanisms are however criticized as being a source of 
uncertainty. 
48
 This, also considering the elaboration of the similar concept of ‘jurisprudential presumption’, as we will 
see later in the same paragraph. 
49
 See in this way S. Patti, Della prova testimoniale e delle presunzioni (artt. 2721-2729), cited above, 95, 
with particular regard to the presumption of bona fide, where in his view the law considers a certain fact as 
proved as far as it is not furnished proof to the contrary. 
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the result of the crystallization of a rule of experience, it appears preferable to classify 
these provisions as merely legal modifications of the onus of proof or simply as 
presumptions.  
It has to be noted that the above-mentioned concepts are mostly of a pure civil law interest, 
while they do not seem to be echoed in the area of tax law. In the field of tax law, the 
scholars have focused on further concepts, among which is the fictions of law
50
. 
Within the Italian doctrine, the observation of the use of presumptions by the courts has led 
to the identification of the concept of jurisprudential presumptions, which are relatively 
common in the field of tax law and have been the object of the EUCJ’s analysis, as we will 
see later on
51
.  
This term refers to a sort of tertium genus
52
, which stands in between presumptions of fact 
and presumptions of law (the latter, fixed by particular provisions and without any 
possibility of interpretation by analogy)
53
. 
As a matter of fact, the type of presumptions at hand is not provided for by law, but at the 
same time it cannot be classified as a mere presumption of fact, as far as its typical effect is 
not the assessment of a disputed fact but rather the inversion of the burden of proof. 
Despite the absence of a legal foundation, it appears to have a general character: on the 
basis of the circumstance that normally a certain fact is the consequence of another one and 
in line with the previous jurisprudence, the judge considers the unknown disputed fact as 
proved without any real ascertainment pertaining to the concrete case, unless the 
counterparty is able to furnish the contrary proof. In practice, a jurisprudential presumption 
normally comes into being as a presumption of fact with regard to specific cases. Then, the 
constant use of a certain presumption, together with its detachment from the peculiarities 
of the concrete case, determine the typification of the presumption and the forming of a 
jurisprudential rule
54
. 
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 See infra, paragraph 3.2 of this Chapter. 
51
 In particular, in the case C-129/2000, Commission vs. Italy, which will be discussed in Chapter III, Section 
IV, when dealing with national presumptions under the perspective of EU law. 
52
 Contra M. Taruffo, Presunzioni (diritto processuale civile), in Enc. Giur., vol. XXIV, Roma, 1991, 1, who 
disagreed with this qualification, considering that jurisprudential presumptions and rebuttable presumptions 
of law share the same structure. 
53
 G. Verde, Le presunzioni giurisprudenziali, Foro It., 1971, V, 177 et seq..The Author pointed out the 
approach of the judge, who put a question of distribution of the burden of proof, rather than of conviction on 
the basis of circumstantial evidence. This, he demonstrated with several examples. Among the cases taken 
into account, the ones concerning the presumptions of gratuitousness of  housework done by live-in relatives. 
54
 In this way S. Patti, Della prova testimoniale e delle presunzioni (artt. 2721-2729), cited above, 87-92, 
with special reference to the responsibility ex lege aquilia for the defective goods, which follows in the text. 
The Author underlined the absence of an evaluation in terms of probability related to the presumed fact. 
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An example that is able to show how a jurisprudential presumption works concerns the 
responsibility of the manufacturer for the damages caused by his products. Ex lege aquilia, 
indeed – and before the introduction of the EU directive that regulates the onus of proof in 
the matter - the plaintiff had to give evidence of the constitutive elements of the 
responsibility, the culpable behaviour included. However, after the judgment given by the 
Italian Supreme Court in the Saiwa case
55
, where it was stated that the damage can be 
connected to the defective (i.e. negligent) manufacturing of the product as a consequence 
of the latter, by means of a logical-presumptive process, there were other decisions in 
which the manufacturer’s culpa was presumed without any real ascertainment in the 
concrete case. 
Hence, the mechanism under discussion is a jurisprudential creation, which however 
implies the relief from the burden of proof in favour of the party who benefits from the 
presumed fact, and the shift of the burden of proof on the other party that is still allowed to 
give evidence to the contrary. This is why it has been considered to be comparable to 
rebuttable presumptions of law
56
.  
In conclusion, the impression is that – like with prima facie proof - there is a shifting from 
the level of the forming of the judicial  persuasion to the one of the rules of judgment by 
the judge of the case, through a sort of abstraction from the concrete case and the use of 
rules of experience. However, being the persuasion uniform in all the type-cases, the free 
evaluation of the proof by the judge is affected. Furthermore, it cannot be disregarded that 
the judicial source of the mechanisms under discussion may raise the question of the 
compatibility with the legality principle
57
. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Moreover, the question is not tackled in terms of personal conviction, but rather of distribution of the burden 
of proof in the light of the reasonableness of the affirmed hypothesis.  
55
 Supreme Court No 1270 of the 25th May 1965. 
56
 S. Patti, Della prova testimoniale e delle presunzioni (artt. 2721-2729), cited above, 89. It is interesting 
that, as the Author observed, a similar phenomenon can be found within the French system, where also the 
jurisprudence “creates” presumptions facing difficulties of proof for certain categories of parties. For instance, 
in the proceedings between the victim of an accident and the insurance company of the person responsible, 
the latter is charged with the proof of the guarantee’s limitations. This, on the grounds of the difficulties of 
proving the content of the insurance company’s obligations by the injured party. L.P. Comoglio, Le prove 
civili, 2010, 322, qualifies jurisprudential presumptions as the praeter legem creation of iuris tantum 
presumptions, which integrate the substantive situation envisaged in the norm by identifying rules of 
judgment different from Art. 2697 of the Italian Civil Code.  
57
 Indeed, in some of the decisions where it is possible to identify jurisprudential presumptions, the solution 
to the case is justified in the light of the relevant legislation.  
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3. Probative effects of legal presumptions under the perspective of the counterparty 
 
3.1 The right to give proof to the contrary: the main criterion in order to draw a 
distinction between rebuttable and irrebuttable presumptions  
According to the perspective chosen, the analysis of presumption’s probative effects 
implies the consideration of the ‘second level’; namely, the position of the party to the 
disadvantage of whom the presumption of law operates. 
It is on this ground, indeed, that we gauge the main difference between the two types of 
legal presumptions, being the counterparty prevented from giving evidence to the contrary 
when dealing with irrebuttable presumptions. And it is still on this ground that we gather 
the different impact on the situation envisaged in the norm, which affects the reading of the 
presumption’s nature, if substantive or rather procedural. 
Irrespective of the interpretation regarding the main effect of legal presumptions
58
, there is 
no doubt that both rebuttable and irrebuttable presumptions affect the ordinary distribution 
of the burden of proof. However, in the second case, the party who does not benefit from 
the presumption is not allowed to rebut it, by giving evidence to the contrary. 
This is the sense of Article 1352, paragraph 2, of the French and Belgian Civil Codes, as 
well as of Article 2728, paragraph 2, of the Italian one, according to which it is not allowed 
to give evidence to the contrary against the presumptions on the basis of what the law 
states the nullity of certain acts or denies the judicial action, unless the law provides for it
59
. 
And, pursuant only to the former provision, save what is said on judicial oath and 
admission
60
. 
The meaning of the reference to the oath and the admission provided for by the last part of 
the article at hand in the Belgian and French Civil Code is not clear, and this is why it has 
been differently interpreted by the relevant doctrine in the past. 
In particular, while on the one hand it could mean that these means of proof can always be 
used in order to hinder an irrebuttable presumption, it might also be intended as confining 
the proof to the contrary against the latter only to them, or as specifying their probative 
                                                          
58
 Which has been dealt with in the previous paragraphs, see in particular paragraph 2. 
59
 In this case, however, the presumption loses its irrebuttable nature and it has to be classified as rebuttable 
or mixed.  
60
 Indeed, unlike the current Italian provision at hand, the above-mentioned text of Article 1352 makes safe 
not only the case in which the contrary proof is legally provided for, but also what the same code lays down 
in the matter of oath and confession: “sauf ce qui sera dit sur le serment et l’aveu judiciaires”. However, as 
observed in the text, taking also into consideration the relevant doctrine, this can be considered a difference 
of little importance in order to gather the characters of irrebuttable presumptions. 
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force and their nature of irrebuttable presumptions
61
. In fact, it is mostly interpreted in the 
sense that these means of proof can be opposed to presumptions even when irrebuttable. 
Since a presumption is fixed in favour of a certain party, it is argued, the latter can waive 
this treatment through oath or admission, unless the presumption is justified in the light of 
the public order or the necessity to avoid the fraud
62
. 
This having been specified, the focus is on the first part of the abovementioned provision, 
which is the same in the different civil codes taken into consideration so far. 
It includes two categories of irrebuttable presumptions, by distinguishing between: 
- presumptions on the foundation of what the law declares the nullity of 
certain acts; 
- presumptions on the ground of what the law prevents from taking legal 
action and thereby the examination of the claim by the judge. 
And it excludes the possibility to rebut these presumptions unless the law does not provide 
for this. 
Apparently, from this text it ensues that presumptions against which the proof to the 
contrary is denied represent the rule, whereas presumptions that can be rebutted are the 
exception
63
.  However, most of the Authors refer the second paragraph of Article 1352
64
 
only to irrebuttable presumptions, which are identified through a narrow definition and 
against which the rebutting evidence is drawn as an exception that needs to be fixed by the 
law. In this view, irrebuttable presumptions are ‘the exception’, whereas normally the 
counterparty is allowed to give evidence to the contrary
65
. 
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 The last interpretation results from the combined provisions of Articles 1350 and 1352. On this reservation 
R. Decottignies, Présomption en droit privé, cited above, 123 et seq.. 
62
 This seems to be the interpretation chosen by F. Laurent, Principes de droit civil, cited above, 640-642, 
according to whom the provision under discussion allows to give proof to the contrary against irrebuttable 
presumptions – i.e. the two types provided for by Article 1352 – apart from the case in which a presumption 
of public order is involved, for instance the presumption of res judicata. In the same way De Page, La preuve 
par présomptions, cited above, 966-967; R. Dekkers, Précis de droit civil belge, cited above, 421. 
63
 In this way H. De Page, La preuve par présomptions, cited above, 952. However, the Author then 
narrowed this opinion to the hypothesis in which the presumption belongs to the two categories laid down in 
Art. 1352.  
64
 In order to facilitate the grasp of the considerations laid down in the text, here is the (French) formula of 
Art. 1352: “La présomption légale dispense de toute preuve celui au profit duquel elle existe. Nulle preuve 
n’est admise contre la présomption de la loi, lorsque, sur le fondement de cette présomption, elle annule 
certains actes ou dénie l’action en justice, à moins qu’elle n’ait réservé la preuve contraire et sauf ce qui 
sera dit sur le serment et l’aveu judiciaires”. 
65
 In this sense, C. Lessona, Accesso giudiziale, intervento istruttorio, presunzioni, cited above, 188, who 
argued from the legal provision at hand and moreover from the principle that the proof to the contrary is by 
rights. As a consequence, the iuris et de iure presumption, which is considered to be a proof from the relevant 
legislation, is exceptional, the proof to the contrary being inadmissible. Accordingly, L. Ramponi, La teoria 
generale delle presunzioni nel diritto civile italiano, cited above, 166 who deduced that the presumption of 
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It follows from this interpretation that if there is not any provision of law to the contrary, 
then the presumption has to be considered as rebuttable. On the other hand, reasons of 
constitutional compatibility together with the consideration that rebuttable presumptions 
are the majority, lead to support this conclusion.  
Concluding on irrebuttable presumptions, it is undoubtedly possible to assert that even 
though the formula used by the cited civil codes is not coincident, it clearly refers to legal 
provisions where the presumed fact is fixed on the basis of the sign-fact and in an 
irreversible way, so that the party who suffers the presumption is not allowed to 
demonstrate the contrary and to hinder the juridical consequences fixed by the legislator on 
the basis of the presumption itself.   
 
3.2 On the distinction between irrebuttable presumptions of law and fictions of law 
Traditionally, the distinction between fictions of law and irrebuttable presumptions of law 
has been deemed to rest in the fact that while irrebuttable presumptions respond to the id 
quod plerumque accidit, fictions reflect the equalizing of two facts that is not based upon 
reality
66
. 
For instance, the presumption of conception during a marriage, when the birth of the child 
happens after 180 days from the celebration of the matrimony and before 300 days from 
                                                                                                                                                                                
law admits, as a rule, the proof to the contrary from rational principles besides positive law. In particular, the 
presumption being based on a calculus of probability, it would be irrational denying the proof intended to 
show that the abstract probability does not operate in the specific case. See also R. Decottignies, Présomption 
en droit privé, cited above, 94 et seq., to whom I refer for an in-depth examination of the second paragraph of 
Article 1352, especially as regards the interpretation of the two hypotheses of presumptions listed in the text. 
See also F. Laurent, Principes de droit civil, cited above: “Donc la preuve contraire est la règle, et 
l’exclusion de la preuve contraire est l’exception. (…) la règle que nous déduisons du texte de l’article 1352 
découle des principes généraux de droit ; en effet, elle forme le droit commun, toute preuve admet la preuve 
contraire”. Cf. E. Brunet, J. Servais, C. Resteau, Présomptions, R.P.D.B., 1951, 229.  
66
 “Unde fictio nunquam convenit cum veritate, praesumtio vero saepe”, meaning that the fiction never 
responds to the truth or real facts, while the presumption often does. Menochius, lib. I, q. VIII, 9 and 10. See 
Ramponi, La teoria generale delle presunzioni nel diritto civile italiano, cited above, 50 et seq., where there 
are also many exemplifications. The Author pointed out that fictions find their basis only in the law, they 
belong to the singular law and so analogy is not admitted. Moreover, the proof to the contrary cannot be 
furnished. Compare also C. Forier, Présomptions et Fictions, Les présomptions et les fictions en droit, (ed.) 
Perelman et Forier, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1974, 8 et seq., according to whom “Présomptions et fictions, si elles 
présentent une certaine analogie du point de vue de la vérité, ressortissent pourtant à des catégories 
distinctes. Les présomptions se rattachent à la théorie de la preuve, les fictions à la théorie de l’extension de 
la norme en droit, voire à celle de la création ou de la légitimation de celle-ci”. Contra, M. Taruffo, 
Presunzioni (diritto processuale civile), cited above, 1, who belittled the difference under discussion, by 
underlining that both fictions and irrebuttable presumptions of law regulate the situation envisaged in the 
norm “without explicitly asserting the presumed or artificial truth of a fact”. F. Carnelutti, Sistema di diritto 
processuale civile, I, Padova, Cedam, 1936, 816, distinguished irrebuttable presumptions and fictio legis by 
using the binomial ‘natural equivalence-juridical equivalence’. 
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the dissolution or annulment of the same matrimony
67
 represents an irrebuttable 
presumption of law. It is clearly a provision based on a rule of experience, according to 
which, if a child is born during a period of time close to the marriage, then he is likely to 
have been conceived within the matrimony. 
This is not the case, for example, where the law provides that the term of a contract, which 
did not take place because of the party who was interested in its not-realization, is 
considered to have occurred
68
. As a matter of fact, here the legislator considers to have 
happened a certain fact (i.e. the subject of the term) that certainly did not happen. 
However, since both the concepts share the same result in terms of substantive juridical 
effects, the question arises as to whether it has any sense to distinguish between them
69
. In 
particular, it seems to be decisive the objection that since the counterparty is not allowed to 
give proof to the contrary
70
 – neither with fictions nor with irrebuttable presumptions - then 
it may happen that in the concrete case even the irrebuttable presumption does not reflect 
the reality. Consider the previous example: it might be that the conception happened before 
or after the marriage (i.e. outside it). Nevertheless, if the birth takes place within the 
abovementioned period of time, the conception is considered to have occurred during the 
matrimony. And, this is the point, without any possibility of proving the opposite. 
Moreover, several Authors are of the opinion that irrebuttable presumptions of law cannot 
be considered presumptions in a technical sense, being rather more appropriate their 
classification as a way of regulation of certain situations envisaged in the norms
71
. 
These considerations show how, to a certain extent, even irrebuttable presumptions are 
able to assume the character of fictio legis and to have de facto the effect of equalizing two 
facts. Yet, it is possible to still justify a distinction based on the ratio of the provision, and 
on the circumstance that irrebuttable presumptions of law are requested to be based on a 
rule of experience. Above all, as it will be clear later on when dealing with taxation, the 
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 Article 232, paragraph 1, of the Italian Civil Code. It is a provision established by other civil codes, in 
accordance with a favour for the legitimate status of the child and in order to guarantee certainty to such 
status. Cf. Article 315 of the Belgian Civil Code (présomption de paternité). 
68
 Article 1359 of the Italian Civil Code. A similar provision is included in many other European civil codes. 
69
 A. De Cupis, Sulla distinzione tra presunzioni legali assolute e finzioni giuridiche, Giust. Civ., 1982, 227 
et seq., who is very critical of the use of fictions. This, in particular, because of the irrationality of the 
provision fixing a fiction, which in the perspective of the simplification creates a legal truth that is in contrast 
with the real truth. In his view, it would be more appropriate using the principle of analogy instead of 
introducing fictions. 
70
 Contra C. Lessona, Accesso giudiziale, intervento istruttorio, presunzioni, cited above, 118, who agreed 
with Ramponi in saying that identity of the effects does not imply identity of content and structure. 
71
 M. Taruffo, Presunzioni (diritto processuale civile), cited above, 1, according to whom legal presumptions 
are only the rebuttable ones. 
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distinction appears to keep value in order to identify the parameters, in view of which their 
compatibility with the relevant constitutional principles has to be evaluated. 
 
3.3 Main aspects of the proof to the contrary. The ‘mixed’ presumptions of law 
Unlike irrebuttable presumptions, facing a rebuttable presumption the counterparty is 
allowed to give proof to the contrary, thereby avoiding the related effects. 
It has to be firstly noted that the counterparty is always allowed to give evidence of the 
inexistence of the known fact, which is the base of the presumption of law, being irrelevant 
in this regard the nature of the mechanism, if rebuttable or irrebuttable. 
Secondly, it is noteworthy that the proof under discussion can be in abstracto furnished 
with every means of proof, including presumptions of fact
72
. 
Above all, the content of the contrary proof needs to be analysed. The object of this proof, 
in fact, is not the reasoning in itself. It can rather concern the (in)existence of the presumed 
fact or the existence of circumstances conflicting with the latter
73
.  
Where such circumstances are strictly set out within the relevant legal provision, so that 
the proof to the contrary cannot be freely furnished, the presumption is classified by some 
scholars as ‘mixed presumption of law’, with a concept that refers also to the legal 
regulation of the means of proof which can be used. In practice, while fixing the 
presumption, the legislator restricts the right of the counterparty to give proof to the 
contrary, by confining it to certain circumstances laid down within the same provision or to 
certain means of proof. 
While to our purpose the classification of this type of presumptions – whether irrebuttable 
or, as it seems to be more appropriate, still rebuttable – is of little importance, it is 
significant that the limits set to the contrary proof’s object affect the judgment of 
compatibility under the national and under the EU point of view as well, as far as they 
restrict the taxpayer’s possibility of defence. Thus, as we will see, the parameters used in 
order to evaluate presumptions of law lead to different outcomes depending also on the 
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 Among the others, see L. Ramponi, La teoria generale delle presunzioni nel diritto civile italiano, cited 
above, 167 et seq.;  
73
 According to C. Lessona, Accesso giudiziale, intervento istruttorio, presunzioni, cited above, 243, it is not 
a proof against the presumption in itself, being not possible to dispute in generic terms the correctness of the 
consequences inferred from the known facts by the legislator. On the contrary, the party has to give evidence 
of the circumstances that in the specific case demonstrate that the presumption is not justified. In practice, as 
explained by L. Ramponi, La teoria generale delle presunzioni nel diritto civile italiano, cited above, 167, it 
is possible to prove that in the pending case the consequence from the known fact cannot be deducted, or that 
the assumed relation between the latter and the unknown fact does not exist. On the contrary, it is not allowed 
to give evidence that the consequence is faulty or the relation is illogical. 
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extent to which the counterparty – who, obviously, in the field of taxation coincides with 
the taxpayer - is allowed to rebut the presumption or he is not. 
 
4. Probative effects of presumptions of law under the perspective of the judge 
The third level of the analysis on the probative effects of presumptions of law concerns 
their efficacy in relation to the general principle of free evaluation of the evidence by the 
judge. As a matter of fact, this principle is limited facing presumptions of law, the judge 
being obliged to consider the relevant facts ascertained as they are fixed within the law and 
to rule on the basis of it
74
. In other words, the presumption of law (regardless of its 
rebuttable or irrebuttable nature) imposes the judge to consider the unknown fact as proved 
when the evidence of the known fact is furnished by the party who benefits from the 
presumption. 
The limitation to the principle cited above is obviously absolute when dealing with 
irrebuttable presumptions, since the unknown fact has to be considered as proved by the 
judge and productive of juridical effects without any possibility to admit the counterparty 
of demonstrating its inexistence. By contrast, when the counterparty is allowed to rebut the 
presumption, the judge will evaluate the proof to the contrary without any particular 
restrictions
75
. However, in the lack of the proof to the contrary, the judge has to hold the 
unknown fact as proved on the basis of the presumptive provision, without any possibility 
of considering the same fact not sufficiently proved or asking the party who benefits from 
the presumption for further proof. 
As discussed further in the next paragraph, this effect of ‘legal proof’, meaning the 
limitations on the free evaluation by the judge, is what distinguishes presumptions of law 
from presumptions of fact under the perspective of the effects. Clearly, it is a mere 
corollary of their different source. 
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 All legal presumptions share the same judicial aim, which is to reduce the discretion of the judge in the 
valuation of the proofs by simplifying the decision on questions of fact, according to C. Lessona, Accesso 
giudiziale, intervento istruttorio, presunzioni, cited above, 135. 
75
 In this case, the free evaluation refers not only to the sole means of proof, but rather to the situation as a 
whole, since the judge has to decide if the presumption has been overcome. See S. Patti, Della prova 
testimoniale e delle presunzioni (artt. 2721-2729), cited above, 110 et seq. The Author underlined that when 
the counterproof is not furnished, the rebuttable presumption of law has the same role of the onus of proof as 
rule of judgment, being in both the circumstances the principle of the free persuasion of the judge inoperative. 
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4.1 The effect of ‘legal proof’ as a criterion to distinguish between presumptiones iuris 
and presumptiones hominis 
Unlike what has been said as regards presumptions of law, the free evaluation of the proof 
operates when dealing with presumptions of fact, which “are left to the insight and 
carefulness of the judge"
76
. 
This is why in Article 1352 of the French and Belgian civil codes
77
 and in Article 2729 of 
the Italian one
78
, the legislator lays down the conditions of their admissibility
79
, which 
consist of an evaluation: 
a) of their seriousness, precision, concurrence; 
and in addition that  
b) the pending case falls within the cases in which the oral evidence is 
admitted by the law. 
Thus, the probative effects of presumptions hominis are not directly fixed by the law but 
rather left to the prudent valuation of the judge. Nonetheless, the legislator does not waive 
to establish some criteria in order to avoid arbitrary decisions; taking into consideration, 
moreover, that the error of judgement seems to be normally censurable with the cassation 
appeal
80
. 
Actually, only one of the two criteria mentioned above – namely, the conditions provided 
for the oral evidence (a) - seems to embody a real requisite for the admission of the means 
of proof under discussion. Whereas the second one – the three requirements that have to be 
met by the presumption (b) - rather concerns its efficacy 
81
. From this perspective, after 
having ascertained that in the pending case the oral evidence would be admissible, the 
judge has to examine the presumption hominis and verify its seriousness, precision and 
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 On presumptions of fact see M. Taruffo, Certezza e probabilità nelle presunzioni, Foro it., 84 et seq., 
especially with regard to the presumptive inference. The difficulties in classifying under the same concept 
legal presumptions and presumptions of fact are pointed out by G. Fabbrini Tombari, Note in tema di 
presunzioni legali, Riv. Trim. Dir. Proc. Civ., 1991, 917. 
77
 Pursuant to which “Les présomptions qui ne sont point établies par la loi sont abandonnées aux lumière et 
à la prudence du magistrat, qui ne doit admettre que des présomptions graves, précise et concordantes, et 
dans les cas seulement où la loi admet les preuves testimoniales, à moins que l’acte ne soit attaquée pour 
cause de fraude ou de dol”. 
78
 Pursuant to which “Le presunzioni non stabilite dalla legge sono lasciate alla prudenza del giudice, il 
quale non deve ammettere che presunzioni gravi, precise, concordanti. Le presunzioni non si possono 
ammettere nei casi in cui la legge esclude la prova per testimoni”. 
79
 Critical of the limitations set for presumptions hominis A. Coniglio, Le presunzioni nel processo civile, 
cited above, 209, because they represent restrictions to the free evaluation of the judge. 
80
 In order to verify if the reasoning is coherent and logical. R. Mougenot, La preuve, cited above, 285. See R. 
Lupi, Metodi induttivi e presunzioni nell’accertamento tributario, Milano,  Giuffrè, 1988, 23 et seq. 
81
 See L. Ramponi, La teoria generale delle presunzioni nel diritto civile italiano, cited above, 257 . Contra 
A. Coniglio, Le presunzioni nel processo civile, cited above, 210; C. Lessona, Accesso giudiziale, intervento 
istruttorio, presunzioni, cited above, 312. 
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concurrence, being such requisites necessary in order to ascribe it the value of full proof. 
Hence, presumptions of fact: (a) apply only when the testimonial evidence would be 
admissible and (b) they are able to give evidence of the unknown fact if the three requisites 
concerning the degree of probability – rectius, reliability or plausibility - are fulfilled. 
Such an interpretation is not consistent with the terms of the law, which explicitly speaks 
of admissibility – or even exclusion, in the Italian formula82 - in both of the cases. 
In any event, in practice the issue under discussion does not seem to affect the evaluation 
of the presumption of fact by the judge, but if ever the logical moment within the legal 
proceedings in which the consideration of the two conditions is placed
83
. Furthermore, 
unlike other types of (direct) proof, with regard to presumptions hominis it is difficult to 
distinguish between the phase of the admission and the one of the valuation.  
Irrespective of this, it is evident that, in order to consider the unknown fact as proved, both 
of the conditions laid down in the above-mentioned articles have to be fulfilled. When this 
happens, the degree of certainty resulting from the presumptions hominis cannot be 
considered as being lower than the one offered by the direct proof
84
. 
 
4.1.1 Presumptions of fact: requisites for admission  
It is now necessary to briefly direct attention to the conditions referred to at the end of the 
previous paragraph. 
In this regard, while the reference to the cases in which the oral evidence is admitted does 
not raise any particular problems, as they are listed within the relevant articles of the civil 
codes, the meaning of the three adjectives provided for by the first part of Articles 1352 
and 2729 cited above needs to be specified. 
Firstly, the seriousness is generally intended as referring to the degree of probability of the 
presumption. In the sense that it has to be such probability that the judge is persuaded 
about; that is, the (moral)
85
 certainty of the (unknown) fact relevant within the proceedings. 
Secondly, the precision seems to concern the logical relation between the known fact and 
the unknown fact. Being in abstracto possible to infer the same consequence from different 
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 See Art. 2729, para. 2, of the Italian Civil Code. 
83
 I.e. the moment of the evaluation of the possibility to admit the proof rather than of the valuation regarding 
its efficacy. 
84
 As it has been already underlined at the beginning of this chapter, dealing with the distinction between 
direct and indirect means of proof. See, among the others, A. Coniglio, Le presunzioni nel processo civile, 
cited above, 224. 
85
 L. Ramponi, La teoria generale delle presunzioni nel diritto civile italiano, cited above, 297 et seq. 
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circumstances, this relation has to be unequivocal, so that the fact that needs to be 
ascertained represents the only possible effect – or at least the most plausible - of the 
known fact.  
In the end, both of these requites boil down to the same concept, which concerns the 
rational plausibility of the presumption, in terms of suitability in indicating specifically the 
unknown fact without either any doubts nor contradictions. 
Lastly, the legislator demands the concordance between the various presumptions. If the 
sense of this requisite might appear quite obvious, especially when there is more than one 
presumption regarding the same unknown fact, it has nonetheless been the object of 
uncertainties, particularly within the less recent doctrine. The main question can be 
summed up as follows: may one presumption of fact be enough in order to consider the 
unknown fact as proved, or instead the reference within the law to concordant 
presumptions implies the necessity of more than one? In this regard, unlike what has been 
submitted by some French Authors
86
, a not-merely-literal interpretation seems preferable, 
according to which the provision under discussion does not request the existence of more 
than one presumption of fact, but simply demands, in such an event, for them to not be in 
conflict
87
. 
 
4.1.2 Some remarks on the definition of presumptions hominis in Article 1353 of the 
French and Belgian Civil Codes 
Pursuant to Article 1353 of the French and Belgian Civil Codes, "Les présomptions qui ne 
sont point établies par la loi, sont abandonnées aux lumières et à la prudence du magistrat, 
qui ne doit admettre que des présomptions graves, précises et concordantes, et dans les cas 
seulement où la loi admet les preuves testimoniales, à moins que l'acte ne soit attaqué pour 
cause de fraude ou de dol”. 
Unlike the equivalent Italian formula, the text  mentioned above contains, in the last part, a 
reference to the case in which a certain act is impugned because of fraud or deception. The 
same reference was included in the pre-unitary Italian codes, but it has not been inserted 
either in the Civil Code of 1865 nor in the one of 1942. 
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  R. J. Pothier, Trattato delle obbligazioni, cited above,  122. 
87
 See L. Ramponi, La teoria generale delle presunzioni nel diritto civile italiano, cited above, 313. It has 
been observed that the mention of the presumption is not technical. It should be rather read as referring to the 
known fact – namely, the base of the presumption - as it is very possible to face different (proved) 
circumstances from which a certain unknown fact can be inferred. In this sense, C. Forier, Présomptions et 
Fictions, cited above, 10. On the distinction between presumption and clue, see A. Coniglio, Le presunzioni 
nel processo civile, cited above, 201 et seq.  
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A literal interpretation would at first glance induce the thinking that in the hypotheses of 
fraud or deception the judge is allowed to admit presumptions hominis even when the law 
does not admit the oral evidence. However, this interpretation is in contrast with the law – 
namely, Article 1348 - pursuant to which in the matter the oral evidence is admitted
88
. 
Another interpretative option then would be to consider that in the cases under discussion, 
while the oral evidence is admitted, the presumption is not. But it would be difficult to get 
the ratio of such an exclusion, given the fact that in these cases, more than in others, the 
use of presumptive criteria is important for the ascertainment of the facts.  
Ultimately,  an interpretation that would refer the clause at hand to the three requisites 
listed in the first part of the article has to be rejected, in the sense that when an act is 
contested on the basis of the fraud or the deception, then the presumption hominis can be 
used irrespective of the fulfilment of those conditions. This would mean obliterating the 
fundamental parameter of plausibility that each presumption of fact is requested to meet. 
The foregoing considerations have brought the majority of the scholars to argue that the 
formula at hand has been included in Article 1353 by the legislator ad abundantiam, 
without having any particular meaning in the context
89
. So that, for our purpose, it is 
certainly possible to assert that there are not any relevant differences between the 
definition of presumption of fact included in the civil codes so far considered.  
 
4.1.3 Presumptions of fact: final remarks 
As  has been pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, since the perspective taken in this 
dissertation is that of the relation between legal systems, presumptions hominis are not 
(directly) relevant to our purpose. Hence, the focus of the research is on presumptions of 
law, while the analysis of the presumptions of fact, which concern more precisely the 
ascertainment of a certain fact in a concrete case, is carried out in the extent to which it is 
functional to the rest. 
Notwithstanding that the legislator pools the two types of presumptions under the same 
formula of Articles 1350 (French and Belgian Civil Codes) and 2727 (Italian Civil Code), 
they lie on a different level. Indeed, far from being the result of the national legislators’ 
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 See: E. Picard, N. D’Hoffschmidt and J. De Le Court, Présomption, cited above, 819. “Cette reserve ne 
peut pas être entendue dans le sens d’une restriction de la preuve testimoniale, ni, avec des auteurs, qui 
s’écartent en cela de l’opinion générale, comme une extension de cet article”.  
89
 See L. Ramponi, La teoria generale delle presunzioni nel diritto civile italiano, cited above, 288, where 
also many references to the French doctrine and the different positions on the issue. Cf. E. Picard, N. 
D’Hoffschmidt and J. De Le Court, Présomption, cited above, 1904, 819. 
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choice, presumptions of fact rather pertain to the acting of the judge and, when dealing 
with tax law, also of the tax administration. This is why, as we will see later on, they 
become relevant only in the extent to which their (constant) application is able to embody a 
breach of EU Law, for which the responsibility always lies on the Member State involved.  
In the light of the foregoing, it is ultimately worthy of attention the issue of the ‘proof to 
the contrary’ that the party is allowed to give facing a presumption hominis. 
In this regard, it has to be specified that the use of the term “proof to the contrary” is a 
simplification, since technically there is not an inversion of the onus of proof. As a 
consequence, it is not possible to discuss  a legal onus to give evidence to the contrary on 
the party who suffers from the presumption hominis.  
Besides this terminological remark, it has to be underlined that a substantial aspect 
distinguishes the subject of the proof to the contrary when dealing with presumptions 
hominis in comparison to presumptions of law. In the latter case, the party is not allowed to 
give evidence of the unreliability of the presumption, being the inference the result of a 
legislative choice. On the contrary, in the former case, the same party can dispute the 
reasonableness of the presumption, namely the likelihood of the presumed fact by 
contesting the plausibility of the reasoning
90
. Obviously, as with legal presumptions, it is 
always also possible to demonstrate that the circumstance at the basis of the presumption 
does not exist or furnish elements supporting the non-existence of the presumed fact. 
 
5. The nature of presumptions of law: introduction to the issue     
The analysis of legal presumptions’ probative effects carried out so far - even in 
comparison to presumptions hominis - permits the questioning of their nature, if 
substantive or rather procedural and to express some considerations. 
Notwithstanding this may be at first glance considered a merely theoretical issue, on the 
contrary, various practical consequences may depend on the answer held.  
The reference is, in particular, to the repercussion on the temporal effects of a provision 
laying down a presumption, on the parameters in the light of which the constitutional 
compatibility of the relevant presumption is to be examined, and lastly on the types of 
errors that may be claimed before the Supreme Court. 
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 R. Decottignies, Présomption en droit privé, cited above, 266: “L’adversaire peut librement combattre la 
vraisemblance qui s’attache à un tel moyen de preuve”. This often happens within administrative 
proceedings. 
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As a matter of fact, if a substantive nature is assigned to a certain presumption of law, then 
the legislation enforceable will be the one that was in force at the time when the relevant 
fact or the act took place. Differently, if it has a procedural nature, the legislation in force 
at the time of the proceedings will apply. 
Moreover, the distinction at hand is relevant in view of the evaluation of constitutional 
compatibility of the presumptive provision concerned. For instance, in tax law the 
substantive nature of the presumption would imply that this evaluation is to be developed 
in the light of the ability to pay principle, while the procedural nature would demand an 
analysis focused on the observance of the right of defence and to a fair trial. 
Finally, the nature of the presumption is able to affect the type of error that can be claimed 
before the Supreme Court, where normally only objections on a point of law may be raised. 
Since presumptions of law clearly find their source within the legislation, this question 
seems to be without any real concrete interest, being, in any case, always possible to appeal 
a violation of the relevant provision before the Court. 
The aspects mentioned so far represent mere exemplifications and simplifications of the 
issues that may arise from the nature assigned to presumptions. The aim is to underline the 
significance of the question, which in this paragraph is only posed. Indeed, as the 
perspective touches these issues in terms of relevant problems and possible solutions, they 
will be dealt with when dealing with presumptions from the fiscal point of view. 
 
5.1  Main theories on the nature of legal presumptions 
This having been premised, within the doctrine it is possible to identify two main positions 
on the nature of presumptions of law. 
Before analyzing them, however, a further observation is necessary. As a matter of fact, 
when dealing with irrebuttable presumptions of law, it is difficult not to recognize their 
substantive nature. As a consequence, the dispute on the nature of legal presumptions 
mainly concerns the rebuttable ones. 
Not much differently from what has been asserted about fictions, irrebuttable presumptions 
can be considered as a way of regulating a given situation in a norm. This, in order to fulfil 
certain interests that will be considered when dealing with taxation, is at any rate mostly 
from a perspective of simplification. In this event,  the party against whom the irrebuttable 
presumption operates is not allowed to give evidence to the contrary, and de facto the 
legislator regulates a certain situation. There are procedural effects deriving from the 
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irrebuttable presumptions also, if we only consider that the judge is obliged to keep the 
presumed fact as proved, and the party who benefits from the presumption is released from 
giving evidence of the latter. However, these consequences can be considered as a 
corollary – thus, a sort of secondary effect - of the main effect, which is exactly the 
regulation of the matter by means of a particular legislative technique
91
.  
This cannot be asserted for certain with regard to rebuttable presumptions, in the extent to 
which the impact on the burden of proof that is their principal effect may lead the 
interpreter to believe that they have a procedural nature, as means of persuasion or 
evaluation of the judge
92
. 
On the contrary, several Authors have supported the substantive nature even of rebuttable 
presumptions, which are defined as being the result of a legislative technique aimed at 
simplifying the discipline of a certain situation
93
. In this perspective, the role of the 
inversion of the onus of proof is belittled, while the focus is on the effects with regard to 
the material discipline of a certain situation, in the absence of the proof to the contrary. In 
fact, it is argued, the legislator fixes the regulation of the case, thereby affecting the 
situation envisaged in the norm and most of all binding the judge to the effects established 
a priori within the provision, unless the proof to the contrary is furnished. 
This theory has had the merit of highlighting the substantive effects that rebuttable 
presumptions of law may have. But it must be borne in mind that such effects occur insofar 
as the proof to the contrary is not given. 
At any rate – and referring to the next chapter for further considerations - since legal 
presumptions have been traditionally set within the theory of proof, the question of their 
nature has to be tackled by appreciating also their role within the legal proceedings (and 
administrative proceedings, in the field of taxation), which cannot be completely sacrificed 
in the name of the undoubted substantive effects  of  presumptions. 
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 In this sense, ex multis, M. Taruffo, Presunzioni (diritto processuale civile), cited above,  C. Lessona, 
Accesso giudiziale, intervento istruttorio, presunzioni, cited above, 180; Contra, however, R. Decottignies, 
Présomption en droit privé, cited above, 92.  
92
 Compare R. DEcottignies, Présomption en droit privé; A. Coniglio, Le presunzioni nel processo civile, 
cited above, 50 et seq. 
93
 Ex multis L. Ramponi, La teoria generale delle presunzioni nel diritto civile italiano, cited above, 60; L.P. 
Comoglio, Le prove civili, terza edizione, cited above, 653. 
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6. Presumptions and common law systems: is there an autonomous common law 
concept of presumption? 
Having dealt so far with the concept of (legal) presumption by reference to some of the EU 
Member States’ representative of the civil law systems, the question arises as to whether a 
common law system, like the United Kingdom, shares the same concept or on the contrary 
a different and autonomous notion needs to be identified. In the first case, indeed, would it 
be possible to label a common concept of legal presumption within the European context, 
on the grounds of then analyzing the EU approach to the latter in fiscal law. 
When dealing with this issue – besides the Anglo-Saxon’s doctrine tendency to deal with 
the law of evidence either in civil and criminal proceedings at the same time by underlying 
the main differences – difficulties lie with the different terminology used at times, which 
mostly reflects the different operation of the civil trial, as compared to the continental one. 
However, the terminological differences might be misleading, being necessary to verify if 
they turn  into substantial differences. 
For our purpose, it is of interest to investigate only three main aspects, i.e. 1) the principles 
governing the distribution of the burden of proof; 2) the ‘degree’ requested in order to 
satisfy it; and, above all, 3) the category of presumptions, in terms of what they  refer to 
and how they are classified. 
 
6.1 A general overview on the burden and standard of proof 
 
6.1.1 The distinction between evidential burden and legal burden of proof 
The analysis of the rules governing the distribution of the burden of proof is inevitably 
affected by the peculiarities of the proceedings in the common law systems. In particular, 
the division between an initial phase regarding the submission of the case and a subsequent 
stage imposes a distinguishing between the so-called evidential burden from the legal one. 
In fact, the above distinction seems to be more suited  to criminal proceedings, where the 
judge is called to decide if the evidence is such as to justify the submission to the court of a 
certain case or to withdraw an issue from the jury
94
. Because nowadays the jury trial in 
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 More in particular, A. Keane, The Modern Law of Evidence, 8
th
 edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2010, 80, identifies two hypotheses in which the evidential burden has to be considered by the court: a) at the 
commencement of the trial in order to determine which party starts; b) during the trial, when the judge states 
if the evidence adduced is enough for the purpose of leaving the issue before the tribunal of fact. After that, 
irrespective of the decision of the judge – in the sense of withdrawing the issue from the jury or allowing it to 
go before the tribunal of fact – the consideration of the evidential burden becomes irrelevant. At this point, 
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civil proceedings is rare, the role of the evidential burden appears to have mostly lost its 
relevance.  
It is defined as the obligation on a party to adduce sufficient evidence on a fact in issue in 
order to justify, as a possibility, a finding in his favour by the jury, and thereby to lead the 
judge to submit the issue to the tribunal of fact. If the submission takes place, then it is up 
to the jury to decide whether or not the fact has been proved; on the contrary, if the 
evidence adduced by the party who bears the evidential burden is not enough, then the 
judge withdraws the issue from the jury, directing them to return a finding on that issue – 
or, depending on the circumstances, on the whole case - in favour of the other party
95
. 
In any event, the discharge of the evidential burden places upon the adversary the 
obligation – defined as provisional burden – to furnish the counter proof, in order to 
convince the jury in his favour.  
When dealing with civil law proceedings without a jury, which currently are the norm in 
the English system, “rarely, if ever, should a judge (...) entertain a submission of no case, 
although (...) there may be some flaw of fact or law of such a nature as to make it entirely 
obvious that the claimant’s case must fail, and the determination at that stage may save 
significant costs”96. 
In the light of the foregoing, for our purpose the second kind of burden, namely the 
concept of legal burden, appears of more interest. It refers to the ‘obligation imposed on a 
party by a rule of law to prove a fact in issue’97, with the consequence that if the same 
party fails to discharge that burden according to the standard required
98
, then he will lose 
on that particular issue.   
Not differently from what we have seen with regard to the civil law systems, the general 
rule on the distribution of the burden of proof between the parties to the action, falls to 
become a rule of judgment, with the aim of avoiding the non liquet
99
. In other words, when 
                                                                                                                                                                                
the legal burden counts. He says: “So far as the court is concerned, the evidential burden requires no further 
consideration; the only burden remaining at this stage is the legal burden”.  
95
 See A. Keane, The Modern Law of Evidence, cited above, 79 et seq., who observes that normally a party 
bearing the legal burden on a certain fact at the beginning of the proceedings also bears the evidential one, 
although this is not always the case. 
96
 A. Keane, The Modern Law of Evidence, cited above, 39, by reference to what has been held by the Court 
of Appeal in Benham Ltd v Kythira Investments Ltd. Diversely, in civil cases tried with a jury “the judge has 
a discretion whether to rule on a submission of no case to answer without requiring the defendant to elect to 
call no evidence (…)”.  
97
 A. Keane, The Modern Law of Evidence, cited above, 77. 
98
 Which, in civil proceedings, is “on the balance of probabilities”, as I will clarify in the ensuing text.  
99
 Compare, in this regard, A. Keane, The Modern Law of Evidence, cited above, 78, who recalls the case 
Stephens v Cannon ([2005] EWCA Civ 222), where the Court summarized the conditions under which the 
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the facts in issue have not been proved by the parties, so that the judge is not in the position 
to make a finding, he will decide by reference to which party bears the legal burden as 
regards those facts
100
. 
The question is then which party bears the legal burden of proof in the concrete case. It 
seems to be obvious that, in this regard, it is necessary to refer to the substantive regulation 
of the relevant matter. Given the peculiarity of the system concerned, the rules of 
substantive law include the ones set out both in precedents and statutes. Hence, the 
incidence of the legal burden may be fixed within the relevant legislation, or in the 
precedents
101
. When this is not the case, however, it has been observed that the courts tend 
to decide “not on the basis of any general principles but more as a matter of policy given 
the particular rule of substantive law in question”102, thereby also taking into account the 
difficulties of proof for the parties of the litigation
103
. 
However, the value of the maxim according to which ‘he who asserts must prove’, is 
generally recognised as the general rule in civil cases. In this view, the legal burden of 
proof will normally lie on the party asserting the affirmative of a certain issue ‘essential’ in 
the proceedings. While the defendant - unless he restricts his defence to a mere denial of 
the counterparty’s assertions - bears the burden of proving the (normally, negative) facts 
which are able to stop the effects of the former
104
. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
judge could refer to the legal burden in order to make a finding. Firstly, the situation has to be exceptional, 
although referring to any issue; secondly, a sort of duty of information in favour of the parties is requested; 
finally, the resort to the above rule is an extrema ratio, in the sense that there has to be the reasonable 
impossibility for the judge to decide. 
100
 This is the meaning of the prohibition of the non liquet: the judge has to decide in any case, irrespective of 
the standard of evidence adduced by the parties in the (civil) proceedings. 
101
 In addition, the parties themselves can agree on the incidence of the burden of proof, by means of express 
agreements such as a written contract. Cf. Levy v Assicurazioni Generali [1940] AC 791, PC and Fred 
Chappell Ltd v National Car Parks Ltd (1987) The Times, 22 May, QBD. 
102
 A. Keane, The Modern Law of Evidence, cited above, 97. 
103
 Similarly to what we have seen, for instance, in some cases of responsibility (involving the proof of fault) 
brought before the Italian judge. See paragraph 2.2 of this Chapter dealing with prima facie proof. Critical on 
a ‘doctrine’ developed in some cases, which put the burden of proof on the party who has peculiar knowledge 
or control of the evidence regarding the matter, R.J. Delisle, Evidence: principles and problems, 2
nd
 ed., 
Carswell, Toronto, Calgary, Vancouver, 1989, 98. This position would find its root in the considerations 
expressed by commentators on the law of evidence that, trying to distil from cases some general law, have 
underlined how the question of the distribution of the onus implies matter of policy, fairness, probability. 
104
 This is one of the two senses in which the term burden of proof is used according to E. Cockle and L.F. 
Sturge, Cases and statutes on the law of evidence with notes explanatory and connective, presenting a 
systematic view of the whole subject, 7th edition, Sweet & Maxwell Limited, London, The Carswell 
Company Ltd, Canada, The Law Book Company of Australasia, Australia Pty. Ltd., 1946, p. 136 et seq., 
where some cases law are reported. The Author distinguished among the ‘particular burden of proof’, and the 
‘general burden of proof’. The former concerns a particular fact in issue and lies upon the party alleging the 
affirmative of this fact; its “incidence (...) or the moment when it shifts may be affected by any relevant 
presumption”. The second one seems to coincide with the ‘right to begin’, so that it refers to the party who 
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An example typically used in the manuals
105
 to show the mechanism concerns the action 
for negligence. Here, the plaintiff has to adduce evidence of the existence of a duty of care, 
its breach and the loss caused as a consequence, to support his claim for damages; while 
the defendant has to prove those facts that avert the effects of the affirmative facts, such as 
the violence suffered by the claimants himself or the contributory negligence.  
In this regard, it is worthy of attention that a substantial approach is privileged in order to 
distribute the burden of proof. This is in the sense that the form of the statement of the case 
is not decisive in order to determine the incidence of the burden, being necessary to 
consider the substance and the effect of the allegation
106
. 
 
6.1.2 The standard of proof 
In order to consider a certain fact as proved, the evidence adduced by the party who bears 
the legal burden on the relevant issue has to be as such to meet the required standard of 
proof. This concept refers to the degree of cogency of the evidence alleged, which 
normally is fixed by the law or finds its ground in the common law. 
The connection between the standard of proof and the rule on the distribution of the burden 
of proof
107
 is evident. Once the party who bears the legal burden with reference to a 
particular issue is identified under the latter rule, it has to be decided by the court if the 
proof is “enough” for the purpose of taking the fact as having happened. If it is not, and the 
judge is left in doubt, then he will make a finding against the party who failed to discharge 
the legal burden borne by him on that certain issue
108
. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
has to begin and who settles the question, thereby normally the plaintiff. On the different meanings given to 
the term ‘burden of proof ‘ see also R.J. Delisle, Evidence: principles and problems, cited above, 91 et seq. 
105
 See A. Keane, The Modern Law of Evidence, cited above, 96 et seq. 
106
 “Thus a party cannot escape a legal burden borne by him on a particular issue essential to his case by 
drafting his claim or defence, in relation to the issue, by way of a negative allegation”. See A. Keane, The 
Modern Law of Evidence, cited above, 97, by reference to the case BHP Billiton Petroleum Ltd v Dalmine 
SpA ([2003] BLR 271, CA at [28].  In the same way E. Cockle and L.F. Sturge, Cases and statutes on the 
law of evidence with notes explanatory and connective, presenting a systematic view of the whole subject, 
cited above, 137: “(...) the substance, and not the mere form, of the pleading is to be considered”.  
107
 Which, as we have seen in the previous paragraph, states who has to prove what. A related question 
concerns which party has the “right to begin adducing evidence”. According to A. Keane, The Modern Law 
of Evidence, cited above, 101, “In civil cases the claimant has the right to adduce his evidence first, unless 
the defendant bears the evidential burden on every issue”. From this we infer that when the legal burden is in 
issue – which interests us the most - the same principle applies, as it seems to be obvious in the civil law 
systems as well. On the other view, the question is devoid of any practical relevance if referred to the 
chronological order,  the plaintiff being the one who brings the claim in front of the court. If it is rather 
intended to identify the party bearing the burden of proof or of the related counterproof, then the nature of the 
facts in issue count, whether positive or negative. In other words, the sequence proof/counterproof depends 
on the nature of the facts alleged. 
108
 Given the fact that in civil proceedings the judge has to decide in any case.  
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Having clarified the relevance of the standard of proof in the common law system, the 
question arises as to the concrete meaning of this merely abstract formula in concrete cases. 
Within the doctrine, the existence of a general rule, according to which, in civil 
proceedings the standard of proof is ‘on a balance of probabilities’ is conventionally 
recognized. This parameter seems to indicate the degree of probability referring to the facts 
that are object of proof, thereby resting on the preponderance of probabilities. To simplify, 
it requests that there are more probabilities that the fact in issue occurred than it did not. 
This holds true even with regard to the discharging of the burden of contrary proof where a 
presumption of law operates. 
There are several exceptions to the general rule, prescribed by the statute law or at 
common law, requesting a different standard. In some cases, the criminal standard, i.e. 
‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’ needs to be met; at other times a (more) exacting civil 
standard of proof applies
109
. Even more important are those exceptions that are neither 
crystallized in the statute law nor can be considered as rules apart, being rather expression 
of the general rule’s flexible application. It has been held by the authorities that the more 
serious the allegation or the consequences if the former is proved, the more cogent must be 
the evidence in order to meet the ordinary standard of proof. The flexibility, in this view, 
does not concern the degree of probability, but rather the strength or quality of the 
evidence itself
110
.  This, on the basis of the assumption that the gravity of the facts requests 
a stronger evidence in order to overcome the unlikelihood of the allegation, in terms of 
improbability that it happened. In particular, the jurisprudence shows an inclination to a 
ductile application of the general rule in very sensible matters, as the matrimonial causes or 
the behaviour having also a criminal relevance. In these cases, the request of a more cogent 
evidence is emphasized by the use of adjectives like ‘strong, distinct, satisfactory, 
irrefragrable’, able to prove the fact in issue ‘clearly and unequivocally’111, which are 
intended to express the major strength assigned to the evidence itself. 
                                                          
109
 For the hypotheses see to A. Keane, The Modern Law of Evidence, cited above, p. 106. 
110
 See A. Keane, The Modern Law of Evidence, cited above, 107, who analyses the case record by reference 
to three main groups of hypotheses: allegations of crime in civil proceedings; matrimonial causes, 
miscellaneous, the latter including a variety of issues calling for a higher standard of proof. 
111
 Given the fact that the analysis of the single judgments goes beyond the purpose of this dissertation, for 
the case law I refer again to A. Keane, The Modern Law of Evidence, cited above, 197 et seq., where also 
other matters are subject to a more rigorous standard of proof. Cf. R.J. Delisle, Evidence: principles and 
problems, cited above, 103, where there are also some case law and opinions. The Author, after having said 
that the burden of persuasion in civil cases normally requires for satisfaction ‘a preponderance of evidence’, 
unlike the criminal standard, noted that it not unusual for a civil court to adopt a different standard, such as 
the criminal one or a third one requiring  “clear and convincing proof”, depending on the issue concerned. 
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It is not clear – and the conflicting case law confirms this - what the above major strength 
of the evidence consists of, if not in terms of more probabilities
112
. On the other hand, the 
words used to define the character of the evidence requested - as illustrated above  – can’t 
be confined to some “delicate” matters. Differently, this would entail the recognition of a 
weak proof in the rest of the cases. Moreover, the connection between the importance of 
the fact in issue and the standard of proof requested, on the grounds of the more or less 
(inherent) likelihood of the former, appears to be illogical
113
, unless it simply turns out in 
the stress on the necessity of an overall consideration of the elements by the judge. 
At any rate, it is most interesting to notice that even in common law the proof seems to be 
evaluated according to a parameter that can be considered as comparable to the principle of 
the proof’s free evaluation, which is typical of the civil law systems so far considered. 
Obviously, this is unless the statute law provides differently. It is up to the judge of the 
concrete case to evaluate the proofs adduced and their likelihood, unless the statute law – 
or at common law – demands a higher standard or fixes the effects of the proof itself – as 
the case may be  with legal presumptions - once it enters into the proceedings.  
 
6.2 Presumptions 
Similarly to the civil law systems analysed so far, within the common law system under 
examination presumptions have been considered in the frame of the theory of proof, more 
exactly the law of evidence
114
. 
In this context, the distinction among direct and indirect evidence – the latter called 
‘circumstantial evidence’ - 115 has had the merit of underlying that every presumption is 
                                                          
112
 In this sense, cf. Bater v. Bater [1951] P 35 at 37, CA, where the opinion of Lord Denning was in the 
sense of the existence of degrees of probability within the standard.  
113
 In this sense, Re B (Children) (Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof) [2009] 1 AC 61 HL, where Baroness 
Hale observed that “The inherent improbability of the event has no relevance to deciding who that was. The 
simple balance of probabilities test should be applied.”   
114
 E. Cockle and L.F. Sturge, Cases and statutes on the law of evidence with notes explanatory and 
connective, presenting a systematic view of the whole subject, cited above, p. 24. 
115
 In this sense, if I am not mistaken, A. Keane, The Modern Law of Evidence, cited above, 12 et seq., who 
adds that “Certain types of circumstantial evidence arise so frequently that they have been referred to as 
‘presumptions of fact’ or ‘provisional presumptions’, such as the presumptions of intention, guilty knowledge, 
continuance of life, and seaworthiness (…)”. For an explanation of the terminology used when dealing with 
judicial evidence, E. Cockle and L.F. Sturge, Cases and statutes on the law of evidence with notes 
explanatory and connective, presenting a systematic view of the whole subject, cited above, p. 1-5. In 
particular, the circumstantial evidence is defined as “evidence of a fact not actually in issue, but legally 
relevant to a fact in issue”.  
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based on the grounds of an inference, which, starting from a ‘relevant fact’, allows to 
induce the existence or non-existence of a fact in issue
116
.  
The foregoing results at common law and can be inferred from single statutory 
presumptions. As a matter of fact,  a general provision on the matter is absent in the 
English law
117
, unlike what we have seen for the other national systems taken into 
consideration. 
“Where a presumption operates, a certain conclusion may or must be drawn by the court 
in the absence of evidence in rebuttal”118. Such definition indicates at first sight that the 
common law system shares the same concept as the civil law one. As a matter of fact, the 
distinction among the possibility (may) and the necessity (must) for the court to draw the 
inference refers to nothing more than to the main division between presumptions fixed by 
the law and the ones left to the discretion of the judge.  
Thus, the notion appears not to differ from the one which results from the civil codes 
considered in this chapter. In addition, the same consideration can be extended as regards 
to classification, effects and nature.  
Conventionally, presumptions are classified into presumptions of law – rebuttable and 
irrebuttable – and presumptions of fact. Plus, a further category is added in some 
manuals
119, i.e. ‘presumptions without basic facts’.  
The main effect concerns, albeit to a different extent, depending on the type of 
presumption, the distribution of the burden of proof. It consists – using the terminology of 
the doctrine - in the assistance of a party bearing that burden
120
, in the sense that the 
reversal of the latter operates in favour of the party normally bearing it. Even if the 
reference to this effect and to the evidence in rebuttal in the above definition could lead the 
interpreter to infer the exclusion of irrebuttable presumptions of law, this is not the case. 
As already stated, common law systems know three kinds of presumptions, as the civil law 
systems do. 
                                                          
116
 See E. Cockle and L.F. Sturge,  Cases and statutes on the law of evidence with notes explanatory and 
connective, presenting a systematic view of the whole subject, cited above, 142, according to whom “all 
presumptions in the law of evidence describe a process or a legal consequence whereby we infer the 
existence of a presumed fact when certain other basic facts  have been established by evidence; the inference 
from the evidentiary fact is usually taken as a result of our own sense of logic or our own sense of experience 
but at times it may be statutorily or judicially directed to accommodate some extrinsic policy consideration”.  
117
 In particular, this is evident by reading the Civil Procedure Rules as well as the different Civil Evident 
Acts, where no traces can be found as regards to presumptions’ general definition. 
118
 A. Keane, The Modern Law of Evidence, cited above, 650 et seq.  
119
 A. Keane, The Modern Law of Evidence, cited above, 654. 
120
 A. Keane, The Modern Law of Evidence, cited above, 650. 
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However many Authors consider as real presumptions only the ones fixed by the law and 
when rebuttable. The focus on the effects, in terms of reversal of the onus of proof, is such 
that it implies the absorbing in the area of presumptions of the rebuttable ones only.  On 
the contrary, irrebuttable presumptions are considered as rules of substantive law, while the 
presumptions hominis as mere inferences developed by the judge from a combination of 
facts
121
. This, again, does not differ from the theory supported by a part of the doctrine on 
presumptions in civil law systems
122
. 
 
6.2.1 Presumptions of law 
The reversal of the burden of proof is certainly deemed to occur when dealing with 
rebuttable presumptions of law – sometimes referred to as ‘persuasive’ or ‘compelling’ –  
as they release the party who relies on them from giving evidence of the presumed fact and 
at the same time allow the adversary to adduce evidence in rebuttal. In the absence of the 
latter, as well as when it does not meet the ordinary civil standard of proof on a balance of 
probabilities, then it is mandatory for the judge to consider the presumed fact as proved on 
the basis of the proof or admission of another fact, which is the so-called ‘primary’ or 
‘basic fact’123.  
The same effects in terms of reversal of the burden of proof are not completely appropriate 
when referring to irrebuttable presumptions of law – often defined as ‘conclusive’ - given 
the fact that the party against whom they operate cannot adduce any proof to the contrary.  
Precisely the impossibility to rebut the presumption by demonstrating that the presumed 
fact did not occur, leads the doctrine to consider irrebuttable presumptions as rules of 
substantive law, although expressed in the form of presumptions
124
. In this view, the 
                                                          
121
 See Delisle, Evidence: principles and problems, cited above, 144; E. Cockle and C.M.Cahn, Cases and 
statutes on the law of evidence with notes, explanatory and connective, 5
th
 edition, Sweet & Maxwell Limited, 
London, etc., 1932, p. 23 et seq.: “Presumptions, or conclusions drawn from certain facts, are frequently 
stated to be of three kinds- (1) Presumptions of fact; (2) Conclusive or irrebuttable presumptions of law; (3) 
Rebuttable presumptions of law. But, for the purposes of the law of evidence, the first two may be 
disregarded”. 
122
 See infra, paragraph 5.1 of this Chapter. 
123
 What has called in the first part of the chapter ‘known fact’. So that according to R. Egglestone, Prova, 
conclusione probatoria e probabilità, Milano, Giuffrè, 2005, p. 158-159 rebuttable presumptions are rules 
according to which if the fact A is proved, then the existence of B can be assumed, unless proof of the 
contrary is adduced. The Author put this type of presumptions in a wider group, including the case in which 
the judge is ‘obliged’ to consider the fact as proved (with the same effects of presumptions iuris et de iure) 
and the one where A is considered as being proof of fact B.  
124
 In this way A. Keane, The Modern Law of Evidence, cited above, p. 650, who, alike Taruffo, asserts that 
rebuttable presumptions are the main concern of the chapter on the matter. See also R. Egglestone, Prova, 
conclusione probatoria e probabilità, cited above, 158, who considered irrefutable presumptions as rules set 
out by the law. 
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situation envisaged in the norm is ruled on by the law, not differently from what happens 
with the other provisions which have a substantive nature as well. 
An interrelated question concerns the ratio governing the introduction of presumptions. In 
the doctrine on the matter there is the awareness that although they normally (should) 
reflect the ordinary course of events, this is not always the case. Especially when dealing 
with irrefragable presumptions, being the party barred from rebutting them, a problem of 
correspondence to the actual facts rises. Considerations of public policy and need to 
regulate the effects of a certain situation come into play, so that the demand of rationality 
appears to be scaled down
125
. 
So far, the brief analysis of the common law context as regards legal presumptions does 
not show any relevant difference as compared to the civil law one. What is peculiar is the 
inclusion of presumptions at common law, under the form of principles of law, in the 
category of legal presumptions, together with the statutory ones. In this regard, it can be 
observed that a number of presumptions at common law have been regulated within the 
legislation thereafter. Moreover, when it comes to taxation and in particular to the 
regulation of the tax obligation, the laying down of clear statutory provisions is essential. 
 
6.2.2 Presumptions of fact  
As already mentioned, presumptions of fact – sometimes defined as ‘provisional 
presumptions’ – refer to the inferences which, starting from a combination of facts, may be 
drawn by the court, though the party against whom they operate can adduce evidence in 
rebuttal.  
                                                          
125
 An example of presumptions where any logic is missing is, according to A. Keane, The Modern Law of 
Evidence, cited above, 650, the presumption that a person is dead if he has not been heard from for over 
seven years, being a question of legal statement the choice between seven years and a different period of time. 
Cf. also E. Egglestone, Prova, conclusione probatoria e probabilità, cited above, 161-162, according to 
whom not always presumptions are the result of a generalization. They can be justified in the light of the aim 
of the legislator to save time and costs by fixing a pre-arranged means of proving fact otherwise difficult to 
prove, or in terms of social policy, or considering the person more entitled as to the knowledge of the fact in 
issue. See also J.B. Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, Rothman Reprints, 
New Jersey, Augustus M.Kelley, New York, 1969, at p. 314, who observed that the scope of presumptions is 
not confined to the law of evidence, being them part of the legal reasoning. According to the Author, they 
“assume the truth of certain matters for the purpose of some given inquiry. They may be grounded on general 
experience, or probability of any kind; or merely on policy and convenience. On wathever basis they rest, 
they operate in advance of argument of evidence, or irrespective of it by taking something for granted; by 
assuming its existence”. 
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Generally speaking, we face the same concept as in civil law systems. It is indeed 
classified as part of the so-called ‘circumstantial evidence’, thereby within the category of  
indirect proof, whose evaluation is left to the discretionary of the court
126
.  
This does not mean that the decision of the judge in the part of the reasoning is not 
censurable at all. On the contrary, it might be reversed on appeal if the judge ignored the 
presumed fact as inferred from the basic facts and no contrary proof was adduced
127
. 
 
6.2.3 Presumptions without basic facts 
Presumptions without basic facts are defined as “merely conclusions which must be drawn 
in the absence of evidence in rebuttal”128. 
Though the terminology could make the interpreter think about a further notion, I am of the 
opinion that, depending on the provision concerned, they merely represent a regulation of 
the distribution of the burden of proof or a rule of experience grounding an improper 
presumption. 
In this sense, indeed, lead the examples that can be found in the manuals in order to give 
concrete shape to the category at hand. It is submitted, for instance, that the presumption of 
innocence would belong to this type of presumption, but at the same time its nature of a 
rule relating to the incidence of the burden of proof is recognised. 
In conclusion, as has been said about the presumption of bona fide, we do not technically 
face a further type of presumption, being possible to classify the provisions concerned as 
irrebuttable presumptions of law, or a mere specification on the distribution of the burden 
of proof between the parties in the civil proceedings. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to verify the existence of a common concept of legal 
presumption at European level, by identifying its main features, functions and effects. 
The reason why  a wide perspective in terms of Member States has been chosen to be 
considered, which will be narrowed in the following chapter, has been stated many times 
already. Since the root of the concept resides within the civil/procedural law, then its 
                                                          
126
 It has been submitted that they represent the expression of judges’ opinion on probabilities: “statements on 
the effect of decisions by the tribunal according to which from the fact A it is possible to infer the fact B. See 
R. Egglestone, Prova, conclusione probatoria e probabilità, cited above, 159-160. 
127
 When, in other words, a strong presumption of fact operates. Cf. A. Keane, The Modern Law of Evidence, 
cited above, 652 et seq. 
128
 A. Keane, The Modern Law of Evidence, cited above,  654. 
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analysis precedes the tax law perspective, which will be narrower. But precisely the 
definition of a fundamental legal concept implies the consideration of different Member 
States, especially in view of the EU perspective undertaken in the third chapter. 
Not surprisingly, the analysis shows a certain uniformity as to the meaning and main 
characters of presumptions, and of legal presumptions in particular. As we have disclosed 
in the introductory paragraphs, like many categories of civil law, the one under discussion 
is the result of a common tradition, which dates from the Roman law. 
This is evident when comparing the notion laid down in the civil codes of some continental 
Member States. The differences that can be traced in the French and Belgian Civil Codes 
in respect of the Italian one are of little importance, and do not affect the fundamentals of 
the category. The same can be asserted when looking to the common law system, where 
the differences in terms of terminology do not turn out to be real obstacles to the 
construction of a shared concept of legal presumption. 
Obviously, the conclusions could be different if the focus was on presumptions of fact, 
given that they are inferences left to the prudence of the judge. 
This chapter shows not only a certain conceptual uniformity at European level, but also an 
inclination towards the inclusion of legal presumptions under the head of proof. In the civil 
law systems, this approach rests on the systematic regulation of the matter in the civil 
codes concerned, under the rules on the means of proof. In the common law systems, it 
seems to be due to the enhancement of the procedural effects in terms of a shifting of the 
burden of proof, which leads some Authors to confine the term presumption intended as 
evidence only to the rebuttable ones, whereas the irrebuttable ones and the presumptions 
hominis are respectively considered as rules of substantive law and mere logical inferences 
that can be developed by the judge. 
In conclusion, the concept of legal presumption refers to the inference which is developed 
by and in the law, based on the normal course of events. This implies that legal 
presumptions are the result of the national legislator’s choice concerning the rules on a 
certain matter or the distribution of the probative burden between the parties involved. 
They must, though, be rational and be based on a rule of experience. This is what marks 
legal presumptions in respect to other similar notions. There is – or, more exactly, there 
should be - a logical inference connecting the known fact and the unknown fact, the former 
being demonstrative of the existence of the latter on the basis of a rule of experience, 
which is missing in the fictions of law, for instance. Finally, legal presumptions are 
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commonly distinguished between irrebuttable and rebuttable depending on the possibility 
for the party against which they operate to rebut them. In the light of this, irrebuttable 
presumptions of law have a marked substantive nature, while this is questioned for 
rebuttable presumptions of law. They cannot be considered as mere means of persuasion of 
the judge, because they contain a certain regulation of the situation envisaged in the norm, 
which applies if the counterproof is not given. Therefore, they may have substantive 
effects, but their probative/procedural nature cannot be denied, given the impact on the 
division of the burden of proof. 
 
 
Legal Presumptions in National Tax Systems. 
The Italian and Belgian Case 
 
 
53 
Chapter II 
Legal Presumptions in National Tax Systems. 
The Italian and Belgian Case 
 
 
1. Legal presumptions in the area of taxation  
The theoretical analysis of legal presumptions, undertaken in the previous chapter, clearly 
shows the existence of a common concept, which can be considered as part of the ius 
commune at European level. This represents the necessary point of departure of a 
dissertation on tax law presumptions, both from a national and EU-wide perspective, as 
they find their general legal definition within the civil domain and the general theory. 
However, tax presumptions reveal several peculiarities respective of the other areas of law, 
which justify separate attention. Such peculiarities influence the role played by legal 
presumptions (as they operate only in favour of the tax administration) and the national 
criteria of constitutional compatibility; moreover, they strengthen the divergence between 
legal presumptions and presumptions hominis, in line with the choice to narrow the 
investigation to the former. 
Indeed, it must be emphasized that presumptions of law and presumptions of fact cannot be 
placed on the same level. 
The presumptions hominis consist of a logical reasoning conducted by the judge (or the tax 
administration issuing a tax decision) in relation to a concrete case. Their application in the 
area of taxation does not differ much from their use in the area of civil law
129
. 
The legal presumptions are legislative provisions which place upon the judge the duty of 
taking the effect provided therein when the known fact is ascertained
130
, though they are 
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 This, in general. In fact, it must be taken into consideration that in the field of taxation tax authorities are 
entitled to make use of presumptions hominis in the context of the administrative proceedings. Furthermore, 
in some Member States, the peculiarity of the authority entitled to draw the inference is alongside  the 
different standard requested in order to consider the unknown fact as proved. This is the case in Italy, where 
the tax administration, under certain conditions set up by the law, is allowed to rely on presumptions even 
when the requisites of seriousness, precision, corroboration – pursuant to Article 2729, para 2, of the Italian 
Civil Code - are not completely met. See Article 39, para 2, of the Presidential decree No 600/1973, (where 
the different hypotheses are listed) on the tax assessment of individuals’ income stemming from the exercise 
of an enterprise, which applies also to persons other than individuals pursuant to Article 40, and Article 41 on 
the ex officio tax assessment. 
130
 In this sense G. Gentilli, Le presunzioni nel diritto tributario, cited above, p. 9. So that unlike 
presumptions of fact, legal presumptions consist of a deontological judgment, as it is not intended to 
convince the judge, but rather to place decisive obligations on him. 
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likewise requested to have a logical basis in terms of correspondence with the principle of 
reasonableness and a rule of experience. To simplify, it can be said that they often end up 
to be no more than choices of the tax legislator regarding the regulation of a certain 
situation, or, to put it otherwise, they are an expression of the legislator’s preference for a 
certain regulation of the matter.  In this regard, given the specialty of the tax obligation, 
where the creditor is the State and for the collection of a levy responding to public interests, 
they are normally established only in favour of the tax administration, thereby to the 
detriment of the taxpayer. This, in view of simplifying the ascertainment of one or more 
elements of the tax obligation and to secure the tax recovery. Clearly, the assessment of the 
relevant fiscal facts – falling into the taxpayer’s sphere - would be hard if the tax 
administration was not ‘assisted’ by presumptions during the administrative proceedings 
and the trial as well. On the other hand, this stresses the importance of fixing certain 
limitations to the operating of legal presumptions, in order to ‘protect’ the taxpayer from 
abuses in their application. In other words, legal presumptions respond to basic public 
interests, which justify the interference of the tax legislator on the ordinary distribution of 
the burden of proof. Such interference, however, cannot be arbitrary. On the contrary, as 
underlined in the first chapter and as results from the Constitutional jurisprudence to be 
discussed below, they have to comply with certain criteria pertaining primarily to their 
structure and to their rationality. 
Accordingly, the reconstruction of (a) national approach to legal presumptions will be 
conducted by examining the constitutional framework and case-law on the one side, and 
the main presumptive provisions in force (having EU relevance, given the perspective 
chosen in this dissertation), on the other side.  
Both these aspects need to be explored. To that end, the tax law systems of two Member 
States are taken into particular regard in this dissertation, though without renouncing the 
expression of general considerations on the overall attitude manifested by Members States 
when coping with legal presumptions. As disclosed in the introduction, the impossibility to 
deal with 28 tax systems suggests a narrowing of the framework to two significant national 
experiences, as clarified below. 
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2. Why Italy and Belgium: the reasons for a comparative-based reconstruction of the 
national approach  
The reconstruction of the national approach to tax law presumptions demands a close 
examination of the tax law system(s) concerned, thereby the choice of one or more national 
contexts that can be considered noteworthy.  
Given the impossibility of dealing with all the Member States, the choice has fallen to Italy 
and Belgium, mainly in the light of two criteria. 
Firstly, the different interest for the topic shown by the scholars within the two national 
experiences. 
As a matter of fact, many authoritative Italian authors have analysed in-depth presumptions 
in tax law. In many contributions, legal presumptions have been distinguished from other 
boundary legal concepts, their effects in terms of interaction with the burden of proof, their 
nature as well as their consistency with the relevant constitutional principles have been the 
subject of several reflections. This is probably also due to the large attention traditionally 
given to the concept also within the civil/procedural law literature and above all to the 
numerous (at time broadly argued) judgments of the Italian Constitutional Court on the 
matter. 
By contrast, the Belgian doctrine seems to have neglected an analysis of tax law 
presumptions able to abstract itself from the contingent tax legislation, and thereby to 
express general principles. It mostly focused on presumptions of fact, which are widely 
used by the Belgian tax administration in order to prove the relevant fiscal facts belonging 
to the sphere of the taxpayer
131
, or it examined presumptive measures under a different 
perspective
132
. In addition, there are very few decisions of the Belgian Constitutional Court. 
Only recently, indeed, it has ruled on legal presumptions, mostly by rejecting the issue of 
unconstitutionality, as will be shown later on. At any rate, the dominant disregard of the 
doctrine and the existence of few decisions of the Belgian Constitutional Court do not 
correspond to a minor need for an exploration of the issue. 
The foregoing makes in this way interesting an analysis of these two national contexts 
under a comparative key. In particular, a contribution may be brought to the issue of the 
role of tax law presumptions in the Belgian tax system, which includes several presumptive 
                                                          
131
 On the other hand, generally speaking, the role played by presumptions of fact in the context of the 
administrative procedure and in the trial is fundamental, considering that it would be impossible for the tax 
administration to prove everything, i.e. all the facts entering into the chain of the reasoning. 
132
 For instance, the perspective of the abuse. As we will see, within the Belgian tax system a number of legal 
presumptions are included in anti-abuse measures. 
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provisions worthy of attention, through the use of the conceptual parameters elaborated as 
regards to the Italian one. 
Secondly, precisely the reconstruction of the national framework is functional to the 
subsequent examination of the EU approach to national tax presumptions, mainly as it 
results from the EUCJ rulings on the matter. In this view, it has to be noted that both Italian 
and Belgian tax law presumptions have been repeatedly the subject of the EUCJ judgments, 
and some of their presumptive provisions and regimes in force are to be checked in the 
light of EU law. In this regard, the examination of the national context will also show how 
and in which extent the EU approach is potentially able to impact on the drafting of the 
national legislation. 
Accordingly, this chapter is devoted to the examination of legal presumptions in the 
context of the two national tax systems mentioned above. In particular, the major degree of 
academic literature in terms of interest in the topic suggests the Italian tax system should 
be dealt with, and after that a Belgian approach should be identified in a comparative 
perspective.  
 
3. A brief note on the methodology  
Before dealing with tax law presumptions within the first of the two Member States under 
examination, a few words on the scheme that will be adopted for the purpose of 
individualising the national approach should be written. 
First of all, it has to be highlighted once again that tax law presumptions are the result of a 
legislative choice, so that the inference cannot in principle be contested by the taxpayer. 
The latter may contend either that the known fact did not occur, or – if the presumption is 
rebuttable and thereby the contrary proof is envisaged – the existence of the unknown fact, 
for instance by proving circumstances incompatible with it. The only way to raise doubts 
on the inference itself is to contend the constitutional inconsistency of the provision laying 
down the presumption. In other words, it falls within the national legislator’s power the 
introduction of any presumptive measures, but it encounters the limitations resulting from 
the relevant constitutional principles, which are placed on the last step of the normative 
hierarchy. This explains why the examination of the constitutional framework and case-law 
plays a fundamental role in the re-construction of the national approach to tax legal 
presumptions. It is on this level that we gather the criteria of compatibility (conditions for 
their ‘tenure’) of tax law presumptions in the national legal order. 
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Generally speaking, the classic parameters of evaluation are represented by the ability to 
pay principle (Italy) or the principle of equality (Belgium), the defence rights, marginally 
also the values of legal certainty and good administration; above all, the general principle 
of reasonableness, which condenses all of them. The relevance of one or more of these 
parameters in a concrete case depends on several factors.  One would say, for example, the 
rebuttable presumptions of law to be evaluated in the light of the ability to pay rule (or 
equality) and the right of defence, whereas the irrebuttable ones to be considered only in 
view of the former – otherwise, they would be constantly in conflict with the Constitution -, 
though this is not always the case. Yet, one would expect the presumptive provisions 
regarding the acting of tax authorities in the context of the administrative procedure to be 
checked under the aspect of the observance of the taxpayers’ defence rights and the value 
of good administration, albeit we will see that this is not always the case. Not least, more 
pragmatically, the way in which the referring court submits the question of compatibility in 
the order of reference to the Constitutional Court might influence the criteria of evaluation. 
Second, as disclosed at the end of the first chapter, the traditional (in civil law) distinction 
among substantive norms (and presumptions) and norms (and presumptions) concerning 
the trial is enriched in tax law with more facets. It suffices to recall that legal presumptions 
operate invariably in favour of the tax authorities and that prior to the legal proceedings 
before the judge a pre-trial phase may take place
133
. Notwithstanding several theories – 
which have been put forward by the scholars - aiming at classifying tax law presumptions 
under one label or the other one are conceivable and could be argued, in my opinion a 
case-by-case approach is preferable for this purpose. This being said, it has also to be noted 
that, looking at national presumptive provisions in force, a distinction should rather be 
made among procedural and substantive presumptions under the following terms. 
On the one side, there are those legal presumptions which regard the powers of the tax 
authorities in the context of the administrative proceedings, thereby implying the exercise 
of such powers for them to apply to the concrete case. It is very much debated if certain 
estimated assessments belong to this group. In fact, they are generically regulated within 
the legislation, but the connection between known fact and unknown fact does not seem to 
correspond to a logical-argumentative scheme, so that they end up to be means designed 
                                                          
133
 The legal proceeding before the judge indicates the (tax) trial. The phase that preceds the trial refers to the 
possible hearing of the taxpayer before the tax authorities prior to the issuing of a tax decision (for instance, a 
notice of assessment). In this dissertation, the procedure conducted by the tax authorities will be referred to 
with the following terms: administrative procedure or tax procedure. 
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for the formal fixing of the facts rather than tools for the demonstration of how the facts 
occurred
134
. 
On the other side, there are those legal presumptions which may apply irrespective of the 
acting of the tax authorities, and in this terms may be defined as being substantive. Under 
this category may be included not only provisions which reflect the traditional scheme of a 
legal presumption, as typically those in the matter of tax residence, but also certain regimes 
(like CFC, limitation to the deductibility of costs, thin capitalization, transfer pricing) 
which may represent anti-avoidance rules formulated as rebuttable presumptions where the 
conditions of application are presumed. In this regard, the EUCJ case-law shows how the 
European Court employs at times a non-technical use of the concept of presumption, so 
that the range of hypotheses included under that concept at EU level is broadened. This 
would suffice to justify their consideration in this dissertation. Moreover, the classification 
and more in general the scheme of reasoning adopted by the EUCJ appears to have an 
influence on the way in which such regimes or provisions are construed or amended by the 
national legislator. 
 
4. Scope and purpose of Chapter II 
In the light of the above considerations, in this Chapter the Italian and Belgian tax systems 
will be separately examined with a view to give an insight into the national approach to 
legal presumptions. The aim is to explore under a comparative key the way in which legal 
presumptions are discussed and dealt with in two different national tax systems, with a 
view to notice possible diversities. This analysis will show that, notwithstanding some 
divergences, under both national systems legal presumptions are perceived as irremissible 
means for simplifying and securing the assessment/recovery of the tax obligation and the 
prevention of tax evasion or avoidance, i.e. for safeguarding the ‘fiscal interest’135. The 
control as to their non-arbitrary and rational nature is entrusted with the Constitutional 
Court, and is basically conducted on the basis of a parameter which concentrates on the 
                                                          
134
 See G.M. Cipolla, La prova tra procedimento e  processo tributario, cited above, 644 et seq. Said 
otherwise, they seem to be addressed to the ascertainment of the normal/average taxable income/turnover 
rather than to the effective income/turnover. The reference is to the statistical studies provided in the Italian 
income tax code and the taxation based on comparison with similar taxpayers provided in the Belgian income 
tax code. As it will be mentioned later one, due to their nature they might raise doubts of compatibility with 
the principle of legality, in the extent to which the determination of essential elements of the tax obligation is 
left in the hands of non-normative sources. 
 
135
 With this formula, the budgetary interest of the Treasury is indicated in the dissertation. 
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legal presumption itself (its structure, its being in line with the normal course of events, its 
being proportionate to the aim pursue, the room for contrary proof, etc.). 
Since the national approach, as construed in this Chapter, will be then confronted with the 
EU-wide perspective, the focus will be mostly on the areas of VAT and direct taxation 
(with regard to provisions applicable to cross-border situations involving EU Member 
States). As to the VAT, it goes without saying its importance both at a national level, 
manifestly for budgetary reasons, and at EU level, as it is fundamental for the functioning 
of the internal market. Besides the area of customs duties, it is the field where the major 
degree of harmonization has been reached. In fact, national rules of the matter embody the 
implementation of the Directive No 112/2006, which lays down the model of reference for 
the national legislator. Thus, the tax law presumptions are to be tested against a rule 
established in advance by the EU legislator, where the principles in the light of which 
carrying out the evaluation of compatibility and the necessary balancing are set forth. As to 
direct taxes, the EUCJ has reiterated in its judgments that they fall outside the scope of EU 
law, except for limited areas that have been harmonized by means of directives. 
Nonetheless, Member States are requested to exercise their sovereignty in accordance with 
EU law. The lack of positive integration in this domain has brought the EUCJ to draw 
basic criteria of compatibility which at times embody alternative models of regulation of 
certain matters in respect of the national provisions, so as to reach a minimum 
harmonization. This holds true as regards tax law presumptions as well. 
Other areas of taxation will not be dealt with in this second chapter, either because the 
national provisions basically give merely execution to the regulation set out almost 
altogether at EU level (customs duty), or because of the limited scope and partial 
harmonization (excise duties), or again because of the pure internal relevance (e.g. 
registration duties, inheritance tax except for cross-border situations involving the exercise 
of the free movement of capital). 
 
Chapter II is divided into Section I and Section II, dealing respectively with the Italian and 
Belgian tax systems. Each Section is divided as follows: first, after a brief introduction, the 
constitutional principles, in the light of which the evaluation of compatibility with the 
constitutional framework is carried out, are illustrated; afterwards, the most significant 
rulings of the Constitutional Court are examined with a view to explaining the reasoning 
surrounding the judgment of consistency with the national system; at this stage, a brief 
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mention is made to some estimated methods of assessment raising questions of 
classification. Ultimately, some of the most interesting presumptive provisions in force are 
discussed, with a view to the subsequent EU-wide perspective. 
 
 
Chapter II - Section I 
Legal Presumptions in the Italian Tax System 
 
1. Tax law presumptions in the context of the administrative proceedings and the tax 
trial 
Placed among the means of proof by the civil legislator, legal presumptions share with 
every kind of ‘tax proof’ the mutual interferences between administrative procedure136 and 
tax trial. The question as to whether a character of means of proof - and all the more of 
proof – can be assigned to them in the context of the administrative proceedings has been 
the subject of an in-depth debate within the Italian literature. This, due also to the 
circumstance that they are provided by the law and may have effects on the regulation of 
the elements of the tax obligation. 
It is still an open question that is not confined to legal presumptions only, but as just said, 
concerns (in theory) all the proofs admissible in tax law. In this regard, considering the 
prohibition of oath and oral testimony, together with the unusual use of the admission that 
ends up being a different distribution of the burden of proof, it remains the presumption of 
fact and the documentary proof. 
In brief, the query is: if a proof is defined as ‘means of ascertaining  the truth’, can this be 
asserted as regards  legal presumptions which the tax administration relies on in the course 
of the administrative proceedings? 
The tax administration is the authority entitled to re-determine the tax due as the result of 
the verifications carried out with regard to a certain taxpayer, and therefore it can’t be 
                                                          
136
 It has to be clarified that ‘administrative procedure’ (or sometimes ‘administrative proceedings’ or ‘tax 
procedure’) refers in this dissertation to the procedure carried on by the tax administration which, starting 
from the tax audit, might flow into a tax assessment. It belongs to the genus of the administrative procedures, 
which indicate a series of activities – carried out by the public administration and regulated by the Law N° 
241/1990 - that normally terminate with a final administrative measure having the character of 
imperativeness and enforceability. The legal proceedings (or tax proceedings, or tax trial), instead, refers to 
the proceedings before the judge, which begins with an action brought against a decision issued by the tax 
administration and ends with a judgment. 
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considered as impartial. Once excluded that its role in this phase is comparable to the one 
of the judge during the trial, meaning that it is not neutral, then it is not clear to whom the 
tax administration has to prove what and to what extent. 
Unlike every party of a private–law relationship, the tax administration has to operate in 
compliance with the law, that is to say that it has to ascertain the if and quantum of the 
(higher) tax due with the observance of the principles of legality and good administration. 
In doing so, however, it is entitled to exercise some penetrating powers, which place it in a 
situation of supremacy over the taxpayer. And this, without being requested to hear
137
 the 
latter, which  could only fully guarantee the protection of its right of defence in the 
administrative stage. 
In the light of such peculiarities characterising the means of proof within the administrative 
proceedings, different theories have been put forward, which in this dissertation can only 
be mentioned briefly: from the one based on the presumed legitimacy of the administrative 
act, by now outdated, to the one according to which the tax administration has to state 
clearly the means of proof on the basis of which the notice of assessment is issued, to the 
intermediate one that ascribes to proofs in the administrative proceedings a para-cognitive 
function
138
. 
                                                          
137
 Since in the Italian tax system it is not possible at the moment to identify a general, constitutionally 
protected, principle according to which the tax administration has to inform the taxpayer about an ongoing 
procedure involving him and possibly leading to the issuing of a tax assessment, it is left to the choice of the 
public party the possibility for the individual to raise exceptions or contesting data in this phase. This, except 
for those cases – recently, they are increasing – when the discipline of a certain method of assessment 
ensures that the debate is compulsory, under the sanction of nullity of the act elevated without having invited 
the taxpayer to produce elements. In any case, the administrative procedure affects the subsequent (only 
possible) trial where the notice of assessment issued by the tax authorities is in hypothesis contested by the 
taxpayer. As said, since the Italian tax system does not include a compulsory debate between tax 
administration and taxpayer in the context of the administrative procedure, it is very often in the trial that the 
latter can exercise his right of defence and (try to) rebut any legal presumptions used by the former to 
motivate the tax assessment. The legal proceedings level, that is to say the tax trial, embodies in this way the 
last level. In this context, the tax administration may rely on the legal presumptions relevant in the case and 
the judge must decide according to the effects fixed by the presumptive provision applicable. Hence, dealing 
with legal presumptions at national level implies the consideration of different “contexts” in which they are 
called on to operate, and this should be always be borne in mind thereinafter. 
138
 Given the EU-wide perspective of this study, it is not possible to deal in depth with the question of the 
nature of legal presumptions and their role in the administrative procedure. Ex multis, see G.M. Cipolla, La 
prova tra procedimento e processo tributario, cited above, in particolar at p. 309 et seq.; G. M. Cipolla, La 
prova nel diritto tributario, Dir. Prat. Trib., 2009, 545; Cf. G.A. Micheli, Aspetti e problemi della prova e 
della decisione nel processo tributario, Riv. Dir. Fin. 1940, 220; R. Sacco, Presunzione, natura costitutiva o 
impeditiva del fatto, onere della prova (aspetti diversi di un fenomeno unico o fenomeni autonomi?), Riv. Dir. 
Civ., 1957, 399, in particular at 408 et seq.; F. Tesauro, Profili sistematici del processo tributario, Padova, 
Cedam, 1980, 55; G. Tinelli, Presunzione (diritto tributario), in Enc. Giur., vol. XXIV, Roma, 1991, 1 et 
seq. ; G. Tinelli, Prova (diritto tributario), in Enc. Giur., vol XXV, Roma, 1991, 1 et seq. ; U. Perrucci, La 
prova nel diritto tributario, Boll. Trib. 1996, 1173, in particular at p. 1193; P. Russo, Problemi della prova 
nel processo tributario, Rass. Trib., 2000, 375 et seq.; C. Glendi, Il giudice tributario e la prova per 
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1.1 The role of legal presumptions in the administrative proceedings 
Without expanding further on the question as to whether legal presumptions may be 
considered as means of proof in the context of the administrative procedure before the tax 
administration, a few considerations should be emphasized. 
It has to be recognised that the inclusion of legal presumptions among the means of proof 
within the civil code appears not to fit with the administrative procedure. This is also a 
corollary of the ambivalent nature of legal presumptions - i.e. substantive-procedural - and 
of the different role played by the tax administration, which is in a position of supremacy 
in the first case and one of the parties in the context of the trial. On the other hand, the 
typical effect of rebuttable presumptions – the reversal of the burden of proof on the 
taxpayer – actually operates entirely in the trial, the seat where the taxpayer is normally 
able to give proof to the contrary. In fact, the taxpayer has a right to be heard by tax 
authorities in the context of the administrative proceedings only in some cases. 
However, one could say that legal presumptions hold a sort of demonstrative nature even 
in the phase of the administrative procedure, though it is absorbed by the (duty of) 
motivation within the tax decision. When contested by the taxpayer in a trial, the latter can 
normally be integrated with further means of proof, but only if they are related to the same 
facts that have been alleged. Hence, the tax administration is not forbidden from 
introducing proofs that did not enter into the impugned tax decision, but the validity of the 
latter is affected by the absence or insufficiency of the motivation. Though, it should be 
noted that in fact the tax administration issuing a tax assessment very often simply applies 
the provision setting forth the presumption, barely reporting in the statement of reasons the 
known fact in addition to the relevant provision of  law. 
The question concerning the nature of means of proof facing legal presumptions can be 
easily extended to the phase of the trial. Asserting that the persuasion of the judge is 
influenced by the legal presumption is no more than a fiction, in the sense that he merely 
applies it. One could say that the judge is persuaded on the occurrence of the unknown fact 
through the bounding inference drawn by the legislator. But still, it is no more than a 
fiction. 
The last consideration strengthens the difficulties in supporting in practice the definition as 
means of proof of legal presumptions. Since the administration/judge is obliged to hold the 
                                                                                                                                                                                
presunzioni, Riv. Dir. Fin. e Sc. Fin., 1985, 593; C. Glendi, L’istruttoria nel nuovo processo tributario, Dir. e 
Prat. Trib., 1996, 1117; F. Gallo, Motivazione e prova nell’accertamento tributario: l’evoluzione del pensiero 
della Corte, Rass. Trib., 2001, 1088; F. Gallo, L’istruttoria nel sistema tributario, Rass. Trib., 2009, 25 et seq. 
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effects as they are provided for by the applicable presumptive provision,  its role of 
persuasion as to the truthfulness of the facts is questionable. At most, it could be argued, 
legal presumptions represent the proof intended as result, being the reasoning developed by 
the legislator. In this way, the classification as means of proof – or, that is the same, as way 
of persuasion – fits altogether only to presumptions of fact. 
In my opinion, notwithstanding the actual application of legal presumptions may raise 
doubts in this sense, the probative (or demonstrative) character is what distinguishes legal 
presumptions (both irrebuttable and rebuttable) from boundary notions, among which are 
fictions
139
. The lack of knowledge as to the relevant fiscal facts realized by the taxpayer 
and the correlative difficulties of proof on the side of the tax administration grounds their 
introduction and is (or should be) immanent in the inference. 
 
1.2 The effects of tax law presumptions and the burden of proof 
Dealing with legal presumptions in general in the first chapter, it has been shown how their 
main effects concern the distribution of the burden of proof between the parties, and 
consequently the constraints to the evaluation made by the judge.  
Alike in the other areas of law, the general rule on the distribution of the burden of proof 
applies in tax law. Article 2697 of the Civil Code provides that “the party who wishes to 
assert a right before a court is to provide evidence of the facts on which the right is 
founded. The party who objects that such facts are non-effective or that the right itself has 
changed or expired is to provide evidence of the facts in which the objection is founded”. 
This conclusion is the result of the overcoming of the presumption of legitimacy referred to 
the administrative decisions. Born in the field of administrative law, the presumption of 
legitimacy has been embraced in tax law as referred to the tax decision. In this view, it was 
up to the taxpayer to demonstrate that the tax claim, which was presumed as being 
legitimate, was undue. 
Heritage of an overcome idea on the administrative body, this theory cannot be supported 
either when dealing with the activity of the Public Administration, which very often is 
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 Contra, F. Moschetti, Il principio della capacità contributiva, Padova, Cedam, 1973, 269, according to 
whom unlike the presumptions of fact, the presumptions of law are mandatory rules non-necessarily linked to 
a logical-deductive reasoning and aimed at securing a certain substantive regulation of a situation. As a 
consequence, legal presumptions cannot be deemed as being proofs. Cf. also G.A. Micheli, L’onere della 
prova, Padova, Cedam, 1966, 168; G.A. Micheli,  Le presunzioni e la frode alla legge nel diritto tributario, 
Riv. Dir. Fin. Sc. Fin., 1976, 396. 
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discretional, nor with regard to the operating of the Tax Administration, which is always 
bound to law. With regard to the latter, in particular, it is sufficient to recall that although 
the action of the tax administration has to comply with the principles of impartiality and 
good administration (Article 97 of the Constitution), nonetheless it is a body having 
authoritative powers, thereby entitled to enact decisions directly affecting the (especially 
economic) sphere of the taxpayer. In the relationship subtended by the tax obligation, the 
tax administration is a public party with the task of guaranteeing the collection of the tax 
due. But it remains a party. As a result, when laying a tax claim the tax administration 
bears the burden of proving the correlative foundation, firstly in the tax decision itself with 
the statement of reasons and afterwards in the tax trial as well
140
. 
This holds true irrespective of the fact that, in the context of the trial, the litigation is 
started up by the taxpayer. Despite the circumstance that the latter brings the action, indeed, 
he only formally plays the role of the plaintiff. In fact, the taxpayer contests the tax claim 
as laid out in the tax decision issued by the tax administration. By contrast, the tax 
administration embodies the plaintiff in a substantive sense, given that it lays the tax claim. 
Of course, this is not always the case, as when the claim is lodged by the taxpayer – for 
instance, asking for the refund of an undue tax, or the recognition of tax reliefs and so on – 
then he also represents the plaintiff from the substantive perspective, with the correlative 
burden of giving evidence as to the existence of the demanded right, whereas the tax 
administration is the defendant. 
In conclusion, it appears to be self-evident among the scholars and the case law the 
operating of the general rule on the distribution of the burden of proof within tax 
proceedings
141
. In such context, it lies on the party that has the interest of proving the 
alleged fact, irrespective of its formal position (whether as plaintiff or defendant) in the 
proceedings. 
                                                          
140
 As regards to the rebuttable presumptions, E. Allorio, Diritto processuale tributario, Torino, 1969, 389, 
points out that the reversal of the onus of proof can be explained in the light, and at the same time is the 
demonstration, of the fact that the burden of proof is ordinarily put on the Tax Administration. If this was not 
the case, it would be without any sense providing in favour of the latter such a simplification. Cf. F. 
Maffezzoni, La prova nel processo tributario, Boll. Trib. 1977, 1677, who supported the non-application of 
the ordinary rule on the burden of proof to the tax trial; Cf. L.P. Comoglio, Oneri e mezzi di prova nel 
processo tributario: temi sempre attuali, in Studi in onore di Enrico De Mita, Napoli, Jovene Editore, 2012, 
213.  
141
 See in this regard, G.M. Cipolla, La prova tra procedimento e processo tributario, cited above, 527 et seq., 
who offers an overview of the issue and refers to the possible mitigations, such as the reference to the 
concrete case and the rule of the best placed. 
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As the “substantive” affects the “procedural” (and vice versa), the lack of information by 
the side of the tax administration about the (possible) theme of proof has led the legislator 
to introduce derogations to the general rule. In this perspective, the finality of tax legal 
presumptions consists in lightening the probative position of the tax administration on the 
one hand, and in simplifying the assessment of one or more elements of the tax obligation 
on the other hand. 
 
2.  A brief note on the perspective chosen 
Once a brief account of the debate still agitating the Italian academic doctrine has been 
given, it has to be underlined that the above-mentioned questions are overshadowed when 
the perspective is the one of the relation between legal systems. 
This being the case, the parameters of investigation are rather the foundation of the 
presumptions concerned, their object also as regards to the contrary proof possibly 
envisaged, the requested reasonableness and their efficacy. Alongside these issues, the 
judgments of the Constitutional Court are examined, in order to discover the criteria of 
constitutional compatibility adopted in connection with the interests achieved by the 
relevant legal presumptions. The aim is in fact to infer from these data the overall Italian 
approach, again in the perspective of the relation within legal systems. 
To that end, three main steps need to be taken in the current section. 
Firstly, in order to set the stage the parameters governing the consistency of legal 
presumptions within the Italian legal order are illustrated. The principles of ability to pay, 
the right of defence, the rule of reasonableness embody the main criteria in the light of 
which the evaluation of the structure of legal presumptions is conducted by the 
Constitutional Court. 
How and to what extent the nature (whether irrebuttable or rebuttable, substantive or 
procedural) of the single legal presumptions affects such evaluation is explored through the 
reference to the main Constitutional Courts’ rulings on the matter. As we will see, the 
Court has on several occasions clarified under which conditions legal presumptions are 
admissible in the national legal order and in doing so has drawn the boundary with other 
concepts. 
Afterwards, a brief mentioned is done of some estimated methods of assessment in order to 
give an insight into the questions of classification that may rise at national level. 
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Ultimately, the most relevant legal presumptions in force are illustrated, with a view to 
testing some of them against the general criteria resulting from the analysis of the 
Constitutional framework and in a perspective serving as a means for a subsequent EU 
analysis. 
The attempt is to give an insight in a matter rich with academic and jurisprudential 
contributions. 
Such analysis will be conducted combining the reference to rulings dealing with 
presumptive provisions in various areas of taxation no more in force with  references to the 
current provisions in the light of the criteria inferred and in view of the subsequent 
consideration of the EU framework. Indeed, given the following EU perspective, these 
current provisions concern taxes where a positive or (at least) negative harmonization can 
be found. The reference is primarily to the VAT: in particular, the legal presumptions in 
the context of the bank investigations and the presumptions of supply and purchase. 
Secondly, to the direct (income) taxation: in particular, to the presumptions in the field of 
tax residence, the CFC legislation and the transfer pricing. 
 
3. The Italian Constitutional Court’s evaluation on tax law presumptions 
The Italian tax system includes several legal presumptions, concerning the taxable event, 
the tax base, or the juridical definition of an element included in the situation envisaged in 
the norm
142
.  
Drawing up a list of all the presumptions put under the magnifier of the Constitutional 
Court so far or anyway currently in force would not add much to the attempt of identifying 
the national approach to the matter. Thus, in the following paragraphs the focus will be on 
the more significant rulings of the Constitutional Court, starting from the ones that 
highlight the demand of a rational basis both for presumptions and for similar concepts. 
After that, the reference to some presumptive provisions or regimes included in the Italian 
legal order is justified in the light of explaining the working of the presumptive scheme or 
in view of the potential relevance at EU level. 
                                                          
142
 Cf. G. Falsitta, Appunti in tema di legittimità costituzionale delle presunzioni fiscali, Note to Const. Court 
3 July 1967, n. 77, Riv. Dir, fin. Sc. Fin., 1968, 5, distinguished between a) presumptions concerning the 
taxable base; b) presumptions concerning a constituting element of the parameter; c) presumptions 
concerning the juridical definition of the tax event; d) presumptions concerning the tax event or one of its 
elements. For an overview of the Italian Constitutional Court’s trends, also as regards to tax law 
presumptions, see E. De Mita, Guida alla giurisprudenza costituzionale tributaria, Milano, Giuffrè, 2004, 3 
et seq. 
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It must be noted at the outset that the Italian tax system’s scenario offers different types of 
presumptions, some of which raise problems of classification. Generally speaking and with 
a certain degree of approximation, it is possible to distinguish those presumptions 
(irrebuttable, but also some rebuttable ones) that appear to have a substantive nature and to 
operate irrespective of a possible assessment or trial, on the one hand; on the other hand, 
those presumptions that have a more marked procedural nature, because they concern the 
powers of assessment and recovery of tax authorities, and as such imply the acting of the 
latter and operate in the context of the administrative proceedings. 
With respect to such distinction, and more exactly to the distinction between substantive 
and procedural provisions, the Italian Constitutional Court has in the abstract asserted that 
solely the former may be questioned in the light of the ability to pay principle
143
. Yet, the 
examination of the decisions handed down on legal presumptions concerning the tax 
assessment shows that the Court has in several occasions ruled on them in the light of that 
substantive parameter, in this way implicitly admitting the possibility to apply the latter 
also with regard to the administrative procedure
144
. By contrast, the Court confines the 
scope of the right of defence to the context of the trial, and not even to the phase of the 
administrative procedure
145
. In practice, in this view the right of defence of the taxpayer is 
not violated insofar he has the possibility to bring an action to the court.  
 
                                                          
143
 See the following ordinances: Const. Court 2 March 1990, No 108; Const. Court 8 July 1992, No 322. All 
the judgments of the Italian Constitutional Court can be found at www.cortecostituzionale.it. See F. 
Moschetti, Il principio della capacità contributiva, cited above, p. 45, 287. According to the Author, the 
irrebuttable presumptions of law, even when rational, are always in contrast with the Constitution, in 
particular with the ability to pay principle. This, because they connect the payment to persons, facts, or 
amounts, whose existence neither is ascertained, nor will be ascertained. As such, they do not guarantee the 
contribution of everyone being commensurated with his actual capacity to pay. By contrast, the rebuttable 
presumptions of law, when based on criteria of normality and rationality, may represent a balance between 
the two interests protected by Article 53 of the Constitution. On the one, side, they do not exclude that the 
contribution of everyone to the public expenses is proportionate to the actual ability to pay; on the other side, 
they can prevent tax evasion or avoidance, i.e. that taxpayers do not fulfil their duty of contribution. 
144
 See infra, the judgments concerning the synthetic method of assessment and the banking presumptions. 
145
 Ex multis, see the ordinance Const. Court 2 February 1988, No 130. A. Marcheselli, Le presunzioni nel 
diritto tributario: dalle stime agli studi di settore, Giappichelli, Torino, 2008, 70, underlines that when facing 
procedural issues, in particular when the law establishes limitations to the ascertainment of the effective tax 
event or taxable amount, the Constitutional principles concerning the defence should be considered. That is, 
Articles 24, 113, 111 for the trial, Article 97 for the administrative stage. In these cases, Article 53 and 3 of 
the Italian Constitution are only indirectly infringed. 
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3.1The reasonableness as an unavoidable feature of each legal presumption 
In line with the purpose of underlining the main features of tax legal presumptions in 
relation to the constitutional framework, the necessary compliance with the principle of 
reasonableness has to be dealt with. While drawing a distinction between legal 
presumptions and presumptions of fact in the first chapter, it has been pointed out that the 
former very often turn out to be a regulation given to a certain situation mostly in  order to 
secure the ‘fiscal interest’, that is to say the interest of the State to the collection of the tax 
due and to tackle tax evasion. 
This does not mean, however, that the legislative choice can flow into free will. Both 
rebuttable and even irrebuttable presumptions, indeed, are always requested to have a 
rational basis and to reflect the logical coherence as to the inference connecting the known 
fact to the unknown fact. 
The principle of reasonableness is considered to be a general criterion that should inspire 
the legislation, thereupon a parameter of constitutional compatibility that is constantly 
recalled by the Constitutional Court in its decisions. 
When dealing with taxation, the content of this rationality or reasonableness criterion 
appears to be the result of the interaction between Articles 3, 53 and even of Article 24 of 
the Italian Constitution. As it is well known, the first one establishes the equality (both 
formal and substantial) principle
146
, the second one prescribes the ability to pay principle, 
while the latter deals with the right of defence and more in general with the judicial 
protection of rights. 
In other words, the impression is that the evaluation of a certain presumption’s rationality 
by the Constitutional Court be the result of the consideration of three elements, not always 
jointly: 
a) the possible discrimination rising from the presumptive provision among different 
categories of taxpayers (Article 3); 
b) the basis of the taxation, i.e. definite – rather than fictitious - indices of ability to 
pay (article 53, para. 1); 
c) the possibility for the taxpayer to rebut the presumption (Article 24, para. 2). 
As it will be clear later on, in most of the Constitutional Court’s cases on tax presumptions 
the reference to the first two parameters occurs, as the relevant presumptive provision is 
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 As clarified in Const. Court No 120/1972 “Equal situations have to be regulated by equal tax regimes and 
different situations by an unequal tax treatment”. 
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able to indirectly affect the taxable event, or the taxable amount, or more in general the 
definition of a certain element of the tax obligation. In other words, it may have 
substantive effects.  
While this is – generally speaking – unanimously asserted as regards to irrebuttable 
presumptions, it holds true also with regard to rebuttable presumptions, even when they 
have a marked procedural nature. For instance, the estimated method of assessment 
analyzed below has been put under the magnifier of article 53 as well, as it is in between a 
method of assessment and a determination of the taxable base. 
As regards the third parameter, the possibility for the taxpayer to rebut a certain 
presumption could “save” the relevant provision from a negative ruling, if interpreted as an 
instrument able to bring taxation back to reality. Since, however, this aspect concerns the 
distribution of the burden of proof, the constitutional framework on this matter will be 
deepen later one, after having clarified the position of the Court as regards the first two 
parameters that normally represent the “measure” of the reasonableness. 
 
3.2 Tax law presumptions: admissibility on condition of rationality  
The Italian Constitutional Court has ruled on the compatibility of tax presumptions several 
times. 
Since from the very first decisions, it has been said that legal proofs
147
 and tax 
presumptions  - as to the event giving rise to the tax obligation, the taxable base, or the 
juridical qualification of a certain tax element - do not contrast in principle with the 
Constitution. Indeed, it falls within the discretion of the legislator the possibility to lay 
down those mechanisms that are able to avoid tax evasion and to safeguard the general 
interest to the tax collection. This, as long as it does not imply an irrational prescription. 
It has been considered as unreasonable, for instance, the discipline in the field of ILOR 
(local tax on incomes) in the extent to which it implied a different treatment of the self-
employment incomes in comparison to the  wage incomes, without corresponding to a 
                                                          
147
 See Const. Court 26 June 1965, No 50, on Articles 45 and 48, Royal decree 30 December 1923, No 3270, 
providing for the predetermination of the means of proof as to the debts deductible from the heritable assets 
in the field of inheritance tax. In tax law, the legal proof contributes to render precise the public claim and to 
simplify the procedure in view of the prompt tax collection. This ‘fiscal interest’ receives special protection 
in Articles 53 and 14, para 2 of the Constitution. Accordingly, “the material impossibility to give the 
requested proof turns into an obstacle of mere fact, thereby unrelated to the constitutional issues (…). Nor it 
can be said that the drawing of a strict legal proof amount to give a fictitious basis to the levy” (Const. Court 
21 April 1983 No 103, on Article 13, paras 3-4, Presidential decree No 637/1972 in the field of inheritance 
tax). 
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different ability to pay. On the basis of a presumption on the existence of a property 
component justifying the assimilation to the enterprise income, the self-employment 
income had been deemed subject to ILOR by Article 1, Presidential decree No 599/1973 
together with the other types of income
148
, except for the wage income. 
Such a presumption was considered by the Court so “uncontrollable and wholesale to turn 
out to be unreasonable and thereby prejudicial to the tax equality”. The common 
experience shows, indeed, that most of the self-employment incomes miss any patrimonial 
component
149
. 
Though the provision at hand would have been better (technically) qualified as an 
assimilation rather than a presumption
150
, the decision on ILOR is worthy since the Court 
confirms that tax presumptions are not unconstitutional in principle, “but they have to 
ground on “indices concretely revelatory of wealth”, that is on ‘real facts’ even if difficult 
to ascertain, in order the taxation not to have a ‘fictitious basis’. 
The Court took the view of the inconsistency with the constitutional frame
151
 also as 
regards the combination of Articles 18, Law No 25/1951 and 10, Presidential decree No 
573/51, on the basis of which, in practice, the direct taxes referred to taxpayers who were 
not taxed according to the balance sheet were (conclusively) calculated on the basis of the 
income received in the previous tax period. In this way, it was drawn an irrebuttable 
presumption as to the receiving of a certain amount of income in the period subsequent to 
the one in which it had been determined. Unlike the temporary record of the tax debt into 
the tax roll on the basis of the taxable income produced in the previous tax period
152
, the 
system at hand did not provide for any balance in the event the income produced was lower, 
with the risk for the taxpayer of being charged for an unreal income. 
This possibility led the Court to consider the provisions as inconsistent with Article 53 that 
demands the tax levy to be fastened to “indices concretely revealing of wealth”, from 
which the actual ability of the taxpayer to discharge the tax obligation can be inferred. The 
boundary between legitimate and illegitimate presumptions is identified in the characters 
of “rationality and conformity to the data of the common experience”. Characters that are 
                                                          
148
 Which the Court defines ‘mixed incomes’, i.e. incomes of capital and labour.  
149
 Accordingly, the Court has ruled the constitutional incompatibility of Article 1 – in respect of Articles 3 
and 53 of the Constitution - where it does not exclude those self-employment incomes that cannot be 
assimilated to the enterprise incomes. 
150
 Which, if ever, represented the ratio. 
151
 Const. Court 28 July 1976, No 200. 
152
 In principle, indeed, it is likely that the income produced in a tax period tallies with the one that has been 
declared in the previous tax period, if the source of income persists. Cf. Const. Court 3 July 1967, No 77. 
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not found in the regulation at hand, since the only index of ability to pay was the income 
produced in the previous tax period and moreover the taxpayer was not allowed to prove 
that in the next period a lower income had been produced
153
.  
As said in the previous paragraph, the possibility for the taxpayer to rebut the presumption 
enters the evaluation of the reasonableness, and contrary to what one would expect, it is 
not confined to procedural provisions or rebuttable presumptions only. When the definition 
of the tax assumption or tax base do not completely reflect the normality, it represents the 
means of retrieving the taxation to reality. This shows, among other things, that the Court 
vests irrebuttable presumptions with a demonstrative character. 
On the other hand, the ruling in this cases shows how rationality refers not only to a single 
element of the presumption, but to the entire scheme. If it is necessary that the premise 
(known fact) embodies real facts having an economic relevance and referred to the 
taxpayer, this is not sufficient. It is also indispensable that the result (consequence, 
unknown fact) be logically connected to the premise, so that the former autonomously 
reflects the ability of the taxpayer involved to accomplish the tax obligation. In the last 
case under discussion, the known fact, i.e. the income produced in the previous tax period, 
represented a suitable index of wealth. From it, however, it could not be logically inferred 
the income referring to a different tax period. As a result, the unknown fact was not able to 
reflect a real ability to pay index. 
 
3.3 The ‘fiscal interest’ 
Despite the cases referred to in the previous paragraph, the evolution of the Constitutional 
Court’s rulings on tax legal presumptions is marked, especially at the beginning, from a 
                                                          
153
 Which is why the relevant provisions might be classified also as fictio iuris. In the judgment the Court 
made constantly reference to the category of irrebuttable presumptions, except for one time. See also Const. 
Court 12 July 1967, No 103, where the question referred to the Court was the compatibility of Article 22, 
para 1, Presidential decree 5 July 1951, No 573 with Article 3 and 53. Facing the lack of the annual tax return 
in the field of direct taxation, it prescribed the entry into the tax roll of the same amount of income 
ascertained for the previous taxable period, which was increased of 10% for chattel incomes. The Court split 
the provision into two norms, and only the second part was found to be inconsistent with Article 53. In this 
view, the possibility for the tax administration to re-register in the tax roll the same income of the previous 
taxable period was justified in the light of the omissive behavior of the taxpayer as well as of the existence of 
incomes for the previous year that grounded the presumption as to the persisting of the same income for the 
next period. On the contrary, the second part of the provision was found  in contrast with Article 53, as long 
as it provided for the mark-up of 10% on the income of the previous period. This, because the presumption as 
to an increase of the activity and the correlative profits is considered to be irrational as it is not based on any 
concrete index and moreover it does not allow the taxpayer to prove that he actually received a lower income. 
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tendency to prefer the ‘fiscal interest’ over the protection of the taxpayer’s position under 
the perspective of Articles 3 and 53
154
. 
As held in the judgment No 283/87 dealing with the presumptive methods of assessment, 
the peculiarity of the tax matter is considered as justifying different regulations in respect 
of the general discipline of presumptions
155
. Such peculiarity can be traced back especially 
to the interest of the State into the tax collection, which receives a constitutional protection 
under Article 53 itself according to the Constitutional Court
156
. As a consequence, tax 
presumptions questioned by the lower courts as to the compatibility with the ability to pay 
principle have been even considered at times as implementing that principle by avoiding 
tax evasion. 
 
3.3.1 The presumption on the existence of chattels, jewels and money within the estate 
The balance between the protection of the taxpayer and the securing of the fiscal interest 
appears delicate in the field of inheritance tax, as it concerns an event – the transfer of 
goods or rights mortis causa – on which the lack of information by the side of the tax 
administration is frequent. This is true, in particular, with reference to the taxable base, i.e. 
the inheritable assets, which might contain movable goods (shares, money etc.) that the 
heir is interested to hide. 
Accordingly, the Legislative decree 31 October 1990, No 346 (the law on inheritance and 
gift tax) provides for a series of presumptions as to the composition of the inheritable 
assets. Among these, Article 9, para 2, establishes the presumption of existence of a certain 
amount
157
 of chattels, jewels and money in the inheritable assets
158
. 
                                                          
154 See E. De Mita, Guida alla giurisprudenza costituzionale tributaria, Milano, Giuffrè, 2004, at p. 340 
with particular regard to tax law presumptions. 
155
 Though in the decision this refers mainly to the possible derogation of the civil regulation, in particular of 
Article 2729.   
156
 See, ex multis, Const. Court 26 June 65, No 50, cited above, where it is held that “the fiscal interest  
receives in the Constitution an individual protection (Articles 53 and 14, para. 2); so that (…) it is not one of 
the undifferentiated interests the public administration has to take care of, but rather a differential interest, 
which dealing with the regular working of the services necessary to the community’s life affects the existence 
of the latter (Judgment 4 aprile 1963, No 45)”.  
157
 The percentage calculated on the value of the de cuius’ estate is 7,10. 
158
 More in detail, they are considered to be included in the inheritable assets in the percentage of 10% of the 
global taxable net value of the inheritable assets, even if they have not been declared or declared for a lower 
amount.  This, unless from the analytical inventory drawn up pursuant to Article 769 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, it results the existence for a different amount. In Article 11, then, it is laid down a presumption of 
inclusion in the inheritable assets with reference to shares and stocks in general. 
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In the decision No 109/67
159
 the Constitutional Court was questioned on the compatibility 
of the provision fixing such presumption at that time
160
 with Articles 53 and 3 of the 
Constitution
161
. The Court rejected the question of illegitimacy on the basis of two main 
considerations:  
a) the provision is in line with the common experience and with logical principles as 
well, so that the 'juridical certainty as to the existence of the goods’ can be asserted; 
b) since the goods concerned are easily concealable and their value difficult to 
determine, the provision is aimed at rendering precise the tax obligation and 
collection and to avoid any attempt of evasion. 
The decision is regrettable in the extent to which the Court belittled the question on the 
classification of the presumption at hand
162
 and defined the latter as a ‘juridical truth’ 
related to ‘real facts difficult to assess’. 
In this view, it did not found any contrast with Article 53, as the tax obligation is deemed 
to be related to a concrete index of ability to pay, like the inheritance asset.  
It seems that the Court arrested the evaluation of rationality to the known fact (the 
hereditary succession of an assets), without considering that the result of the presumption 
is not fully coherent with the premise and does not reflect autonomously an index of 
economic ability
163
. On the other hand, probably because the lower court did not raise the 
question of compatibility with article 24 of the Constitution, there is not any reflection on 
                                                          
159
 Const. Court 26 June 1967, No 109. 
160
 Article 31, paras 1, 2, 3, of the Royal decree 30 December 1993, N° 3270 (on the inheritance tax). From 
the decision we infer that it was interpreted as irrebuttable by the lower court. See on the decision mentioned 
in the text, G.A. Micheli, Capacità contributiva reale e presunta, Giur. Cost., 1967, 1525. 
161
 The first two paragraphs of the same article had been addressee of a negative ruling of the Court (Corte 
costituzionale, sentenza 12 July 1965, N° 69) in relation to article 3 and 53, as the different treatment for the 
farms in comparison to the commercial and industrial firms were not based on objectively different situations. 
Indeed, in order to calculate the percentage of existence of chattels, money, jewels, it was considered the 
gross value when a farm was inherited, while the net value for the commercial and industrial firms. See the 
comment of V. Crisafulli, In tema di capacità contributiva, Riv. Giur. Trib., 2002, at 860. The Author 
criticizes the circumstance that the Court focused on the issue of equality and disregarded the question of 
consistency with the ability to pay principle. 
162
 “Without investigating here if the presumption is irrebuttable or not, which is insignificant to the purpose 
of the case”. Critical on this point also E. De Mita, Fisco e Costituzione, questioni risolte e questioni aperte, I 
(1957-1983), Milano, Giuffré, 1984, 253. When facing rebuttable presumptions, which reverse the onus of 
proof, the question is the suitability to prove the economic ability on the basis of the common experience. 
Instead, an irrebuttable presumption rises a problem of assimilation of different facts; in other words, 
different ability to pay capacities are equalized for tax purposes. Accertamenti fatti su base di valutazioni 
presuntive 
163
 There is indeed the chance that the estate does not include money, jewels or chattels. In this event, the 
base of the taxation would be fictitious. 
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the possible proof by the heir that the inheritable assets does not include those goods or it 
does in a different percentage
164
. 
 
3.4 The id quod plerumque accidit. The presumption of liberality as to the real estate’s 
transfers between relatives 
Pursuant to Article 26, para 1, Presidential decree No 131/1986 (dealing with the 
registration duty), the real estate’s transfers and the transfers of shareholdings165 between 
husband and wife or lineal relatives are presumed to be donations if the global amount of 
the registration duty and every other tax due in relation to the transfer is lower in 
comparison to the tax applicable in case of free transfer. 
Clearly, the provision is intended to prevent the abuse of civil instruments, in particular the 
choice of a type of contract that does not reflect the real intention of the parties but is rather 
due to the aim of avoiding the payment of a higher taxation
166
. The formula of such 
provision is the result of a Constitutional Court’s decision 167  of inconsistency with 
reference to the norm excluding the proof to the contrary. In particular, the Court ruled on 
the compatibility of this presumption having an irrebuttable nature when involving 
husband and wife with Articles 3 and 53 of the Constitution. 
The arguments raised by the State legal advisory service in this case were convincing and 
in line with the previous rulings of the Court, but they have been disregarded. He argued 
the rationality of the irrebuttable character in the light of the (close) relation between the 
parties, which could let them establish the proof of the consideration in advance, even 
when absent. The same kinship or relationship by marriage was considered as justifying 
the presumption of liberality – meaning the absence of any payment of price - as to transfer 
of immovable properties or shareholdings. A transfer that in this view was an index of 
ability to pay equal to the one revealed by donations. 
The judgment is worthy for two main reasons. Firstly, the Court recognised that the context 
in which the presumption applies is changed, so that the provision does not appear 
                                                          
164
 On the contrary, the question was raised as regards to Article 8, para 2, Presidential decree No 637/72 (on 
the inheritance and gift tax), that presumed the inclusion of money, jewels, chattels for a certain percentage 
of the inheritable assets’ net value. In the ordinance of reference 19 January 1988, No 21, the Court excluded 
the relevance of Article 24, thereby of a procedural protection, being rather at issue a substantive matter. 
165
 With a value higher than € 180.759,91. 
166
 This is a typical hypothesis in which the presumption concerns the juridical qualification that has to be 
assigned to an instrument (here, the contract), with all the correlative consequences in terms of tax treatment. 
167
 Const. Court 20 February 1999, No 41. 
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reasonable anymore
168
. Indeed, the increasing number of legal separations that are often 
regulated also by means of property transfers and the current autonomous economic ability 
of each spouse show how transfers with consideration
169
 are not an exceptional event 
anymore. Secondly, here we can see how the contrary proof enters in the evaluation on the 
reasonableness. Indeed, the irrationality is confined to the prohibition of the contrary proof, 
failing the premises that justified the irrebuttable character of the presumption at hand
170
. 
Accordingly, in this part the provision is found to be not only irrational, but also in contrast 
with the principles of equality and ability to pay, as the higher taxation is connected to the 
quality of the contracting parties rather than to a higher concrete ability to pay of the same 
parties, who are even forbidden from proving the real nature of the contract signed.  
It obviously follows that the presumption of liberality is to be interpreted as being iuris 
tantum
171
. 
 
4. Irrebuttable presumptions of law and similar juridical notions  
On the basis of the distinctions rising from the Constitutional Court’s rulings, the Italian 
scholars have identified several notions that might remind the tax irrebuttable 
presumptions’ scheme. Such distinction is quite peculiar to the Italian experience, as in 
other national experiences, such as Belgium, the main distinction is with fictions of law. 
                                                          
168
 In the first chapter it has been observed that legal presumptions codify a rule of experience. As a 
consequence, when the social environment changes, then the logical ground might fail. 
169
 I.e. with a real payment of a price. 
170
 Before being modified by Article 25, Presidential decree 26 October 1971 No 634 and by Presidential 
decree no 131/86, the presumption of liberality was provided for by Article 5, Legislative decree 
(luogotenenziale) 8 March 1945, No 90, but the contrary proof was allowed. The Court rejected the question 
of inconsistency with Article 3 and 53 (Const. Court16 July 1968, No 99) by underlining the difficulties met 
by the tax administration on the one side, and on the other side the correspondence to the id quod plerumque 
accidit, together with the possibility for the parties to prove the contrary. This, by means of titles having a 
definite date according to the Civil Code, from which the payment of the price,  the origin and the availability 
of the sum by the purchaser could be inferred. In the field of registration duty cf. Const. Court 14 July 1976, 
N° 167. The case concerned Article 47, para 5, Royal decree 30 December 1923, No 3269, according to 
which the machineries of a factory that are not dismantled or moved and remain in the factory are presumed 
to have been sold to the purchaser, even when they have been excluded from the sale, and notwithstanding 
the purchaser of the machinery is a person different from the purchaser of the factory. The Court held that if 
the presumption was interpreted as being irrebuttable, then it was irrational. What was irrational, in particular, 
was the inference that the machinery was sold together with the factory from the mere fact that the former 
was in the factory. Instead, the inference could concern at most the existence of an appurtenance link. 
Moreover, a similar presumption of  ‘joint’ transfer was iuris tantum when referred to the appurtenances (in 
service) of a farm. For a brief comment to the latter decision and to the subsequent solution adopted by 
Article 23 Presidential decree No 634/72, see E. De Mita, Fisco e Costituzione: questioni risolte e questioni 
aperte, 1: 1957-1983, Giuffrè, Milano, 1984, 454-455. 
171
 On the scheme of the presumption of liberality, after the constitutional judgment and the legislative 
amendments, see M. Trimeloni, Le presunzioni tributarie, in Trattato di diritto tributario (ed.) A. Amatucci, 
Padova, Cedam, 2001, 734-735. 
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In my opinion, these distinction stresses the importance of recognising to irrebuttable 
presumptions an, albeit limited, demonstrative character. In the sense that the known fact is 
in this view representative of – i.e. implies – the unknown fact that is expression of 
economic capacity. In this limited extent a demonstrative nature can be ascribed to 
irrebuttable presumptions, in order to distinguish a category having a demonstrative nature 
from categories where a statistical-mathematical or imperative evaluation prevail.  
Firstly, this – tough weak – probative nature distinguishes irrebuttable presumptions from 
legal definitions (or legal exemplifications) which delineate the taxable situation. In this 
case there are not two facts, but rather one only fact described within the norm covering 
the notion. For instance, Article 2, para 2 of the Italian income tax legislation (hereinafter 
also TUIR)
172
 can be included in this category
173
, as it provides that “for the purpose of 
income taxes it is considered to be resident the persons who for the majority of the tax 
period are registered in the register of the resident population or have in the State territory 
the domicile or the residence according to the civil code”174. Here, the circumstance of the 
registration, the domicile, or the residence in the State for a certain period of time are facts 
that identify the qualification of residence for fiscal purposes. 
The same provision, however, could be an example of another notion drawn by the tax law 
doctrine, which is the ‘equalization’. It consists of the “application of the regulation 
regarding certain facts to different situations”175, normally because they reveal the same 
ability to pay capacity. Thus, Article 2 at hand could be also read as putting on the same 
level the situation of the taxpayer who has habitually resided for the entire year to the one 
of the taxpayer who meets the conditions laid down by para 2.  
Many provisions could at the same time be read as fixing an irrebuttable presumption or a 
legal definition, an equalization or even a fiction. The evaluation has then to rest on the 
ratio of the norm under discussion and on the interests into play. 
We are certainly out of the field of presumptions when a provision extends a certain 
general regulation to hypotheses unrelated to the general definition, on the basis of a 
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 Presidential decree No 917/1986. 
173
 Although, as observed by A. Marcheselli, Le presunzioni nel diritto tributario: dalle stime agli studi di 
settore, Torino, Giappichelli, 2008, 74, this provision can be read as a definition, a presumption, or an 
equalization. Therefore, the Author suggests to distinguish between the different notions having regard to the 
ratio of the norm. 
174
 Article 2 is very interesting – and it will be subject to examination later on – as par. 2-bis provides for a 
rebuttable presumption of residence. 
175
 A. Fedele, Le presunzioni in materia di imposta di registro ed INVIM, in Le presunzioni in materia 
tributaria. Atti del Convegno Nazionale di Rimini del 22-23 Febbraio 1985, (ed.) A. E. Granelli, Rimini, 
Maggioli, 1985, at p. 103. 
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consideration of a similar economic significance. Many examples can be found in this 
regard, with reference to all those provisions both in income taxation and VAT that define 
a certain type of income, operation or category of subjects involved by drawing a general 
definition and afterwards the ‘assimilated cases’ are listed. For instance, consider Article 2 
of the Italian VAT legislation (hereinafter also Presidential decree No 633/72): in the first 
paragraph it is stated that the transfers of goods are those transfer deeds for a consideration 
that imply the transfer of the right of ownership or the setting/transfer of beneficial rights 
on every kind of goods; the second paragraph covers a list of hypotheses that “are 
moreover transfer of goods”. They include cases like the free transfer of goods produced 
by the firm (No 4) or their allocation to personal use by the entrepreneur (No 5), which 
miss some elements requested by the general definition of the first paragraph (in the 
examples, the consideration). 
 
4.1 Irrebuttable presumptions and legal definitions 
The Italian Constitutional Court has dealt with the so called ‘legal definitions’ (or 
evaluation, qualifications, typifications) in the judgment No 131/1991
176
. The case 
concerned Article 76, para 3, No 2), Presidential decree No 597/73 (on income taxation), 
which considered to be made “in any event with speculative purposes and without any 
possibility of proof to the contrary” the purchase (not for private use)-and-selling of 
immovables within a period of 5 years. The gains accrued by means of speculative 
operations were included into the taxable base when they did not belong to the category of 
enterprise income and considered as ‘diverse incomes’177. The judge of the lower court had 
raised the inconsistency of this provision with Article 3, para 1 and 24, paras 1 and 2, as 
the taxpayer was prevented from proving the absence of the speculative purpose. This, 
even when the personal use of the immovable property did not depend on the purchaser, 
like in the case of the main proceedings
178
, but rather on circumstances beyond his control.   
                                                          
176
 Const. Court 26 March 1991, No 131. 
177
 The ‘diverse income’ is one of the six categories of income that nowadays are listed in Article 6 of 
Presidential decree No 917/1986, on income taxation. The adjective ‘diverse’ refers to the fact that this 
category includes certain hypotheses on condition that they do not belong to other types of income, so that it 
is residual in respect of the others. 
178
 The parties had bought an apartment in order to move in – as a house residence – but because of the 
tenant’s resistance they had to sell it and buy another one for the same purpose. 
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Now, while the same provision had been classified as an irrebuttable presumption
179
 in a 
previous ordinance by the Constitutional Court, on the contrary in the decision No 131 the 
Court opens to a different category and qualifies it as a ‘legal evaluation’. In this view, the 
provision identifies two conducts – purchase and selling of the same good – that when 
occurring within a period of 5 years are considered as a single behaviour with a speculative 
aim. The overall operation is in this perspective the condition of a taxable gain according 
to the evaluation made by the legislator
180
. It follows that the provision under discussion 
cannot be assumed as in contrast with the right of defence, because it has a merely 
substantive nature. As a matter of fact, when dealing with legal evaluations or 
qualifications the only examination of the Constitutional Court is confined to the parameter 
of reasonableness, in terms of correspondence to the socio-economic reality and suitability 
as to the aims pursued
181
.  
In the case at issue it could be reasonably argued that the law simply laid down a legal 
definition of an operation having a speculative purpose to which a certain tax treatment 
was related. In this perspective, the speculative purpose is not an unknown fact inferred 
from the purchase and selling within a close period of time, but rather an element of the 
taxable event. In other words, the legislator fixes what a speculative operation is (purchase 
and selling in 5 years) and prescribes the fiscal consequences (taxable gain as individual 
income, unless it is classifiable as enterprise income).  
In line with this approach it is worthy to recall the view taken by an Author
182
 when the 
Court had not ruled in the case No 131 yet, and that seems to have been adopted in the 
decision. Correctly, he put the attention on the interpretation of the speculative purpose. If 
it stood for a psychological attitude, in the sense that the purchaser intended to get a profit 
from the operations –, then it would be impossible for the tax administration to prove. Thus, 
I add, this would have explained the use of the presumptive scheme. However, he preferred 
an objective interpretation, according to which the speculative purpose represents the 
“suitability of the specific operation conducted to realize a gain”; such suitability can 
                                                          
179
 See Const. Court, ordinance 6 dicembre 1989, No 528. It was found not irrational in view of the 
correspondence to the socio-economic reality. Cf. Const. Court, ordinance 10 marzo 1988, N° 298. 
180
 See M. Trimeloni, Le presunzioni tributarie, 2001, 734 cited above, 743. He stresses that in this view the 
speculative purpose is not a consequence deduced from the two behaviors according to the id quod 
plerumque accidit, but rather the unifying element of qualification, which render them a single (complex) tax 
situation that is source of income. 
181
 In the case the Court rejected the question (‘not founded’) because these aspects had not been raised by 
the ordinance of the lower court. 
182
 E. De Mita, Fisco e Costituzione: questioni risolte e questioni aperte, II (1984-1992), Milano, Giuffré, 
1993, 864. 
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result from a series of circumstances – like the type of good involved, the period of time 
between the two operations etc. -  that render the overall operation objectively speculative. 
In his view, the speculative aim is a character of the global operation. As a consequence, 
Article 76 does not provide for irrebuttable presumptions, but it rather “codifies objective 
criteria revealing the suitability of the operation carried out to realize a gain”. The 
interpretation followed is able to affect the ruling of the Court. In the first case – subjective 
interpretation – the Court should find the provision as being in contrast with the 
Constitution, in line with the jurisprudence on irrebuttable presumptions demanding the 
admission of the contrary proof
183
. In the second case, the provision could be considered as 
constitutionally inconsistent only if the speculative character of the overall operation is not 
based – in Article 76 – on a rational justification, meaning that the objective criteria that 
should reveal ex se the speculative nature of the operation are not suitable.  
More general considerations in terms of protection of the taxpayer lead to prefer an 
interpretation of the provision under the scheme of the presumption. The known fact would 
be the purchase-and-selling of the immovable for not-private use within 5 years; the 
inference would be based on the rule of experience according to which when a certain 
immovable is bought without being used for personal purposes and it is sold in a relatively 
short period of time, then the purchaser aims at making profits; the unknown fact would be 
the speculative purpose, which the law regulates under a certain tax treatment. In this sense 
brings also a literal argument, that is the reference to the prohibited contrary proof  
included in the same provision.  
Such an interpretation can also be supported by reference to the position expressed by the 
Court a few years subsequent to the decision No 131 mentioned above. When referred to 
about the same provision it has again classified it as an irrebuttbale presumption of law and 
has rejected the question of inconsistency with Articles 3 and 53 by underlying the 
rationality under the perspective of the correspondence to the id quod pleumque accidit
184
. 
Instead, the question of the classification so far analysed has been ‘solved’ by the legislator 
of the Presidential decree No 917/1986, by opting for a clear ‘legal definition’. Indeed, 
Article 67 of the text on income taxation includes a list of gains that are considered to be as 
‘diverse incomes’. Among those, there are – though with some exceptions - the gains 
                                                          
183
 The Author refers to the decision No 200/76 commented in the text. 
184
 Const. Court 22 July 1999, No 346. 
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realized through the selling (for a consideration) of immovables that have been purchased 
or built within the previous 5 years, without any mention to the speculative purpose
185
. 
 
4.2 Normative predeterminations 
Legal presumptions need to be distinguished from the so called ‘normative 
predeterminations’, which refer to forfeiting criteria of determination as to the taxable 
base
186
. The main difference rests on the absence of a logical inference and on the fact that 
they are mostly intended to simplify the ascertainment of the taxable amount. 
There seems not to be unanimity within the scholars as to the range of hypotheses covered 
by the category at hand, which in any case is not homogeneous. This is not the seat to list 
all the hypotheses taken into consideration. It is, however, worthy to refer to a couple of 
hypotheses the Constitutional Court has ruled on and that might rise uncertainties as to 
their nature.  
Among those, I agree in classifying as a predetermination the cadastral regime, as it 
consists of a determination ex ante of the normal income ascribable to a certain immovable 
                                                          
185
 Cf. Const. Court 20 July No 315, where the Court clarifies that ‘gains’ stand for a growth in the exchange 
value of a certain good during the period of time from the moment in which it enters in the estate of a person 
and the moment in which it leaves that estate. From the same decision we infer that the tax obligation rises 
when the sum is received.  
186
 As to the predeterminations see L. Tosi, Le predeterminazioni normative nell’imposizione reddituale: 
contributo alla trattazione sistematica dell’imposizione su basi forfettarie, Milano, Giuffrè, 1999, 14 et seq. 
It has to be noted that the notion construed by the Author is broader than the one in the text. He deals with 
those “(…) instruments having a normative source, either the legislation or the regulation, pursuant to which 
a datum established ex ante or anyway definable with fixed criteria is meant to take the place of the real 
datum, being the former relevant for the purpose of the taxation instead of the latter”. As to the object, they 
might concern a single or all the positive or negative items, the taxable base, or the tax due. Their application 
happens through the acts provided for the accomplishment of the tax obligation, i.e. tax return or tax decision. 
The range of hypotheses covered is wide, as it includes the provision of a fix amount of tax due, of 
coefficients applied to (accounting) indicators especially in order to determine revenues and remunerations, 
or the reference to an average/normal value for the calculation of the income. By way of exemplification, the 
category includes very different provisions: from the transfer pricing to the cadastral income, from the 
redditometro to the tax treatment of smaller enterprises, from the statistical studies (studi di settore) to the 
substitute taxation, from the minimum tax to the forfeiting of certain expenditure. As a result, the Author 
gives a narrow notion of legal presumption, which is confined to those categories characterized by a logical-
argumentative connection between the known and unknown fact that is based on the observation and 
representation of the reality, thereby on a rule of experience. Accordingly, the predetermination share the 
legal presumptions’ scheme (inference between two facts) and the effects (in terms of reversal of the burden 
of motivation and proof and binding evaluation by the judge), but they have a different content. Indeed, the 
inference consists of “the direct application of criteria that are merely functional to the achievement of the 
aim pursued by the legislator” (p. 28). This would make them border on fictions, assimilations, typifications, 
legal exemplifications, as they imply “a regulation fully built on the normative level regardless of, or even in 
contrast of, the actual reality” (at p. 30). 
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property
 187
. Similarly, the forfeiting of some costs – according to a fix percentage – may 
reflect a certain predetermination rather than the result of a logical inference.  
As to the forfeiting determination of the taxable income, however, the Constitutional Court 
has on the contrary shown to consider it within the genus of legal presumptions. In 
particular, when questioned on the compatibility of a provision fixing the value of the 
immovable properties for the purpose of registration duty and INVIM (tax on gains from 
the transfer of immovables) with Articles 3, 53 and 24 of the Constitution, the Court has 
asserted the legitimacy of presumptions in tax law – that include the ‘automatic or flat-rate 
assessment’ - with the only limitations given by the need to have a not-fictitious basis188. In 
this regard, the reference to the cadastral income – revalued with the use of proper 
coefficients - would be a safe index revealing the ability to pay
189
. Moreover, the Court 
does not consider the provision as introducing a new system of determination of the 
taxable values, but rather a limitation to the power of assessment of the tax officers when 
they consider that the value of the goods that has been declared by the taxpayer is not 
adequate. In this way, they are prevented from doing a higher evaluation as long as the 
value has been declared in an amount that is not lower of the one determinable 
automatically
190
. 
                                                          
187
 Among the six categories of income, the land income refers to the income of lands and buildings that are 
placed in the territory of the State and are or have to be registered in the respective cadastral register, with 
attribution of a  cadastral rent (Article 6, para. 1, let. a), Articles 25 et seq., TUIR). Unlike the other types of 
incomes, the ones at issue are determined according to the cadastral outcomes. As a result, the taxation is on 
a ‘average ordinary income’ that can be gained in normal conditions from properties having the same 
characters (in terms of quality, category, class), instead of on the real income got from the land or building 
concerned. Such a tax treatment has been traditionally intended to promote the production and in general the 
exploitation of the land, as well as to lighten the administrative fulfillments of the small farmers. Plus, the 
determination of an ordinary (annual) income is possible in view of the source: the property immovable, 
which is considered to give rise to a relatively stable income. See G. Falsitta, Manuale di diritto tributario. 
Parte speciale: il sistema delle imposte in Italia, Padova, Cedam, 2009, p. 128 et seq. 
188
 In the text the question put to the attention of the Court has been simplified, as it has been examined in 
different occasions and with reference to further constitutional parameters. For a broader examination see  M. 
Trimeloni, Le presunzioni tributarie, cited above, 736-739. 
189
 See Const. Court, ordinance 23 dicembre 1987, No 586, dealing with Articles 52 and 79, para. 1, 
Presidential decree No 131/86 on the registration duty. Cf. Const. Court, ordinance 10 dicembre 1987, No 
482, on the taxation of the income from an estate and the agrarian income according to the cadastral system 
(‘tariffe d’estimo’). 
190
 Const. Court 26 ottobre 1995, No 463, on Article 12, Law decree 14 marzo 1988, No 70, converted into 
Law 13 maggio 1988, No 154, which facing the transfer of buildings that were not registered in the cadaster 
yet allowed the taxpayer to ask for the attribution of the cadastral rent at the moment of the cadastral 
registration and thereby the determination of the tax due on the basis of the ‘automatic evaluation’ pursuant 
to Article 52, Presidential decree No 131/86. An automatic evaluation that consisted of multiplying the 
cadastral income by 100. The Court confirms the scheme followed in the previous ordinance No 586/87, by 
asserting that “the flat or automatic evaluation as to the goods’ value provided for by article 52 DPR n° 131 
of the 1986 is a mere simplification of the system on the determination of the values and it is ascribable to the 
general criterion of the use of presumptions”. 
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More doubts rises the inclusion of the standardized methods of assessment
191
within the 
category of the predeterminations. We will see that they do not follow either the scheme of 
legal presumptions nor the one of presumptions of fact, so that they seem to have an hybrid 
nature. Their inclusion among the predeterminations can be excluded, mainly because they 
operate within the tax proceedings as methods of re-assessment of the taxable income 
rather than means of determination of the latter irrespective of the taxpayer’s behaviour. 
Moreover, though they cannot be considered as codifying a rule of experience, they have a 
logical basis and – a least in part – are the result of the observation of the reality. 
 
5. Irrebuttable and rebuttable presumptions of law in the field of taxation with 
particular reference to the right of defence 
In the first chapter the difference between irrebuttable and rebuttable presumptions of law 
has been highlighted when dealing with the effects in terms of derogation to the ordinary 
distribution of the onus of proof. 
As intuitive, the distinction is based on the possibility to give proof to the contrary, which 
concerns only rebuttable presumptions. This explains why most of the scholars ascribe the 
latter to the genus of the means of proof
192
, whereas irrebuttable presumptions are mostly 
dealt of as mere rules of law or fictio iuris
193
. 
When referring to tax presumptions, this distinction needs to be specified taking into 
account the scheme of the tax obligation. 
                                                          
191
 Which L. Tosi, Le predeterminazioni normative nell’imposizione reddituale: contributo alla trattazione 
sistematica dell’imposizione su basi forfettarie, cited above, p. 35, inserts. With particular reference to the 
‘redditometro’ and in general those instruments that establish a relation between expenditure indices and 
income of the taxpayer, he identify two inferences: 1. Availability of certain goods thus meeting of 
expenditure for their maintenance; 2. meeting of expenditure thus possession of a proportionate income. The 
first inference is lato sensu presumptive, but it meets the difficulty in collecting average (or ordinary) data 
having a sufficient degree of verisimilitude. Moreover, the second inference is a mere political choice, as 
there are not rules of experience that allow to infer the amount of income from the expenses met by single 
taxpayers.  
192
 Contra M. Trimeloni, Le presunzioni tributarie, cited above, 706-707, who gathers the ambivalent nature 
of irrebuttable presumptions. On the one side, they contribute to the forming of the tax situation within the 
provision; on the other side, they lay down binding criteria both for tax administration and judge. As a matter 
of fact, the tax administration has to operate by assuming only those facts that are the consequences of a 
certain premise in the presumptive provision and following the procedural iter that the provision implies; 
similarly, the judge has to develop a “cognitive representation” of the same facts having regard to the pre-
determined result fixed in the presumption. Thus, the Author ascribes a probative efficacy to the irrebuttable 
presumptions as well, though he clarifies (p. 702) that the analysis of the single presumptions’s nature should 
follow a case by case approach, having regard to the structure of the tax concerned and the related method of 
assessment. F. Tesauro, Le presunzioni nel processo tributario, Riv. Dir. Fin., 1986, 189, and in particular at 
195, The Author supports the probative nature of both rebuttable and irrebuttable presumptions. In this view, 
the parameters of constitutional consistency should be Article 24 on the right of defence, and in general those 
provisions that lay down guarantees concerning the trial. 
193
 Ex multis, see F. Moschetti, Il principio della capacità contributiva, cited above, p. 267-8-70. 
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Technically, there is a rebuttable presumption when a provision of law provides for a 
certain fact (x) to be representative of a another one (y) that is the tax event (or the taxable 
base, or another element of the tax obligation). Given x, the tax administration relying on 
the presumption does not have to prove the tax event, as long as the premise (x) is proved. 
The burden of proof is therefore shifted on the taxpayer, who has to prove that the taxable 
fact (y) did not occur, if he wants to avoid the effects of the presumption. 
Instead, when facing an irrebuttable presumption, given a certain fact (x) another one that 
is the taxable fact is presumed, without any possibility to prove the contrary. Thus, in 
practice, those two facts are equalized, in the sense that x produces the effects that 
normally ensue from y. As a result, technically there is not a reversal of the burden of 
proof, but clearly the ordinary distribution of this burden is affected, at least if a – though 
weak – probative nature is recognised to irrebuttable presumptions as well.  
In which way this distinction impacts on the parameters of reference in the evaluation of 
constitutional compatibility developed by the Constitutional Court can be already inferred 
from the cases referred to in the dissertation, and more in general from the nature of the 
provisions concerned. 
As a matter of fact, given the predominant substantive feature of irrebuttable presumptions, 
they are requested to be in line with Articles 3 and 53 of the Constitution. Though they also 
produce effects within the procedure and the trial, the Constitutional Court normally 
excludes Article 24 of the Constitution to apply. In some decisions, the prohibition to rebut 
the presumption is taken into consideration, but as said it enters the evaluation of the 
presumption’s rationality, rather than be confronted with Article 24. The focus, in other 
words, is not on the right of defence, but rather on the risk that the taxation would cover an 
ability to pay that is not effective, as it is instead requested by Article 53. 
On the contrary, rebuttable presumptions are evaluated not only under the light of Articles 
3 and 53, but also 24 of the Constitution. The possibility for the taxpayer to give proof to 
the contrary, indeed, raises the question of the limitations to that proof laid down within 
the law. When such a question is put to the attention of the Court, the latter is called to 
verify if the taxpayer is in concrete able to rebut the presumption – mostly, with reference 
to the context of the trial - or if the difficulties in giving the  counterproof (probatio 
diabolica) renders impossible the exercise of the related right. 
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5.1  Irrebuttable presumptions of law and Article 24 of the Constitution on the right 
of defence 
As said in the previous paragraph, when dealing with irrebuttable presumptions the Court 
generally does not examine the question of compatibility with Article 24, which refers to 
the jurisdictional safeguard of rights. Given their substantive nature, they are rather 
considered under the light of Articles 53 and 3 of the Constitution. 
This approach seems to follow also from some decisions handed in the field of coercive tax 
collection, which are interesting as both an irrebuttable presumption and limitations to the 
proof  within a proceedings were at issue
194
. 
The provision concerned prevented the spouse and the closest relatives
195
 of the tax debtor 
from bringing the third party’s appeal in order to prove that they were the real owner of the 
movable properties found in the residence of the owed
196
 and that had been pawned in 
relation to the unpaid tax. This in view of the irrebuttable presumption of law pursuant to 
which the debtor was considered to be the owner of all the movable properties existent in 
his residence
197
. 
In one of the first decisions on the provision at hand the Court focused on the scope and 
frame of the presumption, which it classified as a provision of “material law”. In this view, 
though it directly affected the access to the appeal having an impact on the collector’s 
procedure, nevertheless it fell in the discipline governing the property guarantees of the tax 
obligation
198
. When asked whether the provision was in contrast with Article 24, para. 1, 
the Court excluded any violation by arguing that “it [Article 24] guarantees the protection 
before the tribunal with regard to subjective rights that are considered as regulated by and 
with the limitations resulting from the substantive law”. In fact, according to the Court the 
access to the tribunal was denied in view of the balance of rights and interests worthy of 
protection developed by the legislator. In the case at issue, the protection of the public 
                                                          
194
 See in this regard M. Trimeloni, Le presunzioni tributarie, cited above, 746 et seq. 
195
 Relatives and relatives in law within the third degree. 
196
 Or the person jointly liable to tax. In other words, the debtor of a certain tax that had not been paid. 
197
 See Article 207, let. l, Presidential decree 29 January 1958, No 645 (text on direct taxation, now 
abrogated). The provision made safe the goods that had been set up as a dowry before the annual tax return or 
the tax assessment notice. But the institution of a dowry was so anachronistic that it was an exception with 
few chances of application. 
198
 Const. Court 16 July 1964, No 42. “Indeed, it is up to the substantial identifying those goods that are the 
guarantee for the creditor’s rights”. The Court was also questioned as to the compatibility of Article 207 
with Article 42, para 2, of the Constitution on the protection of the property right. But he question was 
rejected also under this point, as it has been considered in the discretion of the legislator the balancing 
between the protection of the right of property (of the spouse and relatives) and the tax collection. Cf. Const. 
Court 26 novembre 1964, No 93. 
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interest connected to the tax execution prevailed on other interests, so that the provision 
was justified in the light of securing the execution of the tax debt and avoiding fraudulent 
operations
199
. 
Therefore, the violation of Article 24 of the Constitution was excluded
200
. 
However, in a next decision
201
 the Court found Article 52, para. 2, let. b), Presidential 
decree 29 settembre 1972 No 602 (on tax collection of income taxes) to be in contrast with 
the Constitution where it did not provide that the debtor’s spouse could appeal with 
reference to the movable properties, save for those received through a deed of gift having a 
definite date prior to the wedding
202
. In this case, the Court was questioned about the 
compatibility of the presumption under discussion and the related prohibition of appeal in 
the light of Articles 3 (as to the reasonableness and disparities) and 24 of the 
Constitution
203
 (as to the judicial protection of the property right). 
The decision is interesting in the extent to which the Court seems to request the 
proportionality of the measure at hand with the purposes sought by the legislator. Firstly, 
the Court confirmed the prime importance of a prompt collection of the tax debt, which 
justified the provision at hand. Nonetheless, it added that the protection of this interest was 
not unlimited but it rather found a ‘rational limitation’ in the correspondence with the aims 
pursued. The latter cannot consist of the execution of the tax debt anyhow, “even with the 
expropriation of goods that, certainly and without any risk of avoidance, do not belong to 
the defaulting taxpayer”. Instead, according to the Court, the aim was to render prompt the 
collection of the unpaid direct taxes by means of the expropriation of movable properties 
that were presumed to be in the debtor’s possession because of the place where they were 
found. In this frame, the prevention from appealing for the spouse could not be reasonably 
justified in the light of the public interest. As such, it “exceeds the measure of the special 
                                                          
199
 The Court explained: “Thus the legislator has not excluded, in contrast with Article 24 of the Constitution, 
the defense in front of the court with reference to a juridical situation that has been recognized in the law, 
but it has rather provided for a guarantee of the tax obligation’s accomplishment through a norm that 
belongs to the substantive regulation of the tax relation and considering the situation of the existence of the 
movable property in the residence of the owed (…)”. 
200
 Cf. Const. Court 24 ottobre 1995, No 444: “The Court has repeatedly stated since from the decision No 42 
of 1964 that the discipline under constitutional compatibility evaluation does not deal with the defence in the 
proceedings”.  
201
 Const. Court 27 luglio 1994, No 358, that was handed after the coming into force of the D.P.R. 29 
settembre No 602/73 on tax collection. In practice, the  
202
 In practice, the provision under examination presumed that the movable properties found in the house of 
the debtor during a procedure of execution were considered to be of the latter, and the spouse could provide 
otherwise under only by producing a deed of gift prior to the wedding.  
203
 Plus Articles 31 (on the protection of the family), 41 (on the private economic initiative) and 47 (on the 
saving) of the Constitution, which are not of particular interest to our purpose. 
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protection that needs to be secured to the prompt execution of the tax debt, as well as the 
need to prevent and avoid fraud and shams”204. While a reasonable limitation as to the 
contrary proof and to the third party’s appeal205 represented a measure coherent with the 
purpose pursued with the presumption at hand, an utter prohibition did not
206
. This, in 
particular, when the chattels subject to execution had been received by the spouse before 
the wedding for donation, like in the case of the main proceedings. 
Even if in the decision it is not clearly expressed the parameter in the light of which the 
inconsistency with the Constitution has been found, it seems that Articles 3 and 31 have 
been considered
207
, whereas Article 24, para 1, is not at issue. In this view, if a limitation 
can be found, then it concerns the right itself and not the possibility to proceed for the 
protection of the assumed right. 
 
5.2 Rebuttable presumptions of law and proof to the contrary: introduction to the 
main issues 
Currently, most of the legal presumptions laid down within the Italian tax system are 
rebuttable. Much less is the number of irrebuttable presumptions, if we leave out those 
provisions that could be more precisely classified as legal definitions, exemplifications and 
so on. 
The examination of the Constitutional Court’s rulings on irrebuttable presumptions shows 
how, especially in the most recent decisions, they are basically found to be in contrast with 
the Constitution. This, depending on the case, in the extent to which they lack rationality or 
they might enable the taxation of an ability to pay that does not correspond to reality, as the 
taxpayer is prevented from giving evidence to the contrary. 
                                                          
204
 See also Const. Court 27 dicembre 1996, No 415, with regard to the taxpayer’s relatives, 
wherein the findings on the position of the spouse are extended to the taxpayer’s relatives.  On the 
basis of the same arguments, the provision under discussion is found to be unconstitutional where it 
does not provide that the third party’s appeal can be bought when dealing with goods that have 
been brought with a public act having a definite date prior to the taxable event. Cf. G. Fabbrini 
Tombari, L’art. 52 d.p.r. 29 settembre 1972 n. 602 e la giurisprudenza della Corte Costituzionale, Note to 
Constitutional Court 27 December 1996, No 415, Foro It., 1997, 699. 
205
 Which is what is provided for the other third parties by Article 65, Presidential decree No 602/73, being 
them allowed to prove to be the owner of the good concerned only trough a public act or a certified private 
contract having a definite date prior to the delivering of the tax roll. 
206
 Though the possibility to distinguish the position of the spouse in comparison to the others belongs to the 
discretion of the legislator, the prevention from applying the court “cannot be so absolute to put in practice 
the spouse, in relation to the distraint, in the same position of the jointly liable to tax".  
207
 As in the ruling the Court refers to the lack of reasonableness and coherence with the need to favour the 
forming of the family. 
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From the latter consideration it does not follow, a contrario, the compatibility with the 
Constitution when facing rebuttable presumptions. Given the fact that the regulation of the 
proof to the contrary comes into play, the evaluation of the Court is very often extended to 
the parameter stated by Article 24 of the Constitution. As said when discussing of the 
general approach of the Constitutional Court, rebuttable presumptions of law are not 
evaluated solely with reference to parameters concerning the defence, like Article 24 (right 
of defence), Article 97 (principle of good administration), Article 111 (right to a fair trial). 
In fact, it results that similarly to irrebuttable presumptions, the rebuttable ones are to be 
evaluated in view of: 
a) Article 3, with reference to the rationality (i.e. the coherence between known fact 
and unknown fact and the conformity to the id quod plerumque accidit) and to the 
possible disparities that cannot be objectively justified; 
b) Article 53, as to the effectiveness of the ability to pay, in the sense that the taxation 
is levied according to the actual taxpayer’s capacity to contribute to public 
spending; 
The limitations as to the type of proof that the taxpayer is allowed to give may be in 
contrast with the judicial protection that is guaranteed by Article 24 of the Constitution. 
The circumstance that the presumption can be rebutted is not sufficient for the purpose of 
overcoming the constitutional scrutiny. When, for instance, the counterproof turns to be a 
probatio diabolica, similar problems faced with irrebuttable presumptions rise. Moreover, 
the regulation of the contrary proof does not only concern the tax proceedings as a 
consequence of the appeal brought by the taxpayer against the notice of assessment, but it 
also counts during the administrative proceedings. 
In the following paragraphs, a series of rebuttable presumptions of law in force will be 
examined, some of which raise the question of the limitations to the contrary proof in 
relation to the constitutional frame so far highlighted. A few of them have been already 
ruled on by the Constitutional Court.  
In accordance with the order of work illustrated, the focus will be on some of the most 
interesting legal presumptions in force, both in the area of VAT and direct (income) 
taxation, with an eye to the subsequent examination of the EU context. But before turning 
to such provisions, it is suggested to deal with some presumptive methods of assessment. 
The interest is not justified in view of any EU relevance, but rather because of the 
questions of classifications and of compatibility also with the principle of legality that they 
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might arise. They reflect indeed the difficulties of classification when dealing with 
presumptive measures. Notably, some methods of assessment are envisaged in the Belgian 
tax system, but their nature (of legal presumptions) as well as their compatibility with the 
parameter of legality have not been dealt with by the scholars.  
 
6. An outline on the estimated methods of assessment  
As  it is obvious, the first element that should identify tax legal presumptions is the legal 
foundation. This implies that the inference needs to be drawn by a provision of law, or, as 
regards the Italian system, of a law decree or a legislative decree, which are equivalent.  
Where presumptions deemed as being legal and affecting the tax debt are laid down in 
secondary normative provisions or left to the discretion of the tax authority, then they may 
be in contrast with Article 23 of the Italian Constitution. According to the latter, indeed, 
“No personal or property obligation can be imposed unless on the basis of the law”208. 
As is well known, Article 23 is unanimously considered as covering not every element of 
taxation. Hence, not every item of the tax obligation need to be regulated by the law, but 
only the ones defining the an debeatur (the tax event) and the persons liable to taxation. 
Instead, provisions on the tax base (quantum debeatur) or tax rate can be included in 
secondary normative provisions as long as the criteria are laid down in a legislative 
provision.
209
. Furthermore, from analysis of the major literature and constitutional 
judgments, it follows that Article 23 applies to substantive provisions only, so that the tax 
proceedings and the tax recovery do not necessarily have to be regulated in detail within 
the law
210
. It follows that measures affecting one of the essential elements of the tax 
                                                          
208
 The original formula says: “Nessuna prestazione personale o patrimoniale può essere imposta se non in 
base alla legge”. 
209
 A literal argument in this sense is considered to be the wording “on the basis of the law” included in 
Article 23. Of course, in this dissertation it is not possible to exhaust the topic of the legality principle. Thus, 
we refer, ex multis, to A. Fedele, Riserva di legge, in Trattato di diritto tributario, (ed.) A. Amatucci, I, Il 
diritto tributario e le sue fonti, Padova, Cedam, 1994, 157-203. S. Cipollina, La riserva di legge in materia 
fiscale nell’evoluzione della giurisprudenza costituzionale, in Diritto tributario e Corte costituzionale, (eds) 
L. Perrone and C. Berliri, Napoli, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 2006, 163-184. 
210
 A. Fedele, Rapporti tra i nuovi metodi di accertamento ed il principio di legalità, in Il nuovo 
accertamento tributario tra teoria e processo, (ed.) C. Preziosi, Roma, ETI, 1996, 46, explained that there are 
two main theories: according to the first one Article 23 concerns the part of the discipline of the tax 
identifying its specifics characters and function; the second one enlarges the legality principle to all the 
aspects of taxation, though with a different severity depending on the subject of the discipline. The Author 
agreed on the fact that the law must cover the choices on the distributive criteria of the public load, so that it 
must certainly cover the substantive provisions (i.e. regarding tax events, persons liable to tax, tax base, tax 
rate), but it cannot be excluded the inserting of interests relating to those criteria in the formal discipline of 
the relevant tax (i.e. regarding the activity of the tax administration and the taxpayers, the tax collection, the 
fiscal cases, etc.). Thus, in his view Article 23 should apply not only to provisions having a substantive 
nature, but even to a discipline having a formal function, because of the partial protection guaranteed to 
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obligation cannot either be included into secondary normative sources nor left to the tax 
administration’s discretion, without being inconsistent with Article 23 of the Constitution. 
With regard to certain estimated assessments envisaged in the Italian legislation
211
, the 
question arises as to the nature of the presumption laid down in ministerial decrees 
                                                                                                                                                                                
substantive interests (like equity, distributive justice, safeguard of the so-called ‘fiscal interest’). It follows 
the necessity of a legal rule on the criteria and also the limitations to the choices related to the structural 
elements of the taxation. He submitted this position with regard to two hypotheses: a) legal discipline of the 
proof; b) provisions regarding the tax assessment “aiming, more than to the complete realization of the 
legislative choice as to the persons liable to tax, the tax event, the tax base and the tax rate, instead to directly 
affect the behaviours of the mass of the taxpayers according to mean parameters”. Among the second type of 
provisions, basically the so-called ‘redditometro’ and the ‘studi di settore’ are considered. A. Fedele, I 
principi costituzionali e l’accertamento tributario, Riv. Dir. Fin. Sc. Fin., 1992, 463. 
211
 Such standardized methods of assessment are provided for by legislative provisions, but the concrete 
formulation of the fact base is generally left to administrative regulations,  as well as the inference that 
mostly ends up to be no more than a statistical data processing. Cf. A. Di Pietro, Rilevanza sostanziale delle 
“nuove” procedure di accertamento, in Il nuovo accertamento tributario tra teoria e processo, in Il nuovo 
accertamento tributario tra teoria e processo, (ed.) C. Preziosi, Roma, ETI, 1996, 29, observed that the 
presumption, strengthened by the legal foundation, is more and more introduced in the context of the 
derogations to the ordinary methods of assessment, in view of the efficiency of the tax proceedings. Such 
objective prevails over the efficacy that generally characterizes the substantive rule and over the impartiality 
that should qualify the administrative function of tax assessment. From this perspective, the clues assume 
almost the shape of proof, and the Constitutional Court, when involved, tends to prefer the interest to the tax 
collection facing objective difficulties of investigation and control on the side of the tax authority. The 
Author underlined how the Court, when requested to judge on the compatibility of legal presumptions within 
tax assessment, has always evaluated the legal proof not only under the profile of the impartiality and the 
right of defence, but also of the coherence with the ability to pay principle. It follows a substantive effect that 
needs to be kept under consideration while examining the different methods of assessment of recent 
introduction (such as, ‘minimum tax’, ‘coefficienti presuntivi’, ‘redditometro’). From the 1970s and through 
the evolution of the Italian tax system, several types of presumptive instruments of assessment followed one 
upon the other, crossing different areas of taxation, mainly income tax – both individual and enterprise’s – 
and valued added tax. Though they differ in terms of addressee or methodology applied, they share the same 
problems as to the compatibility with fundamental constitutional principles, not least Article 23 of the 
Constitution. In particular, they raise the same demand of debate and consideration of the taxpayer’s 
defensive arguments during the administrative proceedings prior to issuing of the tax assessment. In general, 
they are tools of assessment that the tax administration is entitled to use in the context of the tax audit in 
order to detect the hidden taxable base or some component of the latter.They are based upon presumptive 
criteria pertinent to the relation between expenditure or factors of the production on the one side and taxable 
income or certain components of the latter on the other side. They fall within the category of the so-called 
‘non-analytical methods of assessment’, which differ from the ordinary (‘analytical’) methods of assessment 
and are characterised by the possibility for the tax administration to have recourse to presumptions of fact in 
the re-determination of the overall income, irrespective of the single types of income or accounting items, 
facing the lack of information due to the omissions on the side of the taxpayer or the unreliability of the 
bookkeeping. Though concerning the powers of investigation of the tax administration, they might end up 
affecting the structure of the tax obligation and thereby  impacting directly on the behaviour (in terms of 
obligations) of the taxpayer, particularly where he is not in the position to prove that the result of the method 
concerned does not correspond to reality. For instance, when the ‘studi di settore’ apply, the taxpayer has to 
chose between comply with the results of such statistical studies concerning the relation between indicators 
of normal economic activity and the gross revenue, or disregarding them with the risk of receiving a notice of 
assessment and thus being requested to prove that they do not apply in his specific case. In this regard, it has 
been observed that it appears questionable the rigid distinction, referred to the structure of the tax, between 
substantive provisions on the one side, and provisions concerning the tax assessment on the other side, which 
may be inferred from some judgments of the Constitutional Court. Although the latter are to be evaluated 
mostly in the light of Articles 24 and 97 of the Constitution rather than 53, the risk for procedural provisions 
to affect in concrete the structure of the tribute is real. In the last event, they should also be considered in the 
light of Article 23, in the extent to which they are able to affect aspects covered by the legality principle. See 
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(generally, regulations having a normative character issued by an administrative body) in 
accordance with a certain legislative provision generically referring to the presumption. In 
this regard, it goes without saying that from the perspective of the taxpayer under 
investigation facing a presumption of fact is very much different than confronting a legal 
presumption. The former is left to the prudence of the judge (or is developed by the tax 
authority) and the inference cannot be crystallized in a normative provision. Where the tax 
authority has recourse to a presumption of fact, it cannot simply apply the latter when 
issuing a notice of assessment, being rather requested to justify the use of that inference in 
relation to its characters of seriousness, precision and concordance
212
.  More generally, the 
re-determination of the tax due needs to be supported by a range of probative elements,  
the automatic reference to a presumption of fact alone not being enough for this purpose. 
The sufficiency of the motivation inserted in the tax decision might then be subject to 
evaluation by the court before which the taxpayer lodged an appeal. 
 
6.1 The assessment based on the taxpayer’s spending capacity (‘redditometro’) 
The assessment based on the taxpayer’s spending capacity (‘redditometro’) belongs to the 
genus of the synthetic method of assessment
213
, being provided by Article 38, para 5, 
                                                                                                                                                                                
M. Basilavecchia, Metodi di accertamento e capacità contributiva, Rass. Trib., 2012, 1108. Cf. L. Tosi, 
Profili di costituzionalità della parametrazione del reddito, in Il nuovo accertamento tributario tra teoria e 
processo, Roma, ETI, 1996, 43, who, with particular reference to the ‘studi di settore’ (at that time just 
introduced by the law and on the way of the elaboration by the Commission in charge) raised the question of 
their real nature, in order to clarify if a provision formally on the tax assessment hides in fact a substantive 
way of determination of the income by use of parameters. As a matter of fact, since the ability to pay 
principle implies the reference to an actual economic aptitude, all the methods of determination of the income 
with the use of parameters, though surreptitiously introduced under the form of provisions on the assessment 
procedure, tend to contrast with some constitutional principles (like Article 23, 24, 53). In this regard, it is 
relevant the means and the subject of proof available by the taxpayer: “in other words it is necessary to put 
article 53 of the Constitution in connection with article 24 of the Constitution”. Though the taxpayer is in 
theory guaranteed the exercise of the right of defence, the Author questioned the concrete possibility to 
contest the outcome of the ‘studi di settore’, considering that the probative value of his bookkeeping is 
excluded. It follows a certain difficulty of proof on the side of the taxpayer, especially with regard to 
“normal” events that, albeit affecting the conduct of a business, are not documentable. He is allowed to make 
use of presumptions, and then it’s up to the judge to rule on the plausibility of the contrasting presumptive 
arguments. But precisely this judgment of verisimilitude would be not in line with the constitutional frame, 
according to the Author. 
212
 As requested by article 2729 of the Civil Code. 
213
 The ‘synthetic’ method differs from the ordinary one due to the possibility given to the tax administration 
to re-determine the overall (personal) income regardless of the single categories laid down in Article 6, 
Presidential decree No 917/86 (TUIR) and having recourse to presumptions of fact on condition that they are 
serious, precise, concordant. The general rule governing the rectification of the tax return by the tax 
administration is the analytical consideration of the single categories of income. Both of the methods – 
‘synthetic’ and ‘analytical’ – provided for by Article 38, Presidential decree N° 600/1973, imply that the 
overall income declared in the tax return appears to be below the actual one, or that the deductions from the 
income and from the tax as included in the tax return are not due. Where the overall assessable (i.e. estimated) 
income exceeds for at least one upon five the one declared (i.e. reported in the tax return), the tax 
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Presidential decree No 600/73
214
, where it refers to a ministerial decree for the definition of 
the “inductive content of ability to pay indices”, on the basis of which  the whole individual 
income can be determined. In execution of such provision laying down a general inference 
between expenditure and taxable income, a decree of the Minister of Economic and 
Finance has been enacted (D.M.
215
 10 September 1992), which in fact positively identifies 
the fact base
216
. 
Such decree draws up a list of goods and services
217
 having a peculiar attitude to show a 
qualified ability to pay of the taxpayer, in view of the expenditure that are likely to be met 
for their maintenance. Through the use of parameters and multipliers connected to each 
element of the catalogue
218
, these expenses are quantified and the presumable income that 
is ascribable to the taxpayer is inferred. In other words, once  a certain taxpayer is selected, 
the tax administration identifies which one of the goods/services listed in Table A are in 
his availability during a certain tax period, on the basis of the information included in 
different “databases” (tax registry, traffic control authority, etc.) or a questionnaire filled in 
by the same taxpayer. Each good and service corresponds to a certain coefficient, which 
through the use of a maths formula, leads to the calculation of the global income. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
administration is entitled to use the ‘synthetic’ method, that can nowadays be divided into two subspecies. 
Firstly, pursuant to Article 38, para 4 –modified by Article 22, Law decree 31 May 2010 No 78 - the tax 
administration may synthetically determine the overall income of the taxpayer on the grounds of every kind 
of expenditure incurred during the taxable period concerned. This provision – according also to the Authors 
commenting on its recent introduction – seems to put forward a very general legal presumption, which infers 
the income produced/possessed during a certain taxable period from the costs incurred in the same period. A 
confirmation may be traced reading the rest of the provision, where it is made safe the proof (by the taxpayer) 
that those expenses have been financed with income different from the ones earned during the relevant tax 
period, or with exempt income, or with incomes subject to the definitive withholding taxes or again legally 
excluded from the taxable base forming. Secondly, when  the same pre-conditions occur and with the same 
possibility of contrary proof for the taxpayer, the tax administration is also entitled – pursuant to Article 38, 
para 5 - to make use of “the inductive content of ability-to-pay indices” as identified in a decree of the 
Minister of Economics and Finance every two years, through the analysis of representative taxpayers and 
divided also in the light of family units and geographic area. This is precisely what is commonly known as 
‘redditometro’, which is traditionally distinguished from the above method of (pure) ‘synthetic’ assessment 
as it specifically refers to expenses met for the use and maintenance of certain goods and services.  
214
 The Presidential decree No 600/73 is the Italian legislation governing the assessment of income taxes. 
215
 Italian acronym for Ministerial decree. 
216
 The nature of such decree has been the subject of academic debate, where two main positions have been 
expressed. On the one side, there are those who consider the provision as having the form of a regulation (i.e. 
a normative source); on the other side, there are those who assert its nature of administrative general act. To 
support the former view, one could rely upon the general and, above all, abstract character of the provision 
and from the fact that it is enacted by a subject having a policy function. On the other hand, it should be 
noted that the reference to a ministerial decree for the definition of the indices of ability to pay may be read 
in the sense of a de-regulation of the matter. Indeed, these indices originally were identified by the law 
(Article 2 of the Presidential decree No 600/73). 
217
 See Table A, alleged to the decree. 
218
 And revised every two years. 
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The analysis of the Supreme Court’s rulings on cases involving the application of the 
assessment based on the taxpayer’s spending capacity shows a tendency to consider the 
presumption at the basis of the instrument as being legal
219
. This, mainly arguing from the 
circumstance that the inference is established by Article 38, Presidential decree N° 600/73, 
which refers to a ministerial decree for technical elements only, and above all that it 
represents a means for ‘capturing’ the normal income (i.e. ascribable to the taxpayer based 
on the normal course of events). 
Such an interpretation affects the efficacy of the inference resulting from the 
‘redditometro’. As a matter of fact, in this view the tax administration is not obliged to 
refer to further probative elements, being the result of the redditometro sufficient in order 
to issue a tax assessment
220
. Similarly, the burden of proof in a possible trial is shifted on 
the taxpayer. As a consequence, the judge has to hold such result as proved, unless the 
taxpayer gives proof to the contrary. In this regard, in view of the legal nature of the 
inference, the Supreme Court has on different occasions denied the possibility of 
contesting the inference itself. The taxpayer may prove that the expenses have been met 
with incomes that are exempt or are subject to a definitive withholding tax, or (after Law 
decree No 78/2010) with incomes different from the ones possessed during the tax period 
concerned, or legally excluded from the taxable base. More  generally, the national courts, 
in accordance with some circular letters of the tax administration
221
, allow him to prove 
that the income has not been produced as such, it is lower, or, of course, that the expenses 
have not occurred. In other words, the proof to the contrary can concern the fact base (for 
instance, the possession of a second residence) and the presumed fact (the amount of 
income inferring from the expenses according to the parameters), but not the inference, 
precisely because it has been fixed by the law. 
In line with this case-law of the Supreme Court are a couple of Constitutional Court’s 
decisions, where the legal nature of the presumptions resulting from Article 38 is 
incidentally asserted. These decisions confirm that, as said above, the Constitutional Court 
                                                          
219
 See the following ordinance: Supreme Court 20 December 2011, No 27545. 
220
 See, ex multis, Supreme Court, VI civil division, 20 October 2012, No 18604, where the “confirmed 
jurisprudence of this Court” is recalled in order to assert that when the income is determined by means of the 
redditometro the tax administration is relieved from any further proof as to the fact-indices of a higher ability 
to pay identified in the redditometro and put at the basis of the tax claim. It’s up to the taxpayer, then, 
proving that the presumed income does not exist or it does but in a different amount. Accordingly, 
Commissione tributaria regionale di Bari, sez. XIV, 15 May 2009, No 61.  
221
 See Circular letter 9 August 2007, No 49/E. 
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evaluates presumptive provisions concerning the assessment procedure in the light of a 
substantive parameter, that is the ability to pay principle. 
In the first ruling dating 1987
222
 and referring to the synthetic methods of assessment, the 
Court underlined how the availability of certain goods (secondary houses, horses, ships etc.) 
represents, on the basis of a rule of experience, a sure index of ability to pay. Hence, it is 
able to ground a presumption according to which the person who possesses those goods or 
benefits from those services have a correspondent (taxable) income, though it is not 
possible to analytically identify the source of the latter
223
. From this perspective, from the 
proof of the availability of those goods, the constituing element of the tax obligation 
justifying the tax claim is inferred. As a consequence, the Court finds that such 
presumption fixed by the law is fastened to facts that are certain proof of ability to pay. 
With particular reference to the assessment based on the taxpayer’s spending capacity 
(‘redditometro’), in a second decision224 the Constitutional Court has defined it as being a 
means that lets the tax administration determine the presumable income of the taxpayer on 
the basis of parameters – as indentified in a ministerial regulation - which in the light of 
settled rules of experience are indices disclosing his income. 
If the foregoing has been the prevailing opinion among the scholars as well
225
, very 
recently some signals of an opposite interpretation emerge from the last decisions of the 
                                                          
222
 Const. Court, 23 July 1987, No 283. Critical on this ruling G. Tinelli, L’accertamento sintetico del reddito 
complessivo ai fini dell’IRPEF nella giurisprudenza costituzionale, in Diritto tributario e Corte 
costituzionale, cited above, 380. In his view, the Court has lost the chance to define the demonstrative 
mechanism peculiar to the synthetic method as a legal presumption based on the demonstrative reliability of 
the expenditure, to which the law connects a sort of inversion of the burden of proof on the existence and 
amount of the taxable income. The questions of compatibility would have been better framed. 
223
 I.e. the type of income. 
224
 Constitutional Court, 28 July 2004, N° 297, according to which the taxation is anchored to certain – in the 
sense of proved – facts and within certain limits fixed by the law, in particular having regard to contrary 
proof and threshold. 
225
 See A. Di Pietro, Rilevanza sostanziale delle “nuove” procedure di accertamento, in Il nuovo 
accertamento tributario tra teoria e processo, cited above, 33-34, who excluded that the legal (rebuttable 
presumptions) introduced with the new methods of assessment (‘minimum tax’, ‘coefficienti presuntivi’, 
‘redditometro’) have a merely probative efficacy. In his view, in particular, the use of normal facts and 
averages quantities – that end up to be a formalization of a normative choice - on which the presumptions are 
based on, “increase the distance between the profile of the violation and the one of the assessment” and 
contribute to the deviation from the actual income and to the weakening of the substantive law that is more 
and more characterized by a case-by-case formulation. In fact, the averages “end up to steer also the 
taxpayer’s choices when determining the taxable base. In this way they take, though indirectly, a substantive 
efficacy which as much as the compliance with the average implies the inapplicability of the sanctions”. In 
other words, the procedural provisions do not exhaust their function in the rules on the tax authorities’ 
activity of control and assessment, but they more and more affect the behaviour of the taxpayers. And just 
because of this vested substantive efficacy – especially on the determination of the taxable base - the Author 
considered it as necessary to fix the criteria governing the calculation of the taxable base, and above all to 
secure the observance of the legality principle (Article 23 of the Constitution) as well as of the economic 
ability principle (Article 53 of the Constitution). On the other hand, the Author warned that the wide use of 
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Supreme Court and of the lower courts. In particular, it has been ruled that the assessment 
with the ‘redditometro’ “tends to determine, through the use of presumptions of fact, the 
presumed global income of the taxpayer by means of the indices of ability to pay 
established by the ministerial decree every two years” 226  and more clearly that “the 
redditometro with an uncritical and tabellar application of the parameters is (...) only a 
presumption of fact about a superior ability to produce income, thereby ability to pay, 
which in order to apply for the tax recovery has to be companied and supported by 
circumstantial and recorded fact-checking on the real and actual ability to produce income 
of the taxpayer under assessment”227. 
Though at present there seems to be a contrast within the case-law as to the nature to 
assign to the presumption resulting from the use of the assessment based on the taxpayer’s 
spending capacity, it has to be recognised that the evolution of the instrument tends 
towards a mere presumption of fact, which the tax administration has to support with other 
probative elements in order to issue a notice of assessment. 
In this sense it leads the provision – after the Law decree No 78/2010228 – to a compulsory 
debate between tax administration and taxpayer with the purpose of letting the latter 
                                                                                                                                                                                
legal presumptions based on means is able to alter the traditional relationship between substantive provisions 
and procedural provisions. The risk is that this over-use might stifle every discretionary power of the tax 
administration, confined to the application of provisions, while on the side of the taxpayer the new 
presumptive procedures might overcome the importance of the substantive provisions. Accordingly, A. 
Fedele, Rapporti tra i nuovi metodi di accertamento ed il principio di legalità, cited above, 47, saw in the 
provisions on the tax assessment under discussion an inclination to steer tax administration and taxpayer not 
to the precise observance of the taxable base discipline, but rather to results included in means-bracket 
divided for categories of taxpayers and fixed with several techniques. Here is the insert of substantive 
interests – related to equity in the distribution of the tax burden and to a safer tax collection – within a 
procedural discipline. The legality principle should operate also with regard to the latter discipline, being thus 
requested the setting of criteria and limitations by the law. In his opinion, the evolution of the legislation on 
the assessment seems in contrast with that principle, as long as “it extends the operativeness of the secondary 
sources without assuring  the choices of the tax administration have a sufficient ‘base’ in the primary 
source”. 
226
Supreme Court, tax division, 20 December 2012, No 23554. This, according to the Court, already under 
Article 38 in force before the Law decree No 78/2010, converted into the Law No 122/2010. 
227
 Provincial court of Sondrio, 25 March 2011, No 24. 
228
 The amendments introduced by such decree mostly affect the threshold requested in order to use the 
sysnthetic method - 20% instead of 25% in terms of difference between the income declared and the one 
ascertainable during one taxable period instead of two - and the consideration of the investment expenses, 
which are normally assessed with the pure ‘synthetic’ method. As to the latter, Article 38 included a 
rebuttable presumption according to which the expenditure were met with incomes produced in constant 
quotas in the year when they were met and in the previous four. This presumption has been abrogated, and 
the new para 4, Article 38, mentioned above, generally refers to ‘expenses of any kind’, so that the 
consideration of the assets investments is left to the interpretation of the tax administration and eventually of 
the judge. As to the redditometro, Article 38, para 5, as modified after 2010, refers, for the content of a 
ministerial decree, to a significant sample of taxpayers, explicitly distinguished also as to the composition of 
the family and the geographical area. On the basis of this provision, very recently – with a decree of 24 
December 2012 – a new ‘redditometro’ has been introduced, much more detailed as compared to the 
previous one dated 10 September 1992. While the latter contained a short list of goods and services 
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produce data or information relevant for the assessment, and the necessary start of the 
‘assessment with adherence’229. The possibility for the taxpayer to contest the results of the 
‘synthetic’ method already during the administrative proceedings before the tax 
administration may be interpreted as a sign of a minor (probative) efficacy. From this 
perspective, the tax administration is not bound by the outcome of the ‘redditometro’, 
being rather requested to add further probative elements, in order to render the presumption 
serious, precise, concordant. In addition, the importance given with the ministerial decree 
of 2012 – enacted in execution of the Law decree No 78/2010 - to statistical surveys and 
socio-economic studies, imposes the reference to other probative elements in order to gear 
the data to the concrete case. 
 
6.1.1 Some considerations on the nature of the presumption facing the assessment 
based on the taxpayer’s spending capacity  
As shown in the previous paragraph, several arguments could in theory be raised in favour 
of both of the hypotheses, namely the nature of legal presumption as well as of 
presumption of fact. This reflects the difficulty in classifying the instrument at hand. 
When the assessment based on the taxpayer’s spending capacity (‘redditometro’) was 
introduced, the indices expressing the ability to pay were prescribed by the law – Article 2, 
Presidential decree No 600/73 - so that it was possible to identify a legal presumption with 
reference to the if of the tax claim, at least
230
. In such a framework, the coefficients which 
Article 38, para 4, made reference to were considered as sufficiently restricting the 
                                                                                                                                                                                
associated with a pro-quota expense and a multiplier, the former includes a table with several items and it 
consists also in a calculation of the average expenses attributable to the taxpayer. It is not possible yet to 
express any considerations on the application of the instrument by the tax administration. In this regard, it 
won’t be necessary to wait very long, since the ministerial decree has been enacted on the basis of Article 38, 
para 5, as modified by the Law decree of 2010, so that it will concern the tax returns presented after 2009. 
For our purpose, it appears clear that the introduction of statistics elements in the assessment of the income 
undermines one of the principal arguments in favour of the legal nature of the presumption at the basis of the 
redditometro, which was its correspondence to a rule of experience. 
229
 In the Italian tax system, it is a method of assessment that implies a sort of ‘agreement’ between tax 
administration and taxpayer. 
230
 As observed by A. Fedele, Rapporti tra i nuovi metodi di accertamento ed il principio di legalità, cited 
above, 48, initially the facts-index, from which the parameters of determination of the taxable base are 
inferred, were included in a primary source (Article 2, Presidential decree No 600/73), and the nature of these 
facts was so that the parameters derived implicitly from the primary source. Then the list has been replaced 
by the reference to the minister as to the indication of the elements revealing the ability to pay. “It follows a 
complete lack of predetermination, into primary legal sources, of choices that considering the nature of the 
effects and aims pursued are likely to involve ‘substantial’ interests, both of ‘distributive’ nature and of 
‘fiscal interest’”. In addition, in the preamble of the decrees approving the ‘redditometro’ there is a 
progressive reduction of the criteria and sources adopted. This might affect the judicial protection of the 
taxpayer, when contesting the legitimacy of regulations and general administrative acts in front of the 
administrative judge.  
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discretionary power of the tax administration when identifying and evaluating such 
elements. In other words, under the previous regime the law provided for the fact base that 
needed to be proved by the tax administration in order to make use of the presumption. To 
a Ministerial decree
231
 it was left the technical rules of experience linking the indices to 
certain amounts of global income. Especially in view of the general and abstract provisions, 
the latter were considered as expression of administrative technical discretion having a 
normative function. 
In view of the amendments to the assessment based on the taxpayer’s spending capacity, it 
is nowadays hard to classify it as a legal presumption. It is true that Article 38 fixes the 
inference between expenditure and taxable income, which has been interpreted as a 
presumption as to the ‘income relevance of the expenses’, but this is very general self-
evidence. By referring to a regulation for the elaboration of the indices at hand, it has 
furnished a very spare legal foundation, albeit completed by the limits about the threshold 
and the adversary proof. With particular regard to the quantum, the amount of the income 
assessed is determined through a maths formula according to the parameters established by 
a ministerial decree. Thus, the choice as to the coefficient is completely left to the 
discretion of the Minister and even when possible, it would be difficult for the taxpayer to 
contest the inference. No criteria are traceable in the law in this regard. 
On the other hand, it is a matter of fact that the ‘redditometro’ implies a mitigation of the 
burden of proof normally borne by the tax administration. When the latter has proved the 
existence of certain expenses, it is up to the taxpayer to provide the adversary proof
232
. 
However, this is not automatic, like it would be facing a legal presumption, as the tax 
administration is demanded  - rectius, expected – to adapt the results of the ‘redditometro’ 
to the concrete case during the administrative proceedings, irrespective of the data 
produced by the taxpayer. In fact, when the notice of assessment was enacted by the tax 
office and appealed by the taxpayer, the judge does not seem to be bound by that result, 
being in his prudence the reduction of the tax claim. Precisely this last consideration raises 
doubts about the classification under the label of presumptions of fact, being the reasoning 
and more in general the scheme of the mechanism normatively predetermined. 
 
 
                                                          
231
 I.e. the Ministerial decree 21 July 1983. 
232 Cf. G. Ferranti, La prova contraria negli accertamenti del redditometro, Corr. Trib., 2013, 5. 
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6.2 The assessment based on statistical studies (‘studi di settore’) 
Another standardized method of assessment is the assessment based on statistical studies 
(‘studi di settore’), which grounds on statistical data and socio-economic studies233. It 
concerns only some items of the income (revenues, remunerations and considerations) 
accrued by entrepreneurs and self-employed workers
234
. 
                                                          
233
 It is possible to distinguish two main methods of assessment with regard to the income ascribable to 
enterprises and self-employed persons, which normally are required to keep the accounts. On the one side, 
there is the ‘analytical’ method where the rectification of the data resulting from the tax return is based on the 
books. In fact, it consists of an inspection as to the correct application of the rules governing the 
determination of the relevant income. In this event, the data included in the books may be overcome only 
through direct proofs or serious, precise, concordant presumptions. On the other side, the ‘inductive’ method, 
where the taxable base may be determined globally regardless of the balance and the books, and possibly 
with the use of presumptions devoid of seriousness, precision, concordance as well as of data ‘whatever 
collected’. The tax administration is entitled to make use of this method only in the six hypotheses listed in 
Article 39, para 2, Presidential decree No 600/73, which in brief refers to the failure to declare the taxable 
income or to the lack/unreliability of the books. In addition, it is possible to identify a third method, which is 
in between the two mentioned above and thus defined as ‘analytical-inductive. Indeed, the global income is 
re-determined without disregarding the data of the books, but single assets and liabilities may be determined 
indirectly when it results aliunde that they have been reported incorrectly or not reported in the tax return. It 
is exactly within the frame of this third method that the ‘studi di settore’ are generally set. In particular, 
Article 39, para 1, let. d) counts, where it provides that as regards to the ‘enterprise income’ of individuals 
the tax administration carries on the rectification of the tax return if the “the incompleteness, falseness or 
inexactitude of the elements reported in the tax return or in the documents enclosed” results from the 
examination of the books and accounting records or from the investigations referring to the enterprise 
involved  or from the data collected by the tax administration ex Article 32, Presidential decree No 600/73. In 
this case, “the existence of assets not declared or the inexistence of liabilities declared may be inferred also 
on the basis of presumptions of fact, as long as they are serious, precise, concordant”. Similarly, in the field 
of VAT it is possible to distinguish two main methods of (re)determination of the taxable base. The 
‘analytical’ one is based on the consideration of the tax return and of the accountancy of the taxpayer 
involved, while the ‘synthetic’ one allows the tax administration to re-determine the overall taxable turnover 
and tax rate through the use of presumptions and regardless of the accountancy, but rather by means of data 
and information collected. Ultimately, a third method may be identified, which applies when the 
unfaithfulness, incompleteness, inexactitude of the tax return is indirectly inferred on the basis of the legal 
presumptions of purchase and transfer, of (qualified) presumptions of fact, or emerges from data and 
information obtained during the access and examinations carried out towards other taxpayers, as well as from 
other acts and documents in the tax administration’s hands. In this case, the rectification concerns single 
items relating to taxable operations that have not been reported in the tax return and do not result from the 
books, but it does not disregard the latter. In this context, Article 62-sexies, Law decree No 331/1993 grounds 
the rectification of single items of income on the inconsistencies between the 
revenues/remunerations/considerations declared and the ones resulting from the studi di settore. 
234
 The field of application of the ‘studi di settore’ is confined to enterprises and self-employed workers 
whose business is lower than a certain amount fixed for each sector by the correlative ministerial decree. 
According to Article 10, para 3-ter, Law 8 May 1998, N° 146, these limits may not be higher than 7,5 
millions of euro. See this article and also Article 10-bis – the latter introduced by Article 1, para 13, Law No 
296/2006 - as to the “mode of use of the studi di settore within the assessment” and their periodical revision. 
The former profile has been modified by the Law decree 4 July 2006, No 223, converted into the Law No 
296/2006, which has widened the field by abrogating the threshold of two tax periods of inconsistencies at 
least and by disregarding the accountancy regime adopted. Further amendments have been introduced by 
Article 1, Law 27 December 2006, No 296. The same law, on the one hand – para 14, Article 1 - has referred 
to a ministerial decree (20 March 2007) – the approval of ‘economic normality indicators’ in order to 
determine the revenues or remunerations resulting from the studi di settore, for the purpose of the assessment 
ex Article 10, Law N° 146/98 and the studi di settore adjustment ex Article 2, Presidential decree 31 May 
1999, No 195. They are intended to operate until the revision of the studi that will take into consideration the 
coherence indicators provided for by Article 10-bis, para 2, Law 8 May 1998, No 146, and in para 14-bis it is 
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The reference to the considerations shows the transversality of the instrument, being 
applicable to VAT also. As a matter of fact, it is provided
235
 that the tax assessment 
pursuant to Article 39, para 1, let. d), Presidential decree No 600/73 and 54 Presidential 
decree No 633/72
236
 may be based also on serious inconsistencies between the revenues, 
remunerations and considerations declared and those ones on good grounds inferable from 
the characteristics and conditions of exercise of the specific activity undertaken or from the 
statistical studies (‘studi di settore’)  elaborated ex Article 62-bis, Law decree No 331/1993. 
The assessment at hand has been introduced by Articles 62-bis and 62-sexies of the Law 
decree 30 August 1993, No 331, added when converted into the Law 29 October 1993, No 
427, with the aim of rendering more effective the tax assessment, especially in relation to 
enterprises, self-employed workers and individuals exercising a profession. They are 
mostly the result of economic analysis and statistical data. Simplifying, they are the result 
of a series of steps that can be summarized as follows: 
- collection of data concerning the taxpayers belonging to the different productive 
sectors (i.e. industries), by having recourse to the tax registry, and also to 
questionnaires sent by the tax administration; 
- elaboration of the data with the aim of reducing the several variables into factors, 
describing the main elements characterising each sector; 
- through the cluster analysis homogeneous groups of taxpayers are formed, which 
can be considered as representing the organizational model of the sector, by taking 
care of eliminating the “abnormal” taxpayers; 
- determination of the amount of remunerations referring to the cluster’s members 
trough a statistical technique; 
- correction of the remunerations function depending on the geographical variable; 
- allotment of the single taxpayer to one or more clusters with the use of a statistical 
technique. 
As these steps make evident, the peculiarity of the method of assessment at hand already 
concerns the elaboration of the study, where it moves from the fact to the norm instead of 
                                                                                                                                                                                
clarified that they are experimental and that the higher revenues/remunerations/considerations resulting from 
them represent merely presumptions of fact. On the other hand, according to para 19, with regard to the 
taxpayers holder of enterprise’s and self-employed worker’s income who the studi di settore do not apply to, 
specifics ‘indicatori di normalità economica’ (indices of economic normality) are identified. They are 
intended to detect both revenue or remunerations not included in the tax return that can be presumably 
ascribable to the taxpayer with reference to the conditions of the activity carried on and irregular jobs’. 
235
 Article 62-sexies, Law decree No 331/1993. 
236
 Which include the ItalianVAT legislation. 
Legal Presumptions in National Tax Systems. 
The Italian and Belgian Case 
 
 
99 
the opposite
237
. In other words, normally we assist with the application of a certain 
provision to a concrete situation. By contrast, the instrument at hand is elaborated on the 
basis of the concrete situations and its application in a concrete case does not exactly imply 
an assumption of the situation in the provision. It rather entails the analysis of the recurring 
of certain conditions as to the activity carried on, in order to insert the taxpayer under 
investigation in one or more clusters and verifying if the declared revenues correspond to 
or deviate
238
 from the standards. 
Obviously, all this affects the efficacy of the instrument – and thereby any consideration on 
its nature - as it imposes a debate with the taxpayer already during the administrative 
proceedings. This, with the purpose of a fair procedure and, above all, of adjusting the 
result to the concrete case by considering the factors ignored by the study. 
 
                                                          
237
 C. Garbarino, Aspetti probatori degli studi di settore, in Rass. Trib., 2002, 238; The Author asserted the 
probative – rather than normative – nature of the presumptions at the basis of the pre-defined criteria for the 
inference included in the tax assessment; already in C. Garbarino, Studi di settore, onere della prova, avviso 
di accertamento, in Il nuovo accertamento tributario tra teoria e processo, Roma, ETI, 1996, 216. Cf. A. 
Ferrario, Presunzioni in base a parametri e studi di settore, Note to Const. Court 1 April 2003, GT Riv. Giur. 
Trib., 2003. See also L. TOSI, Profili di costituzionalità, cited above, 44, who with reference to the methods 
of assessment introduced in the period 1989- 1995 (i.e. ‘coefficienti presuntivi di reddito e di ricavi’, 
‘minimum tax’, ‘accertamento induttivo in base a contributo diretto lavorativo nel 1994’, ‘accertamento in 
base agli studi di settore nel 1995’) observed that the presumptions used by the tax administration in these 
hypotheses do not directly refer to the taxpayer under assessment. In his view, by making use of “indices, 
coefficients and parameters drawn from means of sector, methods of determination of the (professionals’ and 
smaller enterprises’) income through parameters have been – directly or indirectly – introduced, with the aim 
of rendering more efficient the tax assessment and the subsequent collection. Contra, with reference to the 
question of the compatibility of the studi di settore with the legality principle, see A. Fedele, Rapporti tra i 
nuovi metodi di accertamento ed il principio di legalità, cited above, 48-49, who believed that they operate 
on the side of the organization of the tax administration’s activity and of the taxpayers rather than on the side 
of the discipline of the legal proof. A certain logical inferential procedure that deduces criteria for the 
determination of items of income of a taxpayer from the results of previous investigation activities regarding 
other entrepreneurs of the same sector. In his view, the results are relevant because they can rationalize the 
activity of the tax administration – by rendering the decision on the measure of the taxable base more 
persuasive - and contribute to the uniformity of the taxpayer’s behaviour. In other words, they do not fix 
probative restrictions or rules of judgment.  In any case, he did not see a violation of Article 23, because the 
instrument is provided by the law, where the reference is to the overall activity of control rather than to 
specifics facts and correlative income (like in redditometro), though it would be advisable the provision of 
precise limits and criteria as to the aim of orientation pursued. However, as underlined in the text, the 
application of the instrument by the tax administration shows a certain automatic use of the results, often 
without a rational investigation. 
238
 Pursuant to Article 62-sexies, para 3, serious inconsistency is requested in order to issue a notice of 
assessment. 
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6.2.1 Some considerations on the nature of the assessment based on statistical studies 
(‘studi di settore’) 
When discussing the nature of the assessment based on statistical studies the relevant rules 
and the interpretation given by national courts offer conflicting arguments in favour of 
different theories, with consequences in terms of their probative efficacy. 
On the one side, the legal nature of the outcome resulting from the application of such 
statistical studies has been supported 
239
. In fact, even in the rulings where they are 
qualified as presumptions of fact, the Supreme Court has recognised that they simplify the 
burden of proof normally laying on the tax administration, putting on the taxpayer the onus 
of proving that in the concrete case they do not apply
240
. As we have seen in the first 
chapter, the shift of the onus of proof normally follows a legal (rebuttable) presumption. 
In this regard, it has to be observed that it was possible to identify a legal presumption at 
most with reference to the presumptive coefficients (‘coefficenti presuntivi’), formerly in 
force, which were regulated by the Law decree No 69/89, while this is hard to argue with 
reference to the statistical studies. Apart from a legal (but very general) foundation and 
from the probative effects, it would become a strained interpretation considering this 
method of assessment as a legal presumption. Mainly because the typical scheme of a legal 
rebuttable presumption does not occur: a real known and proved fact is missing and the 
                                                          
239
 A. Fantozzi, Gli studi di settore nell’accertamento del reddito di impresa, in Diritto tributario e Corte 
costituzionale, ed.) L. Perrone e C. Berliri, Napoli, Edizioni scientifiche italiane, 2006, 396-397-398, 
supported the qualification of the ‘studi di settore’ as a rebuttable presumption. However, he put the attention 
on the sui generis structure of the presumption. The known fact is represented by the structural characteristics 
of the enterprise activity that are relevant for the purpose of the application of the studio di settore (such as 
spaciousness of the premises, number of workers and so on), while the unknown fact is the amount of 
revenue achieved during a certain tax period. The inference is based on the rule of experience according to 
which if analogous activities achieve a certain amount of revenue, then the same is for the activity under tax 
assessment. However – and this is the first peculiarity  –  the selection of the structural characteristics to 
consider and the mean revenues, is not left to the prudence of the tax administration or the judge, but it rather 
consists in a statistical-maths function fixed in ministerial decrees. The statistical way of forming affects the 
contrary proof that the taxpayer is entitled to give in order to avoid the application of the instrument. As a 
matter of fact, that contrary proof is confined to the circumstances that render the presumption not applicable 
in the case at hand. Being almost impossible for the taxpayer to prove the different amount of the revenues by 
contesting the inference – since it is left by the law to the ministerial decrees and in any case requests data 
not available by the taxpayer – he normally needs to prove those situations not considered by the studio di 
settore that justify an abnormal running of the enterprise so that the analogy with the “normal” activity 
considered by the studio appears to be not-reasonable. Thus – and here is the second peculiarity  – the 
contrary proof does not concern the unknown fact, but rather the known fact, that is the analogy between the 
activity assessed and the  “normal” one. “Under the conceptual point of view, it follows that the presumption 
at hand (i.e. the “normal” activity has revenues equal to the mean ones of analogous activities) is in fact not 
open to contrary proof, being only possible to confute only the assumption of the presumption (the normality 
of the activity under control)”. 
240
 Because, for instance, the inconsistency between the amount of the remunerations as declared in the tax 
return and the ones resulting from the application of the ‘studi di settore’ is justified in the light of particular 
conditions of the activity carried on during the relevant taxable period, or more in general, of circumstances 
that are the cause of a lower income. 
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inference is reduced to a statistical function. Moreover, the judge is not bound by the 
outcome of the studi di settore; on the contrary,  the free evaluation of proof is operative. 
More convincing appears the opinion that, on the other side, ascribes the statistical studies 
to the category of the presumptions hominis. This, by giving importance to the 
circumstance that they not always lead to a precise value, but more often to a values 
bracket. As a consequence, the tax administration cannot simply rely on the deviation of 
the declared revenues from the results of the mechanism, when issuing a notice of 
assessment. By contrast, in the motivation it seems to be requested that there is the 
reference to other probative elements, able to qualify those results as presumptions being 
serious, precise and concordant. 
This is the interpretation embraced by the Italian Supreme Court in the more recent rulings, 
with the persuasive strength of the plenary session. In the decision 18
 
December 2009, No 
26635 the Court has ruled that the standardized method of assessment with the statistical 
studies consists of a system of presumptions of fact, whose seriousness, precision and 
concordance is not determined by the law only on the basis of the standards. On the 
contrary, it is the corollary of the administrative proceedings in relation to the debate with 
the taxpayer, which must be put into operation. The hearing of the taxpayer
241
 plays a 
fundamental role in the adjustment of the statistical elaboration of the standards to the 
concrete economic situation of the taxpayer. As a consequence, if the tax administration 
disregards the remarks and data produced by the latter, it has to give account of this in the 
motivation of the notice of assessment. In addition, the Supreme Court clarifies that, 
irrespective of the taxpayer’s behaviour during the administrative proceedings242, he holds 
the possibility to appeal the notice of assessment and to make recourse to all the types of 
proof normally admitted in the tax proceedings, presumptions of fact included. Finally, as a 
confirmation of the just-affirmed nature of presumptions hominis, the Supreme Court 
underlines the principle of free evaluation by the judge as to the applicability of the method 
at hand – applicability that the tax administration is requested to prove – as well as to the 
contrary proof produced by the taxpayer. 
On a closer view, however, even the second reading of the statistical studies, though 
supported by the Supreme Court, does not appear satisfactory. They do not follow the 
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 Pursuant to article 10, par. 3-bis, Law No 146/1998 it is compulsory. See also the Circular letter No 31/E 
of the 22 May 2007. 
242
 He can present observations in order to convince the tax administration not to apply the ‘studi di settore’ 
to his concrete case, or he can remain inert, without losing the right to raise arguments in this sense during a 
tax trial. 
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typical scheme of presumptions, not even of the hominis ones, which normally are those 
drawn from a known fact to an unknown fact by the judge (or the tax administration). Here, 
indeed, the reasoning is drawn elsewhere; though the judge is not bound by the outcome of 
the statistical studies – and the same seems to be for the tax administration – he does not 
appear to be able to ignore them. Furthermore, as already said, it is undoubted that they 
shift the burden of proof on the taxpayer, at least during the administrative proceedings. In 
other words, once the tax administration verifies the inconsistency between the revenues 
reported in the tax return and the outcome of the statistical studies, it is up to the taxpayer 
to raise exceptions. If he does provide elements and the tax administration issues the notice 
of assessment, it is requested to explain in the motivation why they have been disregarded. 
But if he decides not to intervene in the debate when invited, the tax administration will be 
legitimated to issue a notice of assessment only on the basis of the standards. Thus, this 
certainly results in a lightening of the burden of proof normally laying on the tax 
administration
243
. 
In conclusion, the statistical studies cannot be included within the category of tax law 
presumptions without forcing the legislative data. They represent a presumptive method of 
assessment where the outcome is part of a more general presumptive reasoning that 
demands the reference to further concrete probative evidence in order to be considered as 
plausible. In the light of this, they might be classified as a ‘weak legal presumption’244, by 
indicating that, albeit their legal foundation, their probative efficacy has to be supported by 
further probative elements, included the information possibly produced by the taxpayer in 
the context of the compulsory debate. 
As with the assessment based on the taxpayer’s spending capacity, the fact that Articles 
62-bis and 62-sexies provide for a very general rule and refer to a regulation for the 
elaboration of the statistical studies, might create problems of legal certainty. The 
taxpayers subject to that method, the components of income and the procedure to apply are 
identified. More vague is the reference to the elaboration of the instrument
245
, which in fact 
is left to a ministerial decree.  
 
                                                          
243
 See G. Corasaniti,  La natura giuridica degli studi di settore ed il problema dell’onere della prova, Dir. 
Prat. Trib., 2008, 13; L. Garibbo, Studi di settore: presunzioni ed onere della prova, Dir. Prat. Trib., 2011, 3.  
244
 The formula is used by  G. Fransoni, Sulle presunzioni legali nel diritto tributario, Rass. Trib., 2010, 603. 
245
 According to Article 62-bis, the tax offices identify significant samples of taxpayers part of the same 
sectors to be controlled, in order to find the elements characterizing the activity carried on. 
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7. Legal presumptions within the banking inspections 
Similarly to the estimated methods of assessment mentioned above, the nature of the 
presumptions provided in the context of the tax investigations carried out by the tax 
authority in the field both of income taxation and VAT is very much debated
246
. In practice, 
the tax officer may issue the tax demand on the basis of the banking transactions’ data  
resulting from the bank account of the taxpayer under assessment. 
In fact, after the progressive abolition of the banking secret the tax administration is now 
entitled to get information as to the transactions involving the taxpayer from banks and 
similar financial operators. This type of information represent the known fact from which 
the existence of evaded revenues or taxable operations is inferred, unless they are 
registered in the books or the taxpayer gives the proof to the contrary that is requested. 
Before examining the questions at issue, it is convenient to show what is stated in the 
relevant provisions, which deal with the powers of investigation ascribable to the tax 
administration – in general, thus including tax officers and financial police – during the tax 
proceedings.  
 
7.1 In the field of income taxation 
Pursuant to Article 32, para 1, Presidential decree No 600/73
247
 in order to accomplish 
their tasks the tax officers may: 
- ask – upon an authorization by the general or regional director of the tax 
administration or of the regional commander of the customs officer – to the banks 
and to a series of listed financial operators for the data, information and documents 
concerning the relation and financial transactions carried out with their clients (No 
7); 
- invite the taxpayer – with the indication of the reason - to appear before the tax 
officer (in person or with a delegate) in order to produce data and information 
relevant for the purpose of the tax investigations on his position, even with 
reference to the data collected pursuant to number 7 cited above (No 2). 
                                                          
246
 The focus will be on income taxation and VAT. It has to be noted, however, that the introduction of 
Article 53-bis, Presidential decree No 131/86 (on registration duty) by Article 35, para 24, let.a), Law decree 
No 223/2006, has rendered the banking and financial investigations available also for the purpose of the tax 
procedure in the field of registration duty and mortgage and cadastral taxes (provided for by Legislative 
decree No 347/90). 
247
 That is the Presidential decree containing “Common provisions in the matter of assessment of the income 
taxes”.  
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The same provision states that these data and elements are the basis for the notice of 
assessment issued pursuant to Articles 38, 39, 40, 41
248
 when the taxpayer does not prove 
that: 
- he has taken them – the data at hand - into consideration when determining the 
taxable income or 
- they do not have any fiscal relevance. 
Lastly, it is established that “on the same conditions the withdrawals or the amount that 
have been cashed within the aforesaid relations or transactions are also deemed as being 
revenues or remunerations and put at the basis of the same notice of assessment, if the 
taxpayer does not indicate the beneficiary and as long as they do not result from the 
accounting records” (No 2, 2nd indent). 
The latter provision, in particular, has been considered as laying down a presumption iuris 
tantum of revenues and remunerations as to the withdrawals and deposits made by the 
taxpayer on his bank account. The idea supporting the inference is that the transactions – 
ingoing and outgoing – made within the bank account of the taxpayer and that he is unable 
to justify are related to the economic activity undertaken (business enterprise or self-
employment), thereby they correspond to (evaded) taxable income. 
 
7.2 In the field of VAT 
Similarly, Article 51, Presidential decree No 633/72 (legislation on VAT) provides the 
same powers for the Vat officers, as they may: 
- ask – upon authorization – to banks and other financial entities for data, information 
and documents on the relations, financial transactions and services made for their 
clients (No 7); 
- invite the economic operators (entrepreneurs, self-employed persons) to appear 
before the tax officer in order to produce documents or books, or to give data or 
explanations relevant for the purpose of the investigation on their tax position, even 
with reference to the data collected by the tax administration according to the 
previous provision (No 2). 
The data collected pursuant to number 7 are put at the basis of the notice of assessment 
issued pursuant to Articles 54 and 55
249
 if the taxpayer does not prove that: 
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 Of Presidential decree No 600/73, dealing with tax assessment. 
249
 Both dealing with the tax assessment in the field of VAT, respectively the rectification of a non-correct 
tax return and the assessment facing the lack of the tax return. 
Legal Presumptions in National Tax Systems. 
The Italian and Belgian Case 
 
 
105 
- he took them into consideration into the tax returns or 
- they do not refer to taxable operations for VAT purposes. 
It is lastly clarified that both the taxable operations and the purchases are considered as 
being carried out “at the tax rate mainly applied or that would have been applied”. 
Such provision - read together with Article 32 on income taxation - has been interpreted as 
drawing a presumption iuris tantum according to which the withdrawals and deposits that 
are recorded in the banking account but not in the books stand for revenues that have not 
been declared or have been used for black purchases. Or, said differently, they correspond 
to fiscally relevant operations. What is presumed, here, seems to be the inherence of the 
banking transactions in respect of taxable operations within the frame of an economic 
activity subjected to VAT. 
Both of the presumptions under discussion raise several questions, as they are provided 
within the rules on the tax proceedings – dealing with the powers of the tax 
administration – but they are likely to affect substantive interests. Besides the traditional 
question related to their nature
250
, the inference drawn by the legislator between known 
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 Which does not have a merely theoretical significance. In a few decisions of the Constitutional Court and 
Supreme Court that will be analyzed in the text under different aspects, the retroactive application of Article 
32, paragraph 1, N° 2, second period, has been under examination. Indeed, initially it included only the 
reference to revenues, which are the positive items of the income from the exercise of an enterprise. The Law 
No 311/2004 (paragraph 402, let.a), No 1 and 572, Article 1) has extended the presumption to remunerations 
too, which indicate the positive income from self-employed activity. Since Article 32 at hand has been 
considered as a procedural provision, then the tax administration has immediately applied the presumption of 
remunerations as to the banking transactions that self-employed workers could not justify. In other words, the 
presumption has been used with reference also to tax periods prior to the entry into force of the provision 
under discussion. As it has been explained in the first chapter, the procedural provisions are regulated by the 
rule ‘tempus regit actum’, in the sense that in order to find out the applicable rule it has to be considered the 
moment in which the act is done. On the contrary, when a substantive provision is at issue, it has to be 
considered the discipline applicable when the fact (the tax event giving rise to the tax obligation, here the 
possess of income) happens. Many self-employed workers who had received a notice of assessment levying a 
higher tax have contested in the tax trial the constitutional compatibility of the provision where it applies to 
tax periods prior to 2005.  In fact, at that time, the self-employed workers could not predict that the 
presumption at hand would have applied to them, so that they did not consider to keep the documents 
requested in order to give proof to the contrary. A proof to the contrary that – as it will be explained in the 
text – might be ex se very difficult to furnish. Apart from the violation of the principle of equality and right 
of defence, then, the retroactivity of the presumptions was able to affect the general principle on the 
protection of legitimate expectations. The latter has been recognized to the taxpayer by article 10 of Law 27 
July 2000, No 212, which at the first paragraph states that the relations between taxpayer and tax 
administration have to be marked by the principle of cooperation and bona fide. Instead, up to now it is not 
generally recognized to the same principle a fully constitutional protection, though Article 97 of the 
Constitution could be a basis in this sense, where it provides (1
st
 paragraph) that the public offices are 
organized according to the law in order to guarantee the good performance and impartiality of the 
administration. The question of the compatibility of Article 32, para 1, No 2, 2
nd
 indent, with Articles 3 and 
24 of the Constitution has been rejected (rectius, declared as clearly inadmissible for inadequate statement of 
reasons as to the relevance) by the Ordinance 23 November 2011 No 318, in the light of two considerations. 
Firstly, in the main case the tax decisions appealed by the taxpayer (a lawyer) were issued because he had not 
presented the tax return for the tax periods 2003 and 2004; as a consequence, the case fall within the area of 
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fact and unknown fact is not clear so that the evaluation of rationality is left to the 
interpretation. Moreover, the peculiarity of the contrary proof requested by the norm ad the 
circumstance that the debate with the taxpayer is considered as being optional during the 
tax procedure is able to jeopardize his right of defence, which is very often postponed to 
the tax trial before the judge. 
 
7.3 The inference. Constitutional Court’s judgment No 225/2005  
The scheme of the presumption laid down by Article 32, para 1, No 2, second indent, has 
been dealt with in the fundamental decision N° 225/2005 handed by the Constitutional 
Court
251
.  
The judge of the main proceedings observed in the order of reference that the provision 
consisted of a double legal presumption, which inferred from the withdrawals the existence 
of purchases and from the latter the accrual of revenues
252
. The result was the relief for the 
tax administration from the burden of proving the tax evasion. Given that the revenues 
presumed were deemed as taxable income without any deductibility of the related costs – 
in practice, equalizing revenues and incomes - the system ended up to be discriminatory 
towards the taxpayers assessed according to the banking outcomes. Plus, the ‘improper 
sanction’ in this way imposed was not in line with the ability to pay principle, as far as the 
taxpayer could be called to meet a higher tax obligation. 
The question of inconsistency with Articles 3 and 53 of the Constitution raised by the 
lower court has been rejected by the Court with a scanty and disappointing reasoning. 
The focus is once again on the scheme of the presumption concerned and on its rationality. 
With regard to the first point, the Court – following the opinion of the State legal advisory 
service – refers to the more recent jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, which recognizes a 
detraction of the costs according to a certain percentage from the (higher) income assessed 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Article 41, Presidential decree No 600/73 that allows the use of not-qualified presumptions of fact, and the 
judge of the main proceedings did not explain why he wanted to refer to the presumptions laid down in 
Article 32 concerned. Secondly, the Constitutional Court recalls the case-law of the Supreme Court that has 
always interpreted Article 32 as being applicable also to self-employed workers, even before the amendment 
in force from the 1
st
 January 2005, through a broad interpretation of the term ‘revenues’. See V. Guido, 
Profili di illegittimità dell’applicazione retroattiva delle presunzioni bancarie a carico dei professionisti, 
Rass. Trib., 2012, 1233 et seq. 
251
 Const. Court 8 June 2005, No 225. See the Note of A. Marcheselli, Prelevamenti bancari non 
contabilizzati e presunzione tributaria di ricavi: un’occasione perduta, Giust. Cost. 2005, 4005; Critical on 
the decision G. Fransoni, La presunzione di ricavi fondata sui prelevamenti bancari nell’intepretazione della 
Corte Costituzionale, Riv. Dir. Trib., 2005, 976 et seq. 
252
 Before the amendment with Article 1, para 402, Law 30 December 2004 No 311, the provision referred to 
withdrawals only, whereas then it has been extended to deposits also. 
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by the tax administration on the basis of the provision at hand. When interpreted in this 
way, the provision cannot be considered in contrast with Article 53, as it turns out to be a 
presumption of revenues iuris tantum inferred from the existence of withdrawals that have 
not been recorded in the books. A presumption that may be rebutted by indicating the 
beneficiary of such withdrawals. 
Even more cursory is the appraisal of the rationality of the presumption, which is 
expressed in the negative. In fact, the Court uses a formula that can be found in many of 
the recent judgments. It is stated that “it is not clearly arbitrary” to assume that the 
withdrawals from the banking accounts done by an entrepreneur and devoid of any 
justifications have been allocated to the business (enterprise’s activity) and thereby 
considered as taxable income, save the related costs. 
The approach of the Constitutional Court to the presumption concerned reflects the same 
followed in previous decisions on similar matters. However, the vagueness of the 
presumption’s scheme would have requested a closer examination. 
Undoubtedly the existence of financial transactions – in particular, withdrawals – recorded 
in the bank account that a certain entrepreneur cannot justify might represent the index of 
non-declared revenues in an extent to which they correspond to deposits for the same 
amount. But as set out in the provision concerned the scheme is not straightforward and it 
assumes two different steps: 
- the first one, from the withdrawals to the investment of the amount in the economic 
activity (purchases); 
- the second one, from the purchases to the revenue. 
This, at least, seems to be the inference in the interpretation of the Constitutional Court.  
It is not clear why the legislator has not used a more linear inference, like would have been, 
for instance, the one between withdrawals and costs on the one side and deposits and 
revenues on the other side. The circumstance that the Court excludes the “clear 
irrationality” of the presumption under discussion, rather than positively asserting its 
rationality shows the difficulty in supporting the consistency with the principle of 
reasonableness
253
. In this view, the qualification of the regulation suggested by the judge of 
the main case as an improper sanction is not without foundation. The withdrawals are 
presumed to be revenues, unless the taxpayer indicates the beneficiary. 
                                                          
253
 Critical on the presumption at hand under the profile of the reasonableness of the reversal of the burden of 
proof, A. Marcheselli, Prelevamenti bancari non contabilizzati e presunzione tributaria di ricavi: 
un’occasione perduta, cited above, 4005, where some alternative interpretations are advanced. 
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Given the vagueness of the rationale supporting the presumption, such cooperation should 
be binding during the tax proceedings and before issuing the notice of assessment. In other 
words, the debate with the taxpayer is fundamental. 
On the other hand, the scanty decision of the Constitutional Court also reflects the 
incorrect formulation of the question by the judge of the main proceedings, with reference 
to the choice of the provision under examination and the parameter of evaluation as well. 
On the first side, the possible taxation of a gross income was not the consequence of 
Article 32, para 1, No 2, as the latter only presumed the existence of revenue, without 
averting from the deduction of costs. On the other side, it has been correctly observed that 
the choice of questioning on the compatibility with Article 53 of the Constitution as to the 
equalization between revenues and taxable income has overshadowed the parameter of 
reasonableness and most of all the right of defence
254
. 
 
7.4 Procedural guarantees 
The discussion on the rebuttable presumption of law laid down by Article 32, para 1, No 2, 
2
nd
 indent, cannot disregard a question that have not been coped with by the foregoing 
decision, but that it is worthy of attention as it has a more general significance. 
Unlike irrebuttable presumptions, the rebuttable presumptions allow the taxpayer to give 
proof to the contrary. However, it is also important to see in which context he is put in the 
condition to do it. While it is obvious that, in observance of Article 24, par. 2 which 
secures the jurisdictional protection of rights, the taxpayer can (try to) rebut the 
presumption during the tax trial, it is not foregone that it may already happen within the 
administrative proceedings.  
                                                          
254
 In this sense A. Marcheselli, Prelevamenti bancari non contabilizzati e presunzione tributaria di ricavi: 
un’occasione perduta, cited above, p. 4005 , who sets this approach within a tendency of the judges of the 
main cases to privilege the substantive aspects (by referring to Article 53 of the Constitution) to the detriment 
of the procedural ones. The ability to pay principle is the parameter of constitutionality referred to 
substantive provisions in tax law. Whereas “the administrative and jurisdictional procedures, though they 
are means for the realization of the substantive right, have an autonomy that is recognized even at the 
constitutional level”. Indeed, to the provisions governing the trial Articles 24, 111 and possibly 113 apply; 
with regard to the administrative procedures, though the Constitutional Court does not recognize a principle 
of the ‘fair procedure’, nor even on the basis of Article 97, nonetheless the principle of reasonableness ex 
Article 3 has to be met. As a result, a provision that regulated without reasonableness the tax procedure or the 
tax trial would indirectly affect substantive interests by producing a levy contrary to the capacity to pay, but 
earlier directly its own constitutional parameters, such as the principle of reasonableness, the right of defence, 
the right to a fair trial. With special reference to irrebuttable legal presumptions, the Author underlines that 
they are in line with the principle of reasonableness and the right of defence (in the context of the trial) when 
they do not render difficult or impossible the exercise of the party’s right. In this frame, the reversal of the 
burden of proof is rational only in two hypotheses:  if the presumed fact is likely or if the onus is put on the 
party who can more easily bear it. 
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For instance, Articles 32 and 51 under exam make reference to the record of the requests 
(of information, documents etc.) done to the taxpayer and the answers received with regard 
to the banking data collected by the tax administration, so that they seem to imply a debate 
taking place during the tax procedure. In other words, a literal interpretation of the norms 
would lead to consider the possibility for the taxpayer to produce data and documents 
during the tax investigations as being necessary, though the lack of observance by the tax 
administration is not punished. Nevertheless, the debate has been considered as merely 
optional rather than compulsory, according to a unanimous jurisprudence of the Supreme 
Court. As a consequence, a notice of assessment issued without a previous debate with the 
taxpayer is not deemed as null. In other words, the taxpayer has not the right to be heard in 
the context of the tax procedure
255
. 
It is a regrettable interpretation especially facing such a presumption, which requests the 
cooperation of the taxpayer for the correct definition of the known fact 
(withdrawals/deposits)
256
. On the contrary, the taking place of a fundamental phase within 
the tax procedure is left to the discretion of the public party.  
More in general, it has to be observed that, up till to now, the right of the taxpayer to 
adduce evidence during the tax proceedings, and thereby before the tax litigation, does not 
find a constitutional protection. As said already, the Constitutional Court has in several 
occasions clarified that Article 24, par. 2, does not apply to the administrative procedures, 
but only to the proceedings before the judge. In brief, it is argued, as long as the individual 
                                                          
255
 Ex multis, Supreme Court, tax division, 21 April 2008, 10261. See A. R. Ciarcia, La valutazione e 
l’utilizzo della prova nel processo tributario, Napoli, Satura, 2010, at 111, for case-law references.  
256
 Very much critical towards the traditional approach of the Supreme Court according to which there is 
neither a general nor a constitutional duty to start a debate with the taxpayer within the tax procedure A. 
Marcheselli, Contraddittorio e accertamenti bancari: i principi costituzionali e comunitari, Note to Supreme 
Court 5 February 2009, No 2752, Rass. Trib., 2009, 1204 and 1211.  In the case commented the tax 
administration had found in the banking account of the taxpayer withdrawals for considerable amount that 
were considered as being taxable income. The defence of the taxpayer was based on receipts of wins in the 
lottery, which however did not coincide with the amount of the different withdrawals. The Author focuses on 
the part of the decision where it is said that “it is ius receptum in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court the 
principle  according to which (…) the tax administration is not burdened to start a phase pre-contentious of 
debate with the taxpayer in order to use the data and elements resulting from the banking and financial 
investigations”. In the attempt to confute the ruling of the Supreme Court, the Author observes that even if 
we suppose that such a duty is not imposed either by the Constitution or by a general provision of law, it does 
not follow that the debate is not compulsory in the case of the banking assessment. In fact, there is a specifics 
provision (Article 32) that requests the taxpayer to be heard before issuing the tax decision. Moreover, given 
the difficulties in finding a foundation for the presumption at hand, the debate represents a “corrective to an 
unreasonable presumption” or a “structural element of the tax assessment procedure”. A solution denying 
the debate in the tax procedure would be detrimental both to the principle of impartiality and good 
performance of the public administration and to the right of defence of the taxpayer in a broad sense. The 
Author also notes how the jurisprudence in the field of the statistical studies (‘studi di settore’) has 
recognized the importance of the debate as a way of adapting the (presumptive) method of assessment to the 
concrete economic reality of the taxpayer assessed. 
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is given the possibility to bring an action and to produce evidence in order to get the 
protection of his substantive right, then the fundamental norm on the jurisdictional 
protection may not be considered as violated. It follows a gap as to the protection of the 
taxpayer facing rebuttable presumptions of law in the phase of the tax procedure. 
 
7.5 Proof to the contrary 
Alike in most of the tax rebuttable presumptions, the focus has to be on the contrary proof, 
which directly affects the safeguard of the taxpayer’s right of defence and indirectly the 
consistency with the principles of reasonableness and of ability to pay. 
As it will be underlined later on, some of the presumptions of recent introduction show a 
scheme different in part from the one traditionally described by the civil-procedural 
doctrine. In this sense, Article 32, para 1, No 2, second period is a very good example. 
Here the legislator identifies the known fact (withdrawals/deposits), the unknown fact 
(evaded revenues) and confines the contrary proof to the indication of the beneficiary. 
Thus, it seems that the indication of the beneficiary is not technically a contrary proof, as it 
does not imply that there are not hidden revenues. The taxpayer is requested to prove who 
the banking transactions are allocated to – for instance, personal uses rather than payment 
of supplying firms - instead of giving evidence as to the fiscal irrelevance of those 
financial transfers or that they did not produce any taxable income
257
. In other words, the 
contrary proof concerns the application of the presumptive scheme to the concrete case – 
thus, the fact-base - rather than the unknown fact that is considered as proved.  
Given the narrowness of the contrary proof, which imposes to keep track of every single 
financial transaction if not recorded in the books, the violation of Article 24, para 2, of the 
Constitution, cannot be excluded. This, especially in view of the weak rationality - in terms 
of correspondence with the id quod plerumque accidit -  of the legal presumption, which 
shifts the burden of proof on the private party without letting the latter the availability of 
every type of proof. The proof, indeed, is restricted as to the object but also as to the kind 
of evidence, being difficult to imagine something other than the documentary proof. 
                                                          
257
 A. Marcheselli, Contraddittorio e accertamenti bancari: i principi costituzionali e comunitari, cited above, 
1206, who wonders if in order to rebut the presumption laid down by Article 32, para 1, No 2, second part, it 
is sufficient to indicate the beneficiary or it is also requested to prove the fiscal irrelevance of the withdrawal. 
A literal interpretation of the provision excludes the possibility to prove such an irrelevance without 
indicating the beneficiary. Thus, it is not enough giving evidence that the fact is not an index of ability to pay, 
but something more (extraneous to the suitability of the proof) is requested, which is the cooperation with the 
tax authority. Cf. V. Ficari, La rilevanza delle movimentazioni bancarie e finanziarie ai fini 
dell’accertamento delle imposte sul reddito e sul valore aggiunto, Rass. Trib., 2009, at 1280, supports the 
substantive nature of the presumption at hand and underlines the difficulties of proof. 
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Similar considerations can be expressed, mutatis mutandis, with reference to the second 
part of Article 32, para 1, No 2 and Article 51, para 1, No 2, where they prescribe that the 
banking data can ground a notice of assessment if the taxpayer is not able to prove 
respectively that he considered them in the determination of the taxable income or its fiscal 
irrelevance (Article 32) or that he took them into consideration in the tax return or they do 
not refer to taxable operations for VAT purposes (Article 51)
258
. Both of them have been 
interpreted as drawing a legal presumption. In the first case, a presumption as to the 
existence of revenues/remunerations on the basis of the withdrawals/deposits recorded in 
the bank account. In the second case, a presumption as to the carrying out of VAT taxable 
operations on the basis of the same data. 
Once again, the proof to the contrary concerns the suitability of the known fact to ground 
the presumption. In other words, the theme of the proof to the contrary belongs to the 
known fact and it has to happen in order the presumption to operate. If, for instance, the 
taxpayer has considered a certain withdrawal when calculating the taxable income in the 
tax return, obviously that withdrawal is not eligible to be the base-fact of a presumption of 
higher revenues. And the same if the withdrawals are irrelevant from the fiscal point of 
view; the fiscal relevance represents a character inherent to the known fact, whose 
(positive) proof should lay on the tax administration rather than – in the negative – on the 
taxpayer. This is also why the hearing of the taxpayer during the tax procedure is important; 
precisely in order to enlighten on the reading to give to the data resulting from the bank 
accounts. 
 
7.6  Banking presumptions and VAT  
When questioned on the compatibility of Article 51, para 1, No 2 and 7 of the Vat 
legislation with Articles 3, 53 and most of all 24 of the Constitution, the Constitutional 
Court rejected the question with an ordinance
259
. Nevertheless it is interesting as it gives to 
the Court the occasion to judge on the compatibility of banking presumptions with the right 
of defence, particularly under the aspect of the contrary proof. 
                                                          
258
 Moreover, in some decisions of the Supreme Court, it is held that the proof has to concern specifically 
each operation. See, amongst these, Supreme Court 19 March 2009, No 6617; Supreme Court 21 January 
2009, No 1453. 
259
 Const. Court, ordinance 6 July 2000, No 260. To be more precise, the question has been found “clearly 
groundless”, which is a formula used when the Court believes that there are no reasons for analyzing the 
questions of compatibility rose by the tribunal as they are icto oculi without any foundation.  
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It has to be firstly noted that the Court has not any doubts on the circumstance that the 
provision at issue – in particular, No 2 – lays down a presumption “only rebuttable of 
taxability as to the transactions resulting from the banking accounts”, which can be 
overcome by the taxpayer with the proof that such transactions have been considered 
within the tax return or that they do not refer to taxable operations
260
. A presumption that, 
according to the Court, is reasonably based on the objective character of those outcomes, 
which refer to situations where the taxpayer is involved
261
. Moreover, the taxpayer is put in 
the condition to fully exercise his right to produce documents, data, news and 
explanations – in other words, to give proof to the contrary - not only in the jurisdictional 
seat, but also in the administrative seat. Indeed, he is informed about the request by the tax 
authority of a copy of the bank statement or other documents regarding the bank account 
sent to the credit institution
262
. 
The latter being the circumstance that in practice leads the Court to reject the question, 
together with the rebuttable nature of the presumption at hand, it needs to be observed that 
it is not clear how the taxpayer could produce data and documents without the cognizance 
of an analytical charge. If the tax administration does not invite the taxpayer to do that in 
order to clarify a certain definite situation/operation, then he could obviously produce 
documents spontaneously but without a precise charge this could end up to be useless. So 
that he should wait for a tax decision in order to find out the reasons of the tax assessment 
and to contest it by starting a tax litigation.  
                                                          
260
 In line with the majority of the jurisprudence and doctrine. Very recently, the legal nature as to the 
presumptions laid down by Article 32, No 2 (first part) and 51, No 2 has been denied by A. Marcheselli, Dati 
bancari e lotta all’evasione: uno strumento efficace da usare ragionevolmente (Nota a Corte di Cassazione, 
sezione tributaria, No 3263/2012), Corr. Trib., 2012, 1039. The Author asserts that though the structure of 
the sentence of the provisions – where they state that the banking data are put at the basis of tax decisions 
unless the taxpayer gives proof to the contrary – is peculiar of a legal presumption, it is preferable a different 
interpretation. In his view, these provisions empowers the tax administration to infer from the banking data 
presumptions of fact, which can be prudently valuated case-by-case and ground the tax decision. In this sense 
would lead: 1) the heterogeneity of the elements that can be inferred by the bank accounts; 2) the vagueness 
of the norm concerned as to the presumed fact ‘they are put at the basis of the rectifications’; 3) the 
otherwise contrast with the case-law of the Constitutional Court’s decisions on the matter of legal 
presumptions. In this perspective, the reference to the possibility for the taxpayer to contest the presumption 
does not represent a contrary proof, but it rather marks the necessity of a debate prior to the tax decision. 
261
 So that the provision is in not in contrast with Article 53. In the same sense see Const. Court, ordinance 26 
febbraio 2002, No 33, dealing with the probative efficacy of the banking documents collected within criminal 
investigations and transferred in the tax procedure. The compatibility with the principle of equality is 
supported with the similar treatment that is prescribed for the tax assessment in the field of income taxation.                                                        
262
 As it has been observed by A. Marcheselli, Dati bancari e lotta all’evasione: uno strumento efficace da 
usare ragionevolmente, cited above, 1040, note 5, the Constitutional Court gathers a scale of that right prior 
to the judicial phase. Otherwise it would have declared the not-relevance of the reference to Article 24 of the 
Constitution. 
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The argument of the Court for saving the provision at issue seems to be weak. If such 
provision is interpreted as legally presuming the existence of taxable VAT operations on 
the basis of the withdrawals/deposits of the taxpayer concerned, then it is tough to find a 
rational basis justifying such a reversal of the burden of proof. It is true that when the 
presumption was applied the taxpayer can appeal the tax decision before the  court. In the 
latter context he can avoid the levy of a higher value added tax by proving that the banking 
data have been recorded into the tax return or they do not refer to taxable operations. On 
the other hand, though the Constitutional Court makes reference to the possibility for the 
taxpayer to interact with the tax administration already in the administrative phase, from 
the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court it results that the debate in this phase is optional
263
. 
The question that the Court has not faced is if such a burden put on the taxpayer who 
consequently is in charge of keeping track of every single transaction can be 
constitutionally justified with the protection of the fiscal interest. 
The answer very much depends also on the qualification of the taxpayer. It is well known 
that Article 51 - and Article 32 too - applies to enterprises and self-employed persons as 
well
264
. Obviously, unlike a company, a self-employed worker or a small enterprise meet 
more difficulties in keeping evidence of all the financial transactions made within their 
bank account, which is likely to be used also for personal purposes. In this perspective, as 
it has been correctly observed, advancing the possibility for the taxpayer to rebut the 
presumption already in the tax procedure and before the issuing of the tax decision could 
contribute to render the presumption at hand more in line with the right of defence broadly 
intended and with the general principle of good administration as well. Of course, this 
would not eliminate all the doubts related to this presumption, especially in view of the 
kind of burden shifted on the taxpayer. 
Furthermore, if we turn out to the EU framework, the doubts on Article 51 under 
discussion increase, as it will be shown later one when dealing with the criteria of 
consistency with EU law drawn by the EUCJ in the field of VAT.  
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 Ex multis, Supreme Court, 13 June 2002, No 8422; Supreme Court 29 March 2002, No 4601; Supreme 
Court 26 February 2002, No 2814; Supreme Court 18 April 2003, No 6232. 
264
 This, after Law No 311/2004, which has added the reference to the remunerations. According to the 
Constitutional Court, however, already the previous version of Article 32 referred to self-employed workers 
as well, being the term ‘revenues’ used in a broader sense.  
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8.  Legal presumptions of supply and purchase in the field of VAT 
In the context of the administrative proceedings in the area of VAT, the tax authorities may 
have recourse to another type of mixed presumption of law, in order to re-determine the 
taxable turnover. 
They are commonly known as ‘presumptions of supply and purchase’ and represent two 
different inferences though both related to the presence of goods in the places where the 
taxpayer carries on his economic activity. In brief, according to the first one the goods that 
are purchased, imported or produced and are not situated where the taxpayer carries out his 
operations (or in the ones of his representative) are presumed to have been transferred (i.e. 
sold). Similarly, the goods that are in one of the places where the taxpayer conducts his 
activity are presumed to have been purchased. In both of the cases, the taxpayer is allowed 
to avoid the effects of the presumption by giving evidence of certain circumstances pre-
determined by the law as to the object and means of proof. 
They were regulated by Article 53, Presidential decree No 633/1972 (legislation on VAT) 
within the Title dealing with assessment and collection of valued added tax. However, on 
the basis of the Delegate Law No 662/1996
265
, which referred to a delegated regulation in 
order to rearrange the discipline at hand, Article 53 has been replaced by the Presidential 
decree No 441/1997. The goal pursued by the legislator of Law N° 662 was to simplify the 
rules under discussion, as shown by the indication of “criteria of adherence to the 
commercial customs of the different categories of enterprise, by securing the possibility to 
immediately establish, during the accesses, inspections, verifications, the origin of the 
goods that are the object of the activity peculiar to the enterprise and that are found in the 
places of the latter, but without any obligation to introduce further certified books”. In 
other words, the government was called to draw a discipline close to the current customs in 
the sectors concerned and without introducing further administrative burdens on the 
taxpayers, but at the same time an effective measure in the hands of the tax administration. 
As it will be clear examining the new rules, however, the Presidential decree No 441/97 
has failed in complying with the suggested criteria. Especially the regulation of the 
                                                          
265
 Article 3, para 137, let. a), of the Law 23 December 1996, No 662 referred to the government in order to 
enact regulations on presumptions of transfer and purchase pursuant to Article 17, para 2, Law No 400/1988. 
The idea was to use a normative means more flexible than the law. It needs to be clarified in this regard that 
Article 17 of the Law No 400/88 deals with the different type of regulations that can be enacted by the 
government or the single ministers. In particular, the so called ‘delegated regulation’ are provided (para 2) for 
the discipline of matters that are not covered by the absolute reserve clause and in relation to which a law 
authorizes the government by fixing the general criteria governing the matter and prescribing the abrogation 
of the provision in force with effect from the entry into force of the regulation. 
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contrary proof, which includes a detailed indication of documentary duties, loads the 
taxpayer with administrative and probative fulfilments that are not in line with the need of 
simplification
266
. On the other hand, the strict predetermination of the means of (contrary) 
proof has been considered as being the ratio of the presumptions under discussion. It is the 
result of a balance between the interest to the prompt collection of the taxes on the one side, 
and the interest to the certainty of the tax obligation on the other side. In this view, it is 
also in the taxpayer’s interest the predetermination of the inference and of the means aimed 
at overcoming it.  
 
8.1 The presumption of supply 
Pursuant to Article 1, para 1, Presidential decree No 441/1997 “The goods that are 
purchased, imported or produced and are not found either in the places where the 
taxpayer carries out its operations nor in those ones of its representatives are presumed to 
have been supplied. Among these places are included also the secondary seats, branches, 
(...), plants, stores, storages and transport in the availability of the enterprise”. 
The provision consists of a legal presumption as to the sales realized by a certain taxpayer 
based on the ascertainment of the physic absence of goods, normally during the access in 
the places where the activity is carried out. If disassembled, it includes different situations, 
some of which are alternative, others need to occur at the same time. As to the latter, it has 
to be noted that the known fact is here a complex situation, given by the combined 
occurrence of two circumstances: the existence of goods that have been purchased, 
imported or produced resulting by the books or other documents and the fact that these 
goods are not found in the principal or secondary seat of the enterprise or at a 
representative. 
While the reference to the second circumstance seems to confine the provision to 
enterprises only
267
, the generic reference to indefinite ‘goods’ have led to a broad 
interpretation extended to every kind of goods, though the ratio of the provision requestsat 
least a link between the type of goods that are not found and the economic activity carried 
out. In order the presumption to apply, it needs to be ascertained that these goods have 
been produced by the enterprise, purchased or imported. Moreover, it has been observed 
that the meaning of purchase and importation has to be coherent with the notion of 
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 E. Della Valle, Le presunzioni di cessione e di acquisto, Rass. Trib., 1999, 1641; M. Versiglioni, 
Presunzioni e prova del fato ignoto nell’accertamento dell’Iva, Riv. Dir. Trib., 2000, 139. 
267
 Contra, Circular letter  n. 193/E, 1998. 
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purchase of goods laid down by Article 2 of the VAT legislation, which requests the 
transfer of the property right
268
. In other words, the purchase and importation of the goods 
concerned have to imply the full availability by the taxpayer in order him to be in the 
condition to (presumably) sell them.  
The existence of facts that may alternatively occur are to be proved in a predetermined way. 
This, in particular, as regards to the availability of secondary seats - among which the 
means of transport - and to the relation of representation. Pursuant to Article 1, para 3 the 
availability of secondary seats may result from the registration in a public register or, if not, 
from the declaration of start up and data variations provided for by Article 35 of the VAT 
legislation prior to the transfer of goods, or from any other document reporting the 
destination of the goods towards one of the mentioned places and recorded in one of the 
VAT accounting records. Similarly, the relation of representation has to result from a 
public deed, a private registered contract, from a letter that has been recorded prior to the 
transfer of goods in a provided register in the VAT office or from a declaration to the VAT 
office ex Article 35. 
 
8.1.1  Proof to the contrary 
Article 1, para 2, Presidential decree No 441/97 prescribes that the presumption laid down 
in para 1 does not work if it is demonstrated that the same goods: 
a) have been used for the production, lost or destroyed; 
b) have been delivered to third parties in the course of manufacture, storing, bailment, 
or on the basis of valuation contracts, or contracts of work, tender, transport, 
agency, commission or another title that does not transfer the property right. 
Thus, the taxpayer can avoid the effects of the presumption at hand by giving a qualified 
contrary proof. Qualified, in the sense that its object – i.e. the facts that need to be proved – 
and the means of proof – i.e. the way of proving them – are not free but rather prescribed 
                                                          
268
 E. Della Valle, Le presunzioni di cessione e di acquisto, cited above, 1643. See also A. Amatucci, La 
prova dell’acquisto della presunzione di cessione ex art. 53 IVA, Boll. Trib., 1995, 495 et seq. The Author 
criticizes the decision of the Supreme Court No 10617 of the 13th December 1994, where it is asserted that 
the tax administration is not requested to prove the title of purchase, being sufficient the proof of the ‘full and 
autonomous availability’ of the goods concerned by the taxpayer. More in general, the Court supports a 
‘rational interpretation’ instead of a literal one of the formula ‘purchased, imported, produced’ of Article 1, 
para 1. In his opinion, the source of the purchase is the theme of the proof that the tax administration has to 
produce in order the presumption to apply. A confirmation of the fact that the proof concerns the property 
rather than the mere possession or availability of the goods is in Article 53, para 1 (now, Article 1, para 2, No 
2, Presidential decree No 441/97) where in order to win the presumption refers to the hypotheses when the 
goods are transferred to third parties on the basis of a title that does not transfer the property. 
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by the law. As a matter of fact, with the exception of the use of the goods for the purpose 
of the production, the presidential decree contains a detailed regulation of the means of 
proof concerning the happening of the other facts. 
For instance, the transfer of the goods to a third party has to result alternatively (a) from 
one of the books provided for by the Civil Code or by Article 39 of the VAT legislation or 
from an act that has been registered at the registration office from which the characteristic 
of the goods and the reason of the transfer may be inferred; (b) from a document of 
transport indicating also the reason or another document of transfer; (c) from a proper 
record in one of the VAT books including the description of the goods and the receiver. If 
the taxpayer alleges the loss of the goods because of fortuitous events, then he has to 
produce documents issued by a public administration or a substitute declaration of the 
affidavit issued by 30 days since the event occurred or was known, wherein the value of 
the goods lost results (para 3). Again, if the theme of (contrary) proof  is the destruction of 
the goods or their transformation into other type of goods having a lower value, then the 
evidence has to be given through a) a notice to the tax administration offices and to the 
financial police five days before the operations of destruction and transformation, with all 
the correlative information as to the procedure and the goods concerned, unless the 
destruction is set out by the public administration; b) a record written by public officers 
who were present at the operations, or from a substitute declaration if the cost of the 
destroyed goods is lower than euro 100000; c) the document of transport of the goods 
possibly resulting from the operations.  
Besides the above mentioned facts, whose proof shows that the transfer did not happen, 
Article 2, para 2 and 5 provide two more hypotheses that render inoperative the 
presumption: the gratuitous transfers and the transfer of a stock of goods, on condition that 
certain obligations are fulfilled. Indeed, Article 2, para 2 prescribes that the transfers 
provided for by Article 10, No 12), Presidential decree No 633/72
269
 are to be proved with 
a) a written communication from the transferor to the tax administration offices or 
financial police five days before the deliver with all the information on the goods 
gratuitously transferred and the final destination, unless the cost is lower than euro 5.164, 
57; b) issuing of a delivery document; c) substitute declaration of affidavit issued by the 
receiver, where the latter certifies the nature and quantity of the goods received. Article 2, 
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 I.e. the gratuitous transfers – exempt from VAT - towards public bodies, recognized associations or 
foundations having exclusively aim of care, charity, upbringing, education, study, scientific research and to 
the ONLUS.  
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para 5 states that the goods that are not at the firm because of stock transfers or similar 
operations according to the commercial custom are to result from the invoice or from the 
transport document including the description of the goods and the signature of the 
transferee certifying to have received them. 
The Presidential decree seems to deal indifferently with all the facts listed so far, by 
defining all of them as hypotheses of ‘non-operativeness’ of the presumption. Technically, 
however, only the events of the loss/destruction/use for the production of the goods can be 
considered as contrary proof, as by proving them the taxpayer disproves the presumed fact 
(the transfer of goods). By contrast, the events dealt of in para 2 and 5 consist of a transfer 
of goods – albeit with special characters -, so that the taxpayer is not called to prove a fact 
incompatible with the transfer. In these circumstances, the legislator decides to exclude the 
effects of the presumption as long as the taxpayer is able to prove the effectiveness of the 
special transfer, which does not raise the application of the ordinary VAT regulation
270
. 
 
8.2 The presumption of purchase  
Pursuant to Article 3, para 1, Presidential decree No 441/97 the goods that are found in one 
of the places where the taxpayer exercises his operations are presumed to have been 
purchased if it is not proved that they have been received on the basis of a relation of 
representation or one of the titles laid down in Article 1. 
The provision consists of a rebuttable presumption of law based on the inference that the 
goods that are found where the activity is carried out and cannot be justified in the light of 
one of the titles listed in the regulation are likely to have been purchased. Conversely to the 
presumption of supply, the known fact is the discovery of goods. Similarly, however, it has 
been observed that among the taxable persons it concerns enterprises only, and more 
particularly the ones whose activity involves the production and distribution of goods 
rather than the supply of services
271
. 
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 According to E. Della Valle, Le presunzioni di cessione e di acquisto, cited above, 1653, with paragraph 2 
the legislator has intended to pre-determine the procedural fulfillments to prove that a gratuitous transfer in 
favour of certain subjects took place. As a result, if they are not met, then the transfer is treated as a taxable 
operation under VAT rather than deemed exempt, as asserted by the tax administration in the Circular letter 
No 193/E of 1998. Paragraph 5, instead, would be justified in the light of pre-determining the proof of the 
stock transfers’ object especially when the invoice is not compulsory, i.e. for the retail trade. 
271
 As to the type of goods and subjects covered by the presumption of purchase see E. Della Valle, Le 
presunzioni di cessione e di acquisto, cited above, 1654, who refers to the rationale of the provision on the 
one side (checking the purchases’ turnover) and on the other side to the delegated law, and Article 3, para 2 
where it is provided a specific probative discipline as to the origin of the goods “that are the object of the 
activity peculiar to the enterprise”. See also R. Schiavolin, Sulla prova contraria alle presunzioni di cessione 
e acquisto ex art. 53, D.P.R. No 633/1972, Note to Supreme Court, I Division, of the 19
th
 June 1987, No 8954, 
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As Article 3, para 1, refers to Article 1, the presumption of purchase shares with the one of 
supply also the rules on the means of proof as to the existence of the relation of 
representation and to a title that does not transfer the property justifying the availability of 
the goods by the taxpayer. In addition, Article 3, par. 2, provides a specific regulation for 
the proof concerning the title of origin of the goods that are the object of the activity 
peculiar to the enterprise and that are found in one of the places – listed in Article 1, para 
1 – where it is carried out. The reference is alternatively then to a) the invoice, the receipt 
or the receipt for tax purposes; b) the document of transport provided for by Article 1, para 
3, Presidential decree No 472/1996 or another valid document of transport. Failing these 
documents, the presumption can be won through a specially provided record into the 
daybook or another book kept according to the civil code, or in a specially provided 
register kept ex Article 39, Presidential decree No 633/1972, or in the purchases journal 
(Article 25, Presidential decree No 633/72). 
 
8.3 Brief conclusions 
There are no doubts on the qualification of the presumptions at hand as mixed rebuttable 
presumptions of law. Placed in the context of the rules on the tax proceedings in the VAT 
area, they clearly shift on the taxpayer the burden of proving that the supply/purchase did 
not happen, both in the administrative phase and during the tax trial. However – this is the 
core of the question –, the taxpayer is not free as to the means and theme of proof suitable 
to rebut the presumptions, because they are predetermined by the law.  
On the one side, it has been observed that this regime might be in favour of the taxpayer 
also, as he knows in advance which type of proofs are requested in order to avoid the 
application of the presumptions of purchase and transfer. Diversely, if the tax 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Rass. Trib., 1998, 793, who found the exclusion of taxpayers carrying out only the supply of services in line 
with a functional interpretation coherent with the ratio legis that should be adopted in reading the 
presumptions under discussion. In his opinion, “the mechanism of these presumptions consists of giving 
prevalence to the situation of fact, as it appears from the ascertained physical presence or absence of goods, 
in respect of the accountancy’s outcomes”. In this way, the legislator aims at facilitating the proof of the real 
situation to be given by the tax administration by overcoming the accountancy but without allowing an 
imposition having a fictitious basis, which would be in contrast with the jurisprudence of the Constitutional 
Court on tax presumptions and ability to pay principle. Accordingly, the Author believes that the probative 
limitations should not be strictly interpreted and thus the means of proof admissible should be broadly 
interpreted, especially considering the consequences of the application of Article 53 when the taxable 
operation did not happen and nonetheless the taxpayer is not in the condition to prove it. He is then very 
critical with the decision of the Court, which – with regard to the previous regulation of the presumptions at 
hand - has excluded the suitability of the packing list to overcome the presumption of purchase by arguing 
from the peremptoriness of the means of (documentary) proof listed in Article 53, para 2 and 3 of the 
Presidential decree No 633/72.   
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administration made use of presumptions of fact of the same content there would be 
uncertainty. On the other side, it has been said that in fact there is not any limitation to the 
subject of the proof, as the facts that stop the operating of the presumptions exhaust all the 
hypotheses incompatible with the transfer and purchase
272
. 
If it is true that Article 53 formerly and now the presidential decree cover most of the 
circumstances that might be alleged by the taxpayer in order to disprove the supply or 
purchase, nevertheless it is not possible to exclude in advance different events that are not 
included. Moreover, the predetermination of the means of (contrary) proof puts on the 
taxpayer, in some cases, further administrative burdens. With the result that if they are not 
accomplished because of negligence, the risk is to legitimate a re-determination of the 
VAT due that does not correspond to reality
273
. Besides that, normally administrative 
sanctions apply in relation to a supply realized without paying VAT and to a purchase 
without issuing the invoice. 
Despite the intent of simplification pursued by the delegate law, the presidential decree has 
introduced an even more severe regulation as to the contrary proof. As a way of 
exemplification, Article 53 did not provide anything as to the way of proving the loss and 
destruction of goods as well as their use for the production. Under the current regulation, 
instead, only the latter event can be freely demonstrated, while the rest are regulated in 
detail
274
.  
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 That is the use of the goods for the production, their loss or destruction, or their delivery (to third parties) 
or receiving on the basis of a title that does not transfer the property. E. Della Valle, Le presunzioni di 
cessione e di acquisto, cited above, 1638. 
273
 And this may happen, considering that Article 4, para 2, Presidential decree No 441/97 might be 
interpreted as allowing the use of the presumptions at hand also on the mere basis of a comparison between 
different books – thus, without a physical ascertainment (or inventory)- from which the existence or lack of 
store material emerges. As a matter of fact, the first paragraph fixes the moment when the presumptions of 
transfer and purchase – given the physical ascertain of the goods - have effects: it coincides with the 
beginning of the accesses, inspections, verifications. Instead, the second paragraph clarifies that the 
quantitative differences that emerge from the comparison between the records of the auxiliary store books (ex 
Article 14, para 1, let. d), Presidential decree No 600/1973) or of the compulsory documents issues and 
received, and the registered unsold stock “represent presumption of supply and purchase for the tax period 
subjected to control”. 
274
 So that the considerations expressed under the previous regime in this regard need to be revised. R. 
Schiavolin, Sulla prova contraria alle presunzioni di cessione e acquisto ex art. 53, D.P.R. n. 633/1972, cited 
above, 790, who observed that Article 53 “provides for a range of hypotheses where the balance between 
fiscal interest and interest of the taxpayer varies: for the material facts (destruction, loss, use for the 
production) the proof is free, because the concrete circumstance could render impossible to form certain 
means of conviction; for the situations or juridical relations an accounting proof is requested or a qualified 
documentary proof”. In this view, only with reference to some hypotheses the legislator had considered 
further demands of safeguard of the fiscal interest in respect of the correspondence of the levy with the real 
ability to pay. What is still topical is the analysis of Article 53 as inspired by the aim of facilitating the tax 
administration in proving the tax evasion, aim that in the relevant provisions in pursued in different ways. 
Indeed, “In fixing rules of legal proof, the legislator cannot disregard the necessity to give to the debtor the 
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So far, the Constitutional Court has not happened to judge on the consistency of the 
presumptions under discussion with the ability to pay principle or the right of defence. In 
any event, the examination of the jurisprudence on tax presumptions suggests that the 
question would be rejected. Under the profile of the principle of reasonableness and ability 
to pay, the Constitutional Court would have easy play to argue that the inference drawn by 
the legislator is logical and corresponds to a rule of experience, so that it has not a fictitious 
basis. Under the profile of the right of defence, it would be probably asserted that the 
taxpayer has the possibility to rebut the presumptions, by giving evidence of the facts listed 
in the provisions and by keeping documents that he would be mostly due to keep anyway. 
Therefore, the presumptions of supply and purchase do not appear to conflict with the 
Constitutional framework. On the other hand, they are based on real facts, which may be 
assumed as indices of tax evasion, and allow the taxpayer under investigation to give proof 
to the contrary
275
. 
It remains to see if such presumptions are also in line with the EU Law, on the basis of the 
criteria ensuing from the EUCJ rulings. This question will be answered later on. 
 
9. The semi-general anti-avoidance rule in the area of income taxation 
The Italian tax system includes several specific anti-abuse rules in the area of income 
taxation, which are targeted at tackling tax avoidance and/or evasion when cross-border 
situations are at issue. Before dealing with them in the following paragraphs, the semi-
general anti-abuse rule laid down in Article 37-bis of the Presidential decree No 600/73 has 
to be mentioned
276
. 
Article 37-bis entitles the tax authorities to disregard single or connected acts, facts, or 
transactions, which are carried out without valid commercial reasons and are intended to 
                                                                                                                                                                                
concrete possibility to prove the unfavourable (for him) facts, so that those rules have always to be the result 
of a balance between the interest of the tax authority and the interest of the taxpayer, which is safeguarded 
by Articles 24 and 53 of the Constitution”. 
275
 A.E. Granelli, Le presunzioni nell’accertamento tributario, Boll. Trib. 1981, 1652, with regard to Article 
53 of the VAT legislation, did not see any Constitutional inconsistency, because the taxpayer can establish in 
advance the means of proof requested by the provision. 
276
 In this regard, it has to be noted that the Italian Supreme Court has ruled in a number of decisions handed 
down in December 2008 in its plenary session (No 30005, 30056, 30057), in favour of the existence of an 
unwritten general anti-abuse rule stemming from the ability to pay principle. In earlier decisions it had 
supported the existence of a general anti-abuse rule in the Italian tax system which derived from the general 
principles of EU law. Notably, it referred to EUCJ cases dealing with VAT (Halifax, Part Service), but 
argued that the doctrine on the abuse of law was a general and immanent principle that could apply to non-
harmonized sectors as well, like income taxes. See R. Cordeiro Guerra and P. Mastellone, The Judicial 
Creation of a General Anti-Avoidance Rule Rooted in the Constitution, European Taxation, 2009, 511. 
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circumvent obligations and limitations provided under tax law in order to obtain tax 
savings or refunds otherwise undue. 
The scope of the rule is not general, but it rather covers only the operations listed in the 
same provision. Notably, among these, there are certain operations covered by the Merger 
Directive (Article 37-bis, para 3, let. e) and the Interest and Royalties Directive (Article 
37-bis, para 3, let. f-ter)
277
, which, as we will see in Chapter III, allow Member States to 
refuse or withdraw the benefits of the Directive when the principal reason or one of the 
principal reasons is tax evasion, avoidance, or abuse. 
The provision might be seen as including a presumption of avoidance with reference to the 
operations listed in para 3 of Article 37-bis, but from the case-law of the Italian Supreme 
Court it results that the tax administration is required to demonstrate that the transaction 
concerned is abusive. In order to disregard the operation carried out by the taxpayer, the 
tax authorities have to prove the anomalous difference between that transaction and a 
‘standard’ one, which indicates that the former cannot be justified within an economic 
logic, being rather aimed at achieving an abusive result
278
. 
On the other side, the taxpayer is given the opportunity of proving that the transaction 
carried out is justified by valid economic reasons. Moreover, unlike with the ordinary 
administrative procedure, in this case the defence rights of the taxpayer receive a special 
protection. Indeed, Article 37-bis, para 4, provides that the tax authorities must request 
clarifications from the taxpayer on the transaction concerned before issuing a notice of 
assessment; pursuant to para 5, such notice of assessment must be motivated in relation to 
the justification submitted by the taxpayer, otherwise it is null
279
. 
 
10. Presumptions in the matter of tax residence 
After having illustrated the most relevant procedural presumptive provisions included into 
the Italian tax system, the focus is now on some substantive presumptive provisions or 
regimes, which are able to affect directly the position of the taxpayer. 
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 This letter, in particular, refers to the payments of interests o royalties to EU recipients controlled directly 
or indirectly by one or more non-EU residents. 
278
 Ex multis, Supreme Court 21 January 2009, No 1465; Supreme Court, 22 september 2010, No 20030. 
279
 Notably, the last paragraph (8)  of Article 37-bis allows the taxpayer to aplly for a special ruling in order 
to obtain a declaration from the competent tax authorities that a specific anti-avoidance rule does not apply to 
the facts indicated in the request. This, when it is proved that in the specific situation no avoidance effects 
could be gained. In this hypothesis, the burden of proof rests upon the taxpayer, and the specific anti-
avoidance rule concerned operated as a sort of rebuttable presumption of law. 
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Among those, there are the rebuttable presumptions on tax residence of individuals and 
foreign incorporated companies and entities, which are intended to combat tax avoidance 
or evasion by charging the taxpayer with the burden of proof as to the reality of the transfer 
of residence. As intuitive, a more favourable tax treatment can obviously be pursued by 
moving the residence in order to benefit of a more favourable tax regime. This 
phenomenon concerns both individuals and companies or other legal entities, the latter 
being tempted, in particular, by jurisdictions having a lower taxation of capital gains and 
proceeds. 
Generally speaking, the burden of proving the fictitious character of the transfer of 
residence ordinary lies on the tax authorities. In order to specify the content of such burden, 
we firstly need to refer to Articles 2 and 73 of the Italian income tax legislation (TUIR), 
which respectively deal with the individuals and company or other entities subject to 
income taxation and identify the circumstances that need to occur for the purpose of 
qualifying a taxpayer as resident in the State’s territory. 
Starting from individuals subject to income taxation, it is obvious that the qualification of a 
person as resident or non-resident in Italy affects the tax treatment. While the former are 
taxed on all the income possessed irrespective of the place where it is produced (worldwide 
income taxation), the latter are taxed in the extent to which there is a link between the tax 
event and the State’s territory in accordance with the principle of territoriality280. 
Pursuant to Article 2, para 2, TUIR “For the purpose of income tax, individuals that for the 
greater part of the taxable year are registered with the civil registry or are domiciled or 
resident in the State’s territory pursuant to the Civil Code are deemed resident”. Thus, the 
law provides two different types of event, as the first one (registration in the civil registry) 
is a formal fact, while the second one (domicile or residence according to the Civil Code) 
is a situation of fact requesting to be ascertained. They are alternative, meaning that the 
occurrence of one of them suffices in order to consider the taxpayer as resident in Italy.  
Turning to companies and other legal entities, Article 73, para 3 considers them as being 
resident in the State’s territory if, for the greater part of the tax year they have in there their 
legal seat, their administrative seat or their core business. Alike the criteria fixed by Article 
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 Laid down by the Delegate law No 825/1971. In other words, the non-resident are taxed only for the 
incomes produced in the State’s territory, where the conditions rising taxation took place. In practice, this 
happens when a) an activity is carried out or b) a productive good is located in Italy (typically, an immovable 
property). 
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2 above, those provided for by Article 73 are alternative, so that the occurrence of one of 
them suffices for the purpose of qualifying the company or entity as resident.  
The legal seat normally results from the entity’s deed of incorporation or by-laws, while 
the administrative seat coincides with the place where the managerial decisions concerning 
the activity carried on are taken, i.e. where that activity is governed by the board of 
directors. The last circumstance demands to ascertain the concrete situation, and so does 
the third alternative. Indeed, it seems that when the core purpose does not result from the 
deed of incorporation, then the activity actually carried on in the State’s territory has to be 
regarded
281
. 
In conclusion, when contesting the transfer of residence, the tax authority is ordinary 
requested to disprove the constitutive elements of the situation giving rise to the definition 
of residence. Simplifying, it has to contest the formal data (like the proper registration, 
deed of incorporation) or to prove that the domicile, the residence, the place of effective 
management or the core purpose of the taxpayer is abroad on the basis of tangible data. 
 
10.1 The presumption of residence for individuals 
On the basis of the above mentioned Article 2 TUIR the residence of individuals is 
alternatively identified by: 
a) the civil registry (register of the resident population); 
b) the domicile, i.e. the centre of his economic and social interests (Article 43, para 1, 
Italian Civil Code); 
c) the residence, i.e. the place of regular dwelling (Article 43, para 2 Italian Civil 
code). 
As pointed out in the previous paragraph, the provision does not include a formal 
circumstance only, but it permits to deem a person as resident when, irrespective of the 
absence of a formal datum, the dwelling or anyway the main interests (job, family etc.) are 
in the State’s territory. It is sufficient that one of the three listed events occurs in order the 
person to be considered a resident. 
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 In this sense G. Falsitta, Manuale di diritto tributario. Parte speciale: il sistema delle imposte in Italia, 
Padova, Cedam, 2009, 262, who refers to Article 5, para. 3., let. d) dealing with partnerships and assimilated 
organizations. In this view, Article 73, paras. 4 and 5 do not apply in this regards, as they rather deal with the 
way of identifying the core purpose of entities in order to distinguish commercial entities from non-
commercial ones. Once identified the principal activity of the entity, it has to be verified if it is really carried 
on for the greater part of the tax year in Italy.  Cf. P. Valente, Esterovestizione e residenza, Milano, IPSOA, 
2013, 6, who recalls paras 4 and 5, so that he refers to the Law, the Deed of Incorporation or the By-Laws, or 
if the core purpose cannot be identified with one of those elements, to the activity actually carried out in the 
State’s territory. 
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In addition, Article 2, para 2-bis TUIR
282
 states that the Italian citizens who have been 
removed from the civil registry and moved in States or territory different from that 
identified with a ministerial decree are deemed to be resident, save for the counterproof. 
Clearly, this provision has been introduced by the legislator in order to prevent and to 
tackle the transfer of residence of individuals motivated by the aim of benefiting from a 
preferential tax treatment. As with Cfc regulation and similar regimes, the legislator has 
used the technique of a rebuttable presumption that puts the burden of proving that the 
actual residence is outside Italy on the taxpayer, whereas the tax administration is relieved 
from the evidence of the fictitious settlement. 
Undoubtedly, Article 2, para 2-bis is a rebuttable presumption of law. From the  
circumstance that an Italian citizen has transferred its residence in a low tax jurisdiction it 
is inferred the residence in Italy, which implies the fictitious character of the transfer. Its 
reasonableness is questionable, especially because of its general scope, as the mere moving 
to a black-listed State is assumed as proving that the residence is still in Italy, thereby 
adding de facto a further situation to the ones listed in para 2.  
As to the EU context, the potential inconsistency with the fundamental freedoms could be 
real if it applied to EU countries. However, after being amended with Article 1, para 83, let. 
a), Law No 244/2007, para 2-bis refers to States different from that identified by a decree 
of the Minister of Economics and Finance that has not been enacted yet and that will 
presumably include the EU Member States. As a confirmation, the ministerial decree still 
in force that include the States having a preferential tax regime for the purpose of para 2-
bis
283
 has been recently amended by removing Cipro and Malta from the list
284
. 
 
10.2 The presumptions of residence for foreign incorporated companies and other 
entities 
Since 2006 several rebuttable presumptions have been added within Article 73 TUIR as to 
the residence of companies, other entities and trusts, with the intention to tackle the 
phenomenon of fictitious residence consisting of the settlement into a tax jurisdiction 
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 Introduced by Article 10, para 1, Law 23 December 1998, No 448. 
283
 Ministerial decree 4 May 1999. In the previous version of para 2-bis, the reference was indeed to citizens 
cancelled from the civil registry and transferred in a State having a preferential tax regime identified with a 
ministerial decree. The only difference is that earlier the reference was to a black-list, while currently to a 
white list, rectius to the States that are not included into the white list to come. 
284
 With Article 2, Ministerial decree 27 July 2010.  
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guaranteeing capital gains’ exemption on participations or anyway a more favourable tax 
treatment in comparison to the Italian one. 
Following a chronological order: 
1) Para 5-bis – introduced by Article 35, para 13, Law decree No 223/2006 converted 
by the Law No 248/2006 – presumes – save for the counterproof - the existence in 
the State’s territory of the administrative seat of non-resident companies and 
entities holding direct controlling participations
285
 of resident companies and 
commercial entities if the former are (alternatively): 
a) controlled, even indirectly, pursuant to Article 2359, para 1, Italian Civil Code, 
by persons residing in the State’s territory; 
b) administered by a board of directors or other management body, mainly 
composed by directors residing in the State’s territory. 
2) Para 3, second part, states that – save for the counterproof - trusts and entities 
having the same content are deemed to be resident in the State’s territory when they 
are established in States and territories different from that included in the 
ministerial decree ex Article 168-bis TUIR
286
 and at least one of the settlers and 
one of the beneficiaries are tax-resident in the State’s territory. Furthermore, trusts 
established in territories other from that listed in the above ministerial decree are 
deemed resident when, subsequent to their establishment, a person resident in the 
State’s territory transfers to the trust the right of ownership on immovables or other 
rights upon the rem or binding purpose on immovables
287
. 
3) Para. 5-quater provides that – safe for the counterproof – companies and entities 
whose assets is for the most part invested in shares of an Italian closed real estate 
fund ex Article 37 Legislative decree No 58/1998 and are controlled, directly or 
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 Pursuant to Article 2359, para 1, Italian Civil Code. 
286
 The reference to the ministerial decree ex Article 168-bis in para 3, Article 73 TUIR has been introduced 
by Article 1, para 73, let. e), No 1 and 2, Law 24 December 2007, No 244. Before such amendment para 3 
referred to the decree of the Minister of Finance 4 September 1996, which will be in force until the 
enactment – rectius, the taxable period subsequent to the publication - of the new ministerial decree. In the 
meanwhile, the white-list included in the ministerial decree 4 September 1996 has been recently updated by 
inserting Lettonia with Article 1, Ministerial decree 27 July 2010. 
287
 Introduced by Article 1, para 74, let. c), Law 27 December 2006 No 296 (Financial Law 2007). Para 74, 
75 and 76 have for the first time provided a tax treatment in the Italian tax system of the trust. As well known 
it is an institution typical of common law countries. Since the Italian legislation does not include a definition, 
it has to be regarded the notion drawn by Article 2 of the Hague Convention. Trusts are currently included 
among commercial entities (Article 73, para 5, let.b) and also entities that do not carry out on an exclusive 
basis an economic activity (let. c) subject to IRES (Italian corporate income tax). Thus, income produced by 
a trust are taxed according to the discipline of  IRES, unless they are imputed to beneficiaries.  
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indirectly, through trust companies or an interposed person, by persons resident in 
Italy are deemed to be resident in the State’s territory288. 
Though the listed hypotheses differ in terms of subjective range of application and 
conditions requested, a similar scheme can be identified. When the residence of a company 
or other entity is established abroad, but there is a strong link with the State’s territory 
where the persons involved up and down of the chain are resident, then it is presumed to be 
a fictitious settlement and thereby the foreign entity to be actually resident in Italy. 
 
10.2.1 Foreign (sub)holdings, fictitious residence and burden of proof 
Among the presumptions identified in the previous paragraph, to our purpose the one laid 
down in para 5-bis of Article 73 TUIR is worthy of special attention. It concerns the 
situation of a foreign company or entity that (a) holds a controlling participation of an 
Italian company or commercial entity and that in turn (b) is controlled by a person resident 
in Italy or administered by a board of directors who are for the most part resident in Italy. 
Unlike the presumptions on trust’s residence, it does not refer to companies or other 
entities resident in black-listed States. Consequently, the provision is likely to apply to EU 
legal entities as well. Not surprisingly, the national tax authorities have considered the 
issue of compatibility with the freedom of establishment and the EU-pilot Procedure has 
been activated by the European Commission. 
From a merely national point of view, para 5-bis represents the attempt to tackle the use of 
screen-companies established abroad with the purpose of taking advantage of the more 
favourable taxation of capital gains and proceeds in comparison to the Italian one. The 
provision seems to fit particularly the so called 'passive holdings’, which hold 
participations of domestic companies/entities without carrying out any economic activity 
and are resident in tax jurisdictions where they can benefit from preferential tax regimes. 
The scheme of the presumption is drawn as follows:  
a) the foreign entity controls a domestic entity AND 
b) it is controlled by a domestic entity or administered by a board of directors mostly 
resident in Italy 
→ the administrative seat of the foreign entity is actually in Italy. 
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 Introduced by Article 82, para 22, Law decree No 112/2008, converted by the Law 6 August 2008, No 
133. M. Antonini, Un’ulteriore presunzione in tema di residenza fiscale di società ed enti: l’amministrazione 
finanziaria ancora una volta sollevata (parzialmente) dall’onere probatorio, Riv. Dir. Trib., 2009, 49. 
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Since the administrative seat is one of the criteria determining the residence of a 
company/entity (Article 73, para 3, first part), it follows the re-qualification of the foreign 
entity as being resident in Italy, thereby the attraction to the domestic system of taxation. 
Given the difficulty that the tax administration would meet in assessing the real 
administrative seat, the legislator has presumed that facing the above conditions (known 
fact) the former is relieved from proving that that seat is actually established in Italy 
(unknown fact). 
The burden of proof is thus shifted on the taxpayer, in the context of possible 
administrative proceedings and/or the tax litigation. Apart from contesting the conditions 
of application, the presumption can be rebutted by proving that the administrative seat is 
actually in the State where the legal seat is established as main decisions are taken there 
and there is not any rootedness in Italy. 
More in detail, as indicated within the Circular letter N° 28/E/2008, the taxpayer is 
demanded to produce documents that show the managerial autonomy of the foreign sub-
holding - for instance, by alleging official managerial acts/contracts taken abroad - or the 
carrying out of an actual economic activity abroad and so on. It appears that the taxpayer is 
requested to furnish a positive proof, i.e. the proof of a fact incompatible with the 
presumed fact rather than the negation of the latter. In other words, the foreign entity is not 
merely demanded to prove that it has no links with the State’s territory, but it has to 
produce evidence and tangible data certifying the concrete connection with the foreign 
country. 
It has been observed
289
 that among the genus of (rebuttable) presumptions, para 5-bis can 
be classified as ‘presumption of the fact’ which differs from the ‘presumption of the effect’. 
The difference would reside in the unknown/presumed fact. The unknown fact of the 
former is another fact (administrative seat) that once ascertained causes the application of a 
further provision (Article 73, para 3 on the residence) which includes it (the unknown fact) 
as a constitutive element. Instead, the unknown fact of the second type of presumptions is 
directly the effect (the residence). Example of the latter are para 3, second part, and para 5-
quater of Article 73 TUIR, in the extent to which they presume the existence of the 
residence of trusts and immovable funds given certain circumstances. 
Such a distinction is not merely theoretical, as the scheme of the presumption has an 
impact on the contrary proof, which normally tends to disprove the unknown fact. Indeed, 
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 G. Fransoni, Sulle presunzioni legali nel diritto tributario, cited above, 603 et seq. 
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one thing is disproving a certain fact (existence in Italy of the administrative seat), another 
thing is disproving all the facts potentially causing a certain effect (legal seat, 
administrative seat, core purpose). In this view, the limitation to the jurisdictional 
protection of the taxpayer is maximum in the second case. 
One could argue from this the rationality of the reversal of the burden of proof in para 5-
bis in terms of balance between the jurisdictional protection of the taxpayer and the 
simplification of the tax authorities position in the assessment. However, as in many of the 
anti-avoidance presumptive provisions, the rule of experience on which the presumption 
grounds is weak. It is not clear, for instance, why the residence of the board of directors 
should be indicative (rectius, demonstrative) of the residence of the foreign company. 
 
11. CFC rules  
Alike many of the European tax systems, the Italian one contains a CFC legislation aimed 
at tackling the shifting of taxable base towards tax heavens. As well known, indeed, the 
mechanism generally consists of the imputation – irrespective of the formal distribution - 
on the domestic parent of the profits produced by the subsidiary that is resident in a foreign 
tax jurisdiction where the taxation is much lower. Introduced by Article 1, para 1, Law No 
342/2000, it has been recently amended with the Law decree No 78/2009
290
 converted into 
the Law No 102/2009, in line with the guidelines emerging within the OECD. As it will be 
explained, the amendments mostly concern the range of application of the regime, which 
has been extended under certain conditions to States included into a white list, and the 
theme of (contrary) proof. 
The result is a provision that reflects the outcomes reached within the OECD and the EU 
law as interpreted by the EUCJ either. A provision that currently includes a double regime. 
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 Notably, Article 12 of this Law decree has introduced a rebuttable presumption concerning foreign 
investments held in tax heavens. Basically, investments and financial activities held by Italian resident 
individuals, as well as non-commercial partnerships and similarly trated entities, in States with a more 
favourable tax regime (black-listed States) and in violation of reporting obigations (provided for by the Law 
decree No 167/90), are deemed to derive from tax evasion. It rests upon the taxpayer the proof that such 
activities have not originated from non-declared income. Given that such presumption applies as regards to 
black-listed  States, it does not creaty any particular problems at EU level. See M. Vergani, Italy: Recent 
Measures to Fight Tax Evasion through the Use of ‘Tax Havens’, EC Tax Review, 2010, 272 et seq.; M. 
Antonini, La presunzione di evasione per investimenti e attività finanziarie detenute in Paesi a fiscalità  
privilegiata, Riv. Dir. Trib., 2009, 192. Cf. F. Ciani, “Nuova” presunzione legale di imponibilità da 
investimenti CFC, Boll. Trib., 2011, 1435. 
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11.1 CFC rules and black-listed States 
The first paragraph of Article 167 TUIR prescribes that when a person resident in Italy has 
directly or indirectly the control of a person that is resident in a State different from those 
included in the ministerial decree enacted pursuant to Article 168-bis TUIR
291
, the incomes 
accrued by the foreign subsidiary are imputed, since the closing of the tax period, to the 
resident person in proportion to the shareholdings. The same holds with reference to stakes 
in non-resident persons as to the incomes produced by their permanent establishments 
placed in States different from the ones listed in the above mentioned decree. 
In order to fully gather the scope of the provision, three main aspects need be clarified, 
which concern the subjective, objective and territorial profile. 
From paragraph 2 of Article 167 it follows that the persons involved are individuals, 
limited partnerships, companies as well as public and private bodies carrying on a business, 
which are resident in the territory of Italy. 
As to the definition of the control, paragraph 3 refers to Article 2359 of the Italian Civil 
Code, which requests alternatively: 1) the majority of the votes exercisable in the assembly; 
2) enough votes to exercise a dominant influence into the ordinary assembly; 3) the 
dominant influence exercised under contractual obligations
292
. 
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 Article 168-bis, para 1 – introduced by Article 1, para 83, let. n), Law No 244/2007 - refers to a decree of 
the Minister of Economics and Finance for the identification of the States that allow a suited exchange of 
information for the purpose of the application of some provisions of the income tax code, a.o. Article 110, 
para 10 and 12-bis, which will be dealt with later on. Para 2 of Article 168-bis refers to the same decree in 
order to identify the States that allow a suitable exchange of information and where the level of taxation is 
not considerably lower than the one applied in Italy, for the purpose of application, a.o. of Articles 167, para 
1 and 5, 168, para 1 TUIR. Up till to now, such decree has not been enacted. Pursuant to Article 1, para 88, 
Law No 244/2007, until the publication of that decree the provisions in force continue to apply. As a 
consequence, currently it has to be considered the ministerial decree 21 November 2001, that identifies the 
States or territory having a preferential tax regime (black-list) for the purpose of application of Article 127-
bis TUIR that corresponds to Article 167 before the 2003 tax reform. Recently, with the Ministerial decree 27 
July 2010, Article 2, Malta and Cipro have been removed from the list. As explained in the preface, this is 
justified in the light of their being EU Member States and of the recent signature of protocols amending the 
double taxation conventions in the sense of a broader juridical basis for exchange of information. Plus, the 
decision of the ECJ (Cadbury Schweppes) on the question of compatibility of CFC rules with EU law is 
recalled. The Luxembourg 1929 holdings are still included in the list. 
292
 It has to be noted that the CFC rule also applies to related foreign companies, i.e. to stakes that do not 
allow the resident person to control or to exercise a dominant influence into the former. Pursuant to Article 
168 TUIR, indeed, Article 167, except para 8-bis, applies also when the person resident in Italy holds, 
directly or indirectly, a (at least) 20% stake – 10% for listed companies - to the profits of an enterprise, 
company or different body resident in a State different from that listed in the decree ex article 168-bis. The 
provision does not operate facing stakes in persons resident in a State included into the cited decree with 
regard to incomes arising from their permanent establishments located in States different from that listed in 
the same decree. 
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Lastly, the reference to the ministerial decree ex Article 168-bis TUIR, which includes the 
States that allow a suitable exchange of information with the Italian jurisdiction
293
, 
confines the CFC rules laid down in the first paragraph to those States which fall within the 
so called black-list in view of the lack of transparency.  
Having described the main characters of the CFC legislation drawn by the first paragraph 
of Article 167, it has to be dealt with the escapes given to the resident taxpayer in order to 
avoid the application of the regime. For such purpose he is beforehand bound to raise a 
query (ex Article 11, Law No 212/2000) to the tax administration in order to have an 
advance tax ruling on the concrete case. In this way, an instrument normally used in order 
to question the tax authority as to the application of a certain tax provision to a concrete 
case, is provided for giving the taxpayer the possibility to prove that Article 167, para 1, 
does not apply to his case. 
In particular, pursuant to paragraph 5 the domestic parent may alternatively demonstrate 
that: 
a) the foreign subsidiary carries on an actual industrial or commercial activity, as its 
main activity, within the market of the host State; for banking, financial and 
insurance activities this happens when most of the sources, investments and 
turnover originate in that State; 
This letter does not apply when the proceeds of the foreign subsidiary originate, for more 
than 50%, from the management, holding or investment of securities, shares, receivables or 
other financial assets, the transfer or grant of the right to use intangible rights on  industrial, 
literary or artistic property, as well as from the supply of (also financial) services towards 
persons that directly or indirectly control the foreign subsidiary, are controlled by it or by 
the same domestic company (para 5-bis, introduced by Law decree No 78/2009)
294
. 
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 Thus, a sort of white list that is still to come. 
294
 In other words when, according to the interpretation of the Circular letter N° 51/E, the gross proceeds 
produced by the CFC result for more than 50% from investments in financial activities (such as dividends, 
capital gains, active interests, etc), royalties or intra-group services. The ratio is to tackle the delocalization 
of passive income trough the localization of their productive assets in low-tax jurisdictions. It is noteworthy 
that the tax administration supports an interpretation of para 5-bis coherent with the EU principles in the 
matter of anti-abuse, which give the taxpayer the possibility to prove the contrary. In the view taken by the 
tax authority, limitations introduced by para 5-bis represent sort of threshold, above which it is presumed that 
the CFC is a ‘company without enterprise’ safe the counterproof. Accordingly, despite the literal datum, 
which in my opinion stops the possibility for the taxpayer to avail the escape of let. a), when para 5-bis 
applies, the tax administration considers the provision at hand as requesting a “strengthened proof” – in the 
context of a ruling - with regard to the reality of the foreign structure and activity in the market and also the 
absence of elusive purposes and effects aiming at diverting profits from Italy to tax law jurisdictions. It is 
evident  the non-technical use of the notion of contrary proof  supported by the tax administration. 
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b) the participation in the non-resident entity is not used to localize income in States 
different from the ones listed in the ministerial decree ex Article 168-bis TUIR. 
The relevance of such a (contrary) proof is evident, as the application of the CFC 
legislation not only affects the moment in which the profits are imputed on the resident 
parent
295
, but also the levy. In fact, the incomes concerned are subjected to a separate 
taxation with the average rate applied to the incomes of the resident parent, which may not 
be lower than 27%
296
. 
 
11.2  CFC rules and white-listed Member States
297
 
Before discussing the nature of the CFC rules and the correlative safe harbour clauses, the 
second CFC regime resulting from the amendments brought to Article 167 by the Law 
decree No 78/2009 has to be dealt with. To our purpose, it is particularly interesting as it 
extends to EU Member States the CFC rules if certain conditions are met, with all the 
related questions in terms of consistency with the freedom of establishment. As a matter of 
fact, paragraph 8-bis of Article 167 – added with the anti-crisis decree – provides that the 
rule of paragraph 1 applies also when the subsidiary is located in a State different from the 
ones referred to in para 1. In other words, the imputation of profits on the domestic parent 
irrespective of the distribution applies also to States which allow an adequate exchange of 
information, thereupon the EU Member States are included. However, two conditions need 
to be jointly met for this purpose: 
a) the foreign subsidiary is subject to an actual taxation which is less than an half of 
the one that would have applied if it were resident in Italy
298
; 
b) the proceeds consists for more than 50% of passive income or income from services 
supplied to controlled or controlling persons (i.e. intra-group services). The formula 
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 I.e. when they are accrued rather than when they are distributed. 
296
 Paragraph 6, Article 167 continues prescribing that they are determined according to the rules of the TUIR 
on the enterprise income and that the taxes that have been paid abroad are detracted from the tax levied in 
Italy cause of the application of the CFC rules. Of course, as clarified by paragraph 8, the profits that are then 
divided up from the foreign subsidiary do not enter the forming of the tax base of the resident parent for the 
same amount of income already taxed. Otherwise there would result a double taxation. 
297
 It has to be clarified that white-list Member States means here States that are not included in the black-list 
of the Ministerial decree 21 November 2001, as the decree indicating the States that allow a suitable 
exchange of information referred to by Article 168-bis, para 2 TUIR has not been enacted yet. 
298
 In order to verify this condition, the Circular letter 51/E clarifies the subject of the comparison that has to 
be done by the taxpayer for every tax period and the composition of the income to be considered. The 
comparison between the real foreign taxation and the virtual domestic taxation has to concern only income 
taxes – as the CFC rule is in the income tax code -, in case considering also the double taxation convention 
with the foreign State and without calculating IRAP (Italian tax on productive activities).  
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used to draw this condition is the same of para 5-bis, which excludes the operating 
of the escape laid down by para 5, let. a) facing this type and amount of proceeds
299
. 
Even when these conditions are fulfilled, the domestic parent can however avoid the 
application of the CFC rule by giving evidence, through the instrument of the ruling, that 
“the settlement abroad does not represent an artificial arrangement aiming at achieving an 
undue tax advantage”. 
Given the lack of any further indication as to the content of this contrary proof, the only 
reference is represented by the case-law of the EUCJ and particularly by the decision in 
Cadbury Schewppes, which is also referred to in the Circular letter N° 51/E
300
. Moreover, 
it is not clear if the query to the tax administration has to be raised with reference to every 
taxable period or it holds as long as the same circumstances do not change. The answer 
depends on the interpretation of the theme of proof. The second alternative is preferable, 
because the contrary proof concerns circumstances having an objective character
301
.  
 
11.3 Some considerations of the nature of CFC rules 
The CFC legislation belongs to the genus of anti-avoidance rules and these are intended to 
prevent domestic persons from relocate their economic activities in foreign tax 
jurisdictions where the taxable base is shifted in order to take advantage of the lower level 
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 S. Garufi, La nuova disciplina delle CFC, Rass. Trib., 2010, 619 et seq. observes that the new CFC 
legislation resulting from the amendments with the anti-crisis decree has the characters of both the 
jurisdictional and transactional approaches, as it is given relevance to the level of taxation in the host state in 
comparison to that applicable in Italy and to the nature of the foreign income. Though it is an hybrid model, 
because once ascertained the prevalence of the passive income on the foreign subsidiary, the domestic parent 
is taxed on the entire income (passive and active) produced by the former. It follows, in his view, that the 
new CFC legislation would be more correctly classified as an anti-evasion provision aiming at tackling the 
fictitious interposition. “The new provisions thus impose the domestic parent in Italy to verify (or foresee) the 
type of income that the cfc produces (or will produce), as from the income composition of the latter follows 
an (irrebuttable presumption) of interposed person.” 
300
 The same being the terminology, it is inferred that “(…) the legislator has intended to adopt the notion of 
“wholly artificial arrangement” drawn by the EU institutions.  
301
 Contra S. Garufi, La nuova disciplina delle CFC, cited above, 627, who considers it a subjective escape, 
so that a preventive ruling has to be requested by the taxpayer at the beginning of every taxable period. He 
points out that the adoption in the formula of such escape of the EUCJ ruling in Cadbury Schweppes case 
shows that the new CFC rules have been conceived to face tax competition among EU Member States, which 
are likely to be included into the future white-list), with the attempt to avoid an infringement of EU Law. In 
the Circular letter No 51/E it is clarified that the ruling is not binding for the taxpayer, who can ignore it and 
does not lose the possibility to prove later – for instance, in the tax litigation – the conditions to avoid the 
application of the CFC rule. The efficacy of the ruling is not confined to the taxable period that has been 
evaluated as long as the circumstances produced do not change. The tax administration also furnishes some 
indications as to such evaluation: in accordance with the EUCJ decision in Leur Bleum, it has to be case-by-
case on the basis of objective elements that can be verified by thirds. By proposing a view similar to that 
expressed with regard to para 5-bis, the tax administration considers paraa 8-bis as grounding a presumption 
that infers from the excess of the threshold the nature of wholly artificial arrangement of the CFC, save 
counterproof.  
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of taxation or of the tax deferral (even sine die). The means chosen by the legislator in 
order to face the difficulties that the tax administration would meet if requested to prove 
the fraudulent arrangement is the alteration of the ordinary burden of proof. It is up to the 
taxpayer, indeed, to give evidence of the actual character of the establishment abroad, an 
onus that – mutatis mutandis - normally would lay on the tax authorities. 
As to the structure, simplifying, a typical CFC rule is built upon the known fact 
represented by the location of a subsidiary mostly producing passive income in a low tax 
jurisdiction. From such circumstance it is inferred the artificial character of the 
establishment, which justifies the different tax treatment in comparison to a national 
subsidiary. This, unless the taxpayer proves that the establishment abroad is real and it is 
not due to tax reasons only. 
One could say that the unknown fact is not exactly a fact inferred from the base fact, but it 
is rather implied by the latter, so that the presumptive scheme does not occur. In the sense 
that the location into a low-tax territory might imply ex se the existence of an artificial 
arrangement and justify a peculiar tax regime. On the other hand, alike other presumptions, 
the ones in the field of banking inspections for instance, the legislator draws the CFC rules’ 
escapes as exemptions to the application of the regime rather than contrary proofs 
technically speaking. In this sense leads also the moment in which the taxpayer is firstly 
called to demonstrate the facts indicated, that is in the context of a ruling and not in a 
possible trial or during a tax proceedings.  
However, the splitting up of the provision shows how the fictitious settlement is the 
circumstance, though not expressed in the norm, that the legislator presumes on the basis 
of a rule of experience according to which the relocation of economic activities in low-tax 
States where mostly passive incomes are produced hides a fraudulent intent and a fictitious 
arrangement. In this perspective, the contrary proof tends to disprove the presumed fact, i.e. 
the artificial arrangement, rather than the objective circumstances from which the latter is 
inferred that are the conditions of application. 
At any rate, the formula of the CFC rule confirms the tendency of the fiscal legislator to 
introduce presumptive criteria that consist of composed regimes implying the presumption 
of avoidance and the shift on the taxpayer of the onus of proving pre-determined 
circumstances in order to avoid their application. So that the contrary proof looks more like 
an exception to the application of the provision concerned rather than an impeditive fact, 
i.e. a fact that is not compatible with the existence of the presumed event. Despite the 
Legal Presumptions in National Tax Systems. 
The Italian and Belgian Case 
 
 
135 
presumptions we are used within the civil-procedural field which are naturally meant to 
operate in the context of the trial, they show a weak demonstrative character in favour of 
the prevailing aim of preventing tax abuse of law. 
 
11.4 The proof to the contrary (or safe harbour clause) 
The consideration expressed at the end of the previous paragraph appears primarily from 
the context in which the taxpayer is put in the condition of producing the circumstances 
indicated in Article 167 TUIR. Indeed, both the CFC regimes drawn by that Article 
provide that the domestic parent have to raise a query to the tax administration in order to 
furnish the evidence requested for the purpose of the non-application. 
Hence, unlike other types of tax presumptions, here the contrary proof may be given in a 
context that is neither the trial nor a running tax proceedings. So that it is not clear, among 
the other things, what happens if the taxpayer does not raise the request for a ruling in 
advance. Since it seems to be compulsory, the consequence would be the application of the 
CFC rules and the loss of the right to give proof to the contrary in a possible tax litigation, 
at least for the taxable period already closed.  
This, in general. More particularly, the escapes provided for by Article 167, para 5, have 
been criticized by most of the Authors for further reasons
302
. 
Paragraph 5 involves black-listed countries only, among which – after the amendments 
with the ministerial decree 27 July 2010 - there are not any EU Member States any longer. 
The main change in respect of the previous provision concerns the introduction of the 
reference to the ‘market’ in let. a). Most of the Authors303 and industry associations have 
warned on the impact that a narrow interpretation of this escape would have on the 
internationalization of the Italian companies. Indeed, a literal interpretation of let. a) would 
lead to request the domestic parent to prove that the activity of the foreign subsidiary 
mainly addresses the market of the host State
304
, or that – according to the Circular letter of 
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 The discussion on the escape laid down by para. 8-ter will be deepened later on in the dissertation, as it 
echoes the EUCG case law. 
303
 A.o., G. Marino, La nozione di mercato nella disciplina CFC: verso una probatio diabolica?, Riv. Dir. 
Trib., 2011, 1113. The Author questions how the new formula of let. a), para 5, Article 167, should be 
interpreted in order to overcome the presumption of the CFC rule without rendering this a probation diabolica. 
He is particularly critical towards the interpretation of the concept of ‘market’ adopted by the tax 
administration in the Circular letter 51/E. On the one side, it is very narrow and not in line with the intention 
of the legislator, whereas the reference to the market should in his opinion be read as rendering more 
stringent the counterproof. On the other side, the circular illogically recalls the EU notion of market.  
304
 As a consequence, the CFC might be due to show the books. 
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the tax administration N° 51/E – the sources of that activity are placed in the host State305. 
In this view, the ‘host market’ would turn into a justification of the relocation of the 
activity in another tax jurisdiction and thereby the genuineness of the activity itself would 
be proved
306
. 
Under this perspective, the proof of the real establishment (premises, staff) and carrying on 
of an economic activity abroad might not suffice, as long as the same activity could be 
placed in another jurisdiction. In other words, from some documents of the tax authorities 
on concrete cases and circular letters it can be inferred that the investigation of the tax 
administration concerns also the choice of the subsidiary’s location, in order to verify if it 
is due to tax reasons only. In this way, inevitably a subjective element enters the evaluation 
of the tax authority
307
. 
Moreover, the reference to an actual industrial or commercial activity – apart from the 
banking/financing/insurance activities - might exclude, for instance, the supply of services 
or the passive holdings.  
Whereas the escape of let. a) is at risk of a narrow interpretation, the one of let. b) requests 
the proof that from the location in a tax heaven does not follow in practice any advantage 
as to the taxation of the taxable base. Given the vagueness of the formula, it is necessary to 
refer to Article 5, para 3, Ministerial decree 21 November 2001 (No 429) according to 
which the domestic parent has to prove that at least 75% of the incomes pursued by the 
CFC are produced in non-black listed countries and there they are subject to a ordinary 
level of taxation
308
.   
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As an indication, in the Circular letter N° 51/E the threshold of the purchases and sales in the local market 
of the host State in order to fulfill the condition is fixed at more than 50%. Moreover, it is clarified that the 
market concerned not necessarily coincide with the geographical border of the host State. Indeed, depending 
on the concrete case, it may be extended to the surrounding geographical area that is (economically, 
politically geographically or strategically)  linked to the host territory. 
306
 More in detail, in the Circular letter 51/E it is requested the proof of the rootedness of the CFC in the host 
State plus the availability in loco of a structure suitable to the carrying on of the declared commercial activity 
and having managerial autonomy. Thus, the physical presence is necessary but not sufficient, as it is also 
demanded the proof of a connection with the host market, i.e. an economic and social link with the foreign 
territory. A connection that is explained by referring to the words used by the EUCJ in Cadbury Schweppes: 
“…its intention to take part, in a permanent and continuative way, to the economic life of a State…- 
(omissis)-different from the own and to gain benefit…”. The fact that the CFC does not address the local 
market is considered as a sign of the lack of actual activity in the host State. However, it is clarified that in 
this case it is possible to appreciate further elements, like the economic-entrepreneurial reasons leading to 
invest in a low-tax jurisdiction. 
307
 See Circular letter 6 October 2010 N° 51/E, where it is requested not only a physical presence (with 
premises, staff and equipment) but also a rootedness in the phase of the supplying and distribution. It is 
however clarified that if such a proof is missing, it is possible to consider further elements. In particular, it is 
assigned relevance also to the subjective element, i.e. the entrepreneurial reasons.  
308
 The ratio of the escape is to make sure that the CFC’s proceeds are properly taxed. The term of 
comparison is the levy in force in Italy for the Circular letter N° 51/E. The latter provides for some 
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11.4.1  Limitation to the deductibility of costs incurred with enterprises resident in 
black-listed States 
Further considerations on the contrary proof to the first CFC regime arise from the 
consideration of Article 110, paras 10 and 11 TUIR.  
Following a similar scheme, paragraph 10 prohibits the deduction of expenses and other 
negative items met in relation to transactions with enterprises that are resident or placed in 
States and territories different from that listed in the ministerial decree ex Article 168-bis 
TUIR
309
. The provision does not apply when
 310
 the enterprise resident in Italy proves 
alternatively that: 
a) the foreign enterprise “for the most part carries on a real commercial activity”; 
b) the transactions realized live up to a real economic interest and they have been 
concretely put into execution. 
Similarly to the CFC rules
311
, the aim of tackling the shifting of taxable base towards low-
tax jurisdictions has led the legislator to introduce a presumptive regime as to the existence 
of a fictitious arrangement facing transactions with parties located into those territories. 
The mechanism is the same, as the tax administration is relieved from proving the artificial 
character of the foreign enterprise or of the transactions realized, whereas it is up to the 
taxpayer the proof of their correspondence to reality. 
However, the rule at hand differs from CFC rules under two main aspects. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
exemplifications: the source of the income produced by the CFC is abroad (where there is a permanent 
establishment or immovable properties taxed in a non-black listed State), the CFC has legal seat in a black-
listed State but it carries on the principal activity or is fiscally resident or has the seat of effective 
management in a non-black listed State where incomes are taxed; the CFC is located in a non-black listed 
country and operates in a black-listed State trough a permanent establishment whose income is taxed in the 
former State. In general, it has to be regarded the overall taxation on the group with reference to the income 
produced by the CFC. In any event, it has to be proved the absence of tax avoidance purposes. An index of 
that is the regular distribution of profits to Italy. G. D’Abruzzo, Le nuove regole in materia di imprese 
controllate estere al crocevia tra libertà di stabilimento ed abuso delle forme giuridiche, Bol. Trib., 2011, 
1073, arguing from the provision of paragraph 8-bis, Article 167, believes that in order to fulfill the escape of 
let. b) the CFC incomes have to be charged with (at least) a 50% taxation of the corresponding Italian one. 
309
 The current formula of Article 110, para 10 is the result of the amendments by Article 1, para. 83, let. h), 
No 1), Law No 244/2007. The ministerial decree ex Article 168-bis has to be enacted yet. Thus, in the 
meanwhile it has to be taken into consideration the Ministerial decree 23 January 2002 “Non-deductibility of 
expenses and other negative items arising from transactions with enterprises domiciled in States or territory 
having a preferential fiscal regime”. Indeed, with Article 2,  Decree of the Minister of Economics and 
Finance 2010 the list included in Article 1, ministerial decree 23 January 2002 has been updated by removing 
“Cipro”, and from the list in Article 3 - concerning certain persons and activities located in the indicated 
States - “Malta” (No 9) and “Corea del Sud” (No 3) have been removed.  
310
 Apart from merely procedural aspects that are requested, like the separate indication in the tax return. 
311
 The interaction of the two different regulations is dealt of in para 12, Article 110, where it is prescribed 
that paras 10 and 11, Article 110 do not apply to the transactions carried on with non-resident persons which 
are subjected to Article 167 or 168 TUIR on controlled foreign companies. 
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First of all, paragraph 10, second part, provides that the deduction is allowed when the 
transactions are carried on with enterprises resident or located into EU Member States or 
States of the SEE that are included into the list of the ministerial decree ex Article 168-bis 
TUIR
312
. 
Secondly, here the taxpayer is not obliged to raise a query for a ruling. Instead, it is 
provided that before issuing a tax assessment the tax administration has to serve a notice 
where the taxpayer is informed of the possibility of giving the above-mentioned proof by 
90 days. If the proofs produced are not deemed sufficient to avoid the denial of the 
deduction, the tax administration has to specifically give reasons in the tax decision issued. 
 
11.4.1.1 Proof as to the transactions’ reality  
Unlike CFC rules, the limitation to the deduction of the “black-list costs” does not 
necessarily involve enterprises of the same group. It is, indeed, likely to concern 
transactions carried out with third parties
313
. This implies a certain difficulty in proving the 
circumstance laid down by let. a), i.e. the reality of the foreign enterprise, as such a proof 
requests an active collaboration of the third party, especially in terms of documents’ 
delivery.  
It follows the importance of the second escape provided for by paragraph 11, which is 
fulfilled by giving evidence of the economic interest surrounding the transaction carried on 
with that party located into a low-tax jurisdiction and also of the concrete realization of 
that operation. Under this escape, the economical convenience of the operation has to be 
shown. 
                                                          
312
 The same is provided by paragraph 12-bis of Article 110, which extends the provisions of the previous 
paragraphs 10 and 11 to the supplies of services from the freelances domiciled in States different from the 
ones identified by the ministerial decree ex Article 168-bis. Afterwards, it is said that the extension does not 
apply to freelances domiciled in States of the EU or SEE included in the above mentioned list. 
313
 When firstly introduced with Article 1, para 2, Law 30 December 1991, No 413 – that added paras 7-bis 
and 7-ter to Article 76 TUIR at that time in force – the limitation to deductions of black-list costs applied to 
the transactions between a resident enterprise and a foreign company that controlled ex Article 2359 of the 
Civil Code the former or was controlled by the former or by the same company the controlled both of them. 
Afterwards, with Article 1, Law 21 November 2000, the range of application was extended to all the 
transactions between resident enterprises and enterprises domiciled in extra-UE tax heavens, irrespective of 
the control-relation, in line with the recommendations emerging from the OECD report of 1998 on harmful 
tax practices. At the same time, however, the escape was confined to the circumstance that the foreign 
enterprise “carried on principally an actual industrial or commercial activity in the market of the country 
where it was resident”. The last amendment was criticized because it rendered the contrary proof difficult for 
the Italian enterprises. Indeed, they were not allowed to prove the genuineness of the transaction, instead they 
had to prove that the foreign party carried on a real economic activity that mainly addressed the market of 
residence. In the light of this, the enactment of the ministerial decree including the extra UE black-listed 
States had been postponed and by virtue of the Law 28 December 2001 the previously in force escapes were 
reintroduced.  
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Once again, it can be observed that the tax authorities’ evaluation enters the choice done by 
the resident person in order to verify if it is guided by fiscal reasons only. This, not only 
when it is justified in the light of the provision, as with the escape at hand, but also when 
the law seems to request a merely objective inquiry, as in the escapes discussed in the 
following paragraph. 
 
11.4.2 Proof of the economic activity’s reality in the rules on CFC and on the 
limitation to the black-list costs’ deduction 
The analysis of the tax administration’s practice – resulting from circular letters and tax 
rulings – shows a tendency to standardize the interpretation/application of the escapes 
provided for by Articles 167, para 5, let. a) and 110, par. 11, notwithstanding the different 
literal data
314
. 
As said, the former requests the proof that the foreign person carries on an actual industrial 
or commercial activity as its main activity in the market of the State where it is located. 
Whereas the latter demands the evidence of the carrying on of an actual commercial 
activity. 
Even before the amendment of the first escape, which has replaced the reference to the 
‘foreign State’ with the narrower reference to the ‘market’ of the same State, the tax 
authorities used to request a ‘rootedness with the territory’ where the subsidiary was 
established. The same holds also with regard to the second escape, even though a reference 
to the market initially introduced by the Law No 342/2000 has been quickly removed. As a 
consequence of this interpretation, the resident enterprise may be (and in fact is) called to 
prove that the foreign subsidiary/party is connected to the host territory. A connection 
which can result, for instance, from the supplying or clients. And that, in the view taken by 
the tax administration, is a clear sign of juridical-economic reasons supporting the 
establishment of a subsidiary or transactions with a party (possibly related) in low-tax 
jurisdiction
315
.  
                                                          
314
 Ex multis, Circular letter 26 gennaio 2009, No 1/E. 
315
 Critical on the assimilation of the two escapes A. Iannacone, La dimostrazione della “prima circostanza 
esimente” per disapplicare la normative CFC e l’art. 110, comma 10 del Tuir: è giustificata una 
assimilazione delle due norme e quale importanza hanno le interrelazioni dei soggetti non residenti con il 
“mercato locale” del Paese estero?, Nota a Risoluzione Agenzia delle entrate – Direzione Centrale 
Normativa e Contenzioso, 8 aprile 2009 n. 100/E, Riv. Dir. Trib., 2009, 112 et seq., to which I refer for the 
indication of further documentation. The Author underlines how Article 110, para 11, by referring to a 
‘commercial’ activity covers every activity consisting of the carrying on of a commercial enterprise ex 
Article 55 TUIR, so that it is broader than the formula used by the CFC regulation (including activities ex 
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This interpretation is in line with the letter of paragraph 5, let. 5), Article 167 TUIR, as 
amended, though as unanimously warned a narrow application of the escape would 
discourage the investments abroad and would go beyond the purpose of fighting against 
international tax avoidance. As to the second escape – the one provided for by Article 110, 
para 11 TUIR - the interpretation followed by the tax administration cannot be explained in 
view of the provision, as the latter does not requests a connection to the host State, for the 
absence of which the domestic party could not be in any case considered responsible. 
 
11. 5 Brief conclusions  
It has been observed that the CFC rules imply a sort of shifting of the tax event from the 
possession of income to the existence of the income
316
, which might be not in line with the 
ability to pay principle.  
However, the main doubts concern, as we will see later on, the EU point of view. 
In this regard, it can be already observed that what appears from the provisions under 
discussion and their recent amendments is the awareness of the Italian legislator about their 
potential incompatibility with EU law. Indeed, while the ministerial decree ex Article 168-
bis has to be enacted yet, the black-list included in the ministerial decrees in force has been 
revised by removing the residual EU Member States. This, with regard  to the CFC rule 
laid down by paragraph 1, Article 167 (CFC) and also as to Article 110, par. 10 (limitation 
as to the deductibility of costs). 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Article 2195 Civil Code only). Moreover, it does not include any reference to the place where the activity is 
undertaken, so that this element should not enter the evaluation by the tax administration, in line with the 
parliamentary evolution of the provision and the ratio. The advise expressed by the tax authority in the ruling 
commented (8 aprile 2009 n. 100/E), goes in the opposite direction. It has to be firstly said that according to 
Article 11, para 13, Law No 413/91, the taxpayer is exempted from giving proof to the contrary during a tax 
proceedings when the taxpayer has submitted a query to the tax administration as to the nature and tax 
treatment of the transaction that is going to carry on, in accordance with Article 21 of the same law. The case 
concerned a permanent establishment in Italy of a German company, which asked the non-application of 
Article 110, para 10 with regard to the costs met cause of the transactions with a third company of the same 
group located in Switzerland. The latter was located into a black-listed State and classified among the mixed 
companies, i.e. benefiting from a preferential tax treatment to which the Italian limitation as to the costs’ 
deduction applies. The tax administration denied the non-application of Article 110, para 10 as the proof of 
the existence of an organization (office, staff) and the directional seat in Switzerland was not enough for the 
purpose of considering the activity (supply of intangible services to foreign clients) carried on in that territory. 
According to the ruling, in order to consider an enterprise actually located in a certain territory it has to be 
integrated with it and to take constantly part to the economic life of it. Given the lack of a ‘structural 
connection with the local economy’ the tax administration excluded the existence of juridical-economical 
reasons justifying the establishment of a company in Switzerland. In any case, the taxpayer is given the 
possibility to accomplish his onus of proof during the tax proceedings, in order to get the deduction of the 
concerned costs. 
316
 G. Fransoni, L’errore di fondo e le “ragioni” del Fisco, Dialoghi tributari, 2009, 366. In this way it would 
follow a sort of fiscal neutrality according to S. Garufi, La nuova disciplina delle CFC, cited above, 637. 
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The same awareness has led the legislator to draw the contrary proof to the CFC rule 
concerning the white-list Member States by making use of a formula used by the EUCJ. It 
is quite evident how that escape differs from the above mentioned. Clearly, a contrary 
proof consisting de facto into a justification of choice as to the location abroad or the 
transaction with foreign parties would be unthinkable in the context of the internal market. 
It has to be investigated, however, in what extent such CFC regulation as interpreted by the 
national authorities is in line with the EU Law. In particular, the compliance costs put on 
the domestic parents and the prevention from giving proof to the contrary in front of a 
judge when the advanced ruling has not been asked, are relevant in that regard. 
 
12. Transfer pricing under Article 110, para 7, TUIR 
Dealing with anti-abuse provisions having an international relevance, the national 
regulation of the transfer pricing must be mentioned. 
It has to be immediately said that it is a very complicated issue that cannot be exhausted in 
this seat, as it implies the consideration of different methods and international standards. 
To our purpose, it is interesting in the extent to which it appears to consist of a legally 
defined predetermination of the prices facing cross-border inter-company transactions. 
Moreover, similarly to the anti-abuse provisions analysed so far it in practice affects 
directly the position of the taxpayer upon which several (administrative, accounting, 
documentation) obligations lie, even irrespective of a possible tax assessment. 
The rule on transfer pricing is included in Article 110, para 7, TUIR, pursuant to which 
“The items of income deriving from transactions with non-resident companies, which 
directly or indirectly control or are controlled by the [domestic] enterprise, or are 
controlled by the same company controlling the [domestic] enterprise, are evaluated on 
the basis of the normal value of the goods transferred, the services supplied and the goods 
and services purchased, determined according to paragraph 2, if a higher income results”. 
Paragraph 2 of Article 110 cited in para 7 refers to Article 9 TUIR, which in turn at para 3 
defines the concept of ‘normal value’ as “the price or consideration established on 
average for goods and services of the same or similar type, in condition of fair competition 
and at the same phase of marketing, at the time and in the place where the goods and 
services have been respectively purchased or supplied or, failing the same time and place, 
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at the closest”317. Therefore, in the Italian tax system the ‘normal value’ embodies the 
criterion for determining the arm’s length value of intra-group transactions. It refers to the 
price that would be applied under fair market conditions. 
 
12.1 Transfer pricing and burden of proof 
The wording of para 7 gives rise to several questions, in particular as regards the juridical 
qualification of the rule (whether including an irrebuttable presumption, a rebuttable 
presumption or a pure legal definition), the effects on the distribution of the burden of 
proof and the obligations placed upon the parties involved. 
At a first sight, the provision is construed as a rule fixing the price of goods and services in 
case of transactions among related parties, thereby disregarding the (possibly different) 
price agreed upon by them. As a consequence – this is plain both in the doctrine and in the 
jurisprudence – it states the juridical criteria that must be followed for the purpose of 
determining the taxable income to be declared in the tax return, irrespective of the 
subsequent (only possible) verification by the tax authorities. On the other hand, looking at 
the provision per se, it seems not to affect the distribution of the burden of proof. 
In several decisions the Supreme Court ruled in this sense. In particular, it held that the 
burden of proof  lies with the tax authorities pursuant to the general rule (Article 2697 
Civil Code). Under this view, the tax office was requested to provide the reasons for the 
assessment of a higher amount of taxable income, which included not only the proof that 
the transfer prices were not at arm’s length, but also that the overall tax burden in Italy was 
greater than that in the states were the related parties were located. Thus, the tax authority 
had to prove the tax advantage justifying the (abnormal) transfer price. Only once such a 
proof was fulfilled by the tax authority, it was up to the taxpayer to prove that the 
transaction  was not justified only in view of an undue tax advantage. To support such 
conclusion, the Supreme Court classified para 7 among the anti-avoidance provisions 
originating by the EU law doctrine of abuse of law and national anti-abuse legislation. The 
                                                          
317
 Para 3 of Article 9 TUIR continues by stipulating that, when possible, the normal value is to be 
determined according to the price list or to the tariff of the purchaser/supplier or, in the absence of them, 
according to the price list and market list of the Chamber of Commerce or the professional tariffs. For the 
goods whose price is normatively regulated the provisions in force needs to be regarded. Ultimately, para 4 
provides for a special regulation as regards shares and other financial instruments. 
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transfer pricing rule was thus deemed as combating the ‘manoeuvres on the disclosed 
price’ and not the concealment of the price318.   
More recently, the Supreme Court has ruled by explicitly excluding that para 7 contains a  
(legal rebuttable) presumption as to the receiving of a consideration different from the one 
agreed upon and thus by disregarding the actual business reasons in the light of which it 
has been fixed by the parties at a lower amount
319
.  
Ultimately, it seems that there has been a sort of revirement in the jurisprudence of the 
Supreme Court on the issue of transfer price under the profile of the burden of proof and 
the juridical qualification. In a (non-isolated) decision handed down on the 8
th
 of May 2013, 
the Court has held that: 
“It has to be primarily underlined that the so called transfer pricing embodies, under the 
economic perspective, a distortion of the principle of fair competition. This, in the sense 
that, transactions involving companies of the same group having their seat in different 
States take place according to prices that do not correspond to the one quoted in a level 
playing field. Thus, the phenomenon gives rise to the shifting of taxable base and it permits 
to remove taxable income from States with a higher taxation. In the light of safeguarding 
the balanced allocation between member states of the power to tax, domestic rules aimed 
at combating transfer pricing have been introduced. Such rules adopt the principle of the 
business transactions’ normal price included in Article 9, para 1, of the  OECD Model. 
The same principle have been adopted in Italy, in the text applicable ratione temporis, by 
Article 76, para 5, D.P.R. n. 917 of the 1986 [now, Article 110, para 7]. Alike in the other 
States, the Italian regulation of transfer pricing disregards the proof of a domestic higher 
taxation. As a matter of fact, such regulation is a more advanced defence in respect of the 
one combating directly tax avoidance. Thus, the tax avoidance does not have to be proved, 
because such regulation is intended to contrast the business phenomenon per se. Indeed, 
among the elements of the norm combating transfer pricing included in Article 76, para 5, 
                                                          
318
 Ex multis, Supreme Court, 13 October 2006, No 22023; Supreme Court, 15 May 2007, No 11226; 
Supreme Court 25 March 2003, No 4317. See P. Valente, La giurisprudenza della Corte di Cassazione in 
materia di transfer pricing, Il fisco, 2012, 7062. 
319
 Supreme Court 31 March 2011, No 7343: “The provision [Article 110, para 7, TUIR] does not contain at 
all a presumption (in case, a legal one; if iuris tantum, with the possibility of the counter proof) as to the 
receiving of a consideration different from the one agreed upon by the parties, because it simply states the 
only legal criteria to be adopted for the evaluation of the specific business transaction for income tax 
purposes, irrespective of the consideration that has been actually negotiated and thus with the absolute 
irrelevance of the concrete business reasons that have brought the parties to fix it at a lower amount”. See M. 
D’Avossa, Transfer price e onere della prova, Note to Regional Tax Court 10 June 2011, No 63, Rass. Trib., 
2012, 503 et seq., in particular at p. 507. 
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D.P.R. n. 917 of the 1986 there is not the domestic higher taxation. Again, it is not 
necessary to prove the tax avoidance. Hence, it is only necessary the existence of 
transactions among related enterprises. Instead, it lays on the taxpayer, according to the 
ordinary rules on the closeness to the proof as set forth by Article 2697 Civil Code, to give 
evidence that the transactions took place on the basis of market values which are normal 
under Article 9, para 3, D.P.R. 917 of the 1986. Pursuant to the latter provision, as well 
known, normal prices of goods and services are those established in a ‘level playing field’ 
with reference, when possible, to price lists and tariffs normally used (Supreme Court No 
11949 of 2012; Supreme Court No 7343 of 2011). This does not exclude other means of 
proof, which nonetheless the taxpayer has not produced. As a consequence, the Regional 
Tax Court could not expect from the tax authority the proof of the tax avoidance, and in 
particular the proof of a more favourable taxation pursuant to the foreign legislation and 
the abnormality of the intra-group transfer prices.” 
In line with a similar decision handed in 2012 (No 11949)
320
, the Court appears to qualify 
the provision as a rule aimed at combating the phenomenon of transfer pricing which 
undermines the correct allocation of the power of taxation between different States. 
Apparently, the tax authorities are not requested to prove the abusive scheme, being rather 
sufficient to give evidence of the (objective) conditions of application of the transfer 
pricing rule and, presumably, the divergence between the value declared and the one 
deemed as being normal. In this case, the taxpayer is charged with the burden of proving 
that the transfer prices with related parties are in line with those applied to transactions 
with third parties, and at any rate that they are ‘normal’ under the meaning of Article 9, 
para 3 TUIR
321
. 
At any rate, there is not a settled case-law on the issues of the nature of the Italian transfer 
pricing rule and the division of the burden of proof between tax administration and 
taxpayer. 
 
                                                          
320
 Supreme Court, 13 July 2012, No 11949. 
321
 It has to be noted that looking at these decisions one can see that in these decisions the issue of the transfer 
pricing regulation is inextricably related to the one of the deductibility of costs. This brings the Court to 
assert that the burden of proving the existence and inherence of such costs, which in intra-group transactions 
implies the proof of the normality of the prices of the goods and services transferred, is placed upon the 
taxpayer rather than on the tax authorities.  
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12.2 Transfer pricing and anti-avoidance rules 
The Supreme Court’s judgments mentioned in the previous paragraph show that up till to 
now there is not a uniform, settled view of para 7 within the case-law.  
In fact, the interpretation of the norm depends on the rationale assigned to the domestic 
transfer pricing. 
One the one side, it could be argued that the provision belongs to the genus of anti-
avoidance rules and it presumes that given certain conditions (intra-group transactions 
involving companies located in different States) transfer prices that would not be 
established under a level playing field are agreed upon for the purpose of obtaining undue 
tax advantages. To support such view, one could note that the national legislation does not 
include a transfer pricing applicable to merely internal intra-group transactions, i.e. where 
all the parties involved are located in the State’s territory. This could mean that the 
regulation of international situations is aimed at tackling the shifting of taxable base to tax 
heavens, as they are assumed as implying a higher risk of tax avoidance. 
However, we will see that in these cases a further interest enter the evaluation of the 
legislator; an interest which receives protection at EU level and consists of the proper 
allocation of the power to tax between different States
322
. Moreover, an anti-avoidance 
ratio would imply the distinction between the States or territories where the foreign related 
party in an intra-group transaction is located, as with the provisions in the matter of tax 
residence, CFC rules, deductibility of costs with companies resident in black-listed States. 
Thus, the anti-avoidance construction of the domestic transfer pricing is questionable. 
It seems to have been set aside in the more recent judgments of the Supreme Court. In 
these decisions, the Court appears to ‘lighten’ the tax authority’s burden of proving the 
violation of the provision to the disfavour of the taxpayer, on the grounds that he is the 
closest to the proofs from which the observance of the ‘normal value’ standard can be 
inferred. 
In the light of the same reasons, Article 26, Law decree No 78/2010 (converted with 
amendments into Law No 122 of the 30 July 2010) has introduced in the national tax 
system specific documentation fulfilments with regard to transfer pricing, which if 
complied with might be relevant in order to avoid the application of administrative 
penalties on transfer pricing violations. A further paragraph (2-ter) has been inserted in 
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 The issue of the transfer pricing will be dealt with later on as the Belgian transfer pricing has been 
evaluated by the ECJ in the SGI case.  
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Article 1, Presidential decree No 471/97 (legislation on administrative penalties), pursuant 
to which the penalties provided for by Article 1, para 2, are not applicable when two 
conditions are jointly met: a) the taxpayer has filed a communication which has been 
submitted to the tax authorities together with the tax return, where it has declared that he 
has appropriate transfer pricing documentation: b) during possible tax investigations, the 
taxpayer provides the tax authorities with appropriate transfer pricing documentation. Such 
documentation requirements are not binding, as they have been thought in order to 
strengthen the cooperation between tax administration and taxpayers. The latter may 
benefit from the exclusion of the administrative penalties in case of an increase in taxable 
income due to transfer prices’ adjustments, as long as they fulfil the conditions set in para 
2-ter and in the implementing measures
323
. On the other hand, the information given by 
companies as to the transactions with related parties render easier the controls by the tax 
authorities and more effectively the selection of the taxpayers to put under investigation. 
 
12.3 Brief considerations on the nature of the domestic transfer pricing 
In conclusion, it has to be noted that from the interpretation of para 7, Article 110, which 
prevails within the case-law and the scholars
324
, it is certainly possible to infer that such 
provision does not concern directly the powers of investigation and assessment of the tax 
authorities. Instead, it is deemed as a rule that affects the determination of the taxable 
income by the taxpayers in their tax return. In other words, as such the provision does not 
appear to be a probative (or procedural) one, but it has rather a substantive nature. In fact, 
given an intercompany transaction involving companies located in different States, it 
prescribes to consider the market value for income tax purposes, being not relevant for the 
tax legislator any other value. In this view, the provision could be classified as being an 
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 Indeed, it has to be clarified that the documentation that needs to be provided by the taxpayer must 
comply with the requirements specified by the Revenue Agency’s detailed regulation, issued on 29 
September 2010 (No 2010/137654). See also the Circular letter 15 December 2010, No 58/E. For an in-depth 
examination of the new documentation requirements introduced with Law decree No 78/2010 see A.M. 
Garufi, La nuova disciplina in tema di documentazione dei “prezzi di trasferimento”, Rass. Trib., , 2011, 
1444 et seq.  
324
 A.M. Gaffuri, La nuova disciplina in tema di documentazione dei “prezzi di trasferimento”, cited above, 
at p. 1468, observes that the transfer pricing differs from the traditional model of tax avoidance behaviour. 
The latter is characterized by the circumvention of a tax provision, which only formally is abided by. By 
contrast, the ploy on transfer prices determine an open and direct violation of a legislative provision. If the 
taxpayer does not declare the market value for tax purposes, he explicitly behaves in contrast with Article 
110, para 7 TUIR. In this view, “it is necessary to consider the market price as it was the one actually 
negotiated and paid. Being this the only amount that can be reported in the tax return, in the end it embodies, 
in the context of the legislative provision, the real one”. 
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irrebuttable presumption, or more correctly a legal determination or definition of the value: 
it refers to the normal value as if it was the one negotiated and paid by the parties. 
Once having stressed this substantive nature, the consequences in terms of proof to be 
given in a possible tax trial need to be taken. If the tax administration issues a tax 
assessment contesting the abnormality of the transfer prices, the taxpayer is requested to 
prove that the goods or services have been transferred at the market value. By contrast, if 
para 7 was interpreted as including a rebuttable presumption of law according to which the 
parties have established a price different from the ‘normal’ one in view of an undue tax 
advantage, and thereby authorising the tax authority to re-determine the taxable base on the 
basis of the ‘normal value’, then the taxpayer would be requested to prove the absence of 
any tax avoidance scheme. 
 
13. Conclusion 
Before turning to deal with tax law presumptions within the Belgian tax system, and 
leaving more general considerations for the conclusions to Chapter II, some lines need to 
be drawn concerning the Italian tax system. 
In the Italian experience, the role played by tax law presumptions as means of proof of one 
or more elements of the tax obligation, in the different context in which such obligation is 
relevant, has been very much debated by the scholars. 
To this debate, an important contribution has surely been derived from the numerous 
Constitutional Court’s rulings on irrebuttable and rebuttable presumptions, from which the 
parameters of compatibility with the legal order have been progressively laid down. 
Summarizing, the Constitutional Court employs an examination of the legal presumption 
(both irrebuttble and rebuttable) concerned which focuses on the rationality of the 
inference and on the correspondence to the normal course of events. 
The most relevant parameters of evaluation are the principle of reasonableness, the ability 
to pay principle, and the right of defence. In principle, the latter should concern rebuttable 
presumptions only, otherwise the irrebuttable one would be always inconsistent with the 
Constitution. The examination of some decisions, however, shows that the absence of the 
possibility to rebut a presumption may enter the evaluation of rationality of the irrebuttable 
presumption itself, so that it is found to be non-rational. With regard to rebuttable 
presumptions of law, the Court does not confine the evaluation to the defence rights of the 
taxpayer, as one would expect given that they affect the division of the burden of proof, but 
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most of the time goes to verify if they comply with the ability to pay principle. This is 
presumably because it gathers the substantive effects on the definition of the tax obligation 
that may derive from the single presumption concerned. This is evident, for instance, with 
regard to the estimated method of assessment based on the taxpayer’s spending capacity or 
the presumptions provided in the context of the banking inspections carried out by the tax 
authorities. The Court checks their compatibility with the principle of ability to pay, apart 
from the right of defence. Finally, from the decisions of the Court a distinction between 
irrebuttable presumptions of law and similar notions (typifications, legal definitions, 
emerges. The former are requested to reflect a rule of experience, while the latter are only 
requested to be rational. 
Yet, several questions concerning the classification of certain presumptive provisions and 
the consequences in terms of the distribution of the burden of proof are still open. In this 
Section, only some examples were given, but they are sufficient to mean that classifying 
certain presumptive provisions is not an easy challenge. For instance, the estimated 
methods of assessment are in between legal presumptions and presumption of fact, and this 
affects the extent to which the tax administration may rely on such instruments when 
issuing a notice of assessment and the taxpayer may contest the presumptive inference. 
When the provision covers a matter harmonized or concerns cross-border situations, the 
question has also significant implications in terms of consistency with EU law. A good 
example of this is the transfer pricing rule. It is formulated as a rule which basically 
implies that the taxpayers have to report in their books the prices at the arm’s length value. 
This seems to be the more recent interpretation stemming from the case law of the 
Supreme Court, but there is not settled case-law on the issue. If, by contrast, the provision 
was interpreted as presuming tax avoidance facing transactions with non-resident related 
companies, then the tax authorities should at least prove the facts on which the 
presumption is based and the taxpayer would be allowed to prove not only that the prices 
agreed upon are at the market value, but also that, irrespective of this, there are commercial 
reasons justifying the transaction. Similar issues, in particular in terms of the concrete 
possibility for the taxpayer to give proof to the contrary have been posed dealing, on the 
one side, with the legal presumptions that in the field of VAT simplify the assessment and 
detect tax evasion; on the other side, with regard to the specific anti-avoidance rules (tax 
residence, CFCs) that the Italian legislator has introduced over the last years. Notably, for 
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some of them, the Italian legislator appears to acknowledge the risk of conflict with EU 
law, and in fact it has recourse to the formulas stemming from the EUCJ case law. 
 
 
Chapter II - Section II 
Legal Presumptions in the Belgian Tax System 
 
1. Tax law presumptions in the Belgian tax system 
The reasons why the Belgian tax system fits the purpose of this dissertation have been 
illustrated in the introduction to the second chapter. In that introduction, two main aspects 
have been emphasized, namely the circumstance that the literature has not yet confronted 
in a systematic way the topic of legal presumptions in the field of taxation on the one side, 
and the involvement of several national provisions in the valuation of consistency with the 
EU law on the other side. 
While the latter issue will be dealt with in the subsequent chapter, the focus is now on the 
first issue, with the attempt to individualise the Belgian approach to tax law presumptions. 
In doing so, the same methodology adopted for dealing with the Italian tax system will be 
used. Firstly, the principles governing the compatibility of tax law presumptions within the 
national legal order are illustrated; afterwards, the main Constitutional Court’s judgments 
are examined in order to highlight the reasoning adopted in the evaluation of consistency 
with the Constitutional framework; ultimately, in the light of the foregoing the principal 
tax law presumptions in force are discussed, with a view to their possible relevance in the 
EU context. 
It should be noted at the outset that the Belgian approach may at first sight appear more 
‘pragmatic’ in comparison to the Italian one. This, particularly, as the question of the 
nature of legal presumptions (whether substantive or procedural) and above all of their role 
in the context of the administrative proceedings (whether considerable as means of proof) 
remain in the shadow. Despite this, however, we will see how the overall approach does 
not differ much from the one identified when dealing with the Italian legal order. 
Accordingly, they still may be assumed as being representative of the national approach to 
tax law presumptions and confronted with the one of the European Union.  
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Below, the focus will be first on the Constitutional framework in order to set the stage. 
Afterwards, some Constitutional Court’s decisions dealing with presumptive provisions in 
the light of the fundamental principle of equality will be examined, with the aim of 
inferring the scheme adopted in the evaluation of tax presumptive measures’ compatibility 
with the legal order. After that, a brief mention will be made of some estimated methods of 
assessment, as they giv rise to problems of classification. Ultimately, the most relevant 
presumptive provisions in force will be dealt with. As with the Italian tax system, the focus 
will be first on VAT, where a number of presumptions are set forth in the context of the 
administrative proceedings; afterwards, some presumptive provisions and regimes in the 
field of direct (income) taxation will be examined in view of their relevance at EU level 
(such as (semi-)general anti-abuse rule, transfer pricing adjustments, thin capitalization). 
 
2. Burden of proof, ‘probative’ legal presumptions and fictions 
Generally speaking, although the Belgian tax literature has not inherited from the civil law 
doctrine the dispute concerning the nature of legal presumptions, nonetheless it seems to 
perceive the distinction between those presumptions having a dominant procedural nature, 
in the sense that they concern the powers of control and inquiry of the tax administration, 
and those presumptive provisions that may affect the design of the tax obligation. Such 
distinction, as we will see, emerges from the more recent contributions of the scholars 
concerning the general anti-abuse clause laid down in Article 344 of the Belgian Income 
Tax Code (hereinafter also CIR). Furthermore, within the Belgian Constitutional Court’s 
case-law and doctrine a distinction between irrebuttable presumptions and similar notions 
referred to dealing with the Italian experience (legal definitions, predeterminations, and so 
on) does not clearly emerge, and is rather overlapped by the distinction between legal 
presumptions and fictions
325
. 
Legal presumptions set out in the Belgian tax legislation are clearly distinguished from 
both fictions and presumptions of fact, as they are deemed to be means of proof peculiar to 
tax law. In this view, on the one side, unlike fictions they are not pure rules of substantive 
law, but they rather belong to the genus of the means for the ascertainment of the truth in 
                                                          
325
 Both are classified by some Authors under the umbrella of ‘vérité fiscale’ which takes the place of the 
reality (i.e. real facts). See J.P. Bours, Vérité et preuve fiscale, in La preuve et la difficile quête de la vérité 
judiciaire, (ed.) G. de Leval, Liège, Anthemis, 2011, 236 et seq., where the expression ‘présomptions légale 
probatoire’ comes from. Cf. S. Sergier and M. Bentley, Le droit fiscal se fonde sur des réalités: une fiction?, 
R.G.F. 2000, 11 et seq.; J. Kirkpatrick, Le droit fiscal se fonde sur des réalités, J.P.D.F., 1969, 161 et seq.; Cf. 
J.-E. Krings, Fictions et présomptions en droit fiscal, in Les présomptions et les fictions en droit, Bruxelles, 
Bruylant, 1974, 162. 
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the context of a trial and earlier within the administrative proceedings. On the other side, 
they embody means of proof peculiar to tax law, alongside the means of proof common to 
other areas of law, amongst which are presumptions of fact. 
The last distinction, in particular, would result from the wording of Article 340 CIR 
326
 and 
Article 59 of the Belgian VAT Code (hereinafter also CTVA)
327
, as well as from the 
legislation in the field of registration duty
328
 and inheritance tax
329
. These provisions are 
unanimously interpreted as specifying that, in accordance with the general rule on the 
distribution of the burden of proof, it lies upon the tax administration the onus of proving 
the if and the amount of the additional taxation or the contravention to the provisions of the 
relevant code, and to that end it may have recourse to all the ordinary means of proof 
admissible, including the report of the tax administration’s officers and except for the oath. 
Such a general rule does not apply and the burden is shifted upon the taxpayer where the 
tax administration may rely on legal presumptions, which over the last decades the 
legislator has been increasingly introducing in the view of simplifying the ascertainment of 
the relevant facts by the tax administration itself
330
.  
                                                          
326
 Placed under Chapter IV, heading “Moyens de preuve de l’administration”, it states that “Pour établir 
l’existence et le montant de la dette d’impôt, l’administration peut avoir recours à tous les moyens de preuve 
admis par le droit commun, y compris les procès-verbaux des agents du Service Public Fédéral Finances, 
sauf le serment. Les procès-verbaux ont force probante jusqu’à preuve du contraire.” 
327
 At para 1 it stipulates that  "L’administration est autorisée à prouver selon les règles et par tous moyen de 
droit commun, témoins et présomptions compris, à l’exception du serment, et, en outre, par les procès-
verbaux des agents du Service public fédéral Finances, toute infraction ou toute pratique abusive aux 
dispositions du présent Code ou prises pour son exécution, de même que tout fait quelconque qui établit ou 
qui concourt à établir l’exigibilité de la taxe ou d’une amende. Les procès-verbaux font foi jusqu’à preuve 
contraire».  
328
 Article 185, Code des droits d’enregistrement provides that «Indépendamment des modes de preuve et des 
moyens de contrôle spécialement prévus par le présent titre, l’Administration est autorisée à prouver selon 
les règles et par tous moyens de droit commun, témoins et présomptions compris, à l’exception du serment, et, 
en outre, par les procès-verbaux de ses agents, toute contravention aux dispositions du présent titre et tout 
fait quelconque qui établit ou qui concourt à établir l’exigibilité d’un droit ou d’une amende. Les procès-
verbaux font foi jusqu’à preuve contraire. (…)».  
329
 By the same token, Article 105, Code des droits de succession: «Indépendamment des modes de preuve et 
des moyens de contrôle spécialement prévus par le présent code, l’Administration est autorisée à prouver 
selon les règles et par tous moyens de droit commun, témoins et présomptions compris, à l’exception du 
serment, et, en outre, par les procès-verbaux de ses agents, toute contravention aux dispositions du présent 
code et tout fait quelconque qui établit ou qui concourt à établir l’exigibilité d’un droit ou d’une amende. Les 
procès-verbaux font foi jusqu’à preuve contraire. (…)». The distinction between ‘moyens de preuve de droit 
commun’ and ‘moyen spéciaux de preuve’ results from the code itself, as they repectively head Section I and 
II of the Chapter XII on the means of proof. Under Section II, as it will be mentioed later on in the text, a 
series of legal presumptions are set out. 
330
 Ex multis, J.P. Bours, Vérité et preuve fiscale, cited above, 273, observes: “L’allégeance prétendue au 
droit commun de la preuve, évoquée dans les articles 340 C.I.R. et 59 C.T.V.A., n’est donc que de façade. Il 
est vrai que la charge de la preuve du montant taxable d’un revenu pèse sur l’administration. Mais, trop 
souvent, celle-ci ne recourt aux moyens de preuve du droit commun que lorsqu’ils la servent. Cette 
administration a été, au fil des décennies, bardée par le législateur de textes spécifiques, de présomptions 
légales, de forfaits ou de fictions, qui sont autant de façon de travestir la réalité pour en extraire une 
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2.1 The general rule on the division of the burden of proof in the context of the 
administrative proceedings 
Articles 340 CIR and 59 CTVA cited above, as well as the similar provisions laid down in 
the legislation on registration duties and inheritance tax reflect (better, imply) the general 
rule on the division of the burden of proof, which in the Belgian legal order results from 
the combination of Articles 1315 of the Civil Code
331
 and 870 of the Civil Procedural 
Code
332
. Pursuant to these provisions, the party who claims the execution of an obligation 
has to prove the facts on which it is based, whereas the counterparty who contests such 
claim by contending the payment or the extinction of that obligation has to allege the 
relating facts. 
This holds true even when it comes to a tax litigation and the parties are the tax 
administration and the taxpayer. Similar to what has been illustrated when dealing with the 
Italian experience, the tax literature has adhered to a substantive approach, by giving 
relevance to the type of claim lodged (appeal against a tax administration’s decision, a 
request for a reimbursement, etc.) by the taxpayer rather than to the role played in the 
context of possible legal proceedings before the court. The circumstance that it is always 
up to the taxpayer to bring an action against the tax administration does not imply that he is 
always (in the position of) the plaintiff. It has been significantly said that “L’‘inversion’ du 
contentieux n’induit pas un ‘renversement’ de la charge de la prevue”333. It follows that, 
irrespective of the (formal) role vested within the legal proceedings, the party raising the 
tax claim, normally the tax administration, bears the burden of proving it, while the 
counterparty – normally, the taxpayer - may submit exceptions.   
Having clarified this, it is worth mentioning that, with particular regard to the application 
of such rule in the context of the administrative proceedings, it has been observed that 
neither the obligations of cooperation upon the taxpayer nor the ex officio method of 
assessment derogate from it. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
prétendue ‘vérité fiscal’.” As said in the text, under the profile of the possible divergence between the réalité 
and the so called ‘vérité fiscal’, the Author assimilates legal presumptions to other mechanisms, like fictions 
and flat-rate rackoning of the taxable base. 
331
 «Celui qui réclame l’exécution d’une obligation doit la prouver. Réciproquement, celui qui se prétend 
libéré doit justifier le paiement ou le fait qui a produit l’extinction de son obligation ». 
332
 « Chacune des parties a la charge de prouver les faits qu’elle allègue». Cf. A. Decroës, La procédure 
judiciaire fiscale, J.D.F. 2000, 257 et seq. 
333
 J.P. Bours, Vérité et preuve fiscale, cited above, 238. See Supreme Court 7 August 1941, Pas., 1941, I, 
790. Hence, the tax authority bears the burden of proving the amount of the taxable income, while the 
taxpayer bears the burden of proving the possible deductions, exemptions and in general all the 
circumstances that may reduce the tax debt. 
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As to the first ones, in general they consist of obligations related to the delivering of 
information or documents (such as books, invoices and so on) regarded by the tax 
authorities as necessary in order to (re)determine the tax debt in the context of the 
administrative proceedings and before issuing a tax assessment. Though with different 
wordings, such obligations are laid down in the various codes and their infringement may 
give rise to administrative fines or to the possibility for the tax administration to have 
recourse to the ex officio method of assessment
334
. 
In fact, they represent the other side of the coin in respect to the tax authorities’ powers of 
investigation. Far from entailing the reversal of the burden of proof on the taxpayer, they 
rather confirm that the tax administration is due to justify its demand for payment.  
As to the second one, it applies, for instance in the field of income taxation, in a series of 
listed hypotheses, among which the omission of the tax return and the infringement to one 
of the obligations set out in the relevant code. When one of such circumstances 
(alternatively) occurs, the tax authority is allowed to determine the taxable income 
presumably attributable to the taxpayer concerned on the grounds of the elements at its 
disposal
335
. At this point, Article 352 puts on the taxpayer the burden of proving the exact 
amount of the taxable income
336
, thereby fostering the idea that the method of assessment 
                                                          
334
 Cf. M. Maus and S. Mercier, A. Delafonteyne (co-author), Le contrôle fiscal en pratique, Bruxelles, La 
Charte, 2009, 143 et seq. 
335
 Article 351 CIR provides at para 1 that “L’administration peut procéder à la taxation d’office en raison 
du montant de revenus imposable qu’elle peut présumer eu égard aux éléments dont elle dispose, dans les 
cas où le contribuable s’est abstenu: - soit de remettre une déclaration dans les délais prévus par les articles 
307 à 311 ou par les dispositions prises en exécution de l’article 312 - soit d’éliminer, dans le délai consenti 
à cette fin, le ou les vices de forme dont serait entachée sa déclaration; -soit de communiquer les livres, 
documents ou registres visés à l’article 315 ou les dossiers, supports, ou données visés à l’article 315-bis; - 
soit de fournir dans le délai les renseignements qui lui ont été demandés en vertu de l’article 316 ; - soit de 
répondre dans le délai fixé à l’article 346 à l’avis dont il y est question.» Once one of the listed 
circumstances occurs, the same article sets out upon the tax administration the obligation of notice prior to 
the issuing of the tax assessment and the right of the taxpayer to submit any observations. Para 2 indeed 
states that “Avant de procéder à la taxation d’office, l’administration notifie au contribuable, par lettre 
recommandée à la poste, les motifs du recours à cette procédure, le montant des revenus et le autres 
éléments sur lesquels la taxation sera basée, ainsi que le mode de détermination de ces revenus et éléments.» 
Ultimately, para 3 reads as follows: «Sauf dans la dernière éventualité visée à l’alinéa 1er ou si les droits du 
Trésor sont en péril pour une cause autre que l’expiration des délais d’imposition ou s’il s’agit de 
précomptes mobilier ou professionnel, un délai d’un mois à compter du troisième jour ouvrable qui suit 
l’envoi de cette notification est laissé au contribuable pour faire valoir ses observations par écrit et la 
cotisation ne peut être établie avant l’expiration de ce délai.» If the tax administration issues the tax 
assessment, thereby disregarding the observations submitted by the taxpayer, then it is requested to justify its 
decision by virtue of Article 352-bis CIR. 
336
 It states that “Lorsque le contribuable est taxé d’office, la preuve du chiffre exact de ses revenus 
imposables et des autres éléments à envisager dans son chef lui incombe » and at para 2 adjusts its aim: 
«Toutefois, cette preuve incombe à l’administration si: - le contribuable établit qu’il a été empêché par de 
justes motifs soit de communiquer  les livres, documents ou registres visés à l’article 315, alinéas 1er et 2, 
soit de communiquer les dossiers, supports ou données visés à l’article 315-bis, alinéas 1er à 3, soit de 
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at hand affects the division of the burden of proof. Instead, it is argued, such burden 
remains on the tax authority. Given the lack of information due to the non-cooperative 
conduct of the taxpayer, it may determine the tax obligation by way of presumptions of 
fact based on the elements available. When receiving a tax assessment under the ex officio 
procedure, the taxpayer may contest the presumptions hominis used by the tax authorities 
(e.g. by contending that they are unreliable, the known fact does not exist etc.) or may give 
further evidence supporting a different determination of the taxable income
337
. 
In fact, the ex officio method of assessment does not per se (technically) reverse the burden 
of proof on the taxpayer, but its purpose is to allow the tax authority to determine the 
income of the taxpayer where it cannot rely upon the necessary documentation, such as the 
tax return or the accounting records. Nonetheless, it de facto exempts the tax authority 
from proving analytically the composition of the taxpayer’s income(s): it may presume the 
taxable base to be attributable to the taxpayer in a certain amount and it is up to the latter to 
give evidence to the contrary
338
. 
More interpretative difficulties in relation to the division of the burden of proof and to a 
certain extent in the light of the constitutional framework arise from Articles 341 and 342, 
as well as Article 344 CIR, which will be discussed later on in this section. Though 
Articles 341 and 342 (except for the provision concerning non-resident taxpayers carrying 
on an activity in Belgium) have a merely internal character, it is worthy to concisely deal 
with them too in order to frame the issue of tax law presumptions in the Belgian legal order, 
                                                                                                                                                                                
fournir dans le délai les renseignements qui lui ont été demandés en vertu de l’article 316, soit de répondre 
dans le délai fixé à l’article 346 à l’avis dont il y est question; la taxation a été établie sur la base 
mentionnée dans l’avis visé à l’article 346 avant l’expiration du délai prévu par ledit article parce que les 
droits du Trésor étaient en péril.»  
337
 In this way J.P. Bours, Vérité et preuve fiscale, cited above, 240-241. He observes that, mainly based on 
Article 352 CIR, «Il se dit souvent que, dans l’hypothèse du recours par l’administration à la procédure 
d’imposition d’office, il y a ‘renversement de la charge de la preuve’». He disagrees, and after having cited 
Supreme Court 23 May 1959, Pas., 1959, I, 669, holding that “le montant presumé [de revenus imposable] 
est le montant déterminé par présomptions. Or, le système par présomptions exclut le système par simple 
appréciation, fût-elle faite (…) en conscience» in order to argue that a reversal of the burden of proof is not 
conceivable, he concludes that «L’administration conserve donc la charge de la preuve du montant du 
revenus imposables, même lorsqu’elle recourt à la procédure de la taxation d’office. Lorsqu’il reçoit 
notification de semblable taxation, le contribuable peut soir faire prévaloir que les présomptions sur 
lesquelles l’administration s’est fondée sont insuffisantes, voire inexistantes (auquel cas la taxation d’office 
est arbitraire), soit combattre les présomptions sur lesquelles se fonde le fisc en en invoquant d’autres, et 
donc en apportant la preuve du montant de ses revenus.» Contra, the majority of the scholars. See A. 
Tiberghien, Manuel de droit Fiscal 2011-2012, Bruxelles, Kluwer, 723, according to which the ex officio 
method of assessment implies the reversal of the burden of proof. In accordance with the case-law of the 
Supreme Court, it is clarified that it is does not suffice to merely contest the amount of income as determined 
by the tax authority, being rather necessary the contrary proof to concern the “chiffre exact des revenus”. 
338
 Obviously, the tax authority is required to prove the circumstances which ground to the ex officio method 
of assessment, and, where it makes use of presumptions hominis, the known facts. 
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and afterwards to focus on those provisions potentially relevant from the EU law 
perspective.   
 
3. The principle of equality as the main ‘domestic’ parameter in the tax law 
presumption’s evaluation 
As said in the introduction to the second chapter, the lack of a systematic consideration of 
tax law presumptions in the Belgian legal order may be explained also in view of the 
constitutional framework and the relatively recent attribution to the Arbitration Court 
(afterwards, Constitutional Court) of the task of verifying the compatibility of the 
legislation with Articles 10 and 11 (in 1989), 170 and 172 (in 2003)
339
, dealing with 
equality and legality principles.  
In the Belgian experience, the principle of equality basically embodies the only criterion in 
the light of which the consistency of tax law presumptions in respect of the constitutional 
framework is usually evaluated
340
. It plays a fundamental role, by requesting similar 
                                                          
339
 In fact, with regard to the range of competences attributed to the Court, three main periods may be 
distinguished. Initially (1
st
 October 1984-16 February 1989) the main task of the Arbitration Court concerned 
the distribution of competences among the decision-making powers at different levels (national, communities, 
regions). From 17 January 1989 (when the Special Law 6 January 1989 entered into force) the competence of 
the Court was extended to the control of the compatibility of single provisions of law (on request through an 
application for annulment or a preliminary question) with Articles 10, 11 and 24 of the Constitution. 
Ultimately, after the Reform of the Court by the Special Law 9 March 2003 (entered into force the 21
st
 April 
2003) it is also competent to verify the compatibility in respect of the entire Title II of the Constitution 
(“Belgians and their rights”) and the Articles 170 and 172 especially dealing with taxation. All the decisions 
of the Belgian Constitutional Court,  which will be referred to in the text or in the footnotes, can be found at 
www.const-court.be.  
340
 It goes without saying that the principle of equality before the levy does not correspond to the ability to 
pay principle, which in other legal orders (like the Italian one) is laid down in the Constitution and limits the 
taxing power of the legislator by requesting taxation to be levied in accordance with the taxpayer’s capacity 
to contribute to public spending. On the role of the ability to pay principle in the European context, see C. 
Bardini, The Ability to Pay in the European Market: An Impossible Sudoku for the ECJ, Intertax, 2010,  2 et 
seq.; As observed by M. Bourgeois, Constitutional framework of the different types of income, in The concept 
of tax in EU Member States, (ed.) B. Peeters, Amsterdam, EATLP International Tax Series, Vol. 3, 2008, 97, 
the Belgian traditional approach to ability to pay seems to make it a non-legally binding guideline for the 
legislator. Nonetheless, in the Belgian tax system the ability to pay principle may be extracted from some 
provisions of the Belgian Constitution. Besides the principle of non-discrimination, Article 16 on the 
protection of the property right is relevant in this sense. See Arbitration Court 22 June 2005, No 107. 
Interestingly, this decision contains an explicitly reference to the ability to pay principle of the taxpayer: 
“B.12.2. En portant le taux du tarif des droits de succession applicable « Entre toutes  autres personnes » de 
50 à 60 p.c. pour la tranche de 25.000,01 à 75.000 euros, de 65 à 80 p.c. pour la tranche de 75.000,01 à 
175.000 euros et de 80 à 90 p.c. pour la tranche supérieure à 175.000 euros, l’article 1er du décret entrepris 
aggraverait la pression fiscale atteignant l’ayant droit sans lien de parenté ou de cohabitation légale avec le 
défunt à tel point qu’elle ne respecterait plus le principe de la capacité contributive du contribuable, ce qui 
créerait une discrimination entre les ayants droit recueillant un émolument net supérieur à 25.000 euros”. In 
another important point of the same decision the Court found disproportionate the provision of a (high) rate 
merely justified by budgetary interest: “B.15.6. En l’espèce, le législateur décrétal a porté une atteinte 
disproportionnée à la fois au droit du testateur de disposer de ses biens et aux espérances légitimes qu’a le 
légataire de les recueillir, en fixant un taux qui est sans commune mesure avec les droits fiscaux exigés pour 
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situations to be treated in the same way and different situations to be treated differently. 
When facing tax law presumptions, this implies that they cannot create any discriminations, 
and if they do, the different regulation has to be objective, reasonable and proportionate. 
The evaluation of reasonableness and proportionality (in terms of correspondence between 
means and aims pursued) of the single legal presumption is conducted in the light of the 
general principle of non-discrimination read in conjunction with the principle, according to 
which privileges in the matter of taxation are forbidden. Such evaluation concerns not only 
legal presumptions, but also fictions. Only for the former, however, is the possibility for 
the taxpayer to rebut the presumption taken into consideration. 
It has to be noted that similarly to what has been illustrated with reference to the Italian tax 
system, the Belgian tax legislation includes some presumptive methods of assessment 
which have an ambiguous nature, in the sense that the reasoning is only generally drafted 
at the normative level while the tax authority is entitled to fill in the presumption of content. 
This holds true, in particular, as regards Articles 341 and 342 CIR, providing respectively 
the method of assessment by indices and by comparison, the latter being questioned so far 
under the parameters of equality and proportionality. When examining these methods of 
assessment, we will see how they might give rise to doubts with respect to the legality 
principle, also under the aspect of the legal certainty. So far, the question has been put 
under investigation by  the Constitutional Court only with regard to Article 344 CIR, para 
1, previous version, as its nature of ‘blanket norm’ was contended.  
 
3.1 The principle of equality  
The fundamental parameter in the light of which tax law presumptions are to be evaluated 
is the equality principle. It results from several articles of the Belgian Constitution and it 
has played a fundamental role before 2003 in order to enlarge the control of the Court, as it 
was read in conjunction with single rights or freedoms set out by the Constitution or other 
general principles like the principle of legal certainty and the right of defence. 
To be precise, Article 10 provides the principle of equality (before the law), whereas the 
subsequent Article 11 states the principle of non-discrimination (referring to the exercise of 
                                                                                                                                                                                
d’autres formes de transferts de propriété et avec ceux qui frappent d’autres catégories d’héritiers. S’il 
relève des choix politiques du législateur fiscal d’appliquer des taux différents aux différents impôts et de 
taxer différemment les catégories d’héritiers, il est manifestement disproportionné d’appliquer, en matière de 
droits de succession, un taux dont aucun objectif propre à la catégorie de contribuables visée ne justifie qu'il 
soit aussi élevé, en n’ayant égard qu’à l’objectif budgétaire poursuivi”. Cf. Y. Hougardy, La capacité 
contributive, in Liber Amicorum Jacques Autenne, Promenades sous les portiques de la fiscalité, (eds.) E. 
Traversa and V. Deckers, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 135. 
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rights and freedoms). Nonetheless, they have been constantly considered by the Court in its 
judgments as being inextricably interrelated and express the same (general) principle of 
equality and non-discrimination. In the case-law involving taxation, these articles are often 
recalled in conjunction with Article 172, para 1 of the Constitution, which prohibits 
privileges in tax matters and is therefore considered as specifying the equality and non-
discrimination principle in tax law
341
.  
It has been observed that in interpreting the principle of equality, the Belgian 
Constitutional Court has strongly been inspired by the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights
342
, in particular where it does not prohibit all the distinctions, but only those 
ones that cannot be reasonably justified
343
. On several occasions the Court held that: 
“Les règles constitutionnelles de l’égalité et de la non-discrimination n’excluent pas 
qu’une différence de traitement soit établie entre des catégories de personnes, pour autant 
qu’elle repose sur un critère objectif et qu’elle soit raisonnablement justifiée. Les mêmes 
règles s’opposent, par ailleurs, à ce que soient traitées de manière identique, sans 
qu’apparaisse une justification raisonnable, des catégories de personnes se trouvant dans 
des situations qui, au regard de la mesure considérée, sont essentiellement différentes. 
L’existence d’une telle justification doit s’apprécier en tenant compte du but et des effets 
de la mesure critiquée ainsi que de la nature des principes en cause; le principe d’égalité 
                                                          
341
 It stipulates: «Il ne peut être établi de privilège en matière d’impôt”. See J. Kirkpatrick, L’égalité devant 
l’impôt en droit belge, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1975. Further specifications of the same principle may be found 
in Article 10, para 3, which prevents inequalities based on sex (“L’égalité des femmes et des hommes est 
garantie”) and Article 191 concerning foreigners (“Tout étranger qui se trouve sur le territoire de la 
Belgique jouit de la protection accordée aux personnes er aux biens, sauf les exceptions établies par la loi”). 
342
 In this sense J. C. Scholsem, L’égalité devant la Cour d’Arbitrage, in Liber Amicorum Prof. em. E. Krings, 
Brussel, E. Story-Scientia, 1991, 773 et seq., in particular at 774: «Comme on l’a déjà note à de nombreuses 
reprises, cette definition s’inspire très étroitement de celle donnée par la Cour Européenne des Droits de 
l’Homme, notamment dans l’affaire ‘relative à certains aspects du régime linguistique de l’enseignement en 
Belgique». Though, the Author identified two main differences among the two definitions. First, the ECHR 
refers not only to the aim of the measure, but also to the ‘principes qui prévalent généralement dans les 
sociétés démocratiques’ in order to check the difference in treatment; second, it requests that ‘il est 
clairement établi qu’il n’existe pas de rapport raisonnable de proportionnalité entre les moyens employés et le 
but visé’, where the word ‘clairement’ seems to indicate that its control will concern only measures 
manifestly disproportionate. As to the first difference, the Belgian Constitutional Court has also referred to 
the ‘principes in cause’ from the judgment No 25/90 of the 5 July 1990.  
343
 As clearly explained by I. Richelle and V. Sepulchre, Non-discrimination at the crossroads of 
international taxation - Belgium, Cahiers de droit fiscal international, Vol. 93A, 2008, 135, in particular at 
146: “The constitutional rule of equality in relation to tax implies that all those in the same situation are 
equally affected but it does not exclude a distinction being made on the basis of certain categories of 
individuals provided that the distinction is not arbitrary, i.e. that it can be objectively and reasonably 
justified. Likewise, the same rules also prohibit categories of individuals in situations which, in the light of 
the measure considered, are different, being treated in the same way, without an objective and reasonable 
justification being evident. The existence or non-existence of such a justification must be assessed in relation 
to the aim and effects of the tax drawn up as well as the reasonableness of the relationship of proportionality 
between the means employed and the aim sought.” 
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est violé lorsqu’il est établi qu’il n’existe pas de rapport raisonnable de proportionnalité 
entre les moyens  employés et le but visé»
344
. 
Les articles 10 et 11 de la Constitution ont une portée générale. Ils interdisent toute 
discrimination, quelle qu’en soit l’origine. Ils sont également applicables en matière 
fiscale, ce que confirme d’ailleurs l’article 172 de la Constitution, lequel fait une 
application particulière du principe d’égalité formulé à l’article 10”.345 
With reference to the delicate relationship between the exercise of the legislative discretion 
and the margin for an interference by the Court, the latter held that: 
“Il n’appartient pas à la Cour d’apprécier si une mesure établie par la loi est opportune 
ou souhaitable. C’est au législateur qu’il revient de déterminer les mesures à prendre pour 
atteindre le but qu’il s’est fixé. Le contrôle de la Cour sur la conformité des lois, décrets er 
ordonnances aux articles 6 et 6bis de la Constitution [now, Articles 10 and 11] porte sur le 
caractère objectif de la distinction, l’adéquation des mesures au but recherché et 
l’existence d’un rapport raisonnable entre les moyens employés et l’objectif visé. La Cour 
n’a pas à examiner en outre si l’objectif poursuivi par le législateur pourrait être atteint 
ou non par des mesures légales différentes”.346 
From this wording we infer that the scheme followed by the Constitutional Court in 
evaluating single provisions of law normally runs through three main steps: the existence 
of a difference in treatment, which implies the ascertainment as to the comparability of the 
categories of persons treated differently
347
; if so, the control of the objective nature of the 
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 Ex multis, Arbitration Court 21 March 1995, No 26, para B.3. Such a definition is «totalement centre sur 
le critère de proportionnalité» according to T. Afschrift, L’impôt des personnes physiques, Bruxelles, De 
Boeck, 2005, 64 et seq. The same formula is in most of the judgments dealing with the issue, since the first 
one: Arbitration Court 13 July 1989, No 21. 
345
 Among the others, Arbitration Court 8 July 1997, No 37, para B.7. 
346
 Arbitration Court 13 October 1989, No 23, para B.2.7. Cf. Const. Court 4 July 1991, No 20: «Lorsque la 
loi fiscale vise en même temps des contribuables dont les situations de revenus et d'avoirs sont diverses, elle 
doit nécessairement appréhender cette diversité de situations en faisant usage de catégories qui ne 
correspondent aux réalités que de manière simplificatrice et approximative. Il en est ainsi d'autant plus qu'en 
droit fiscal, l'efficacité des critères et le coût administratif de leur application doivent être pris en 
considération pour apprécier s'ils sont susceptibles d'une justification raisonnable. Ces éléments sont à 
prendre en considération pour vérifier si le législateur n'a pas excédé son pouvoir d'appréciation. (…) Il 
n'appartient pas à la Cour de décider si une mesure prescrite par la loi est opportune, ni de vérifier si le but 
poursuivi par le législateur pourrait également être atteint par d'autres mesures. (…)» 
347
 As warned in Const. Court 7 March 2007, N0 36, where at issue was the distinction between the surviving 
spouse and the surviving cohabitant more uxorio resulting from Article 8, indent 6, 3°, Code de droits de 
succession, dealing with the taxable base, at para B.4.2. “In ne faut pas confondre différence et non-
comparabilité. La situation juridique distincte dans laquelle se trouvent le conjoint survivant et le cohabitant 
de fait survivant n’empêche pas que ces deux personnes puissent avoir reçu des rentes et capitaux qui ont été 
établis par suite de l’intervention de l’employeur du défunt avec lequel elles avaient une communauté de vie». 
This leads the Court to reject the exception of incomparability and to turn to the control of the reasonableness 
of the measure: “B.6.1. Il appartient au législateur fiscal compétent de fixer la base d’une imposition. 
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criterion on which the distinction is based
348
; ultimately, the possible reasonable 
justification in the light of the aim pursued, the effects of the measure and the principles in 
play, which includes the control as to the proportionality of the means employed in relation 
to the aim sought
349
 
350
. Instead, at least in its more remote judgments, the Court seems to 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Lorsqu’il emploie à cet effet des critères de distinction, ceux-ci doivent pouvoir être justifiés de manière 
objective et raisonnable. B.6.2. La différence de traitement entre conjoints er cohabitants de fait se fonde sur 
un élément objectif, à savoir que leur situation juridique diffère aussi bien en ce qui concerne leurs devoirs 
personnels mutuels que pour ce qui concerne leur situation patrimoniale. (…) B.6.3. Le législateur peut, en 
matière de droits de succession, prendre des mesures qui sont en rapport avec l’objectif, manifesté en droit 
civil, de favoriser une forme de vie familiale qui implique les droits et obligations précités et qui, à son 
estime, offre de meilleures chances de stabilité. B.6.4. En n’accordant pas au cohabitant de fait survivant 
l’avantage que la disposition en cause accorde au conjoint survivant, le législateur a pris une mesure qui 
n’est pas dépourvue de justification compte tenu de l’objectif rappelé en B.6.3.». See Const. Court 16 
February 2005, para B.5.: «Il existe des différences fondamentales entre les travailleurs indépendants, d’une 
part, et les travailleurs salariés, d’autre part, en ce qui concerne les régimes fiscaux qui leur sont 
applicables. Ces différences empêchent de comparer à tous égards ces catégories de personnes. La 
circonstance que l’indemnité de réparation d’une perte temporaire de revenus professionnels soit payée, 
fixée ou attribuée tardivement par le fait d’une autorité publique ou de l’existence d’un litige peut néanmoins 
avoir une incidence défavorable sur les impôts à payer, tant pour les travailleurs indépendants que pour les 
travailleurs salariés. De ce point de vue, ils peuvent être réputés comparables». After having found the 
situations as being comparable, the Court gave an insight into the ratio legis by referring to the preparatory 
work: “B.7. En adoptant l’article 93 du C.I.R. 1964, le législateur a voulu éviter les conséquences sévères 
que l’application rigoureuse de la progressivité de l’impôt des personnes physiques entraînerait pour les 
contribuables qui recueillent certains revenus ayant un caractère plutôt exceptionnel. Selon les travaux 
préparatoires, le législateur a voulu « freiner la progressivité de l’impôt, lorsque le revenu imposable 
comprend des revenus non périodiques» (Doc. parl., Chambre, 1961-1962, n° 264/1, p. 85; ibid., n° 264/42, 
p. 126)». In the light of such purpose, it did not find the measure as being reasonably justified: «B.10. Le fait 
qu’il existe des différences fondamentales entre les travailleurs indépendants, d’une part, et les travailleurs 
salariés, d’autre part, et plus précisément le fait que les revenus des travailleurs indépendants peuvent varier 
d’une année à l’autre, alors que le salaire des travailleurs salariés est déterminé d’avance et n’est 
généralement pas soumis à des fluctuations incertaines, ne saurait, contrairement à ce que soutient le 
Conseil des ministres, justifier la différence de traitement en cause. En effet, le revenu imposable est en 
l’espèce11 constitué aussi d’indemnités de remplacement d’une perte temporaire de revenus, qui peuvent 
varier d’une année à l’autre aussi bien pour les salariés que pour les indépendants». It consequently upheld 
the preliminary question of inconsistency with the principle of equality. Cf. Const. Court 16 February 2005, 
No 38. 
348
 In some decisions, the Court verifies, alongside the objectivity of the criterion of distinction, also its 
‘pertinence’ in respect of the purpose attained by the legislator. This seems to concern already the control of 
the existence of a reasonable justification. See, for instance, Const. Court. 28 March 2007, No 50, at para 
B.12.1. 
349
 In this regard, it should be noted that the need for simplification pursued by the legislator with a certain 
measure that distinguishes amongst categories of taxpayers is not per se disproportionate. See for example, 
Arbitration Court 7 December 2005, No 181: “B.2. Il appartient au législateur fiscal compétent de fixer le 
tarif d’imposition et d’en établir les modalités. Lorsqu’il utilise à cet effet des critères de distinction, ceux-ci 
doivent être objectivement et raisonnablement justifiés. Les tarifs et modalités doivent être appliqués de 
manière égale pour toutes les personnes qui se trouvent dans une situation équivalente au regard de la 
mesure considérée et du but poursuivi, sous la réserve que le législateur fiscal doit pouvoir faire usage de 
catégories qui, nécessairement, n’appréhendent la diversité des situations qu’avec un certain degré 
d’approximation ». Cf. Const. Court 15 September 2004, No 151, at para B.7.; even more explicitly the 
Court clarifies that in the decision Const. Court 28 July 2006, No 126: “B.6. Pour ce qui est de la pertinence 
du critère de distinction employé, il convient d’observer au préalable qu’un législateur ne peut appréhender 
la diversité des situations qu’avec un certain degré d’approximation. Une telle différence de traitement n’est 
pas, en soi, inconstitutionnelle, à condition que les critères puissent être justifiés raisonnablement au regard 
des articles 10 et 11 de la Constitution.» 
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exclude from its scope the consideration of alternative measures able to attain the same 
objective but with the observance of the proportionality
351
. 
In view of the subsequent exploration of the decisions issued as regards tax law 
presumptions, it is worth highlighting that the fulcrum of the Court’s reasoning is 
embodied by the objective of the measure
352
 and its proportionality in terms of adequacy of 
                                                                                                                                                                                
350
 Basically, similar steps are identified by I. Richelle and V. Sepulchre, Non-discrimination at the 
crossroads of international taxation - Belgium, cited above, at 147, according to whom where a difference in 
treatment or identical treatment between different distinct groups of individual is criticized, the review of the 
tax norm should confront three main questions: “(a) Does the tax norm create a difference in treatment 
between different distinct groups of comparable natural persons or legal entities or identical treatment 
between different groups of natural persons or legal entities actually in different situations in light of the 
norm in question? (b) Is the aim that the legislator pursues using the tax norm legitimate? (c) Is there 
objective and reasonable justification for the difference in treatment or the identical treatment in relation to 
the legitimate aim pursued in that – either the distinction or identical treatment is based on an objective 
criterion that is pertinent to reach the aim set in the norm at issue and does not result in effects that are out 
of proportion in relation to the aim sought (in this case, the tax norm will be deemed not to violate articles 10 
and 11 of the Constitution)? – or is the distinction or identical treatment based on a criterion that is not 
objective or that is not relevant in relation to the aim sought by the tax norm in question or there is no 
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the effects resulting from the distinction or identical 
treatment and the aim sought (in this case, the tax norm will be deemed to violate articles 10 and 11 of the 
Constitution)?”. In their opinion “The Constitutional Court should criticize the choice of the legislator only if 
the distinctions are (clearly) arbitrary or unreasonable and it should accept measures that stay within the 
limits of the margin of appreciation of the legislator provided that they are reasonably and objectively 
justified”. In this regard, it has to be noted that in certain decisions the Court rules that the difference in 
treatment “n’est pas dépourvue de justification raisonnable” (a negative statement) which might be read as 
implying a less strict control in respect of the decisions where it asserts that the provision concerned is 
reasonably justified (positive statement). Normally, the first formula is accompanied by the premise that in 
the matter under examination the legislator has a wide discretion or that the Court is entitled to censure the 
legislator’s choices as manifestly unreasonable.  
351
 Critical on this point (i.e. with regard to the last part of the paragraph reported in the text) J.-C. Scholsem, 
L’égalité devant la Cour d’Arbitrage, cited above, 785, “Certes, le législateur a le choix des moyens, en 
opportunité, mais une fois un moyen choisi, il est de l’essence du contrôle de proportionnalité de s’interroger 
sur la question de savoir si l’objectif n’aurait pas pu être atteint en portant moins atteinte aux droits des 
particuliers, in casu à la liberté d’association, ce que le requérant soutenaient». The question arises then 
«Peut-être la Cour a-t-elle voulu indiquer que son contrôle ne serait que ‘marginal’, qu’il ne sanctionnerait 
que des entorses manifestes , ce qui à ses yeux n’était pas le cas en l’espèce?». 
352
 J.-C. Scholsem, L’égalité devant la Cour d’Arbitrage, cited above, 778,  observed that «Le but de la loi 
devient donc le critère principal, sinon unique, du jugement porté en matière d’égalité. On notera ce qui peut 
apparaître comme un certain paradoxe: lorsqu’il s’agit d’interpréter le norme, la prise en considération de 
la ‘ratio legis’, en d’autre termes, l’interprétation téléologique, apparaît comme une démarche subsidiaire; 
au contraire lorsqu’il s’agit d’en apprécier la validité au regard du principe d’égalité, ce but, en général 
bien moins clair que la norme elle-même, devient le critère d’appréciation». However, he further noted that 
at times the approach of the Court appears partially different, for instance in Arbitration Court 5 July 1990, 
No 25, and «Ici c’est pur de ‘raisons particulières (non autrement précisées) que le legislateur peut déroger 
au droit commun, voire créer des exonérations. Le problème est vu comme un problème d’opportunité. Il 
suffit que la spécificité de la situation régie soit ‘objectivement identifiable’. Le but de la loi est certes encore 
pris en considération mais il est refoulé au stade du contrôle de proportionnalité qui s’enrichit puisqu’il doit 
prendre en considération les effets de la norme et la nature de principes en cause». In his opinion, the 
jurisprudential scenario shows that «le ‘but de la loi’, instrument de mesure premier de l’égalité est un mètre 
bien flexible et incertain et, dans un certain sens, un ‘fausse notion claire’». To support such a conclusion he 
recalls some leading decisions: «C’est dans l’arrêt ‘Biorim’ [Const. Court 13 July 1989, No 21] que 
l’analyse paraît la plus complète et la plus systématique. Dans l’arrêt ‘Comines’ [Const. Court 23 May 1990, 
No 18] le but se confond avec une certaine conception de la ‘raison d’Etat’, qui ne peut guère constituer un 
instrument de mesure très rigoureux sur le plan juridique. L’arrêt ‘Elections européennes’ [Const. Court 14 
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the means chosen with the aim pursued
353
. In this way, the equality principle, as interpreted 
by the Court, ends up being a parameter of reasonableness of the single legislative 
provision, similar to Article 3 of the Italian Constitution. In fact, where the Court finds a 
measure to differentiate between categories of taxpayers, it verifies if it is objective and it 
can be reasonably justified, taking into consideration the aim and the effects of the measure. 
At this stage, the Court is called upon to find a balance between the different interests in 
play
354
 (for example, the need to combat tax evasion
355
, to guarantee the collection of the 
tax due, the need for simplification, the protection of the taxpayer’s right of defence or his 
right to choose the lowest tax route). Such a balance is developed, according to the criteria 
expressed by the Constitutional Court itself, in the light of the ratio surrounding the 
introduction of the measure and its effects. In practice, more than on the effects, the 
decisions focus on the goal pursued by the provision concerned. Not surprisingly, most of 
them include a wide reference to the preparatory works, which are intended to reveal the 
intent of the legislator. Afterwards, the Court completes the balance between the interests 
                                                                                                                                                                                
July 1990, No 26] est plutôt centré sur le contexte, son évolution et le caractère de ‘loi de circonstance’ de la 
norme attaquée. Enfin, l’arrêt ‘Pilotage’ [Const. Court 5 July 1990, No 25] met l’accent, du moins à titre 
principal, sur la spécificité objective de la situation régie». 
353
 For a reference to the evolution of the Constitutional Court’s notion of proportionality through its first 
decisions, see J.-C. Scholsem, L’égalité devant la Cour d’Arbitrage, cited above, 784-787. The Author 
summarized as follows: « Par le contrôle de proportionnalité, la Cour se dote d’armes formidable. Pour la 
Cour, serait contraire au principe d’égalité toute loi, décret ou ordonnance dont l’objectif serait 
incompatible avec les ‘principes fondamentaux de l’ordre juridique belge’, la Constitution ou les droits et 
libertés dérivant de dispositions du droit international directement applicables. Violerait aussi la règle de 
l’égalité, la norme sans rapport objectif et raisonnable avec le but poursuivi ou celle, qui présentant ce 
rapport, porte cependant atteinte aux principes fondamentaux de l’ordre juridique belge, la Constitution ou 
les droits et libertés reconnus par le droit international directement applicable ou enfin la norme qui, sans 
présenter une tell violation, est néanmoins marquée par une disproportion entre le moyens utilisés et le fins 
poursuivies.». Again, on the evolution of the notion of proportionality within the Belgian legal order, see P. 
Martens, L’irresistible ascension du principe de proportionnalité, in Présence du droit public et des droits de 
l’homme : mélanges offerts à Jacques Velu, Tome premiere, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1992, 49 et seq., who 
particularly highlighted the impact of such principle on the role played by the judge. He observed: «En 
l’autorisant à apprécier le raisonnable et à mesurer la proportion, on lui donne l’instrument capable de 
recalibrer la totalité de l’œuvre normative, qu’elle soit réglementaire ou législative. Seule la Constitution 
échappe à son contrôle. Mais comme elle est riche en virtualités de ce dont elle est avare en clarté, elle est 
moins un obstacle qu’un tremplin à son audace». 
354
 Which might also concern non-taxation policy, as for example the purpose of promoting economic 
investments or to safeguard the environment.  See respectively Const. Court 19 September 2007, No 120; 
Arbitration Court 11 February 2007, No 9. 
355
 For example, Arbitration Court 8 July 1997, No 37: “B.9. C’est au législateur qu’il appartient de 
déterminer les objectifs qu’il entend poursuivre en matière fiscal. Il peut se soucier de lutter contre un usage 
anormal qui pourrait être fait de la déduction des revenus définitivement taxés. Ainsi, il est légitime que le 
législateur refuse que des sociétés puissent bénéficier d’une double déduction à l’impôt des sociétés pour des 
opérations qui ne seraient menées que pour l’avantage fiscal qu’elles procurent. La Cour doit cependant 
vérifier si la mesure prise par le législateur peut se justifier objectivement et raisonnablement au regard de 
cet objectif.» 
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by controlling if the means chosen by the legislator fit the purpose attained, or they are 
rather disproportionate in respect of that purpose. 
In conclusion, the equality principle plays a fundamental role in the field of taxation, and, 
for our purpose, with regard to tax law presumptions. It represents the criterion in the light 
of which their consistency with the legal order is evaluated, particularly under the aspect of 
the rationality and the protection of the taxpayer’s right of defence356.  
 
3.2 Equality principle and tax law presumptions: Constitutional Court’s line of 
reasoning  
After having set the stage, the focus is precisely on the scheme followed by the 
Constitutional Court when confronting legal presumptions in the field of tax law. 
Notwithstanding it has had only a few occasions to deal with the matter and even in those 
cases it has come out with very dry reasoning, it is possible to identify a precise approach 
of the Court to tax law presumptions and to foresee future developments. 
Below, some judgments of the Belgian Constitutional Court on presumptive provisions (or 
at least assumed as such) are illustrated. 
At first sight, they follow the same scheme that has been illustrated when dealing with the 
equality principle in general. In brief, the Court verifies if  there is a distinction in 
treatment of comparable situations and if so, it proceeds to control if such distinction is 
objective and reasonably justified (meaning also proportionate). 
What is peculiar when confronting tax law presumptions is the last step in the line of 
thought. It includes the core of the balance between the interests in play, which normally 
are the fiscal interest (to the accurate assessment and recovery of the tax due) and the 
protection of the taxpayer’s rights357. As we will see, the possibility to give proof to the 
contrary, which characterizes most of the legal presumptions provided in the Belgian tax 
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 For sake of completeness, it should be mentioned that the notion of equality adopted by the Constitutional 
Court basically matches with the one resulting from the case-law of the State Counsel and of the Supreme 
Court. For an in-depth exploration of the case-law of the State Counsel see R. Andersen, Le Conseil d’État et 
le principe d’égalité en matière fiscale, in Protection des droits fondamentaux du contribuable, (eds) R. 
Andersen and J. Malherbe, Brussels, Bruylant, 1993, 41 et seq. As regards the Supreme Court’s judgments 
see, E. Krings, L’égalité en matière fiscale dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de Cassation, in Protection des 
droits fondamentaux du contribuable, (ed) R. Andersen and J. Malherbe, Brussels, Bruylant, 1993, 63 et seq. 
Of hystorical interest is C. Faider, L’égalité devant la loi, Pas, 1871, I, II-XX. 
357
 See O. Bertin, Les droits de la défence du contribuable, in Les dialogues de la fiscalité, (eds.) E. Traversa, 
O. Hermand, E.-J. Navez, V. Deckers, C.-A. Helleputte, Y. Hougardy, A. Lecocq, D. Lequeux, B. Vintras, 
Bruxelles, Larcier, 2012, 439. Cf. also D. Renders and B. Gors, Origine et contours des principes généraux 
de bonne administration, in Les dialogues de la fiscalité, (eds.) E. Traversa, O. Hermand, E.-J. Navez, V. 
Deckers, C.-A. Helleputte, Y. Hougardy, A. Lecocq, D. Lequeux and B. Vintras, 2012, 393. 
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system, is assumed by the Court as a guarantee of the latter interest, and thereby as 
legitimizing almost any legal presumption conceived in view of a reasonable purpose. 
 
3.2.1 Arbitration Court No 51/1999 
A question of consistency with the principle of equality was raised before the Court with 
reference to Article 394, para 1, CIR
358
, in the extent to which, in the field of tax recovery, 
it draws a distinction among the spouse of a person liable for income taxes on the one side 
and the spouse of a person owing for other debts, included other types of levies on the 
other side
359
. 
Basically, that provision allows the tax collector to recover the tax due in relation to the 
taxable income of any of the spouses by proceeding with execution, not only on the 
common goods, but also on each of their  own goods, irrespective of the marriage 
settlement chosen. Such enforcement proceedings cannot take place, for the tax due in 
relation to the income produced by a spouse, upon the other spouse’s own goods where the 
latter proves one of the circumstances listed in the same article and concerning the legal 
status (i.e. the property right) of those goods: a) he possessed them before the marriage; b) 
they have been inherited or donated by a person other than the spouse; c) they have been 
purchased by means of funds realized from the selling of similar goods or d) by means of 
his own income in accordance with the marriage regime
360
. 
                                                          
358
 Pursuant to which: « Chacune des quotités de l’impôt afférentes aux revenus respectifs des conjoints ainsi 
que le précompte enrôlé au nom de l’un d’eux peuvent, quel que soit le régime matrimonial, être recouvrés 
sur tous les biens propres et sur les biens communs des deux conjoints. Toutefois, la quotité de l’impôt 
afférente aux revenus de l’un des conjoints qui lui sont propres en vertu de son régime matrimonial ainsi que 
le précompte mobilier et le précompte professionnel enrôlés au nom de l’un d’eux ne peuvent être recouvrés 
sur les biens propres de l’autre conjoint lorsque celui-ci peut établir : 1° qu’il les possédait avant le mariage; 
2° ou qu’ils proviennent d’une succession ou d’une donation faite par une personne autre que son conjoint; 
3° ou qu’il les a acquis au moyen de fonds provenant de la réalisation de semblables biens; 4° ou qu’il les a 
acquis au moyen de revenus qui lui sont propres en vertu de son régime matrimonial.» 
359
 The preliminary question was formulated as follows: “«L'article 394, § 1er, du Code des impôts sur les 
revenus est-il conforme aux articles 10 et 11de la Constitution, dans la mesure où il pratique une distinction 
entre, d'une part, les conjoints depersonnes débitrices de n'importe quelle dette, autre que des impôts sur les 
revenus, et, d'autre part, les conjoints de personnes débitrices d'impôts sur les revenus, dans la mesure où les 
premiers ne peuvent jamais, hormis le cas de fraude, subir le recouvrement sur leurs biens propres, de dettes 
de leur conjoint, tandis que les seconds ne peuvent échapper à un tel recouvrement sur leurs biens propres, 
[que] si, d'une part, ils font la preuve du caractère propre de ces biens et où, d'autre part, ils établissent en 
outre, soit qu'ils possédaient ces biens avant le mariage, soit qu'ils proviennent d'une succession ou d'une 
donation faite par une personne autre que leur conjoint, soit qu'ils les ont acquis au moyen de fonds 
provenant de la réalisation de semblables biens, soit qu'ils les ont acquis au moyen de revenus qui leur sont 
propres en vertu de leur régime matrimonial?». 
360
 It goes without saying that it needs also to be proved that the tax debt refers to taxable income of the 
spouse. 
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Before analyzing the ruling of the Court, it must be observed that the wording of Article 
394, para 1, CIR, which is still in force, renders difficult its classification under one 
category or the other. It is suffice to say that in the order of reference the referring court 
defined it a fiction according to which the tax debt is always common to the spouses, 
whereas the party in his observations to the Court designated it as an irrebuttable 
presumption of fraud or simulation
361
. Both of the categories are not correct. It could be 
considered a fiction or an irrebuttable presumption if the spouse was not allowed to escape 
its application. In fact, it seems to embody a reversal of the burden of proof as to the 
property of the goods (either own or common) in order to secure and speed up the tax 
recovery. The tax collector is not requested to prove that certain goods, suspected to have 
been fraudulently transferred to one of the spouses in order to avoid the collection upon 
them, have been actually purchased with incomes of the person liable to tax. The goods at 
hand are – arguing from the object of the contrary proof – presumed as being common or 
bought with incomes produced by the person liable to tax/debtor. 
Turning to the content of the decision, after having found the situations at issue 
comparable, the Court examined Article 394, para 1, starting from the preparatory works 
and it exhausted the question in a few lines. From the Parliamentary documentation it 
results that the legislator has intended to secure the tax recovery by preventing the possible 
arrangements among the spouses with the aim of removing the debtor’s goods from the tax 
recovery’s proceedings. The safeguard of the general interest has been pursued irrespective 
of the marriage regime chosen by the parties, whether separation of property or joint 
property. Such derogation from the ordinary rules in force in civil law is grounded 
precisely on the peculiarity of the tax recovery as it is reserved to fuel public expenses and 
finds its only limitation in Articles 10 and 11 of the Constitution. 
In this regard, the Court considered the measure to be coherent with the aim sought; that is 
avoiding the fraud by the spouses in the field of income taxation. In the latter field, indeed, 
such an eventuality is more likely than in other areas of taxation. Moreover, based on the 
                                                          
361
 To support the thesis of the discrimination created by the provision, the appellants interestingly referred to 
the parliamentary works according to which “eu égard au caractère exorbitant du droit commun que revêt 
cette mesure, l’administration prescrira à ses services de ne l’appliquer qu’avec modération et dans les cas 
de fraude manifeste”. Moreover, they underlined that the historical circumstances which justified the measure 
did not occur anymore. By contrast, the Government recalled the decision (Const. Court 5 March 1997, No 
11) where the Court has recognised that the tax procedure may derogate to the rules ordinary applicable, in 
particular as regards tax recovery. From this perspective, “la règle critiquée a pour seul effet de soumettre le 
conjoint non débiteur de l’impôt à un régime de preuve plus contraignant qu’en droit commun eu égard à la 
possibilité de fraude aisément réalisable entre époux; cette règle n’est manifestement pas disproportionnée 
par rapport à l’objectif d’assurer, de la meilleure manière, le recouvrement de l’impôt». 
Legal Presumptions in National Tax Systems. 
The Italian and Belgian Case 
 
 
165 
circumstance that the non-debtor-spouse may prove the origin of the goods concerned, the 
Court excluded the non-proportionality of the provision and thus rejected the question of 
inconsistency with the equality principle. 
The approach of the Court appears to be in favour of the fiscal interest (here very much 
coinciding with the budgetary interest), which in its view justifies a simplification in the 
tax recovery that affects a person other than the one liable to tax. Though the contrary 
proof is provided, the provision has more the character of a fiction than that of a rebuttable 
presumption, because of the lack of a demonstrative (or probative) character with regard to 
the fact base. 
The recourse to a rigid scheme prevented the Court from taking into sufficient 
consideration further circumstances, like the possible difficulty of bringing up the proof or, 
as in the case under discussion, the archaism of the provision which is no more grounded 
on a rule of experience (as regards the spouses’ economic relationships). Moreover, the 
measure aims at avoiding fraud, but it does not include any index thereof. This might raise 
doubts as to the coherence of the measure with the aim pursued and as to the 
proportionality of the means chosen, which on the contrary the Court held. 
Perhaps the preliminary question would have been more appropriately brought before the 
Court under this aspect: the provision applies to every spouse without any distinction, and 
it may thus conflict with the principle of equality where it requests a difference in 
treatment as regards different situations. Having raised the question of consistency under 
the assumed inequality created by the provision between a debtor for income taxes and a 
common debtor to which the civil law rules apply has made the rejection of the question 
easier for the Court. 
 
3.2.2 Arbitration Court No 125/2006 
In a subsequent ruling of the Court, the prevailing interest legitimizing a presumptive 
provision is the need for legal certainty and to a certain extent also the need for 
simplification. 
The case concerned the consistency of Article 42, para 1, second indent
362
, Law 26 March 
1999, with Articles 10 and 11 of the Constitution, where it charged the employee receiving 
                                                          
362
 Article 42, para 1 provided that «Les avantages de toute nature obtenus en raison ou à l’occasion de 
l’activité professionnelle du bénéficiaire, sous forme d’attribution gratuite ou non d’option constituent, dans 
le chef de celui-ci, un revenu professionnel qui est imposable, lorsqu’il ne l’a pas affectée à l’exercice de son 
activité professionnelle, au moment de l’attribution de cette option. L’option est, au point de vue fiscal, 
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an option on shares by the employer, irrespective of the real possibility to exercise that 
option
363
. 
Indeed, Article 42 stipulated that the advantages under the form of options gathered by the 
employee on occasion of his professional activity was a business income taxed (on a lump-
sum basis) at the time of the assignation of the option. Such assignation, pursuant to the 
second indent, was considered to have taken place for tax purposes the sixtieth day 
following the date of the offer, even when the exercise of the option was under (suspensive 
or resolutive) conditions and unless the beneficiary had notified in writing to the bidder the 
refusal of the offer. 
The substantive nature of the provision directly affecting the position of the taxpayer was 
not in doubt in the proceedings. To confirm this, one can refer to the circumstance that the 
new version of the provision was recalled in the decision, with the only purpose of 
showing that the legislator itself intended to link the taxation to the actual attribution of the 
advantage. Indeed, the facts of the main proceedings had taken place before the entry into 
force of Article 404 of the Programme Law 24 December 2002, which has amended the 
second indent of Article 42, para 1, by providing that in the absence of an in-writing 
notification with the acceptance of the offer by the sixtieth day from when the latter is done, 
it is considered as being refused. Irrespective of the rejection of the question by the 
Court
364
, the legislator has thus amended the provision which had raised doubts of 
compatibility with the equality principle. The result is a measure that would be more 
appropriately classified as a presumption of the will, which turns out to be a rule of law 
that applies when the party does not explicitly express his will on a certain matter: in the 
previous formula the acceptance was presumed, in the subsequent wording the refusal is 
presumed unless the party does not explicitly notify his will by a certain time-limit. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
censée attribuée le soixantième jour qui suit la date de l’offre, même si l’exercice de l’option est soumis à des 
conditions suspensives ou résolutoires, à moins que le bénéficiaire n’ait, avant l’expiration de ce délai, 
notifié par écrit à l’offrant son refus d’accepter l’offre». The question of compatibility with the equality 
principle concerned in particular the second indent. 
363
 The question for a preliminary ruling submitted to the court was: «L’article 42, § 1er, alinéa 2, de la loi 
du 26 mars 1999 relative au plan d’action belge pour l’emploi 1998 et portant des dispositions diverses, tel 
qu’il était rédigé avant sa modification par l’article 404 de la loi-programme (I) du 24 décembre 2002, 
viole-t-il les articles 10 et 11 de la Constitution coordonnée en ce que les travailleurs auxquels l’employeur 
attribue une option sur actions sont imposés de la même manière, qu’ils aient ou non la possibilité d’exercer 
l’option?» 
364
 Which did not consider this circumstance as an index of the lack of rationality with regard to the previous 
provision. On the contrary, «La circonstance que la loi-programme (I) du 24 décembre 2002 a instauré une 
présomption de refus de l’offre, si le bénéficiaire n’a pas notifié par écrit à l’offrant l’acceptation de cette 
offre, n’est pas de nature à priver la présomption légale présentement en cause de son caractère 
raisonnable.» 
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This having been clarified and turning to the decision, the latter reflects the same pattern 
described so far. The reasoning verges on verifying the existence of a reasonable 
justification supporting the same fiscal treatment for employees receiving an option on 
shares irrespective of the actual exercise of such option. In doing so, as usual the Court has 
recourse to the Parliamentary works that have accompanied the introduction of the 
‘présomption légale d’attribution’. This underlines the following points. First, the 
provision has been conceived with the aim of securing the legal certainty in the interest 
both of the taxpayer and the State with regard to the taxation of the options
365
; in fact, the 
former is aware of the levy upon those benefits which are taxed at a reasonable rate once 
and for all at the time of the attribution of the option
366
, whereas the latter can count on the 
related tax revenue. Second, the recipient of the option is in the position to know the risk 
related to the acceptance (even tacit) of the option in terms of payment of a levy for a right 
issue that he may not have the possibility to exercise, and thereby to refuse such 
assignment. From the Parliamentary documents, indeed, it results that the tax event giving 
rise to the levy is the attribution of the option, which enters the recipient’s patrimony and is 
charged in the quality of business income under an advantageous tax regime, due also to 
the difficulties in quantifying the benefits deriving from the attribution of the option. 
In the light of the foregoing, the Court found the presumption as being reasonable
367
.  
                                                          
365
 The Court observed: «B.4. L’article 42 de la loi du 26 mars 1999 fixe le statut fiscal des avantages de 
toute nature obtenus en raison ou à l’occasion de l’activité professionnelle du bénéficiaire, sous forme 
d’attribution - gratuite ou non - d’option. Le législateur entendait ainsi offrir la sécurité juridique souhaitée 
concernant le statut fiscal de ces options, comme il ressort des travaux préparatoires cités en B.3. L’alinéa 2 
dudit article détermine le moment où l’option est censée attribuée au point de vue fiscal, à savoir le 
soixantième jour qui suit la date de l’offre. La présomption légale d’attribution au jour ainsi défini 
s’applique, selon ces dispositions, même si l’exercice de l’option est soumis à des conditions suspensives ou 
résolutoires, si bien que les bénéficiaires sont imposés de la même manière, qu’ils aient ou non la possibilité 
d’exercer l’option.» 
366
 Thus, the possible advantages resulting from the availability of the option are exempted. In the decision it 
is explained that “Le régime fiscal applicable à l’attribution d’options conduit à ce que l’effet négatif de 
l’imposition immédiate de l’avantage obtenu sous forme d’option sur actions, au moment de son attribution, 
prévue par l’article 42, § 1er, de la loi du 26 mars 1999 - du reste au taux avantageux fixé à l’article 43, §§ 
5 et 6, de la même loi - est indissociable de la non imposition de tous les avantages directs ou indirects qui 
peuvent résulter de l’option accordée, une mesure prévue par l’article 42, § 2, de ladite loi». From the 
preparatory works it indeed results that «Les principes qui sous-tendent le projet sont donc la confirmation 
pure et simple du droit commun: l’attribution gratuite de l’option en raison ou à l’occasion d’une activité 
professionnelle constitue un avantage taxable au titre de revenus professionnels au moment de son octroi, et 
le seul problème est de quantifier cet avantage. A partir du moment où elle lui a été attribuée, l’option fait 
partie du patrimoine privé de la personne physique bénéficiaire; dès lors, l’exercice de l’option et la 
réalisation ultérieure d’une plus-value sur les actions constituent des actes de gestion normale d’un 
patrimoine privé qui échappent à l’impôt conformément au droit commun (Doc. parl., Chambre, 1998-1999, 
n° 1912/1, p. 104)». 
367
 By summing up the reasoning behind that conclusion, it reads as follows: “B.9. L’objectif poursuivi par le 
législateur d’offrir la sécurité juridique concernant le statut fiscal de l’attribution d’options sur actions, le 
régime fiscal avantageux, la connaissance suffisante des effets potentiels de leur attribution et le caractère 
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3.2.3  Constitutional Court No 50/2012 
Very recently, the Court has had the occasion of ruling on a rebuttable presumption 
included in Article 442-quater, para 2, CIR, introduced by the Programme Law 20 July 
2006. The question of compatability with Articles 10, 11 and 172 of the Constitution was 
raised with regard to the difference in treatment between the tax collector (i.e. the Treasury) 
and the other creditors of a certain enterprise on the one side, and on the other side between 
the management, depending on the type of tax to be paid by the enterprise
368
. The 
provision  makes the management jointly liable for the withholding tax (on business 
income) that the enterprises or the legal entities other than companies (‘personne morales’) 
have failed to pay, when such omission is attributable to them under the form of the fault, 
pursuant to Article 1382 Civil Code
369
, committed in managing the entity. In the second 
paragraph, such fault is presumed, save for the contrary proof, where the failure to pay the 
withholding tax is reiterated
370
.  
                                                                                                                                                                                
volontaire de l’acceptation de l’offre constituent une justification raisonnable suffisante de l’identité de 
traitement à laquelle sont soumis tous les travailleurs auxquels l’employeur attribue une option sur actions, 
qu’ils aient ou non la possibilité d’exercer l’option». 
368
 More precisely, the question referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling was: “L’article 442quater § 2 
CIR/1992 tel qu’il a été inséré par la loi-programme du 20 juillet 2006, viole-t-il les articles 10, 11 et 172 de 
la Constitution en ce que, dans le cadre de la responsabilité des dirigeants d’entreprises, il instaure des 
règles plus sévères à l’égard du fisc qu’à l’égard des autres créanciers auxquels leur faute causerait un 
dommage et/ou en ce qu’il soumet les dirigeants d’entreprise à des règles plus sévères, exorbitantes du droit 
commun, pour le paiement du précompte professionnel par rapport aux mêmes dirigeants pour le paiement 
des autres impôts (sauf la TVA qui bénéficie d’une disposition similaire) où les règles du droit commun 
continuent à s’appliquer ? ». 
369
 It states : «§ 1er. En cas de manquement, par une société ou une personne morale visée à l'article 17, § 3, 
de la loi du 27 juin 1921 sur les associations sans but lucratif, les associations internationales sans but 
lucratif et les fondations, à son obligation de paiement du précompte professionnel, le ou les dirigeants de la 
société ou de la personne morale chargés de la gestion journalière de la société ou de la personne morale 
sont solidairement responsables du manquement si celui-ci est imputable à une faute au sens de l'article 
1382 du Code civil, qu'ils ont commise dans la gestion de la société ou de la personne morale. Cette 
responsabilité solidaire peut être étendue aux autres dirigeants de la société ou de la personne morale 
lorsqu'une faute ayant contribué au manquement visé à l'alinéa 1er est établie  dans leur chef. Par dirigeant 
de la société ou de la personne morale au sens du présent article, l'on entend toute personne qui, en fait ou 
en droit, détient ou a détenu le pouvoir de gérer la société ou la personne morale, à l'exclusion des 
mandataires de justice.» 
370
 It provides as follows :«§ 2. Le non-paiement répété par la société ou la personne morale du précompte 
professionnel, est, sauf preuve du contraire, présumé résulter d'une faute visée au § 1er, alinéa 1
er
 ». As 
recalled in the decision, the same paragraph clarifies the meaning of ‘reiterated non-observance’ by 
requesting that “Par inobservation répétée de l'obligation de paiement du précompte professionnel au sens 
du présent article, l'on entend : - soit, pour un redevable trimestriel du précompte, le défaut de paiement d'au 
moins deux dettes échues au cours d'une période d'un an; - soit, pour un redevable mensuel du précompte, le 
défaut de paiement d'au moins trois dettes échues au cours d'une période d'un an». In the following 
paragraphs, Article 442-quater specifies the scope of the provision and the procedure to be followed by the 
administration for the purpose of ascertaining the liability. It stipulates that: « § 3. Il n'y a pas présomption de 
faute au sens du § 2, alinéa 1er, lorsque le non-paiement provient de difficultés financières qui ont donné 
lieu à l'ouverture de la procédure de concordat judiciaire, de faillite ou de dissolution judiciaire. § 4. La 
responsabilité solidaire des dirigeants de la société ou de la personne morale ne peut être engagée que pour 
le paiement, en principal et intérêts, des dettes de précompte professionnel. § 5. L'action judiciaire contre les 
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As usual, the examination of this norm is conducted by referring to the preparatory works 
of the Law 20 July 2006. From them it results that the provision is intended to put an end 
to the uncertainties within the jurisprudence and the doctrine as to the responsibility of the 
management, by setting forth their joint liability for the payment of the withholding tax (on 
business income) and the VAT
371
 when the failure of payment is due to their fault in 
managing the enterprise. In this way, the interest of the State in collecting the tax 
concerned and the fair competition between the enterprises are safeguarded. Though such 
fault is presumed (iuris tantum) in case of reiterated failure to pay, the management is 
allowed to give evidence of the absence of fault. Moreover, the same Article 442-quater, 
indent 5, provides a specific procedure that the tax administration has to comply with for 
the purpose of collecting the payment upon the management, who must receive notice of 
that intention. 
In the light of the foregoing, the Court recognised that the situation of the two categories of 
creditors referred to in the order of reference are comparable in principle. Nonetheless, it 
found the presumption to be reasonably justified in view of the general interest to the 
collection of the tax due and in view of the interest of the taxpayers paying their tax debts 
on time to a fair competition. From this perspective, a derogation to the rules applicable in 
areas other than tax law is legitimate. Ultimately, the possibility given to the management 
to give proof to the contrary and the provision of a procedure which implies the 
ascertainment of the responsibility by a judge were deemed as guaranteeing the 
proportionality of the measure
372
. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
dirigeants responsables n'est recevable qu'à l'expiration d'un délai d'un mois à dater d'un avertissement 
adressé par le receveur par lettre recommandée à la poste invitant le destinataire à prendre les mesures 
nécessaires pour remédier au manquement ou pour démontrer que celui-ci n'est pas imputable à une faute 
commise par eux. Cette disposition ne fait, toutefois, pas obstacle à ce que le fonctionnaire chargé du 
recouvrement puisse requérir, dans le délai précité, des mesures conservatoires à l'égard du patrimoine du 
ou des dirigeants de la société ou de la personne morale qui ont fait l'objet de l'avertissement ». 
371
 As a matter of fact, a similar provision is set forth by Article 93-undecies CTVA. 
372
 Thus, the Court rejected the question of consistency with the principle of equality. Indeed, “B.7. La 
mesure litigieuse n’est pas davantage disproportionnée. Le législateur a uniquement prévu une présomption 
de faute en cas de manquement répété et cette présomption peut être renversée si le dirigeant prouve qu’il 
n’a pas commis de faute de gestion. Par ailleurs, l’action en responsabilité doit être intentée auprès d’une 
juridiction qui doit vérifier si toutes les conditions légales sont remplies pour engager la responsabilité civile 
du dirigeant. L’accès à un juge exerçant un contrôle de pleine juridiction est dès lors garanti aux dirigeants 
concernés. B.8. La disposition en cause ne crée pas de privilège ni ne contient une exemption ou une 
modération d’impôt. Elle n’est donc pas incompatible avec l’article 172 de la Constitution». 
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4. An outline on the methods of assessment and the legality of the levy under the 
Belgian Constitution  
Similarly to the order of work followed dealing with the Italian tax system, before 
examining the most interesting legal presumptions with a view to the subsequent analysis 
of the EU context, it is useful to refer to some estimated methods of assessment included in 
the Belgian (income tax) legislation, namely in Articles 341 and 342 CIR. This, because 
despite the fact that they are plainly classified as legal presumptions, they seem rather to 
draw a general inference and to leave to the tax authorities or to non-legislative rules to 
develop the presumption. In this perspective, they might raise a question of compatibility 
with the principle of legality. 
Such principle in the field of taxation results from the conjunct dispositions of Articles 170 
and 172, para 1, 2
nd
 indent, of the Belgian Constitution. The former, in its first paragraph, 
provides that “Aucun impôt au profit de l’Etat ne peut être établi que par une loi» and the 
second one completes the principle by adding that “Nulle exemption ou modération 
d’impôt ne peut être établie que par une loi»373. 
The ratio of the principle of legality and the extent to which secondary normative 
provisions (or even administrative measures) are admitted to regulate the tax obligation 
have been delineated in various judgments of the Belgian Constitutional Court. First, the 
Court has confirmed that those Articles reflect the basic rule of democracy ‘No taxation 
without representation’, thereby requiring that any measure imposing a levy or exempting 
from a levy, has to be approved by a deliberative assembly democratically nominated, so 
that any delegation concerning the regulation of essential elements of a certain tax is 
susceptible of being in contrast with the Constitution.  
Second, the Court has clarified the meaning of ‘essential elements’ by indicating on several 
occasions which items of the tax obligation should be individualized within the law and 
                                                          
373
 Notably, unlike the Italian wording for the same principle, Article 170 (as well as Article 172 with 
reference to exemptions) requests any tax to be regulated ‘by the law’ and not ‘by virtue of the law’. As said 
when dealing with the Italian experience, precisely the use of the second formula in Article 23 of the 
Constitution has led the literature to qualify the legality principle as being ‘relative’, meaning that not every 
aspect of the taxation has to be covered by the law. A contrario, one could thus argue that the legality 
principle in the Belgian tax system should concern every aspect of the taxation. If manifestly this cannot be 
the case, at least in absolute terms, given the impossibility to foresee in the abstract in great detail all the 
elements forming the tax obligation, one would expect nonetheless (at least) a stricter evaluation. However, 
the analysis of the judgments handed down on Article 344, para 1, CIR, which will be referred to in the text, 
shows how the evaluation of compatibility with the legality principle appears to be influenced by the interests 
in play. When it is about preventing tax avoidance or evasion, the balance with the need to avoid the 
discretion of the executive or administrative power is in favour of the first (general) interest, and the legality 
principle is interpreted less strictly. 
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which may instead be regulated by secondary normative or administrative measures. The 
above provisions are not interpreted as requesting the law to regulate each aspect of a 
single taxation or exemption
374
, but rather to contain clear criteria concerning the persons 
liable to tax and the amount of the levy
375
. More specifically, the essential elements that 
must be marked at the legislative level are: the persons liable to tax, the tax event, the 
taxable base, the tax rate and the possible exemptions or tax reliefs
376
. Accordingly, a 
                                                          
374
 Ex multis, Const. Court 21 February 2007 No 32, in the field of VAT. B.7. “Les dispositions 
constitutionnelles précitées ne vont toutefois pas jusqu’à obliger le législateur à régler lui-même chacun des 
aspects d’un impôt ou d’une exemption. Une délégation conférée à une autre autorité n’est pas contraire au 
principe de légalité, pour autant qu’elle soit définie de manière suffisamment précise et qu’elle porte sur 
l’exécution de mesures dont les éléments essentiels sont fixés préalablement par le législateur.» Accordingly, 
«B.10. Compte tenu des précisions qu’il fournissait quant à la destination du bâtiment, le législateur pouvait, 
dans une matière complexe, sans violer le principe de légalité de l’impôt, attribuer au ministre des Finances 
la compétence technique de définir les critères servant au calcul de la superficie du bâtiment, elle-même 
établie par le législateur». See also Const. Court 17 October 2007, No 131 on Article 56 CTVA which 
delegated to the government the definition of the criteria for the determination of small enterprises’ 
forfaitaire taxable bases by the tax administration. The Court rejected the question holding that «B.5.1. 
L’article 56, § 1er, du Code de la T.V.A. permet de prévoir des modalités simplifiées d’imposition et de 
perception de la taxe en ce qui concerne les entreprises qui, en raison de leur taille, ne disposent pas d’une 
organisation comptable suffisante pour permettre l’application du régime général de la T.V.A. (Doc. parl., 
Chambre, S.E. 1968, n° 88/1, pp. 11 et 51) et auxquelles il est dès lors permis d’opter pour le régime 
forfaitaire de taxation établi en vertu de la disposition en cause. La diversité des situations dans lesquelles se 
trouvent ces entreprises est suffisante pour justifier que le législateur s’abstienne de fixer lui-même 
l’ensemble des règles d’imposition applicables à ces entreprises. B.5.2. Compte tenu de ce que le législateur 
a lui-même inscrit dans la loi le principe de l’imposition forfaitaire et de ce qu’un forfait vise, par hypothèse, 
des situations qui se prêtent mal à un règlement par la voie de dispositions générales constituant l’objet 
d’une loi, le législateur pouvait, dans une matière où domine la diversité des situations et où l’article 24, 
paragraphe 1, de la sixième directive du Conseil des Communautés européennes du 17 mai 1977 cité au 
B.1.4 prévoit lui-même la possibilité d’un régime de forfait, attribuer au Roi sans violer le principe de 
légalité de l’impôt, le pouvoir de régler les modalités selon lesquelles l’administration détermine la base de 
taxation conformément au principe du forfait inscrit dans la loi». 
375
 Const. Court 13 March 2008, No 54: “B.11. Le principe de légalité en matière fiscale inscrit à l’article 
170, § 1er, de la Constitution exige que nul ne soit soumis à un impôt sans que celui-ci ait été décidé par une 
assemblée délibérante démocratiquement élue, seule compétente pour instaurer l’impôt et établir les 
éléments essentiels de celui-ci. En réservant aux assemblées délibérantes démocratiquement élues la décision 
d’établir une imposition et la fixation des éléments essentiels de celle-ci, l’article 170, § 1er, de la 
Constitution constitue une garantie essentielle qui ne peut, en principe, être retirée à certains citoyens sans 
justification. B.12. La désignation des contribuables et le montant à payer par ceux-ci constituent des 
éléments essentiels de l’impôt.» Le principe de légalité fiscale garanti par l’article 170, § 1er, de la 
Constitution exige par conséquent que la loi fiscale contienne des critères précis, non équivoques et clairs au 
moyen desquels il peut être décidé qui est redevable et pour quel montant». Cf. Const. Court 30 March 2010, 
No 32, at para B.10.2. 
376
 Const. Court 24 April 2008 No 72: «B.6. Font partie des éléments essentiels de l’impôt la désignation des 
contribuables, la matière imposable, la base d’imposition, le taux d’imposition et les éventuelles 
exonérations et diminutions d’impôt». Similarly Const. Court 16 June 2011 No 103, where the Court 
qualified the levy under examination (an annual flat-rate levy upon companies which was used to finance the 
social security of self-employed workers fixed by Law 30 December 1992) as a tax rather than a social 
security levy given that it is intended to cover the general expenditure of public interest. Once found 
applicable the principle of legality, it held: “B.6.1. En vertu des dispositions en cause, les sociétés sont 
redevables d’une cotisation forfaitaire annuelle qui doit être considérée comme un impôt et le Roi est 
habilité à fixer le montant de cette cotisation, étant entendu qu’elle ne peut être supérieure à 868 euros. Les 
dispositions en cause reviennent à habiliter le Roi à fixer in concreto un élément essentiel de l’impôt, à 
savoir le taux d’imposition. Toutefois, le législateur a inscrit dans la loi non seulement le principe de 
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delegation to the government is not per se inconsistent with the principle of legality as long 
as it is delimited and it is in execution of criteria established by the legislator
377
. Moreover, 
such a delegation is admissible if it concerns pure procedural aspects, like the tax return, 
the controls or the tax collection
378
. Ultimately, where reasons of urgency impose to 
delegate the regulation of essential elements of taxation, then the law must fix 
unequivocally the object of delegation and the time-limits between which the measures 
enacted are to be examined by the Parliament.
379
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
l’imposition forfaitaire, mais également le montant maximum de cet impôt. Le législateur a uniquement 
entendu laisser au Roi le soin de fixer le tarif, sur la base de critères qui tiennent compte de la taille de la 
société. Toutefois, il se déduit du mot «notamment» figurant à l’article 91, alinéa 2, deuxième phrase, en 
cause, que le Roi pourrait prendre en considération d’autres critères que la taille de la société. B.6.2. En 
conséquence, la disposition en cause n’est pas compatible avec le principe de légalité inscrit à l’article 170, 
§ 1er, de la Constitution, mais uniquement en ce qu’elle contient le mot «notamment». Cf. Const. Court 13 
October 2011 No 150, at No B.2.; Const. Court 27 May 2008 No 83: «B.6. L’article 2 de la loi attaquée [loi 
du 26 novembre 2006 portant modification de l’article 51 du Code des impôts sur les revenus 1992] habilite 
le Roi à fixer, par un arrêté délibéré en Conseil des ministres, le montant des frais professionnels forfaitaires, 
exprimé en pourcentage des rémunérations de catégories déterminées de contribuables, et le mode 
d’établissement des frais professionnels forfaitaires. Cette disposition revient à habiliter le Roi à fixer des 
éléments essentiels de l’impôt. Il s’ensuit que, pour que cette habilitation soit compatible avec les 
dispositions citées au premier moyen, il doit être satisfait aux conditions mentionnées en B.5.2», i.e. «B.5.2. 
(…) lorsque le législateur se trouve dans l’impossibilité d’établir lui-même tous les éléments essentiels d’un 
impôt, parce que le respect de la procédure parlementaire ne lui permettrait pas d’agir avec la promptitude 
voulue pour réaliser un objectif d’intérêt général, il peut être admis qu’il habilite le Roi à le faire, pourvu 
qu’il détermine explicitement et sans équivoque l’objet de cette délégation et que les mesures prises par le 
Roi soient examinées par le pouvoir législatif dans un délai relativement court, fixé dans la loi 
d’habilitation» taking into consideration that  «B.9. (…) Les circonstances exceptionnelles qui justifient une 
habilitation doivent exister au moment où celle-ci est accordée». 
377
 See Const. Court 20 April 2005, No 72, at No B.29 et seq. 
378
 A. Tiberghien, Manuel de droit Fiscal, cited above, 15. «Les délégations ainsi admissibles concernent 
l’établissement de règles administratives relatives à la déclaration du contribuable, à l’établissement de 
l’impôt, au contrôle et au recouvrement de l’impôt, car ces aspects n’affectent pas la dette du contribuable». 
379
 See Const. Court 16 March 2005, No 57, on Article 6, 3
rd
 indent CTVA. At issue was the compatibility 
with the legality principle of the such provision in the extent to which it authorized the government to 
determine the operations giving rise to the tax obligation upon the municipalities, thereby derogating from 
the first indent of the same article that defined them as being not-liable-for VAT for the activities carried out 
in the capacity of public authorities. In accordance with Article 6, 3rd indent, which in turn implemented the 
regulation included in the Sixth VAT Directive, the royal decree 2 December 1970, No 26, qualified the 
municipalities as liable to pay VAT for the operations carried out in the use of the ports. The Court rejected 
the observations of the Conseil d’Etat concerning a different interpretation of the concept of ‘essential 
elements’ referred to indirect taxation379 and the circumstance that the rule was in application of the Sixth 
Directive. It found a balance between the need for a legislative definition of the criteria of taxation (guarantee 
of a democratic deliberation) and the impossibility of regulating any aspects of such taxation in abstracto as 
follows: «B.8.1. Il se déduit des articles 170, § 1er, et 172, alinéa 2, de la Constitution qu’aucun impôt ne 
peut être levé et qu’aucune exemption d’impôt ne peut être accordée sans qu’ait été recueilli le consentement 
des contribuables, exprimé par leurs représentants. Il s’ensuit que la matière fiscale est une compétence que 
la Constitution réserve à la loi et que toute délégation qui porte sur la détermination de l’un des éléments 
essentiels de l’impôt est, en principe, inconstitutionnelle. Le manquement à ces dispositions est, en outre, 
constitutif d’une violation des articles 10 et 11 de la Constitution. Il implique en effet une différence de 
traitement injustifiable entre deux catégories de contribuables: ceux qui bénéficient de la garantie que nul ne 
peut être soumis à un impôt si celui-ci n’a pas été décidé par une assemblée délibérante démocratiquement 
élue et ceux qui sont privés de cette garantie constitutionnelle. B.8.2. Toutefois, lorsque le législateur se 
trouve dans l’impossibilité d’établir lui-même tous les éléments essentiels d’un impôt parce que le respect de 
la procédure parlementaire ne lui permettrait pas d’agir avec la promptitude voulue pour réaliser un objectif 
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The Court has had the occasion to rule on the compatibility with the legality principle of 
another provision concerning the assessment in the area of income taxation, that is Article 
344, para 1, CIR, which lays down a general anti-abuse rule. The provision will be 
discussed later on. It has been recently amended in order to render it more effective and the 
Constitutional Court has very recently handed down a decision on the new version. The 
new formula is less vague, by virtue of a definition of the constituing elements of the abuse 
that entitle the tax authority to disregard the act(s) carried out by the taxpayer. 
Notably, the Constitutional Court did not deem the old formula in contrast with the legality 
principle. Article 344, para 1, in the wording before the amendment brought in 2012, stated 
that the legal qualification given by the parties to a single legal act or to different acts that 
are part of the same operation could be disregarded by the tax administration where the 
latter ascertained, by having recourse to presumptions or other means of proof provided for 
by Article 340 CIR, that such qualification had been conceived with the aim of avoiding 
taxation
380
. In the judgment No 188/2004
381
 the Court was asked if Article 344, para 1, was 
in conflict with the legality principle, in the extent to which it embodied a ‘blanket norm’, 
which left in the hands of the executive power, the determination of the tax events, 
irrespective of the existence of a sham and without securing the right of defence to the 
taxpayer in the context of the proceedings. 
Given the fact that Article 170, para 1, of the Constitution requests the essential elements 
of taxation to be established by the law, the entire decision is reserved to examine whether 
the general anti-abuse provision is specific enough  as to the conditions for its application 
or if it rather leaves room for the executive power to affect the circumstances giving rise to 
taxation
382
. In fact, the provision was silent as to the extent to which the tax administration 
                                                                                                                                                                                
d’intérêt général, il peut être admis qu’il habilite le Roi à le faire, pourvu qu’il détermine explicitement et 
sans équivoque l’objet de cette délégation et que les mesures prises par le Roi soient examinées par le 
pouvoir législatif dans un délai relativement court, fixé dans la loi d’habilitation».  
380
 Cf. T. Afschrift and D. Danthine, De la licéité de principe des ventes simultanées d’actifs et d’actions 
d’une société dans le but d’éviter l’impôt, J.D.F. 2000, 219. With regard to the question as to what extent the 
previous formula allowed the tax administration to requalify the act of the taxpayer, in particular under the 
perspective of the similarity of the effects requested by the Belgian Supreme Court, see J.-P. Bours, L’article 
344, § 1
er, du C.I.R. et les effectsjuridiques d’un acte : identité, similitude, ou équipollence?, Note to 
Supreme Court 4 November 2005, R.G.C.F., 2006, 315. 
381
 Arbitration Court 24 November 2004, No 188. The case of the main proceedings originated from the re-
qualification for tax purposes of a series of legal acts that in the view taken by the tax administration were 
planned in order to avoid the application of Articles 7, 32 and 33 of the CIR. 
382
 In the latter sense, were the observations submitted by the parties of the main proceedings, which 
contended that a constitutionally oriented interpretation of the measure implied that it could not affect the 
content and the effects of the act(s) chosen by the parties, but the qualification only. In this perspective, the 
tax administration was not allowed to interfere with the arrangements chosen by the parties. In other words, it 
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could substitute the qualification chosen by the parties with the ‘qualification juridique 
normale’, using the words of the government in its observation submitted to the Court.  
The Court (albeit not explicitly) recognized that it falls within the power of the tax 
authority the re-qualification of the act(s) as a consequence of the ascertainment of the tax 
avoidance’s purpose. Nonetheless, it rejected a reading of the measure as generally 
authorizing the tax authority to determine the taxable event. By contrast, Article 344, para 
1, was deemed as being a means of proof intended to let the tax administration consider the 
circumstances of the concrete case. In other words, the Court opted for a classification of 
the measure as having a merely procedural nature, thereby referring to the powers of the 
tax administration only. In the perspective taken by the Court, the measure includes a strict 
definition of the conditions for its application, with particular regard to the circumstance 
that the tax administration is requested to prove in order to proceed with the re-
qualification and the (contrary) proof that the taxpayer may give in order to escape the 
measure. The former is required to give evidence of the pure tax purpose justifying the 
qualification chosen by the parties, whereas the latter is allowed to prove that the operation 
carried out is justified in the light of financially legitimate reasons. Moreover, the 
Constitutional judge outlined that the nature of the phenomenon that the measure aims at 
preventing - i.e. tax avoidance, which is distinguished by the Court from the (still) 
legitimate right to choose the lowest route - requests a general measure capable of fitting 
the various forms in which the abuse is realized by the taxpayers. In the light of this, the 
Court found the measure in line with the principle of legality
383
.  
                                                                                                                                                                                
was permitted to rectify the qualification of the legal acts carried out by the taxpayer, but keeping the same 
juridical effects. 
383
 To this end, the Court made an excursus of the Parliamentary works that had accompanied the 
introduction of the provision concerned. The results of this are: firstly, that the measure has been introduced 
in order to restrain the effects of the Supreme Court’s settled case-law, which found legitimate the tax 
planning on the sole condition that it is based on a real situation, and thus to tackle more efficaciously the 
increasing recourse to the lever of the legal qualification for the purpose of avoiding the tax due; secondly, 
that it applies to economic operators in the exercise of their activity; thirdly, that the tax administration is 
required to prove that the choice of the legal qualification made by the taxpayer is due to the aim of avoiding 
the taxation which should (normally) apply pursuant to the provision of law circumvented; in parallel, the 
contrary proof that the taxpayer can give concerns the legal qualification and consists in proving that the 
latter is justified in the light of ‘legitimate needs having an economic and financial character’; ultimately, the 
tax administration is to carry out the control of the act(s) by taking into consideration the effects of the 
operation and the aim pursued; in the light of this, it will be entitled to re-qualify those act(s) so as to secure 
that the taxation applied corresponds to the normal legal qualification of the operation. For sake of 
completeness, as regards the Supreme Court’s settled case-law, which the Constitutional Court refers in the 
decision, the landmark case is Supreme Court 6 June 1961, Brepols, Pas., I, 1082, where it was held that 
taxpayers have the right to perform actions which would result in the most favourable tax treatment, even if 
the transaction is carried out in a rather unusual manner, provided that they accepted all the legal 
consequences of their actions. In a subsequent case it was added that the same conclusion is valid even if the 
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Undoubtedly, a general anti-abuse clause is by its own nature non-specific, as it is intended 
to cover all the possible ways of avoiding taxation through the circumvention of the 
(normally) applicable provision of law. With particular regard to Article 344, para 1, at that 
time in force, the conditions of application and the contrary proof to be given by the 
taxpayer were indicated, so that it did not represent a delegation to the executive power for 
the enactment of general acts identifying the taxable circumstances. Nonetheless, the 
conditions were designed in a very general way (‘cette qualification a pour but d'éviter 
l'impôt’); moreover, the effects of the anti-abuse clause, which in case of various 
consecutive acts that the tax administration considered as being part of the same economic 
operation entitled the latter to disregard the qualification given by the parties to any of 
them and to levy the correspondent taxation, would have deserved a more in-depth 
examination
384
. Unlike the other elements of the norm, indeed, such effects did not clearly 
result from the provision itself
385
. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
actions have been performed with the sole aim to reduce taxation (Supreme Court 22 March 1990, Au Vieux 
Saint Martin). 
384
 The prevailing interpretation within the scholars and the case-law was in the sense that the tax 
administration was entitled to re-characterize the acts which has been actually concluded by the parties 
provided that with the other qualification given the juridical effects of the same act are not affected. See T. 
Afschrift, L’évitement licite de l’impôt et la réalité juridique, 2nd ed., Bruxelles, Larcier, 2003, particularly at 
p. 293 et seq.; Supreme Court 4 November 2005, F.J.F., 2006; Supreme Court 22 November 2007, Pas., 2097. 
In line with this strict intepretation of Article 344, para 1, were also the judgments of the Constitutional Court 
illustrated in the text. In other words, it resulted that a re-classification of a transaction or series of 
transactions was possible only if the new legal classification led to the same legal consequences as the 
original one upheld by the taxpayer. Under the condition of the ‘observance of the juridical effects’ the 
provision was certainly more in line with the legal certainty, but susceptible to be ineffective, because of the 
difficulty to identify two alternative qualifications for all the constituing elements of a certain act. In thise 
sense M. Bourgeois and A. Nollet, L’introduction d’une notion générale d’ “abus (de droit) fiscal” en 
matière d’impôt sur les revenus, de droits d’enregistrement et de droits de succession, cited above, 4 et seq. 
The amendment of Article 344, para 1, is justified precisely in view of facing the problems of application of 
the previous formula. This is clearly stated in the Circular letter 4 May 2012, AAF. No 3/2012, AGFisc No 
17/2012, AGDP No 4/2012, where it is also clarified that the nature of the provision is unchanged: “il s'agit 
toujours d'un systéme de preuve et de preuve contraire: la charge de la preuve de l'existence d'un abus fiscal 
repose sur l'administration et le contribuable peut fournir la preuve contraire que d'autres considérations 
que l'évitement des impôts sur les revenus justifie sa forme juridique”. 
385
 In this perspective, the classification of the measure under the means of proof may be read in the sense of 
excluding any substantive relevance of the measure. But the reference in the Parliamentary works to the 
‘normal legal qualification’ indicates that the provision is potentially enable to impact on the definition of the 
tax obligation by overlapping what is ‘normal’ to the plan that the parties would apply in the absence of such 
a provision. The Court has confirmed the ruling handed down in the decision No 188/2005 in the subsequent 
judgment of 16 March 2005, No 60. The case of the main proceedings concerned an operation of own shares 
buyback realized by a public limited company, which the tax administration had considered aimed at 
avoiding the withholding tax on income generated by movable assets (précompte mobilier) to be applied to 
the distribution of the dividends. Accordingly, it had qualified the act as a distribution of dividends. The 
Court ruled in exactly the same way as in its previous decision, thereby confirming the consistency of Article 
344, para 1, with the principle of legality. In this perspective, the legislator has delimited the conditions of 
application of the provision, with the legitimate aim of tackling tax avoidance but at the same time without 
breaking the principle according to which the taxpayer is allowed to choose the most fiscally convenient 
arrangement as long as it is justified in the light of economic reasons. 
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4.1 The estimated assessment based on indices: Article 341 CIR 
The estimated method of assessment governed by Article 341 CIR is commonly classified 
among legal presumptions having a relevant probative nature. It has a purely domestic 
scope. Nonetheless, it is worthy of attention as it contributes to the understanding of the 
national approach to legal presumptions. In view of this, the provision is analysed focusing 
on the nature and effects in terms of distribution of the burden of proof. 
Pursuant to Article 341 CIR, the taxable income of individuals and legal entities other than 
companies (‘personnes morales’) may be determined by means of signs and indices from 
which a higher income situation in respect of the income declared in the tax return may be 
inferred
386
.  
As said, the provision is plainly deemed as laying down a rebuttable presumption of law in 
the hand of the tax administration
387
. Based on certain indices, the difference between the 
income declared and the higher income resulting from those indices is considered to be 
taxable income. More exactly, the term ‘aisance’ included in the formula of the norm 
suggests that the indices and signs to be considered are inherent to the taxpayer’s standard 
of living, so that from them the existence of a taxable income which has not been declared 
is inferred. The notion of indices and signs resulting from the administrative practice and 
the case-law is however very broad, as it covers not only the expenditure incurred by the 
taxpayer during a certain taxable year, but often the investments as well. More generally, it 
is accompanied by the evaluation of the overall assets at his availability
388
. 
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 The first indent provides as follows: « Sauf preuve contraire, l'évaluation de la base imposable peut être 
faite, pour les personnes morales comme pour les personnes physiques, d'après des signes ou indices d'où 
résulte une aisance supérieure à celle qu'attestent les revenus déclarés.» 
387
 See, with regard to Article 341 C. Lenoir, Les moyens de preuve en matière d’impôts directs, in Manuel 
de procédure fiscale, Limal, Anthemis, 2011, at p. 237: «Il s’agit là d’une présomption légale. C’est donc la 
loi qui, dans ce cas, déduit de faits connus l’existence d’un fait inconnu, à savoir des revenus imposables, 
non déclarés par le contribuable. De cette manière, le législateur dispense le fisc d’établir le lien entre les 
faits connus et le fait inconnu. Le contróleur se limite à démontrer l’existence des faits connus qui serviront 
de base à la taxation du contribuable sur signes et indices d’aisance.  C’est le législateur qui établit le 
raisonnement par induction (le contróleur en est donc dispensé) qui permet d’établir le lien entre les faits 
connus (les signes et indices d’aisances) et le fait incommu (l’existence de revenus non déclaré par le 
contribuable)».  See p. 250 as regards Article 342 CIR. 
388
 For an in-depth excursus of the judgments on the matter, see  by T. Afschrift, Traitè de la preuve en droit 
fiscal, 2 ed., Bruxelles, Larcier, 2004, 415 et seq.  Notably, he observed that even before the introduction of 
Article 341, first indent, by the Law 28 July 1938, the tax administration could infer the existence of a higher 
income by the standard of living of the taxpayer concerned. In other words, such inference embodied a 
presumption of fact, which was freely evaluated by the judge. On the contrary, the legal presumption 
included in Article 341 CIR reverses the burden of proof on the taxpayer and the judge cannot disregard the 
reasoning established within the law: “Le juge est dorénavant privé de tout pouvoir d’appréciation quant à la 
validité même du raisonnement, qui permet d’induire d’un certain train de vie l’existence de revenus 
imposables de l’exercice. Pour autant que l’existence même du fait connu dont est déduite la présomption, 
c’est-à-dire les signes ou indices d’aisance, soit établie, il en résulte nécessairement sauf preuve contraire, 
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Some of the considerations expressed as regards the Italian synthetic method of assessment 
(and the assessment based on the taxpayer’s spending capacity, in particular) hold true with 
reference to the provision under discussion. Indeed, it is based on the rule of experience 
according to which there is a correlation between expenditure met and income accrued 
during a certain taxable period
389
. The law draws an inference between such expenditure 
(known fact) and the higher taxable income (unknown fact). The difference between the 
amount of income that is normally necessary to meet such expenditure and the one that has 
been reported in the tax return is deemed as being part of the taxable base, thereby 
justifying a notice of assessment wherein the overall taxable base and income taxation are 
re-determined. 
This is the situation, unless the taxpayer gives the proof to the contrary, i.e. he proves that 
the expenditure which exceeds the income declared has been met with income that has 
been reported in the tax return or is exempt from (income) taxation. Such counterproof is 
not predetermined by the law, except when it concerns the selling of movable properties or 
other financial instruments, as in this case the documents produced need to be ‘nominative’ 
and contain the name of the taxpayer
390
. 
 
4.1.1 Conditions of application and proof to the contrary 
Despite other presumptive tools of assessment, like Article 342 CIR, the ‘preuve par signes 
ou indices d’aisance’ does not imply any particular condition to be met for its application. 
As it results from the wording of Article 341 CIR, it applies to individuals and legal 
entities other than companies. This is, apparently, irrespective of the reliability of the 
accounting records or the violation of the Income tax Code. As a consequence, the tax 
                                                                                                                                                                                
apportée par le contribuable, que ceux-ci proviennent de revenus imposables de l’exercice» ; Cf.  T. 
Afschrift Propos sur quelques questions actuelles en matière de preuve, R.G.C.F., 2003, 38; M. Baltus, 
L’étonnante extension du champ d’application de la présomption légale attachée aux signes et indices 
d’aisance, J.D.F. 1997, 225 et seq., who criticizes the broad intepretation of the legal presumption based on 
indices which result from the Supreme Court’s case-law. In his view, it ends up to be irrational.  
389
 In this sense also J.-P. Bours, Vérité et preuve fiscale, cited above, at p. 257, who observes that «L’idée 
générale exprimée par l’article 341 C.I.R. est la suivante: si, au cours d’un exercice, un contribuable a 
exposé des dépenses pour un montant supérieur à celui des revenues déclarés, l’administration est en droit 
de présumer que l’excédent des dépenses par rapport aux revenues provient de revenus non déclarés. Il 
s’agit là d’une présomption légale réfragable (iuris tantum) et, donc, dont le contribuable peut apporter la 
preuve contraire , par exemple en démontrant que l’excédent a été financé par des rentrées non taxables 
(donation, prêt, etc.)». 
390
 See the second indent of Article 341 CIR, pursuant to which «Lorsque la preuve contraire fournie par le 
contribuable se rapporte à des ventes de valeurs mobilières ou d'autres instruments financiers qu'il a acquis 
au titre de placement, les bordereaux ou documents d'achat et de vente invoqués ne font preuve à l'égard de 
l'administration des contributions directes que s'ils portent la mention "nominatif" et sont établis au nom du 
contribuable ou des personnes dont il est l'ayant-droit.» 
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administration issuing a notice of assessment based on the indices at hand is not requested 
to justify the recourse to such instrument, being only required to give evidence of the 
existence and amount of expenditure
391
. 
The vagueness of the provision has given rise to several questions, which to a certain 
extent have received an answer in various decisions of the lower courts and above all of the 
Supreme Court. Thus, from the jurisprudence we infer that the signs and indices must 
concern the concrete situation of the taxpayer
392
 and for a reasonable period of reference
393
; 
                                                          
391
 As regards the evidence that has to be given by the tax authority, one of the most debated issues concerns 
the category in which the higher income is to be placed. The question is whether the tax authority bears the 
onus of proving not only the existence and amount of the indices, but also the origin of that income, amongst 
the categories listed in Article 6 CIR. In a number of decisions handed down by the Supreme Court in the 
past, which were in line with the administrative practice, Article 341 was deemed as including a legal 
presumption of origin, according to which the amount it refers to is presumed to originate from taxable 
income accrued during the taxable period by the taxpayer in the exercise of his professional activity. Ex 
multis, Supreme Court, 22 November 1966, Pas, 1967, I, p. 382; Supreme Court 31 October 1967, Pas., 1968, 
I, p. 310, according to which “la présomption que constituent les signes ou indices dont résulte une aisance 
supérieure à celle qu’attestent les revenus déclarés est une présomption légale d’origine, c’est-à-dire que les 
sommes auxquelles elle se rapporte sont présumées, jusqu’à preuve contraire, provenir de revenus réalisés 
pendant la période imposable dans l’exercise de l’activité professionnelle du contribuable »; Supreme Court 
8 October 1968, Pas., 1969, I, p. 145; Supreme Court 2 January 1997. Critical  regarding this intepretation, 
which «reviendrait à intoduire une double présomption fondée sur l’article 341 du Code, l’une légale, 
l’autre née de la jurisprudence»,  T. Afschrift, Traitè de la preuve en droit fiscal, cited above, 463. In more 
recent decisions, however, the Supreme Court has clarified that under Article 341, the expenditure are 
presumed to have been met with ‘revenus imposables d’origine indéterminée’, i.e. a further category in 
respect of the ones listed in Article 6 CIR. See Supreme Court 16 October 2009 (in http://www.cass.be/): “En 
vertu de cette disposition [Article 247 CIR 1964, now 341 CIR 1992], les dépenses, placements, 
investissements et accroissements d’avoirs constatés au cours d’une période imposable, considérés comme 
des signes ou indices d’où résulte une aisance supérieure sont présumés, sauf preuve contraire, provenir des 
revenus imposables. Cette présomption légale implique que, pour déterminer la base imposable, 
l’administration ne doit établir ni la provenance ni la nature des avoirs qui justifient la taxation d’après des 
signes ou indices et, partant, ne doit pas rattacher ces avoirs à l’une des catégories particulières des revenus 
visés à l’article 6 du code précité. Après avoir constaté que le demandeur avait été, à un poste frontière, 
trouvé en possession d’un relevé d’avoirs en banque, l’arrêt considère que ces avoirs constituent des signes 
ou indices d’une aisance supérieure à celle qui résultait de ses revenus déclarés. Il énonce que « sauf preuve 
de leur origine spécifique, ces revenus sont réputés être des revenus nets imposables au sens de l’article 6 
dont l’origine reste pour le reste indéterminée». It follows that they will be subject to the ordinary tax 
treatment (with a progressive tax rate) and the tax authority is relieved from proving the actual category, 
unless it has at its disposal enough information to correctly qualify the higher income. In this regard, J.-P. 
Bours, Vérité et preuve fiscale, cited above, 262-263, warns from allowing the tax administration to prove 
that the higher income falls within the category of ‘professionnel revenus’ (business income) by means of 
presumptions of fact, as this would imply legitimating a presumptions’ chain (‘cascades de présomptions’). 
J.-P. Bours, La nature des revenus dégagés par une situation indiciaire, ou la quadrature du cercle, Note to 
Supreme Court 1 October 2004, R.G.C.F., 2005, 261 et seq. 
392
 Court of Gand 23 December 1986. Accordingly, the evaluation of the expenses for vital needs when not 
accompanied with reasons is arbitrary. Court of Anvers 3 December 1996. Among the indices taken into 
consideration by the tax authorities in order to verify the correlation to the income declared, there are the 
household expenses (‘dépenses de ménage’), which have given rise to several case-law as they are normally 
calculated by the tax authority by having recourse to presumptions hominis. Critical to this way of applying 
the presumptive assessment J.-P. Bours, Vérité et preuve fiscale, cited above, at p. 259, as a legal 
presumption ends up  being based on a presumption of fact. In the light of this he considers “préférable que la 
situation indiciaire soit établie sans evaluation des “dépenses de ménage” et que l’on se pose ensuite la 
question de savoir si l’excédent des revenus par rapport aux dépenses est suffisant pour mener un train de vie 
raisonnable». The same reasonableness should guide, for the Author, the consideration of an important 
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he may be asked for information by the tax administration but only on the grounds that 
there are elements for an assessment based on indices
394
. As said in the previous paragraph, 
the expenditure taken into consideration are interpreted in a broad sense, comprehensive of 
expenses met for basic needs and investments. At any rate, the presumptive assessment 
must be reasonable and not arbitrary, i.e. it has to ground on indices concretely revealing 
the wealth of a certain taxpayer. 
Article 341 CIR sets forth a rebuttable presumption, as it manifestly results from its first 
wording (‘Sauf prevue contraire’). Above, it has been said that the second indent of the 
same article requests certain formalities when documentation certifying the selling of 
movable properties or other financial instruments is produced. Apart from this limitation, 
and given the lack of further indications in the norm, the taxpayer appears to be allowed to 
rebut the presumption by giving evidence of: 
a) the inexistence of the known fact, for instance by contesting the existence or the 
amount of the expenditure on which the tax claim is based; 
or 
b) the inexistence of the unknown fact, that is the higher income correlated to the 
expenditure. To this end, he may prove that such income was subject to taxation, or 
that it is not taxable for the purpose of income taxation (e.g. a donation) and so on. 
Such contrary proof may be given by the taxpayer with all the means of proof, including 
presumptions hominis and except for the oath. 
As with the indices, the suitability of certain circumstances to rebut the presumption results 
from the examination of the judgments on the matter
395
. The taxpayer may also give proof 
to the contrary with regard to the category in which the tax administration inserts the 
higher income ascertained. In this case, he is required to produce precise elements 
certifying the nature and origin of the income concerned. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
investment, for instance, as it could be financed with income of different taxable years. Cf. R. Rosoux, 
L’évaluation de dépenses de ménage: le maillon faible des décomptes indiciaires, R.G.C.F., 2002, 3 et seq. 
393
 Normally represented by the taxable period.  
394
 Tribunal d’Anvers 20 May 2008, F.J.F., 2011, liv. 9, 963.  
395
 Ex multis, Supreme Court 11 February 2002, (http://www.cass.be/), according to which «pour apporter la 
preuve contraire qui lui incombe, le redevable doit établir par des éléments positifs et contrôlables que cette 
aisance supérieure provient de ressources autres que celles qui sont taxables aux impôts sur les revenus ou 
de revenus provenant d’une période antérieure à la période imposable». 
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4.1.2 Some considerations on the nature of the assessment with signs and indices 
Article 341 CIR embodies a tool, in the availability of the tax administration, for the 
purpose of proving the existence of a higher income in respect of the one which results 
from the annual tax return. It is based on the idea that where the expenditure met during a 
certain taxable year are higher than the amount of income declared, then it may be inferred 
that the difference consists of taxable income hidden from the tax authority. By means of 
such instrument, the tax administration is not requested to give evidence of the inference, 
being only requested to merely prove the known fact, i.e. the expenditure exceeding the 
taxable income. The burden of proof is shifted onto the taxpayer, who can prove that the 
presumption cannot be applied to his concrete case, as the income concerned is not taxable 
or it has been taxed already. 
However, Article 341 includes undoubtedly a very general inference. Moreover, the known 
fact is construed through the necessary investigations of the tax administration. It is up to 
the latter, indeed, to identify and quantify the indices. In this sense, the provision includes 
a ‘weak’ presumption of law, meaning that its efficacy is not that peculiar to a presumption 
of law. In a possible trial where a notice of assessment was appealed by the taxpayer, the 
judge would not be obliged to consider the unknown fact as proved once the known fact is 
produced by the tax administration. In fact, he has a certain discretion in evaluating the 
suitability of the elements on which the tax claim is based. In several judgments, the 
assessment has been considered as being arbitrary. For example, it has been held that the 
tax administration cannot simply apply the presumption by generically referring to the 
provision at hand and to the expenditure for satisfying vital needs. The tax authority seems 
to be required to argue and  support such allegation
396
. 
At any rate, the vagueness of the norm, especially in the definition of the known fact and 
the related determination of the higher income, imposes the tax administration to have 
careful recourse to the instrument and taking into consideration all the possible information 
or documentation even in the hands of the taxpayer, before issuing a notice of assessment. 
In fact, unlike other legal presumptions that are introduced also in view of securing legal 
certainty, the risk is that Article 341 be rather a source of uncertainties. 
 
 
                                                          
396
 Court of Anvers, 3 December 1996, F.G.F., 1997, 92. 
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4.2 Estimated assessments based on comparison with similar taxpayers: Article 342 
CIR 
A further estimated method of assessment for the purpose of income tax is provided for by 
Article 342 CIR, which deals with the determination of certain items of income by means 
of comparison with similar taxpayers. The article includes several provisions. 
The first paragraph, first indent, states that, facing the absence of probative elements, the 
proceeds may be determined through the comparison with the normal proceeds accrued by 
at least three similar taxpayers, and taking into consideration all the useful information, 
including the turnover, the investments, the factors of production and so on. The same 
paragraph entitles tax authorities to establish, through the orchestration with the trade 
associations, a flat-rate taxation, which may ground an assessment facing a lack of 
probative elements. 
The second paragraph refers to a royal decree for the determination of the minimum 
taxable proceeds for foreign enterprises. The only indication in this regard concerns the 
necessary consideration of the elements listed in the first paragraph, first indent, which 
concern the structure of the enterprise in terms of number of workers, investments, 
turnover and so on
397
. This part of the norm is worthy of special attention for our purpose 
and it will be dealt with later on. Indeed, it has been found by the EUCJ (case Talotta) to 
be in contrast with the freedom of establishment in the extent to which it discriminated 
against foreign enterprises.  
The EUCJ judgment, however, concerned a taxable period when the treatment at hand 
applied to foreign entities only. Since  the taxable year 2005, and following that judgment, 
it has been extended
398
 to domestic enterprises and self-employed persons when they fail to 
deliver the tax return or in case of delay (para 3). 
 
4.2.1 The assessment based on the comparison with three similar taxpayers 
The first method of assessment laid down by Article 342, CIR, is based on the comparison 
with at least three similar taxpayers, for the purpose of assessing the proceeds (more 
exactly, profits or remunerations) attributable to the taxpayer under investigation. His 
                                                          
397
 Notably, the provision was deemed as rebuttable by giving evidence of the exact taxable income. 
398
 By the Programme Law 11 July 2005. 
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proceeds are in this way presumed as being comparable to those accrued by taxpayers 
whose activity shows similar structural elements
399
. 
The reference included in the norm to ‘bénéfices’ and ‘profits’ renders evident that it does 
not concern, unlike Article 341, the overall taxable income, but only these items
400
. It also 
implies that it applies to persons carrying on a self-employed activity, i.e. enterprises and 
self-employed persons. 
Again, unlike Article 341 CIR, the tax authority is entitled to have recourse to the method 
at hand only when facing the lack of probative elements
401
. Such circumstance, which has 
to be proved by the tax administration, normally occurs where the accounting records are 
                                                          
399
 According to J.-P. Bours, Vérité et preuve fiscale, cited above, at p. 263, «Il s’agit d’une présomption 
légale réfragrable, reposant sur l’idée, contestable, que les ratios sont comparables entre contribuables 
exerçant des activités similaires («nivellement de marges »)». The Author is very critical also as regards the 
secrecy covering the subjects of comparison. He illustrates his doubts with the following example: 
“Lorsqu’elle affirme, par exemple, que les points de comparaison vendent de vêtements pour enfants et 
exercent leur activité en banlieue, elle doit être crue et le tribunal ne pourra exiger la production de dossiers 
des points de comparaison». In his opinion, this is in conflict with the principle held by the Supreme Court in 
the judgment 25 February 1982 «le seule affirmation d’un fait par une partie litigante ne peut tenir lieu de 
preuve de l’existence de ce fait». 
400
 More exactly, Article 342, para 1 refers to “les benefices ou profits visés à l’article 23, para 1, 1 and 2”. 
The former are defined by Article 24 CIR and originate from the carrying on of “enterprises industrielles, 
commerciales ou agricoles quelconques”, while the latter are delimited by Article 27 CIR as “tous les 
revenus d’une profssion libérale, charge ou office et tous les revnue d’une occupation lucrative qui ne sont 
pas considérés comme des benefices ou des remunerations». In this regard, it should be noted that since the 
beginning, the Supreme Court has gathered the difference between the presumption laid down in Article 342 
concerning the amount of taxable proceeds, which has to be used under the conditions provided for by that 
provision, on the one side, and the presumptions of fact regarding the existence of elements from which the 
taxable base may be inferred. The tax administration is entitled to make use of the latter without having 
complied with Article 342 CIR, but of course they do not have the probative value of legal presumptions, as 
the judge is free to evaluate them. It held that “ne recourent pas au mode spécial de preuve prevue par (…) 
[now, Article 342, CIR], mais à une présomption de l’homme, l’arrêt qui invoque une comparaison avec des 
redevables similaires aux seules fins de déterminer un élément servant à établir la base imposble» (Supreme 
Court 23 October 1975, Pas., 1976, I, 240. Likewise, Supreme Court 25 February 1982, J.T., 1982, 545, with 
note of T. Afschrift. 
401
 Under the same conditions the tax administration may determine the taxable base on a flat-rate basis, 
which is established in cooperation with the trade associations. This method embodies a special way of 
assessment through comparison with similar taxpayers. In this case, the tax authority has to prove the lack of 
probative elements and also that the activity carried out by the taxpayer under assessment falls in one of the 
categories for which the forfait may be applied. On the side of the taxpayer, from the case-law it results that 
he can only avoid the application of the forfait by proving the existence of exceptional circumstances. On the 
other hand, given the unreliability of the accounting records, he is not likely to be capable of proving his 
effective income. Of course, he may contest such unreliability, which is the condition for the application of 
the forfait. The tax administration regularly provides, after a debate with the groups concerned (for example 
farmers, retail traders, artisans), for the forfait to be considered, which normally last three taxable years. It 
remains, however, possible for the tax administration to disregard the amount  established in this way and to 
prove the real taxable income, if higher. The same procedure may be followed by the tax administration with 
reference to certain expenditure, which normally cannot be justified by means of probative documentation. 
Article 342, para 1, 4
th
 indent, states as follows: «L'administration peut également arrêter, d'accord avec les 
groupements professionnels intéressés, des forfaits pour l'évaluation des dépenses ou charges 
professionnelles qu'il n'est généralement pas possibles de justifier au moyen de documents probants». 
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unreliable, or more in general where the documentation necessary in order to verify the 
correct determination of the items of income concerned is considerably inaccurate
402
. 
On several occasions, the courts have ruled regarding the suitability of the proof given by 
the tax administration for justifying the use of the assessment by means of comparison
403
. 
From this case-law we infer, for instance, that the accountancy or bookkeeping has a 
probative value if it is kept regularly and it is precise and verifiable, while this is not the 
case where it contains serious mistakes or fraud
404
. Again, the tax authorities violate the 
principle of good administration if they do not contest the reliability of the accountancy for 
years, but they suddenly take another view on occasion of a tax investigation regarding the 
income of previous taxable years. 
Once the condition of the absence of probative elements occurs, the tax administration is 
entitled to re-determine the proceeds on the basis of the normal profit and remuneration of 
(at least) three similar taxpayers. An evaluation of similarity is thus the result of a 
comparison which rests on certain significant aspects regarding the economic activity 
carried on, like the type of activity, the turnover, the number of employees and so on. As 
clarified in the jurisprudence, it implies the consideration of the same taxable year and of 
taxpayers whose income has been determined analytically and not on a flat-rate base. 
Above all, the reference to the ‘normal’ proceeds attributable to the taxpayers compared 
need to be stressed, as it reflects the core of the assessment under discussion. 
                                                          
402
 Supreme Court 12 November 1980, Pas. 1981 (I.P. 302-310); Supreme Court 7 January 1993, Pas. 1993 
(I., p. 25), where the Court held that in order to prove the unreliability of the documents enclosed in the tax 
return, the tax administration cannot simply make reference to the result of the comparison with similar 
taxpayers. 
403
 See Supreme Court 26 November 1968, Pas., 1969, I, 302, which requested the taxable base to be 
determined on the basis of “des revenus normaux de redevables similaires, reconnus judicieusement choisis”, 
meaning that the elements of comparison need to be as such to lead to a proper and reasonable evaluation of 
the proceeds. Indeed, “le juge du fond apprécie souverainement la pertinence et la valeur probante des points 
de comparison choises pour determiner les revenus professionnels du contribuable” (Supreme Court 30 
March 1965, Pas., 1965, I, 809). In general, from the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and of the lower 
courts it results that the notion of similarity is broadly interpreted. Thus, “il suffit que la comparaison soit 
faite avec les profits normaux de redevables qui exploitent une entreprise du même genre, offrant des points 
de similitude suffisants» (Supreme Court 10 March 1970, Pas, 1970, I, 610), being not requested that «le 
redevable, prise comme élément de comparaison, fasse le commerce des mêmes marchandises que le 
contribuable intéressée et encore moins le commerce du même article» (Supreme Court 16 May 1967, Pas., I, 
1075). Such comparison is provided «avec les revenus normaux d’entreprises similaires, et non point avec 
ceux entreprises exploitées dans des circonstances identiques» (Supreme Court 18 March 1967, Pas., 1967, I, 
869), so that the determination of the taxable base «implique une certaine latitude dans la comparaison, des 
bénéfices de redevables similaires présentant nécessairement des discordances» (Supreme Court 16 
November 1965, Pas, 1966, I, 350). 
404
 See in this regard, B. de Clippel, La comptabilité probante en matière de contributions directes (examen 
de jurisprudence), R.G.C.F., 2003, 9 et seq. 
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The tax administration cannot generally refer to similar taxpayers, instead being  required 
to give reasons for the assumed similarity by making explicit the elements considered. This, 
also in accordance with Article 346 CIR, which puts upon tax authorities the obligation of 
notifying the taxpayer under inquiry with the amount of proceeds of the three similar 
taxpayers and the elements on the basis of which the proceeds referred to him are 
proportionally determined. Nonetheless, such provision has to be read in conjunction with 
the secrecy covering the identity of the three taxpayers deemed by the tax authority to be 
similar, which might render difficult the exercise of the right of defence by the taxpayer 
involved, at least in contesting the similarity. 
As a matter of fact, the provision is commonly interpreted – and all the more so after the 
recent decision of the Constitutional Court discussed below - as allowing the taxpayer who 
receives a notice of assessment based on comparison with similar taxpayers, to give proof 
to the contrary. First of all, he can certainly contest the absence of the condition for the 
presumptive assessment to apply, i.e. the unreliability of the accountancy. Moreover, he 
can also contest the recurring of the similarity, which grounds the determination of his 
proceeds. This is not an easy challenge, though, as it encounters in fact the limitations due 
to the acknowledgement of the other taxpayers considered in the comparison. In other 
words, since the tax authority is prohibited from revealing the identity of the taxpayers that 
enter the comparison, the defence of the taxpayer under assessment may only concern the 
elements explicitly referred to by the tax authority (type of activity, turnover etc.) and aim 
at asserting the specificity of his situation (for instance, the activity is carried out in a 
suburb, the taxpayer had personal problems or an exceptional event occurred etc.). 
One could question whether the taxpayer is allowed to give evidence of the actual amount 
of the proceeds, thereby contesting the result of the comparison. At any rate, given that 
such method of assessment applies when the accounting records are unreliable or so is the 
documentation alleged in the tax return, this type of proof would be unlikely to be given by 
the taxpayer. 
 
4.2.2 The minimum taxable proceeds for domestic enterprises and self-employed 
persons 
Whereas the minimum taxable proceeds for foreign enterprises will be dealt with later on, 
a few considerations need to be made as regards the same method of taxation applied to 
enterprises and self-employed persons who are established in Belgium. 
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As disclosed already, initially such a presumptive method of determination of the proceeds 
concerned only those enterprises established abroad and operating in the Belgian market, 
with regard to the proceeds accrued on the Belgian territory. From the taxable period 2005, 
the same treatment has been extended to national taxpayers, given certain conditions. The 
result is a provision perhaps in line with the indications included in the EUCJ judgment 
Talotta, but with a questionable ratio at national level. As we will see, in the cited case, the 
European Court of Justice has found Article 342, para 2, CIR as being discriminatory 
towards foreign enterprises in respect to national ones, because only for the former such 
method of determination of the proceeds was laid down. 
Currently, Article 342, para 3, empowers the tax administration to apply the minimum 
taxable proceeds established by a royal decree implementing para 2, also to domestic 
enterprises and self-employed persons when the tax return has not been delivered or it has 
been submitted but with a delay. Thus, Article 182 of the Royal decree giving execution to 
Article 342, para 2 CIR, regulates the minimum taxable proceeds upon a) the foreign 
enterprises operating in Belgium which are taxed according to the procedure of comparison 
provided for by para 1, first indent, Article 342 and b) the Belgian enterprises and self-
employed persons in case of an absent or delayed tax return. In practice, this provision 
includes different criteria for calculating the amounts depending on the industry (para 1). 
Furthermore, it states that in any case the amount of the minimum taxable proceeds cannot 
be lower than 19.000,00 euro
405
. 
The last provision has been criticised within the doctrine
406
 and in various judgments its 
rationality has been questioned
407
. In particular, it has been said that the amount of 
                                                          
405
 In Com. I.R., 342/84 it is clarified that “ce minimum constitue un forfait absolu qui ne peut être réduit 
proportionnellement au nombre de mois d’activité ». See in this regard the judgment of the Constitutional 
Court No 93/2013, interim. 
406
 See J.-P. Bours, Vérité et preuve fiscale, cited above, at p. 268, who, with reference to Article 182 
A.R./CIR concludes: «Ce texte est une indignité. (…) Dans le cas présent, et lorsque l’on est en présence 
d’une «entreprise» ou d’un «titulaire de profession libérale», l’administration est dispensée de toute preuve 
et peut faire application de forfaits totalement arbitraires. Pourquoi, en effet, un bénéfice imposable d’au 
minimum 19.000,00 EUR? Est-il réellement inimaginable qu’une entreprise réalise, une année, un bénéfice 
inférieur, voire même une perte? Ce texte constitue donc une violation flagrante des principes généraux 
applicables en matière de droit de la preuve. C’est à l’administration qu’incombe la charge de celle-ci, mais, 
si le contribuable est une entreprise ou un titulaire de profession libérale et qu’il se trouve dans la situation 
visée par l’article 342, §  3, C.I.R. (absence de déclaration ou remise tardive de celle-ci), l’administration 
n’a plus rien à prouver et peut lui appliquer un forfait, ce qui est un fait du prince. Le texte est par ailleurs 
discriminatoire, puisqu’il ne vise que les «entreprise » et « titulaires de profession libérale», à l’exclusion 
des titulaires d’un charge ou d’un office». According to X. Thibéaut, Le minimum des bénéfinces ou des 
profits imposables des enterpises et des titulaires de professions libérales. La nouvel article 342, § 3, du 
C.I.R. 1992, inséré par la loi-programme du 11 juillet 2005, R.G.C.F., 2005, 251 et seq., in particular at p. 
255, Article 342, para 3, does not embody a new hypothesis of taxation by comparison, but rather «une 
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minimum taxable proceeds established in the royal decree, which applies when the 
taxpayer does not comply with the obligation of submitting the tax return on time, is 
arbitrary and does not reflect the concrete situation of the taxpayer concerned. For instance, 
there is not any distinction based on the period of time in which the activity has been 
carried out (the entire taxable year or just a few months) or on the type of activity. 
 
4.2.2.1 Minimum taxable proceeds and principle of equality. Constitutional Court No 
93/2013 
Not surprisingly, the question of compatibility of Article 342, para 3, with the principle of 
equality is recently arrived before the Constitutional Court and a decision has been handed 
down
408
.  
The referring court of Liège asked whether the provision was in conflict with Articles 
10,11 and 172 of the Constitution. In particular, at issue was the minimum taxable 
proceeds established in Article 182, AR/CIR, in execution of para 2, Article 342, which 
applied to all the enterprises and self-employed persons irrespective of the period of time 
in which the activity was carried out during the taxable year and without allowing the 
taxpayer to prove the real taxable income
409
. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
nouvelle sanction à l’absence ou au retard de déclaration, sanction aux effets redoutables, particuliérement 
pour les contribuables imposés au forfait », which among the other things raises doubts of compatibility with 
the principle of equality «en rompant l’équilibre existant entre taxation d’office et moyen de défence». 
407
 One of the most critical views is in Court of Liège 31 May 2012, where it was held that “(...) le 
contribuable est privé du droit de soulever l’arbitraire du mode de calcul retenu par le taxateur. Il apparaît 
disproportionné de sanctionner un contribuable, certes négligent dans ses obligations de rentrer sa 
déclaration fiscale, en lui fixant un minimum absolu de base imposable sans aucune autre considération et 
sans lui permettre de se défendre comme pourrait le faire tout contribuable taxé d’office. De surcroît, 
l’attribution automatique d’un bénéfice forfaitaire de 10.000 euros peut s’avérer sans relation avec l’activité 
concrète de la requérante; en cela, l’article 182 § 2 de l’AR CIR/92 confère à l’administration des pouvoirs 
exorbitants puisqu’elle présume que toute entreprise génère nécessairement un bénéfice imposable de 19.000 
euros. Ce forfait ne repose sur aucune considération précise, et est fixé sans aucun rapport avec la nature de 
l’activité exercée, l’âge de l’exploitant, l’importance du personnel occupé, les difficultés pour rentabiliser 
une activité déficitaire etc. Ce n’est pas parce qu’un contribuable fait preuve, les cas échéant, de mauvaise 
volonté, que l’administration se trouve dispensée de recourir, pour l’imposer, aux modes de preuve connus». 
Given that «Le contribuable ne peut donc échapper à l’application d’un forfait, nécessairement approximatif 
et bien supérieur au montants des barèmes forfaitaire établie par secteur d’activités, s’ils existent et pour 
lesquels le contribuable pouvait opter» it conludes that « Etre taxé sur cette base minimale, sans rien d’autre 
à prouver, est nécessairement arbitraire et toute imposition qui est fondée sur un tel mécanisme doit être 
annulée». 
408
 Const. Court 19 June 2013, No 93. 
409
 The question was formulated as follows: «L’article 342, § 3, du C.I.R./92 viole-t-il les articles 10, 11 et 
172 de la Constitution en ce que les minima imposables établis par le Roi en exécution du § 2 de cette 
disposition sont applicables à toute entreprise et titulaire de profession libérale quelle que soit la durée de 
l’activité exercée au cours de l’exercice d’imposition en cause? L’article 342, § 3, du C.I.R./92 viole-t-il les 
articles 10, 11 et 172 de la Constitution en ce que cette disposition instaure un minimum imposable et ne 
laisse pas au contribuable la possibilité d’établir le chiffre exact de ses revenus imposables?». 
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Thus, though in respect of the same constitutional parameter, the presumptive assessment 
was questioned under two main aspects. Firstly, it was deemed as treating in the same 
manner different situations, by disregarding any elements concerning the concrete situation 
of the taxpayer to which the minimum tax base applies. Secondly, it was deemed as 
jeopardizing the defence rights of the taxpayer, as long as the latter was not permitted to 
give the contrary proof, or more exactly to prove that the minimum does not apply to his 
case, as he has actually earned a lower amount. 
With regard to the first question, which directly concerns the possible violation of the 
equality principle, the Court recalls that it falls within the competence of the tax legislator 
the provision of a certain tax treatment and the manner of levy. Where to this end criteria 
of distinction are introduced, these are legitimate as long as they are reasonably justified, 
meaning that they equally apply to all the persons who are in the same situation in respect 
of the measure concerned and its aim, save for the unavoidable simplification which is 
implied by the reference to categories instead of concrete situations. 
Having clarified this, the Court, as usual, examines the norm by starting from the 
preparatory works. From them, it results that the measure has to be framed in the context of 
the ex officio assessment provided for by Articles 351 till 352-bis CIR, and it has been 
conceived in order to speed up such procedure and to alleviate the burden as to the 
statement of reasons lying upon the tax authority, by allowing a flat-rate estimation of the 
proceeds
410
. Such frame is completed by the legal presumption included in the first 
paragraph of the same Article 342, which is inextricably correlated to para 3 under 
discussion. In the view taken in the parliamentary documentation, indeed, the minimum 
taxable proceeds established in para 3 consist likewise in a legal presumption based on a 
comparison, albeit with an entire industry or group of taxpayers rather than three similar 
taxpayers. Ultimately, in the preparatory works reported in the decision of the 
Constitutional Court, the provision is justified with the aim of combating tax fraud, as 
unlike the first para of Article 342, the subsequent para 3 applies only to taxpayers who 
failed to submit the tax return or did it with delay. 
In the light of the foregoing, the Court excludes the violation of the equality principle. In 
this view, the ex officio assessment applies without any distinctions to each enterprise and 
self-employed person envisaged in Article 182 of the royal decree whenever the tax return 
is not submitted on time. On the other hand, it is argued, the type of income concerned 
                                                          
410
 Id., at No B.6. 
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originates from activities where the quality of the work is the essential element, rather than 
the timing
411
. The factors on which the amount of proceeds depends are so many that 
introducing a distinction based on the effective duration of the activity carried out could 
even create more inequalities. 
With regard to the second question, the answer is included in the initial part of the decision, 
where the Court inserts the minimum taxable proceeds within the ex officio assessment. It 
follows from this that the taxpayer may rebut the legal presumption included in Article 342, 
para 3, by proving the effective amount of income earned, pursuant to Article 352, para 1, 
first indent. Precisely the contrary proof leads the Court to find the measure not only 
appropriate to the aim sought (tackling tax fraud), but also without any disproportionate 
effects
412
. 
 
4.2.3 Some considerations on the nature of the assessment based on comparison with 
similar taxpayers 
If the assessment based on indices recalls the Italian synthetic method, the assessment 
based on comparison with similar taxpayers shows some similarities with the Italian 
statistical studies (‘studi di settore’). 
They all reflect the tendency of the national tax legislator towards assessments based on 
standardized taxable income or items of income. In this way, provisions which should 
concern the ‘formal’ tax law, meaning the powers of inquiry and assessment by tax 
authorities, have an impact on the definition of the tax obligation. From this perspective, 
indeed, the taxable proceeds tend to be identified with the average proceeds of the industry 
in which the taxpayer may be inserted, rather than the actual proceeds accrued upon him. 
This is particularly evident with regard to the method of assessment set forth by Article 
342, para 1, which consists of determining the taxable proceeds through the reference to 
                                                          
411
 Id., at No B.8.2: «A la différence des salariés qui sont le plus souvent rémunérés à l’heure, les  revenus 
générés par les professions telles que celles visées en l’espèce ne se mesurent pas tant à l’heure d’activité 
prestée qu’au regard de la prestation ou de la réalisation d’un contrat  faisant appel à une qualité de 
services reposant sur un savoir dont le facteur temps n’est qu’un  des paramètres pour définir le revenu. La 
diversité des activités considérées dans le chef d’entrepreneurs et de titulaires de professions libérales est 
telle qu’introduire un forfait tenant compte de la durée effective d’activité aurait pu être de nature à générer 
plus d’inégalités  encore. Ainsi, un même revenu imposable pourra être produit en un nombre différent 
d’heures selon la qualité du professionnel, les moyens investis, l’environnement de sa profession libérale et 
les modalités du contrat qui le lie au bénéficiaire de ses services». 
412
 See Id., B.10. It concluded as follows: “(…) Ainsi, la disposition en cause est un moyen pertinent pour 
atteindre l’objectif rappelé en  B.6 de combattre la fraude fiscale. Elle n’a pas non plus d’effets 
disproportionnés dans la  mesure où la présomption légale qui en résulte dans le chef de l’administration 
fiscale peut être renversée par le contribuable défaillant en apportant la preuve du montant exact des 
revenus générés par l’exercice de sa profession.” 
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the normal proceeds accrued by three similar taxpayers. It is an instrument introduced by 
the tax legislator with the aim of facing the lack of information on the side of the tax 
authority, which in this way is relieved from the onus of proving the actual amount of 
taxable proceeds and may instead refer to the normal income attributable to the taxpayer, 
or to a forfait according to the second indent of para 1. 
This is even more evident with regard to the minimum taxable proceeds established in 
Article 182 AR/CIR, in particular in the extent to which it fixes in 19.000,00 euro as the 
minimum taxable threshold, apparently without any concrete evaluation of the activity 
carried out by the taxpayer. One could object that this method is justified by the 
illegitimate position of the taxpayer who did not submit the tax return or did it with delay. 
In fact, due to the lack of information the tax administration would hardly be able to 
determine the taxable items. If such circumstance justifies the reversal of the burden of 
proof, it cannot however legitimate the provision of an amount which seems not to be 
correlated to indices revealing the existence of taxable income. 
In the light of such considerations, the judgment of the Constitutional Court is regrettable 
in the extent to which it gets rid of the question of whether the minimum taxable proceeds 
was consistent with the equality principle where it disregarded the real conditions in which 
the activity was actually carried out. The referring court, similarly to other rulings handed 
down on the same matter, questioned the provision under the light of its reasonableness. In 
other words, the amount of 19.000,00 euro was found to be arbitrary. In the light of this, 
the need for simplification and tax fraud’s encounter appears to be redundant and 
contributes to a reading of the provision as a fine envisaged for taxpayers who do not 
comply with their obligations. 
The impression is that, despite  these considerations, the possibility for the taxpayer to give 
proof to the contrary is what brings the Constitutional Court to ‘save’ the minimum taxable 
proceeds from a decision of inconsistency with the principle of equality. It has to be noted, 
however, that the concrete exercise of the defence right should have been taken into 
consideration. In fact, given that the minimum taxable proceeds implies the lack of a tax 
return (or a tax return submitted with delay), the taxpayer may have difficulties in proving 
his real taxable income, and as a result he might be subject to a fictitious taxation. The 
contrary proof here ends up being confined to exceptional events that justify the accrual of 
proceeds different from the amount fixed by the royal decree giving execution to Article 
342, para 2 CIR. 
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5. Legal presumptions in the field of VAT 
Having set the stage in the previous paragraphs, the focus is now on some legal 
presumptions included in the VAT Code (CTVA), under the headings concerning the 
collection of the tax due and the means of proof in the hands of the tax authorities
413
. To 
our purpose, they are particularly interesting, as VAT is regulated at EU level. The most 
relevant provisions are Articles 64, 65 and 68 CTVA, which are dealt with below. 
It has to be noted that among the presumptions in the field of VAT, Article 51, para 1, 
CTVA is also normally referred to. It contains the list of the persons liable for payment of 
VAT. Besides  those who supply goods or services, it refers to all persons who mention the 
VAT in an invoice or an equivalent document, irrespective of any supply
414
. 
The ratio of the provision consists of avoiding that the person who issues the invoice, 
which gives right to a deduction upon the addressee, does not comply with the obligation 
to pay the VAT
415
. To this end, a formal fulfilment is assumed as an index of chargeability 
of the tax precisely upon the person issuing the invoice. In the light of this, the norm might 
be read as an irrebuttable presumption, a fiction, or more exactly a legal definition or 
assimilation. In fact, it identifies the persons liable for payment of VAT by assimilating 
those who realized the taxable operation and those who did not, as long as the latter have 
issued an invoice
416
. In this way, it encounters the phenomenon of issuing of invoices for 
inexistent transactions, aimed at circumventing the VAT system. This being the ratio, it 
does not apply where, for instance, the invoice reports a mistaken amount of tax, as long as 
the transactions concerned have actually taken place.  
 
5.1 Presumptions of supply of goods and services 
Article 64 CTVA, inserted under the heading “moyens de preuve et mesures de controle” 
contains five presumptions, which are aimed at ‘attracting’ in the scope of VAT 
transactions that have taken place without the obligation of payment being accomplished. 
                                                          
413
 On legal presumptions in this field see H. Vandenbergh, De bewijsplicht van de fiscus inzake BTW en de 
omkering ervan door het instellen van wettelijke vermoedens, T.F.R., 2001, 999 et seq.; D. Stas, De wettelijke 
vermoedens van artikel 64, 65 en 68 W. BTW, T.F. R., 2002, 3. 
414
 It reads as follows: “§ 1er. La taxe est due: 1° par l'assujetti qui effectue une livraison de biens ou une 
prestation de services imposable qui a lieu en Belgique; 2° par la personne qui effectue une acquisition 
intracommunautaire de biens imposable qui a lieu en Belgique; 3° par toute personne qui, dans une facture 
ou un document en tenant lieu, mentionne la taxe sur la valeur ajoutée, encore qu'elle n'ait fourni aucun bien 
ni aucun service. Elle est redevable de la taxe au moment où elle émet la facture ou établit le document». 
415
 Indeed, it has been introduced in accordance with Article 273 of the Directive 2006/112/EC, which allows 
Member States to impose other obligations which they deem necessary to secure the correct collection of 
VAT and the prevention of evasion.  
416
 It is classified as a presumption by T. Afschrift, Traitè de la preuve en droit fiscal, cited above, at p. 491. 
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To this end, the legislator has legally presumed the chargeability of the VAT if certain 
circumstances are met. In this way, once the tax authority has proved the latter, it is up to 
the taxpayer to prove that the tax is not due or it has been paid off
417
.  
As we will see, some of these presumptions are to a certain extent similar to the 
presumption of supply included in the Italian VAT legislation. Likewise, they are intended 
to alleviate the probative position of the tax administration in the administrative procedure 
and tax trial. Besides that, they may have substantive effects, given that the taxpayer 
concerned may be called upon for the payment of VAT for supplies that might not have 
taken place, if for instance he is not able to give proof to the contrary. Or, said otherwise, 
the presumptions at hand are able to affect the definition of the tax obligation, by 
introducing de facto circumstances giving rise to the tax debt. Nonetheless, they are more 
correctly classifiable as procedural presumptions, because they imply the exercise of the 
tax administration’s power of control and investigation in order to apply. 
 
5.1.1 The presumption of taxable supplies 
The reflection developed at the end of the previous paragraph is evident when reading 
Article 64, para 1, according to which all persons who purchase or produce certain goods 
in view of the selling are presumed to have supplied them under the condition for the VAT 
chargeability, save for the counterproof
418
. 
In the academic literature, this norm has not received much attention. Despite  this, it is an 
extraordinary means of proof in the hands of the tax authority in order to detect tax evasion. 
In fact, it entitles the tax administration to presume that the merchandise which has been 
purchased or produced and does not result from the stock-inventory has been sold. In order 
to have recourse to such presumption, the tax administration has to prove that the purchase 
or the production of the goods concerned have taken place
419
, and that from a control it 
                                                          
417
 As explained by J.-E. Krings, Fictions et présomptions en droit fiscal, in Les présomptions et les fictions 
en droit, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1974, at 182, in these cases the presumption «s’appuie sur des éléments de fait 
et facilite la charge de la preuve dans le chef de l’Administration fiscale. Il n’y a pas d’extension de la loi 
fiscale et celle-ci ne recourt à aucune fiction, aucune dénaturation des faits».  
418
 It provides: «Toute personne qui achète ou produit pour vendre est présumée, jusqu'à preuve du contraire, 
avoir livré dans des conditions qui rendent la taxe exigible les biens qu'elle a achetés ou produits». 
419
 In some decisions, the provision is broadly interpreted, by letting the tax authority  make use of the legal 
presumption on the basis of a merely documentary verification. Moreover, it is recognised the possibility for 
the tax administration to prove the purchase by means of presumptions hominis. See Appeal court of 
Bruxelles 8 December 2000, (www.monkey.be), maximized as follows: “La comptabilité et les aveux d'un 
fournisseur permettent à l'administration d'établir qu'un assujetti a réalisé des achats en noir. La Cour 
estime que les éléments de la comptabilité du tiers ne sont certes pas opposables à l'assujetti, mais demeurent 
toutefois fiables et peuvent démontrer le mécanisme d'une fraude pratiquée. L'ensemble des éléments 
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results that the same goods are not reported in the accounting records at the end of the 
taxable period to be verified
420
. 
From the administrative practice and the case-law of the lower courts, a broad 
interpretation of the provision seems to prevail. In fact, it is applied on the basis of 
purchases that are not reported in the accountancy or for which the invoice has not been 
issued, thereby irrespective of a ‘material’ verification as to the presence of the goods in 
the storehouse. The norm is deemed  preventing  the phenomenon of the non-declared 
purchases – resulting, for instance, from the accounting records of the purchaser - and it is 
applied automatically once the known fact is ascertained. 
A more reasonable interpretation of the norm, which however is not supported either by 
the administrative and judicial practice or by the letter of the provision, would request a 
‘material’ verification as to the presence of the goods concerned in the storehouse. 
Similarly to what we have seen when dealing with the presumption of transfer included in 
the Italian tax system, the idea grounding the legal inference would be that, if at the 
beginning of a taxable period a certain quantity of goods were at the disposal of the 
taxpayer and at the end of the same period their absence is ascertained without him being 
able to provide a justification, then it is likely that he sold them without complying with 
the necessary VAT obligations.  
                                                                                                                                                                                
présentés sont cohérents et confirmés par les déclarations du gérant du fournisseur et de ses préposés, de 
même que par la comptabilité de l'assujetti lui-même. Les mentions de la comptabilité du fournisseur sont 
des indices qui sont confirmés par d'autres éléments tels que les carnets de route du propre chauffeur de 
l'assujetti. L'assujetti est dès lors mal venu aussi de soutenir que l'administration ne tient pas compte de la 
nature des marchandises livrées au noir alors que les notes d'envoi après livraison ont été détruites. Elle ne 
peut invoquer sa propre turpitude. Le Code TVA prévoit une présomption légale selon laquelle les achats 
effectués en noir sont réputés vendus. Il appartient à l'assujetti de prouver de manière concrète les pertes 
résultant des casses, erreurs, commandes et autres éléments. A défaut d'apporter le moindre élément de 
preuve à cet égard, elle ne renverse pas la présomption prévue par l'article 64 § 1 
er
 du Code TVA». In this 
case, the turnover for the purpose of VAT of the taxpayer was re-determined on the increase, by presuming 
the selling of the the goods which had been purchased but not recorded in the accountancy. In turn, the 
purchase of those goods by the taxpayer was inferred on the basis of the documentation of the supplier. 
Contra, Court of first Instance of Bruges 17 May 2005, (www.monkey.be), according to which a 
presumption hominis is not certain enough for the purpose of being the basis of the legal presumption set 
forth in Article 64, para 1 CTVA. In this view, which contrasts with the view traditionally taken by the tax 
authorities, a chain of presumptions leads to an arbitrary demonstration. 
420
 T. Afschrift, Traité de la preuve en droit fiscal, cited above, at p. 493 observes that «C’est notamment sur 
la base de cette disposition légale que s’est développé le principe en vert duquel, lorsque l’assujetti prétend 
que les biens dont il ne peut établir l’affectation se trouvent encore en magasin, il doit prouver cette 
allégation par la production de l’inventaire de ses biens en stock au début de la période contrôlée. A défaut 
d’une telle preuve, l’administration, suive par la jurisprudence considère que le stock existant à l’époque du 
contrôle est égal à celui qui existait au début de la période». Moreover, as noted by F. Baltus, Procédure en 
matière de T.V.A., in Manuel de procédure fiscale, Limal, Anthemis, 2011, 696, «la jurisprudence va souvent 
jusqu’à considérer que la présomption permet à l’Administration de taxer l’opération en appliquant une 
marge bénéficiaire qu’elle estime reasonable pour le secteur considéré». Cf. W. Defoor, Note to Trib. 
Louvain 15 December 2006, Cour. Fisc., 2007, 416. 
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Instead, it seems that the tax authority is merely required to prove that the taxpayer has 
purchased or produced certain goods in view of the selling and that the transactions 
concerned do not result from his accountancy. 
It is then up to the taxpayer to prove, possibly, that they are in the storehouse. Indeed, the 
presumption is manifestly rebuttable. As a consequence, the taxpayer is allowed to prove, 
by producing the stock-inventory or any probative documents, that the merchandise was 
actually in the storehouse at the time of the verification made by the tax authority, or that 
the allocation assigned to the goods concerned does not give rise to the chargeability of 
VAT. For example, the taxpayer may allege that the goods concerned were lost, because of 
exceptional events or as they were perishable goods, and so on. It goes without saying that 
the pure allegation of a certain fact is not enough to escape the application of the 
presumption, being necessary to support it with probative elements (for example, reliable 
accounting records), which can be produced with any means of proof. More generally, he 
escapes the application of the presumption by giving evidence that the merchandise was 
not sold. 
Paragraph 2 of Article 64, CTVA, provides the same presumption with regard to the supply 
of services. It stipulates, indeed, that each person who supplies a service is presumed to 
have done that under the conditions for VAT’s chargeability, save for the contrary proof. 
In the same article the legislator has dealt with the case where one of the hypotheses 
envisaged in para 1 or 2 occurs and various operations have been carried out to which 
different rates apply. If so, para 3 entitles the tax authority to presume that such operations 
are subject to the highest rate applicable, save for the counterproof.  
Para 4 of Article 64 presumes the existence of supply of services concerning immovables 
behind the selling of a new building, thereby entitling the tax authority to ask for the 
payment of the VAT calculated on the basis of the normal value of those services
421
. As 
with the previous presumptions, this is rebuttable as well
422
. The owner of the new building 
                                                          
421
 Pursuant to Article 36, para 1, let. b) CTVA. 
422
 In this regard, para 4, Article 64 places on the owner the onus of keeping the invoices concerning the 
supplies for the construction of the building. It states: “Tout bâtiment nouvellement construit est présumé 
jusqu'à preuve du contraire, avoir été livré par un assujetti en exécution d'une ou plusieurs prestations de 
services ayant pour objet des travaux immobiliers. Le propriétaire d'un bâtiment auquel cette disposition 
s'applique est tenu de conserver, pendant un délai de cinq ans à compter de la date de la signification du 
revenu cadastral, les factures relatives à la construction, ainsi que les plans et les cahiers des charges de 
l'immeuble. Il doit les communiquer à toute réquisition des agents chargés du contrôle de la taxe sur la 
valeur ajoutée. A défaut de communication, la taxe est, jusqu'à preuve du contraire, réputée ne pas avoir été 
acquittée du chef des services pour lesquels des factures n'ont pas été produites. Dans les trois mois de la 
date de la signification du revenu cadastral, le propriétaire est tenu, en outre, de remettre au fonctionnaire 
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can prove that the presumed supply of services did not take place, that the transactions 
carried on are not subject to VAT, or that he realized the services himself
423
.   
Ultimately, a further paragraph (para 5) has been introduced by Article 39 of the Law 17 
December 2012 and has been in force since the 1
st
 of January 2013. It states that the supply 
of a certain good is presumed to have occurred at the time when it is not in the store, in the 
atelier, in the warehouse or in any other place in the availability of the supplier in Belgium, 
any longer, save for the counterproof
424
. 
The insertion of such norm in Article 64 confirms that para 1 does not imply a ‘material’ 
control for the purpose of verifying if the merchandise purchased is in the storehouse or it 
is not there anymore. Instead, this seems to be the sense of para 5. The latter appears to 
entitle the tax authority to presume that the goods which are not in the places where the 
business activity is carried on, have been sold under the conditions which render the VAT 
chargeable, and at the time when they have left such places. This interpretation is 
supported, on the one hand, from the circumstance that the norm is placed among those 
ones dealing with the means of proof in the hands of the tax administration, and on the 
other hand from the fact that the moment in which a certain transaction is considered to 
have taken place, is regulated in other articles of the same VAT Code. 
 
5.1.2 The presumption of purchase 
Whereas Article 64 CTVA sets forth a series of presumptions concerning the supplies of 
goods or services, Article 65 CTVA deals with the purchase and is based on the 
symmetrical inference that goods which are at the availability of the taxpayer are presumed 
to have been purchased. 
In brief, it states that the goods which are delivered (‘envoyés à vue eou deposés en 
consignation’) are presumed to have been purchased by the addressee or consignee where 
                                                                                                                                                                                
désigné par le Ministre des Finances, une déclaration comportant un relevé détaillé des factures relatives à 
la construction sur lesquelles la taxe sur la valeur ajoutée a été portée en compte.» 
423
 In this sense T. Afschrift, Traitè de la preuve en droit fiscal, cited above, at p. 495. Cf. Circular letter 
16/1973, No 17. 
424
 It states as follows: “Sauf preuve contraire, la livraison d'un bien est présumée être effectuée au moment 
où le bien cesse d'exister dans le magasin, l'atelier, le dépôt ou toute autre installation dont dispose le 
fournisseur en Belgique». The Law 17 December 2012 has modified several articles of the Belgian VAT 
legislation in order to implement the Directive 2010/45/UE, which has amended the Directive 2006/112/EC 
as regards the formalities related to the invoices. 
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he is not able to demonstrate the availability of those goods or their delivery back to the 
sender
425
. 
It seems that in the latter situation, the tax authority is entitled to presume that a purchase 
has taken place where a taxpayer who has received certain goods is not able to justify 
according to which title they are in his availability. 
It must be observed that this provision – and the same holds true as regards Article 64 – is 
formulated in an extremely general and ambiguous way, so that it is difficult to interpret 
univocally the content of the norm. Given the role played in the context of the 
ascertainment made by tax authorities as regards circumstances having a relevance for the 
purpose of determining the turnover of the taxpayers involved, a more detailed description 
of the fact grounding the legal presumption, and above all on the content of the contrary 
proof are to be hoped for. This is especially so in view of the principle of legal certainty. 
Besides that, the presumptions mentioned in the Articles 64 and 65 CTVA need to be 
tested in respect of the EU Law, in order to verify if they reflect the balance between the 
need to prevent VAT’s evasion and fraud and the protection of the taxpayer’s right as laid 
down in the VAT Directive. 
 
5.1.3 The presumption of importation 
For the sake of completeness, the provision of Article 68 CTVA has to be recalled, though 
the little administrative practice and the case-law in the matter suggests that it has a scanty 
practical relevance. 
Similarly to what is provided as regards the supply and purchase of goods in Articles 64 
and 65, a given circumstance, in this case the presence of the goods in the customs radius, 
is assumed as grounding the presumption that they have been imported into Belgium, save 
for the contrary proof and in any case with the exception of the goods for private use
426
. 
                                                          
425
 It reads as follows: «Les biens envoyés à vue ou déposés en consignation sont présumés avoir été achetés 
par le destinataire ou le dépositaire si celui-ci ne peut justifier de la détention de ces biens ou de leur renvoi 
à l'expéditeur ou au déposant.» 
426
 Para 1, Article 68, CTVA stipulates that «Tous biens se trouvant dans le rayon des douanes, tel qu'il est 
délimité par la réglementation douanière en la matière, sont présumés, jusqu'à preuve du contraire, avoir été 
importés en Belgique. Cette disposition n'est pas applicable aux biens qui, en raison de leur nature ou de 
leur quantité, ne doivent pas être considérés comme étant destinés à des fins professionnelles» and at para 2 
it provides the same for the means of transport: «Tous moyens de transport à moteur, par terre ou par eau, à 
l'exception des bâtiments de mer ou de navigation intérieure visés aux articles 1er et 271 du Livre II du Code 
de commerce, ainsi que les remorques routières, sont réputés, lorsqu'ils se trouvent dans le pays, avoir été 
importés s'il n'est pas établi que ces véhicules sont en situation régulière au point de vue des droits d'entrée 
et des mesures de prohibition, de restriction ou de contrôle applicables à l'importation».  
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The owner of the goods may, for instance, prove that the origin of the goods concerned is 
in Belgium or that they have been imported at an earlier time. If the counterproof is not 
given, then the tax authority is entitled to apply the VAT applicable for importations
427
. 
 
6. Anti-abuse rules in the field of VAT 
General measures combating abusive practices in the fields covered by EU law must be in 
line with the latter as interpreted by the EUCJ. 
In this regard, it is significant that the general anti-abuse measure introduced by Article 
128 of the Law 27 December 2005 in Article 59 CTVA, at para 3, was repealed precisely 
because it was not in line with the EUCJ case-law. Similarly to Articles 344 CIR, and 
Article 18 of the Code on registration duty, it entitled the tax administration to disregard 
the qualification given by the parties to the act(s) if the tax authority ascertained that such 
juridical qualification was justified solely in view of avoiding taxation. This, unless the 
taxpayer was able to prove that the qualification chosen responded to legitimate business 
reasons
428
. 
Such provision has been almost immediately abrogated
429
, as it was not in line with the 
principles on abuse of law resulting from the EUCJ judgment handed down in the case of 
Halifax
430
. 
Accordingly, a general definition of tax abuse has been inserted in Article 1, para 10, 
CTVA
431
, which is in line with the conditions requested by the EUCJ in order to detect 
                                                          
427
 As clarified in para 3: «Lorsque la preuve contraire réservée par les §§ 1er et 2 n'est pas faite, la taxe est 
exigible selon les règles relatives aux importations. Elle est due, ainsi que l'amende prévue par l'article 70, § 
1er, solidairement par l'importateur, le propriétaire, le détenteur et, en outre, s'il s'agit d'un véhicule, par le 
conducteur du véhicule. » 
428
 It stated that “N'est pas opposable à l'administration, la qualification juridique donnée par les parties à 
un acte ainsi qu'à des actes distincts réalisant une même opération lorsque l'administration constate, par 
présomptions ou par d'autres moyens de preuve visés au § 1er, que cette qualification a pour but d'éviter la 
taxe, à moins que l'assujetti ne prouve que cette qualification répond à des besoins légitimes de caractère 
financier ou économique». See I. Massin, Introduction of a General Anti-VAT Avoidance Measure in 
Belgium, International Vat Monitor, 2006, 37 et seq., who foresaw the need to adapt the (at that time) 
recently introduced measure to the EUCJ decidion in Halifax; I. Massin, Introduction of Halifax in the 
Belgian VAT Legislation, International VAT Monitor, 2006, 336. 
429
 By Article 20, Law 20 July 2006. 
430
 ECJ 21 February 2006, C-255/02, Halifax, where the Court held that "in the sphere of VAT, an abusive 
practice can be found to exist only if, first, the transactions concerned, notwithstanding formal application of 
the conditions laid down by the relevant provisions of the Sixth Directive and the national legislation 
transposing it, result in the accrual of a tax advantage the grant of which would be contrary to the purpose of 
those provisions.  Second, it must also be apparent from a number of objective factors that the essential aim 
of the transactions concerned is to obtain a tax advantage. As the Advocate General observed in point 89 of 
his Opinion, the prohibition of abuse is not relevant where the economic activity carried out may have some 
explanation other than the mere attainment of tax advantages”. Cf. also ECJ 20 February 2008, C-425/06, 
Part Service. 
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abusive practices. It refers to those transactions which entitle the taxpayer to obtain an 
advantage in contrast with the objective pursued by the Code or measures of enforcement 
of the Code and whose principal aim is the attainment of such advantage. 
Besides that, several provisions included in the VAT Code are inspired by the need to 
encounter tax avoidance, but currently there is not a general anti-abuse clause. One could 
say, though, that on the basis of this definition and the principles stemming from the EUCJ 
rulings, tax authorities may deny a certain tax advantage, irrespective of a specific national 
provision establishing this
432
.  
It has to be noted, that the legislator does provide explicitly the consequences of abusive 
practices when they concern the VAT input deduction. Indeed, Article 79, CTVA, which 
deals with adjustments of deduction, provides at para 2
433
, 2
nd
 indent, that the person who 
has exercised the right of deduction with reference to the goods or services supplied or 
imported has to pay it back to the State, if at the time when the transaction has taken place 
he knew or he should have known that the tax due within the chain of transactions would 
have not been paid to the State with the intention to avoid taxation. The question arises as 
to whether the burden of proving the subjective state (knowledge of the abusive scheme) 
lies on the tax authority or if it is presumed, and in the latter hypothesis if this is in line 
with the EU law. As we will see later on, the more recent EUCJ judgments on the matter 
tend to recognize as legitimate the reversal of the burden of proof on the taxpayer in 
similar cases, while the absolute prohibition of the right of deduction based on the 
presumption of a participation of the purchaser in the abusive scheme is in principle 
against the VAT Directive.  
                                                                                                                                                                                
431
 Article 1, CTVA, is dedicated to the definition of several notions for VAT purposes. Pursuant to para 10 
«Pour l'application du présent Code, il y a pratique abusive lorsque les opérations effectuées ont pour 
résultat l'obtention d'un avantage fiscal dont l'octroi est contraire à l'objectif poursuivi par le présent Code 
et les arrêtés pris pour son exécution et que leur but essentiel est l'obtention de cet avantage». For a 
comment by the tax authorities, Circular letter 24 August 2006, No AAF/2006, No 14/2006. For an in-depth 
analysis of the provision, see also T. Afschrift, Les dispositions fiscales de lois du 20 juillet 2006 (deuxième 
partie). Les mesures destinées à combattre les «pratiques abusives » en matière de T.V.A., J.T., 2006, 756 et 
seq.; F. Baltus, Les “pratiques abusives en matière de TVA”, J.D.F., 2006, 57. 
432
 See in this regard Circular letter 24 August 2006, No 14, where it is asserted «les pratiques abusives 
condamnées qui tendent à l’obtention d’un avantage fiscal ne se limitent pas à celles qui ont pour but une 
déduction. Il peut s’agir également de la réduction d’une obligation». As explained in the text, indeed, 
nowadays the VAT Code includes an explicit anti-abuse provision only as regards deduction of input VAT. 
433
 Introduced by Article 51, Law 27 December 2006. It explicitly refers to abusive practices and provides 
that “En cas de pratique abusive, la personne qui a opéré la déduction de la taxe sur les opérations en cause, 
doit reverser à l'Etat les sommes ainsi déduites à titre de T.V.A.. La personne qui a opéré la déduction de la 
taxe ayant grevé les biens et les services qui lui sont fournis, les biens qu'elle a importés et les acquisitions 
intracommunautaires qu'elle a effectuées, doit reverser à l'Etat les sommes ainsi déduites si au moment où 
elle a effectué cette opération, elle savait ou devait savoir que la taxe due, dans la chaîne des opérations, 
n'est pas versée ou ne sera pas versée à l'Etat dans l'intention d'éluder la taxe.» 
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7. Anti-abuse rules in the field of income taxation  
In the Belgian tax system a number of general anti-abuse measures have been introduced 
over the last few years in various areas of tax law (income tax, registration duty
434
, 
inheritance tax
435
) and have been recently amended by the Programme Law 29 March 2012 
on the basis of the same pattern. Placed among the provisions on the means of proof, they 
entitle the tax administration, in the context of the administrative proceedings, to disregard 
the single or connected acts carried out without sound business reasons, when they are 
intended to circumvent one or more provisions of the tax legislation concerned in order to 
obtain undue tax savings or advantages.  
In addition, a semi-general anti-abuse rule is included in Article 344, para 2, CIR, targeted 
at cross-border situations. 
 
7.1 The general anti-abuse rule in Article 344, para 1, CIR 
The scope of the general anti-abuse clauses is very much debated and the prevailing 
opinion within the doctrine is in the sense of their double nature. Particularly with 
reference to Article 344, para 1, CIR, it has been asserted that, on the one side, it has a 
probative character, as it defines the circumstances which the tax administration has to 
prove in order for the abuse to be presumed and also the circumstances which the taxpayer 
may rely on in order to prove that the abuse did not occur in the concrete case. On the other 
side, it is argued, Article 344, para 1, has a material character as well, in the extent to 
which it allows the tax administration to disregard the juridical acts (actually) realized by 
the taxpayer and to re-determine the levy on the basis of fictitious elements (‘élément 
fictifs’)436. 
                                                          
434
 Article 18, para 2, of the Registration Duty Code. 
435
 Article 106, para 2, of the Inheritance Tax Code, which refers to Article 18, para 2 of the Registration 
Duty Code . 
436
 Critical to the attribution of a purely probative nature to Article 344, para 1, M. Bourgeois and A. Nollet, 
L’introduction d’une notion générale d’ “abus (de droit) fiscal” en matière d’impôt sur les revenus, de droits 
d’enregistrement et de droits de succession, R.G.F., 2012, 14. They – rightfully – underline how this view is 
influenced by the issue of compatibility with the principle of legality and the criteria for the division of the 
competences among the various levels of political subdivisions in the field of registration duty and 
inheritance tax. “Concernant la caractérisation de l’abus, la mesure comporte incontestablement une 
dimension probatoire, en venant définir, d’une part, les critères dont la rencontre doit être prouvée par le 
fisc pour présumer l’existence de l’abus, et d’autre part, les justifications qui’il possible au contribuable de 
rapporter pour établir l’absence d’abus en l’espèce. Mais dès lors qu’un abus a été caractérisé dans le chef 
d’un contribuable, les actes juridiques qu’il a accomplis et qui matérialisent cet abus sont rendus 
inopposables au fisc, et ce, nonobstant la réalité juridique de la conclusion de ces actes. À ce stade de son 
application, la mesure emporte alors un volet matériel, en permettant au fisc d’écarterdes actes qui ont été 
réelement conclus pour rétablir l’imposition du contribuable sur la base de’élément fictifs. Certes, 
l’administration ne viendrait pas modifier la définition des élément essentiels de l’impôt par voie de mesures 
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Such interpretation reflects the main components forming the definition of tax abuse in 
Article 344, para 1. In fact, the first indent prescribes that the tax administration can 
disregard the single juridical act or the acts that are part of a single operation, where the tax 
office proves that they embody tax abuse. Whether there is tax abuse depends on the 
verification of one of the circumstances listed in the second indent of the same article. It 
requests alternatively that the operation realized by the taxpayer: a) is contrary to the 
objectives of a provision included in the CIR or its enforcement measures and places him 
outside the scope of such provision; b) entitles him to obtain a tax advantage provided in a 
provision of the CIR or its enforcement measures, contrary to the objectives of such 
provision and in the extent to which the grant of that advantage is the essential aim pursued 
by the operation. 
In this way, tax abuse covers either those schemes planned by the taxpayer in order to 
avoid the application of a certain provision setting out a heavier tax treatment, or those 
operations plotted for the purpose of having granted a certain tax benefit for which 
otherwise he would not be entitled. Turning on the side of the taxpayer, the third indent of 
paragraph 1, Article 344, lets him prove that the choice of the single or more juridical acts 
                                                                                                                                                                                
générale et abstraites; il n’empêche qu’elle viendrait bien toucher à la consistance concréte de ces éléments 
dans le cas individuel du contribuable concerné”. Accordingly, they attribute a hybrid nature to Article 344, 
para 1, as it “présente en effet un volet probatoire majeur (présomption réfragrable d’abus) doublé d’un volet 
matériel évident (fiction d’inopposabilité impactant sur l’établissement concret et individuel de la 
cotisation)”. Even more drastic is the position recently expressed by T. Afschrift, L’abus fiscal, 1 éd., Larcier, 
at 199, who believes that the probative scope of Article 344, para 1, is ‘accessoire’ in respect to the 
substantive scope. He says: “De tel textes [Article 344, para 1, Article 18, para 2] ne peuvent être considérés, 
malgré l’intitulé de la section, du chapitre ou du titre au sein desquels ils ont été insérés, comme des mesures 
relatives à la preuve, Il s’agit de dispositions touchant au fond du droit, ayant pour objet et pour effet de 
modifier la base imposable, le taux de l’impôt ou le exonérations, et comportant accessoirement une règle de 
preuve destinée uniquement à assurer leur propre application.” To support this theory, he refers particularly 
to the aim sought by the provision, which is not to alleviate the probative burden of the tax authorities, but 
rather to levy certain acts or income that would not be taxed otherwise. The same held true as regards the 
previous wording of the same provision, pursuant to which the tax administration could disregard the 
qualification given to the act(s) by the parties. In both of the cases, he argues, the tax authorities are entitled 
to extend the taxable base. The provision, therefore, lays down a way of determination for the taxable base. It 
does not contrast with the legality principle provided that the objective of the law which Article 344, para 1, 
refers to can be certainly determined through official documentation and the taxable income is re-determined 
by identifying the rule applicable to the concrete facts. In his view, the provision is in line with the legality 
principle if “il s’agit de “changer le droit”, c’est-à-dire d’appliquer la règle légale, en cas d’abus fiscal, à 
des hypothèses entrant dans le champ d’application voulu de la norme en question, comme ci celle-ci avait 
effectivement un champ d’application conforme aux objectifs du législateur”. By contrast, “s’il fallait devoir 
interpréter l’article 344,  1er, alinéa 4, du Code comme permettant de “changer les faits”, c’est-à-dire 
d’appliquer la loi non pas aux actes qui ont été effectivement accomplis, mais à d’autres, à choisir par le 
taxateur, de telle manière qu’il permette une taxation “conforme aux objectifs du législateur”, nous pensons 
que cela conduirat nécessairement à une indétermination du résultat. En effet, dans la quasi-totalité des cas, 
il existe plusieurs possibilités d’actes, conformes aux objectifs du législateur, qui pourraient se substituer à 
l’acte réellement accompli par les parties.” Under this second intepretation, which entitles the tax authority 
to replace the act chosen by the parties with another (more ‘normal’) one, the provision would not be in line 
with the principle of legality, because of the lack of any objective criteria in the law. 
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embodying an operation, which is abusive in the view taken by the tax authority, is 
justified in the light of reasons different from the essential aim of avoiding the payment of 
the income tax. If he does not produce such evidence, the tax authority is entitled (last 
indent) to re-determine the tax debt (‘base imposable’, ‘calcul de l’impôt’) as if the abuse 
did not take place, so as to apply a levy in line with the purpose of the relevant 
(circumvented) provision. 
In fact, the provision governs the consequences of the ascertainment by the tax 
administration of an abusive conduct, which is defined by the law. In other words, the 
provision does concern the powers of investigation of the tax authorities, and in this sense 
it has a procedural (or probative) nature. It may have fictitious effects, though, in the extent 
to which the tax administration has the power to disregard the acts originally chosen by the 
parties involved and reckon the taxation on this new basis.  
In this regard, in a very recent decision
437
 the Constitutional Court has found Article 344, 
para 1 (new formula), to be in line  with the principle of legality, and it has given further 
elements for interpreting such rule
438
. In particular, alike what had asserted as regards the 
old formula, the Court has excluded that such rule affects the tax obligation, being rather a 
means of proof in the hands of the tax administration
439
. In this view, it does not leave to 
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 Const. Court 30 October 2013, No 141. In the decision, the Court has also examined the compatibility of 
Article 344, para 1, with the principle of equality and rejected the question. 
438
 In particular, some uncertainties could raise as regards the asymmetry between the way in which the 
contrary proof is provided in the third indent and the hypotheses of abuse laid down in the second indent. The 
former states that “Il appartient au contribuable de prouver que le choix de cet acte juridique ou de cet 
ensemble d’actes juridiques se justifie par d’autres motifs que la volonté d’éviter les impôt sur le revenus». 
At first sight, it regards exclusively the subjective element of the abusive conduct, which in turn the tax 
authority is (literally) requested to prove only in the second hypothesis of abuse set out in the second indent. 
In fact, whereas the first hypothesis refers to an operation which places the taxpayer outside the scope of a 
CIR provision in contrast with the objective of the provision itself, the second covers an operation carried out 
with the essential purpose of obtaining a certain tax advantage and that entitles him to get such benefit 
pursuant to (albeit in contrast with the objective of) a CIR disposition. In brief, both the hypotheses of abuse 
contemplate the circumvention of a certain provision of the CIR (providing for a certain tax treatment or tax 
benefit), but only in the second one is the tax authority requested to prove the subjective element alongside 
the objective component. Consequently, one could infer that the evidence of the recurring of non-fiscal 
justifications may be given only when the abuse consists of availing of a certain tax benefit contrary to the 
objective pursued by the provision granting it. Even though in the literature there has been the attempt to 
refer the subjective component also to the first hypothesis listed in the second indent, para 1, Article 344, the 
actual wording of the provision does not fit such systematic interpretation 
439
 The Court refers to the Parliamentary works and states that “B.15.1. Les travaux préparatoires font 
apparaître que la nouvelle disposition anti-abus, comme l’ancienne, est un moyen de preuve de 
l’administration et qu’il s’agit d’un «système de preuve et de preuve contraire » (Doc. parl., Chambre, 2011-
2012, DOC 53-2081/001, pp. 111-112). Dans une première phase, l’administration doit démontrer qu’il y a 
un abus fiscal (élément objectif). Cette preuve doit être apportée à l’aide de présomptions ou des autres 
moyens de preuve visés à l’article 340 du CIR 1992. Il s’agit des moyens de preuve du droit commun, à 
l’exception du serment (ibid., pp. 113-114). Ensuite, le contribuable peut prouver que d’autres motifs que 
l’évasion fiscale justifiaient ses actes juridiques (élément subjectif). S’il n’y parvient pas, le fisc peut imposer 
comme si l’abus n’avait pas été commis (Doc. parl., Chambre, 2011-2012, DOC 53-2081/016, p. 10). 
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the discretion of the administrative power
440
 the determination of the tax event or taxable 
amount, but it is rather a procedural provision that alters (but do not reverse) the division 
of the burden of proof  between tax administration and taxpayer. The former is requested to 
demonstrate the constituting elements of an abusive conduct, which is defined by the same 
provision in accordance with the rules set at EU law. In particular, it has to prove that the 
act or operation chosen by the taxpayer contradicts the objectives of a certain (income tax) 
provision with the aim of avoiding taxation. At this stage, the tax administration is not 
requested to prove also the possible other reasons justifying the act or operation. It is up to 
the taxpayer, indeed, to give evidence of such economic and financial (i.e. non-merely 
related to taxation) reasons. 
Therefore, under Article 344, para 1, the tax authorities are not relieved from the burden of 
proving the abuse. At most, a presumptive rationale may be assigned to the provision at 
hand, as it assumes the behaviour of the taxpayer to be abusive (guided by the intention of 
avoiding taxation) where some circumstances are met, i.e. the circumvention of an income 
taxation provision with the essential aim of obtaining a tax advantage. As such, it does not 
appear to embody a legal presumption. It is rather a rule of assessment having a 
presumptive ratio and apparently formulated as a rebuttable presumption, with the attempt 
to meet the constitutional as well as the EU standards. 
 
7.2 The (semi)-general anti-abuse rule in the field of income taxation for cross-border 
transactions 
Article 344, para 2, CIR, provides that the (income) tax administration may disregard the 
transfer of a number of listed assets to a non-resident taxpayer
441
 who is not subject to 
                                                                                                                                                                                
(...)B.15.3. La circonstance que par suite de l’application de la disposition anti-abus, une opération 
déterminée peut être soumise à l’impôt ne conduit pas à la conclusion que la mesure attaquée aurait réglé le 
taux d’imposition, la base imposable (« base d’imposition ») et les exonérations de certains impôts 
régionaux. En effet, comme l’ont souligné à plusieurs reprises les travaux préparatoires mentionnés en 
B.15.1, la disposition anti-abus est une règle de procédure relative à l’administration de la preuve qui 
permet l’établissement factuel de la base.” To support such classification the Court refers also to the fact that 
Article 344, para 1, is placed under the heading ‘Moyens de prevue de l’administration’ in the CIR. 
440
 At point B.21.1 it states that “la mesure attaquée n’est pas une habilitation générale autorisant 
l’administration à fixer elle-même, par voie de mesure générale, la matière imposable, mais constitue un 
moyen de preuve destiné à apprécier, dans des cas concrets, sous le contrôle du juge, des situations 
particulières, de manière individuelle.” 
441
 More precisely, the provision refers to ‘a taxpayer mentioned in Article 227’ CIR, which identifies as 
follows the persons subject to non-resident income taxation: “1° les non-habitants du Royaume, y compris les 
personnes visées à l'article 4; 2° les sociétés étrangères ainsi que les associations, établissements ou 
organismes quelconques sans personnalité juridique qui sont constitués sous une forme juridique analogue à 
celle d'une société de droit belge et qui n'ont pas en Belgique leur siège social, leur principal établissement 
ou leur siège de direction ou d'administration; 3° les Etats étrangers, leurs subdivisions politiques et 
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income taxation or is subject to a remarkably more favourable taxation for the income 
generated by those assets in respect of the treatment provided by the Belgian legislation. 
As a result, the income generated by these assets are attributed to the transferring taxpayer, 
unless he proves alternatively that a) the operation is justified by legitimate financial and 
economic needs or b) he has received a consideration for the transfer which generates 
income that is subject to a normal tax burden in respect to that which would have been 
applied in the lack of the operation
442
. 
Similarly to paragraph 1 of the same Article 344, the above provision entitles the tax 
administration to disregard the conveyance between the parties for income tax purposes 
only
443
, thereby applying the taxation as if did not take place. Unlike the general anti-abuse 
provision, however, it has a specific scope, in the sense that it covers only certain listed 
operations and it is targeted at countering the shifting of income towards tax havens. In 
other words, whereas the former aims at tackling all the possible ways in which abusive 
practices are carried out, the latter rather concerns only the transfer of certain assets 
producing income to a non-resident benefiting from a more favourable foreign tax regime. 
Besides the scope, they differ also under the perspective of the division of the burden of 
proof between tax authorities and taxpayer. As a matter of fact, under para 1, the tax 
authority is required to give full evidence of the abusive conduct, as defined in the same 
paragraph. It has to prove that the legal act grants to the party an undue (meaning contrary 
to the objective of the income tax legislation) tax advantage or lower taxation and the act is 
essentially justified by the aim of obtaining a tax advantage. Instead, when having recourse 
to paragraph 2, the tax authority is relieved from proving that the relevant transaction has 
been carried out for the purpose of avoiding the ‘normal’ taxation, as such the burden is 
shifted onto the taxpayer. In fact, once the tax administration has proven the circumstances 
                                                                                                                                                                                
collectivités locales ainsi que toutes les personnes morales qui n'ont pas en Belgique leur siège social, leur 
principal établissement ou leur siège de direction ou d'administration et qui ne se livrent pas à une 
exploitation ou à des opérations à caractère lucratif ou se livrent, sans but lucratif, exclusivement à des 
opérations visées à l'article 182.» 
442
 It stipulates that: «N'est pas non plus opposable à l'Administration des contributions directes, la vente, le 
cession ou l'apport d'actions, d'obligations, de créances ou d'autres titres constitutifs d'emprunts, de brevets 
d'invention, de procédés de fabrication, de marques de fabrique ou de commerce, ou de tous autres droits 
analogues ou de sommes d'argent, à un contribuable visé à l'article 227, qui, en vertu des dispositions de la 
législation du pays où il est établi n'y est pas soumis à un impôt sur les revenus ou y est soumis, du chef des 
revenus produits par les biens et droits aliénés, à un régime de taxation notablement plus avantageux que 
celui auquel les revenus de l'espèce sont soumis en Belgique, à moins que le contribuable ne prouve soit que 
l'opération répond à des besoins légitimes de caractère financier ou économique, soit qu'il à reçu pour 
l'opération une contrevaleur réelle produisant un montant de revenus soumis effectivement en Belgique à une 
charge fiscale normale par rapport à celle qui aurait subsisté si cette opération n'avait pas eu lieu.» 
443
 In the sense that the operation will normally have effects from the civil law point of view. 
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provided for by the law (assets transfer to non-resident established in a low tax 
jurisdiction), it lies on the taxpayer the evidence to the contrary. The resident taxpayer 
bears the burden of proving that there are concrete economic reasons behind the operation 
or that from the latter it does not follow the effect of transferring the income to a lower tax 
jurisdiction and eroding the taxable income subject to the Belgian legal order. 
Precisely the reversal of the burden of proof and the content of the contrary proof indicate 
that Article 344, para 2, introduces a rebuttable (mixed) presumption of law, and in 
particular a presumption of cross-border tax avoidance. The carrying on of certain transfers 
of assets, which in the evaluation of the legislator show a higher risk of abusive 
manoeuvres, with persons resident in low tax jurisdictions, is assumed as the known fact 
from which the intention of avoiding tax by transferring assets abroad is inferred, save for 
the counterproof. 
The ‘secondary’ effect of this presumption is that in respect to the tax authorities the 
transfer is deemed as if it never took place. In this way, the assets, though transferred under 
private law, are still part of the transferor’s patrimony for income tax purposes, so that the 
income generated by those assets is taxed under the Belgian legal order. Such ‘secondary’ 
effect ensuing from the application of Article 344, para 2, has led tax authorities to classify 
the norm as a presumption of sham
444. As it has been correctly observed, however, “It 
follows from the evidence which the taxpayer is required to administer to ward off the 
application of Art. 344(2) BITC that Art. 344(2) BITC does not introduce a presumption of 
                                                          
444
 See Com. CIR 344/3: “Pour combattre la fraude décrite ci-dessus, l'art. 344, CIR 92, présume que les 
actes ayant pour objet le transfert de droits ou de biens à des sociétés holdings, à des personnes ou à des 
entreprises établies dans des pays dénommés "pays-refuges" et y soumises à un régime fiscal exorbitant du 
droit commun, sont des actes simulés, accomplis dans une intention de fraude et d'évasion fiscales. Il dispose, 
en effet, que ces actes sont réputés non opposables à l'administration, c.-à-d. que le contribuable ne peut en 
tirer argument pour justifier qu'il n'est plus propriétaire des actions, obligations, créances, brevets 
d'invention, etc., et qu'il doit être imposé sur les revenus de ces valeurs comme si le transfert n'avait pas eu 
lieu»; Com. CIR 344/4 :  «Le texte de l'art. 344, CIR 92, vise, d'une manière générale, les différentes 
opérations par lesquelles un contribuable peut transférer à une société holding établie à l'étranger ou à une 
personne ou à une entreprise établie dans un "pays-refuge", la propriété de droits ou de biens normalement 
productifs de revenus passibles de l'IPP, de l'ISoc. ou de l'INR, tels que actions ou parts, obligations, fonds 
publics, créances et prêts à charge de sociétés ou de personnes physiques, dépôts d'argent, rentes et valeurs 
mobilières étrangères, créances sur l'étranger, brevets d'invention, procédés de fabrication, marques de 
fabrique ou de commerce et tous autres droits analogues». Cf. also Com. CIR 344/5, where it is clarified that 
the sham may be claimed only as regards the person who carried out the transaction, and not also to the 
assignee. Indeed, «En effet, l'art. 344, CIR 92, a pour objet de maintenir fictivement dans le patrimoine du 
contribuable, qui a effectué une opération visée par cette disposition, les éléments d'actif qu'il en a ainsi fait 
sortir, mais non d'introduire fictivement, même au décès de ce contribuable, dans le patrimoine de tiers, des 
éléments d'actif qui ne s'y trouvent point, eussent-ils même pu y entrer si l'opération n'avait pas été réalisée 
(Cass., 18.12.1962, Dauge Pierre et Dauge Elisabeth, Bull. 397, p. 1109)». 
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sham, but a (rebuttable) presumption of (international) tax avoidance”445. In fact, if the 
provision presumed the sham, the taxpayer would be called upon to prove that the transfer 
of assets actually took place and that he accepted all of the legal consequences. On the 
other hand, the presumption under discussion is not targeted at abusive schemes wherein 
the legal act(s) which appear to have been conveyed were not actually carried out. By 
contrast, the phenomenon that the provision aims at tackling is the transfer of taxable base 
towards low tax jurisdictions, which may happen through acts which actually transfer the 
ownership (or other) rights.  
From the foregoing it results that the construing of the provision as including a rebuttable 
presumption of law appears to be the more suitable. One could object that the subjective 
element is not presumed, but rather inherent to the situation envisaged in the norm, in the 
sense that the circumstances provided by the provision are deemed as implying ex se the 
avoidance intent, which thus is not presumed. Such theory, which ends up to label para 2 
of Article 344 as a typification or at most a fiction, is not supported by the scheme drafted 
in the provision. In particular, it is significant that the contrary proof is admitted and even 
that it does not concern the known fact (i.e. the condition for Article 344, para 2, to apply), 
but rather the unknown (presumed) fact. The counterproof, which is provided for by the 
same provision, aims at proving the inexistence of the intention to fraud or reduce the tax 
base, either because the transaction carried out is justified by economic (other than tax) 
reasons or because there was not in fact a reduction of the taxation as the tax burden on the 
consideration received is ‘normal’; a circumstance which per se excludes the recurring of a 
tax avoidance scheme. 
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 L. De Broe, International tax planning and prevention of abuse. A study under domestic tax law, tax 
treaties and EC law in relation to conduit and base companies, IBDF Docotoral Series, Vol. 14, 2008, at p. 
128. Otherwise, the contrary proof envisaged in the norm would be hard to give. Notably, the Author, while 
examining the possible interference of Article 344, para 2 with Article 26 CIR, observes that the former is 
listed amongst the provisions dealing with the methods of proof available to the tax administration, so that it 
embodies a specific method of proof. Accordingly, Supreme Court 18 December 1962, Pas., 1963, I, 489. Cf. 
A. Nollet, L’article 344, §2, du C.I.R. 1992: essai de contrôle de “constitutionnalité” et de 
“conventionnalité” d’une disposition légale belge “anti-abus”, R.G.C.F., 2011, 488 et seq. The Author 
observers how the provision “combine dans une seule disposition plusieurs techniques legislatives qui sont 
symptomatiques du fonctionnement des measures anti-abus rencontrées dans le C.I.R. 1992: présomption 
réfragrable d’évasione fiscal, fiction d’inopposabilité d’actes juridiques non simulés, stigmatisation de 
regimes fiscaux étrangers, reattribution de revenus entre different contribuables”. In his opinion, “ces 
measures [Articles 54 and 344, para 2 CIR] viennent présumer le mobile d’ “evasion fiscal” dans le chef du 
contribuable à partir de caractéristiques objectives d’une operation qu’il accomplit, renversant alors sur ce 
contribuable la charge de prouver positivement certains elements qui “contre-indiqueraient” que cette 
operation a pour finalité essentielle la diminution de son imposition”. 
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7.2.1 Article 344, para 2, CIR, and CFC rules 
Looking at the alternative forms of evidence that the taxpayer can give in order to ward off 
the application of Article 344, para 2, one may observe that they recall the contrary proof 
drafted by Article 167 TUIR governing the Italian CFC rule. Simplifying, in both of the 
cases, it rests upon the (resident) taxpayer the proof that a) the transfer of assets/activity 
carried on abroad is justified by sound business reasons or that b) from the transfer/activity 
carried on abroad does not ensue a remarkable lower taxation. 
As a matter of fact, it has been observed in the academic literature that, albeit the Belgian 
tax system does not include a CFC legislation, some of the features of the latter may be 
recognized in the rule laid down in Article 344, para 2, CIR. 
The main similarities concern the task sought by the legislator and the taxing mechanism. 
As to the former, they both aim at preventing a resident taxpayer from transferring taxable 
income to a low tax jurisdiction, possibly enjoying a tax deferral. As to the second, they 
are both based on a fiction, which consists of attributing the income produced by the non-
resident taxpayer to another resident taxpayer. In the case of Article 344, para 2, the non-
transfer of the assets is assumed, whereas in the case of a CFC rule the earning of the 
CFC’s profit directly (i.e. irrespective of the distribution as a dividend) by the resident 
shareholder. Nonetheless, they differ under several aspects, besides their different nature. 
Among these, it has to be noted that Article 344, para 2, does not imply a control 
requirement, albeit it may in practice occur. Instead, the condition of the (qualified) control 
requirement or of a certain interest of the resident person in the foreign entity is peculiar to 
every CFC rule. If from this point of view the CFC regime might appear more restricted in 
scope, this is not the case when considering the type of income which is imputed to the 
resident taxpayer. In the case of Article 344, para 2, it is the income generated by the assets 
that have been transferred, which continue to be taxed under the Belgian law taking into 
account its character and source. Instead, the CFC regime (normally) entails that all the 
CFC profits are included in the taxable base of the shareholder (in proportion to his 
participation) irrespective of their distribution, as if the foreign entity was transparent.  
 
7.2.1.1 Conditions for application and proof to the contrary 
The conditions for the application of Article 344, para 2, are clear enough. 
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The rule applies to all transferors who are resident taxpayers in Belgium, either individuals 
or corporations
446
, with regard to the transactions carried on with non-resident persons who, 
pursuant to the legislation of the State where they are established, are not subject to income 
tax or, with respect to the income generated by the assets transferred, are subject to a 
considerably more favourable tax treatment in comparison to the one that would have been 
applicable in Belgium. With regard to the list of assets and rights covered by the provision, 
it is only apparently specific, as the inclusion of the transfer of cash significantly 
contributes to the extension of the (objective) scope. In practice, the legal acts envisaged 
(sale, transfer, contribution) have in common the effect of transferring the ownership right 
of the listed goods (financial instruments, patent or intellectual property rights, cash). 
Having said this, it has to be noted that uncertainties arise as regards the method of 
determination of the income attributable to the transferor. In fact, from Article 344, para 2, 
we certainly infer that the income derived from the assets in the hands of the transferee are 
imputed on the transferor, because such assets are deemed as not having been transferred. 
But this puts on tax authorities a heavy administrative burden, as a certain difficulty in 
getting the necessary information and in tracking the assets can be foreseen. Furthermore, 
one could wonder what happens if the assets are reinvested or are sold by the transferee to 
a third party.  
Moreover, uncertainties concern also the theme of the contrary proof, particularly the 
second one. 
As said, Article 344, para 2, introduces a mixed presumption of law, that is a tax law 
presumption for which the law provides strictly the circumstances to be proved in order to 
rebut the presumption
447
. In other words, the contrary proof cannot be freely given, and 
this advocates for an evaluation of the concrete possibility to meet such burden. 
                                                          
446
 Moreover, it “equally applies to non-residents that own income producing assets situated in Belgium 
which are susceptible to being transferred outside the Belgian tax jurisdiction (mainly assets belonging to a 
Belgian branch)” according to L. De Broe, International tax planning and prevention of abuse. A study under 
domestic tax law, tax treaties and EC law in relation to conduit and base companies, cited above, at p. 128. 
447
 In this regard, according to the tax authorities, Com. CIR No 344/6: “La présomption légale de simulation 
que l'art. 344, CIR 92, attache à l'égard des actes en question, n'est pas irréfragable. Le même article 
dispose en effet que le contribuable peut renverser la présomption "juris tantum" en prouvant : soit que 
l'opération répond à des besoins légitimes de caractère financier ou économique; soit qu'il a reçu pour 
l'opération une contre-valeur réelle produisant un montant de revenus soumis effectivement en Belgique à 
une charge fiscale normale par rapport à celle qui aurait subsisté si cette opération n'avait pas eu lieu». 
Thus, Com. CIR No 344/7 : «En ce qui concerne la première manière de renverser la présomption "juris 
tantum", on se référera utilement aux règles énoncées aux commentaires de l'art. 49, CIR 92, qui sont relatifs 
au renversement de la présomption légale dont il est question à l'art. 54, CIR 92. En ce qui concerne la 
seconde manière de renverser la présomption "juris tantum", on notera qu'il appartient au contribuable 
d'établir non seulement qu'il a reçu une contre-valeur réelle (espèces, titres, etc.) en échange de ses actions, 
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Under the first alternative counterproof, the taxpayer is requested to give evidence of 
‘legitimate financial and economic needs’ justifying the assets transfer. This first escape 
does not give rise to any particular doubts. It is plainly interpreted as referring to the 
economic reasons other than tax saving which can explain the transfer of the assets. As 
such, it is a positive proof: the taxpayer is not required to prove that the transaction is not 
justified by the aim of alleviating the tax burden, but rather that there are financial and 
economic needs which the operation is called upon to satisfy. In this way, economic 
purposes may co-exist with income tax burden considerations, but the latter have to be 
separated from the former. 
In this regard, a number of observations drawn with reference to one of the escapes to the 
Italian CFC rule may be extended to the counterproof at hand. It has to be noted, indeed, 
that the ascertainment of the existence of such economic needs entails a delicate balance 
between the prevention of business conduct guided by tax burden purposes and the 
freedom of economic private initiative. The latter implies the discretion of the taxpayer as 
regards the management of his business, which neither the administrative nor the judicial 
authorities enter
448
. 
The second form of evidence implies a more complex burden of proof upon the taxpayer, 
as he is required not only to prove that he has received a consideration for the transfer, but 
also that such consideration generates income which is subject in Belgium to a tax burden 
that is ‘normal’ in comparison to the one that would have been imposed in the absence of 
the transfer. Thus, the evidence concerns first of all the remunerative character of the 
transaction, and secondly, a hypothetical (domestic) comparison between the current 
taxation upon the income produced from the consideration and the taxation that would 
have been applied on the income from the assets transferred. All this, in order to show that 
the effect of the transaction is not a lower tax burden in the home State, as the use of the 
vague term ‘normal’ for judging the comparison seems to suggest. Moreover, while the 
first escape (the existence of economic needs) is to be ascertained at the time when the 
transfer occurs, the second does not appears to be susceptible to a one-time ascertainment, 
                                                                                                                                                                                
obligations, brevets d'invention, etc., mais encore que cette contre-valeur produit un montant de revenus 
soumis effectivement en Belgique à une charge fiscale normale par rapport à celle qui aurait subsisté si cette 
opération n'avait pas eu lieu». 
448
 Though, the use of the term ‘legitimate’ indicates that the statute requires a ‘reasonableness’ test, meaning 
that “The tax authorities (and later the Courts) may therefore reject the needs put forward if a reasonable 
person who is guided by the alleged needs would not have chosen such a scheme” according to L. De Broe, 
International tax planning and prevention of abuse. A study under domestic tax law, tax treaties and EC law 
in relation to conduit and base companies, cited above, at p. 140. 
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as the tax burden might depend on several factors. It seems to follow, then, that the 
taxpayer should be allowed to prove the normality of the taxation borne on the income 
actually produced in comparison to the one that he would have produced in the absence of 
the transfer, even beyond the taxable year when the transfer occurs
449
. 
 
7.2.2  Critical aspects and questions of Constitutional (in)consistency 
Given the uncertainties related particularly to the assessment of the taxable income 
imputable upon the resident taxpayer, one cannot be surprised to see that Article 344, para 
2, has not found a wide application in practice. In fact, it relieves tax authorities from the 
evidence of the tax avoiding scheme, but once this is deemed as being proved, they have to 
determine the taxable income by taking into account the assets which are in the hands of 
another person, according to the criteria provided for by the norm. 
However, such criteria are not (at least explicitly) set forth by the same article, where it is 
simply stated that the transfer cannot be opposed to the tax authorities for income tax 
purposes. This raises questions of compatibility with the legality principle, as the taxable 
income is one of the essential elements that must be regulated by the law rather than left to 
the discretion of the tax administration
450
. In this regard, it cannot be ignored that the 
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 In other words, if the taxpayer fails to prove the first escape, he must yearly administer the second escape. 
See L. De Broe, International tax planning and prevention of abuse. A study under domestic tax law, tax 
treaties and EC law in relation to conduit and base companies, cited above, at p. 140. He illustrates this with 
the following example: “if assets have been contributed to the paid-up capital of the beneficiary and the 
beneficiary distributes sufficient dividend to meet the burden of proof in one year but not in another year, the 
tax authorities can disregard the contribution in the second year but not in the first year.” 
450
 According to A. Nollet, L’article 344, § 2, du C.I.R. 1992: essai de contrôle de “constitutionnalité” et de 
“conventionnalité” d’une disposition légale belge “anti-abus”, cited above, 496, the compatibility with the 
legality principle has to be particularly checked with regard to the first form of evidence provided in the norm 
and the effects of the latter on the amount of income to be imputed upon the taxpayer. As to the former, the 
Author criticizes the choice of the terms (‘legitimate needs’, ‘economic and financial’), which are vague and 
undetermined, so that it is left to the tax administration the power of determining their concrete meaning in 
single cases. On the other hand, he recognizes that in order to be effective an anti-avoidance measure must be 
general so as to cover all the various ways of avoiding tax, though analogy and a retroactive application are 
to be excluded precisely by virtue of the legality principle. Thus, with regard to Article 344, para 2, he asserts 
as follows: “l’insertion de la clause ouverte des “besoins légitimes à caractère économique ou financier” est 
venue permettre au législateur d’appréhender sans complexe une catégorie complete et homogène d’actes 
juridiques suspectés d’évasion fiscal, tout en laissant “exfiltrer” les actes dont les circonstances singuliéres 
ne justifieraient pas l’application de redressement prevue”. Yet, the fact that the determination of the content 
of the escape at hand is left to the tax administration is not in line with the legal certainty (‘sécurité juridique’) 
on the side of the taxpayer, which the legality of the levy aims at safeguarding. As to the margin of 
manoeuvre of the tax authorities in determining the income imputable upon the taxpayer when Article 344, 
para 2 applies, the Author excludes the inconsistency with the legality principle on condition that the measure 
is strictly interpreted. Indeed, he argues: “Dans l’article 344, S2, le législateur a ciblé certains actes de 
transfert d’avoirs mobiliers et s’est contenté de les rendre inopposables à l’égard de l’administration des 
contributions directes. Lors d’un redressement en application de cette mesure, le fisc n’a dès lors aucun 
autre choix que d’établir l’“impôt sur les revenus” du contribuable-cédant comme si le transfert en cause 
n’avait pas eu lieu, et partant, l’imposer dans le chef de ce contribuable les revenus des actifs mobiliers 
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approach of the Constitutional Court manifested on occasion of its judgments concerning 
Article 344, para 1, (prior to the amendments of 2012) is in the sense of ensuring the 
specificity of the legislative choice consisting of providing that the tax administration can 
disregard the relevant operation. 
Furthermore, Article 344, para 2, might be questioned under the light of the principle of 
equality as well
451
, because – similarly to para 1 – it may give rise to economic double 
taxation. Unlike some CFC rules, like the Italian one, which provides that the income taxed 
upon the resident taxpayer before the distribution of profits is not taxed a second time at 
the time of the distribution, no provisions aiming at avoiding such effects are laid down in 
Article 344.  
                                                                                                                                                                                
transférés comme si ces biens étaient restés dans son patrimoine. (...) En effet, la disposition légale ne 
prévoit que l’inopposabilité de l’acte de transfert et non la transparence de la personne du cessionnaire, en 
sorte que ce sont uniquement les revenus qui sont directement produits (après le transfert) par les biens 
transférés qui peuvent être ré-inclus dans la base imposable du cédant (et ce, dans leur catégorie normale 
d’imposition).” In this view, the transferor cannot be taxed, for example, on the income generated by the 
assets that the transferee has obtained by selling the assets transferred. The possibility for the taxpayer to ask 
for an advance ruling by the tax authorities only partially alleviates the gap of legal certainty. As to the 
availability of such instrument, the tax authorities have recalled, in the Circular letter 4 May 2012, AAF. No 
3/2012, AGFisc No 17/2012, AGDP No 4/2012, that the royal decree 17 January 2003 (enacted pursuant to 
Article 22, para 2, Law 24 December 2002) excludes the authorization to issue an advance ruling as regards 
"la déclaration, les investigations et le contrôle, l'utilisation des moyens de preuve, la procédure de taxation, 
les voies de recours, les droits et privilèges du Trésor, la base minimale d'imposition, les délais, la 
prescription, le secret professionnel, l'entrée en vigueur et les responsabilités et obligations de certains 
officiers et fonctionnaires publics, d'autres personnes ou de certaines institutions". Thus, “En soi, le service 
des décisions anticipées en matière fiscale (SDA) ne peut donc pas se prononcer sur le fait de savoir si 
l'administration appliquera ou non la mesure anti-abus (DOC 53 2081/001, p 112). En soi, la mesure anti-
abus de droit est une règle de procédure qui ne peut s'appliquer qu'après la réalisation des opérations visées. 
Certes, ce service pourra prendre une décision relative au choix de l'acte juridique ou l'ensemble d'actes 
juridiques qui lui est présenté par le contribuable. Le service pourra donc se prononcer sur le fait de savoir 
si le choix du ou des acte(s) juridique(s), ou l'ensemble d'actes juridiques projetés et réalisant une même 
opération, est justifié par d'autres motifs que l'évitement des impôts. L'accord de ce service sur le choix du 
contribuable d'un acte ou d'un ensemble d'actes implique que celui-ci ne peut pas être remis en question 
dans le cadre de la présente disposition, pour autant que toutes les opérations aient été realisées telles 
qu'elles sont reprises dans l'accord préalable (DOC 53 2081/001, p. 112).” 
451
 A. Nollet, L’article 344, §2, du C.I.R. 1992: essai de contrôle de “constitutionnalité” et de 
“conventionnalité” d’une disposition légale belge “anti-abus”, cited above, at p. 504-505, holds that “la 
mesure étudiée apparaît bien compatible avec le principe d’égalité tante elle ne “discrimine” que sur la base 
de catégories pertinentes et qu’avec une intensité proportionnée par rapport à sa ratio legis de lute contre 
une certaine forme d’évasion fiscal internationale”. In fact, the Author finds the distinction resulting from 
the scope of the provision as being coherent with the aim sought. In this light, it can be reasonably justified 
the exclusion of legal acts which do not transfer the property rights, the inclusion of the transfer of cash but 
not of immovables. He also finds the effects of the mechanism in line with the proportionality principle, 
provided that the re-determination of the taxable base is interpreted strictly. It should be noted, however, that 
the same Author, dealing with the issue of the anti-abuse measures in respect of the equality principle, points 
out that “la mesure controlée implique, dans le chef des contribuables auxquels elle s’applique, un 
redressement fiscal qui n’excède pas ce qui est nécessaire pour neutraliser les consequences fiscales 
favorables dont ces contribuables ont abusivement cherché à bénéficier”. This statement is not completely 
coherent with the conclusion of consistency of Article 344, para 2 with the equality principle. As said in the 
text, the event of a double taxation is a concrete possibility.  
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Ultimately, given the fact that the provision is targeted exclusively at cross-border 
operations, which might involve EU Member States, where a taxation considerably lower 
than in Belgium is envisaged, it has to be tested against the EU fundamental freedoms, as 
we will see. 
 
8. Transfer pricing adjustments 
The Belgian legal order includes several specific anti-avoidance rules aimed at combating 
international tax avoidance which de facto imply a relief for the tax administration from 
proving certain abusive practices and where the inference is drawn by the legislator. 
Among these, there is a set of rules providing for transfer pricing adjustments, though in 
different forms. They embody very different mechanisms for restoring the taxable base, 
which may be made through the disregard of a certain assets transfer, the recapture of 
profits or the disallowance of deductions. Though, in the extent to which they concern 
cross-border situations, they have in common the aim of tackling the shifting of the taxable 
base towards foreign jurisdictions, as manifestly results from the circumstance that their 
application mostly implies the non-taxation or considerably lower taxation of the income 
concerned. 
One of these mechanisms is represented by Article 344, para 2, dealt with above. It entitles 
tax authorities to disregard certain transfers of assets to a person established in a low tax 
jurisdiction, unless the taxpayer proves that the transaction is justified by legitimate 
economic needs or that he received a real consideration generating income which is subject 
in Belgium to a normal tax burden. Though the potential substantive effects of this 
provision cannot be denied, it is still a mechanism which assumes the exercise of 
assessment powers by the tax administration. In other words, the provision seems to be 
addressed to tax authorities before than to taxpayers potentially involved. 
The other two forms of transfer pricing adjustment appear to set forth certain rules as to the 
determination of profits and expenditure, which seems to first address the taxpayers, as the 
different location in the system of the CIR reflects. 
The reference is to Articles 26 and 54 CIR. The former recaptures, among the others, the 
abnormal or gratuitous advantages granted by a resident company to foreign-related 
persons or persons established in low tax jurisdictions, where the conditions agreed upon 
differ from those which would be made between independent enterprises in a free market. 
The second grounds the disallowing as deductible business expenses of certain expenditure 
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items (interest, royalties, fees) paid by a resident to a non-resident holding company or any 
other recipient located in a tax haven, except if the taxpayer proves that the transaction is 
actual and the payment does not exceed the limits. 
Hereinafter the aforementioned provisions will be examined with a special view to their 
main features and effects on the distribution of the burden of proof
452
.   
 
8.1 Profit adjustments for abnormal or gratuitous advantages under Article 26 CIR: 
main features and conditions of application 
Article 26 CIR, in its first indent, provides that when an enterprise established in Belgium 
grants abnormal or gratuitous advantages, these are added back to the enterprise’s profits, 
unless such advantages are taken into consideration for determining the taxable income of 
the beneficiary thereof
453
.  
For our purpose, more interesting is the second indent of the same article, where it states – 
without any exception – that such abnormal or gratuitous advantages are to be added back 
to the enterprise’s taxable income where they are granted to a non-resident person or legal 
entity. More in detail, where the beneficiary alternatively is: 1) a taxpayer mentioned in 
Article 227 CIR, with which the enterprise located in Belgium is directly or indirectly 
related; 2) a taxpayer mentioned in Article 227 or a foreign establishment which, according 
to the laws of the country where they are located, are not subject to income tax or are 
subject to a tax regime that is considerably more favourable than the one to which the 
Belgian enterprise is subject; 3) a taxpayer mentioned in Article 227, which has a common 
interest with the taxpayer or the establishment mentioned in No 1 and 2 above
454
. 
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 It goes without saying that in this dissertation the issue of the transfer pricing adjustments cannot be 
exhausted and it will be dealt with in the extent to which they lay down presumptive provisions which are 
relevant in the EU perspective. 
453
 This escape implies, according to the tax authorities’ interpretation, that the income concerned is taxable 
in Belgium. See COM. CIR 92, No 26/12. 
454
 Article 26 CIR, 1st indent, reads: “Sans préjudice de l'application de l'article 49 et sous réserve des 
dispositions de l'article 54, lorsqu'une entreprise établie en Belgique accorde des avantages anormaux ou 
bénévoles, ceux-ci sont ajoutés à ses bénéfices propres, sauf si les avantages interviennent pour déterminer 
les revenus imposables des bénéficiaires». At the 2
nd
 indent it continues as follows: «Nonobstant la 
restriction prévue à l'alinéa 1er, sont ajoutés aux bénéfices propres les avantages anormaux ou bénévoles 
qu'elle accorde à: 1° un contribuable visé à l'article 227 à l'égard duquel l'entreprise établie en Belgique se 
trouve directement ou indirectement dans des liens quelconques d'interdépendance; 2° un contribuable visé 
à l'article 227 ou à un établissement étranger, qui, en vertu des dispositions de la législation du pays où ils 
sont établis, n'y sont pas soumis à un impôt sur les revenus ou y sont soumis à un régime fiscal notablement 
plus avantageux que celui auquel est soumise l'entreprise établie en Belgique; 3° un contribuable visé à 
l'article 227 qui a des intérêts communs avec le contribuable ou l'établissement visés au 1° ou au 2°». 
Conversely, Article 207 CIR, second indent, looks at the abnormal and gratuitous advantages received by a 
Belgian taxpayer from an affiliated company and it precludes him to claim certain deductions (for losses, 
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The core of the provision - Article 26, second indent - is represented by the ‘abnormal or 
gratuitous advantages’ which are granted from a resident person to a foreign taxpayer. 
The concept is not defined by the law, but from the case-law it results as referring to any 
kind of enrichment (‘advantage’) attributed to the transferee under unusual economic 
conditions (‘abnormal’) or in the absence of  any consideration (‘gratuitous’)455. It has been 
observed how this notion is inspired by the arm’s length principle set forth by Article 9 of 
the OECD model convention, though the domestic case-law has manifested a more 
subjective approach, which aims at fitting the provision to the personal situation of the 
taxpayer involved
456
.  
At any rate, the provision has a general (objective) scope, and it envisages either the 
situation in which the attribution of an advantage results from practising a lower price or 
fee for the goods and services supplied or the situation wherein a higher price, in 
comparison to the one that would be agreed upon under free market conditions, is 
conveyed between the parties. As a consequence, once applied such provision may 
determine a reintegration of the profit forfeited or a disallowance of the deduction of the 
excessive costs. 
As to the ratione personae conditions of application on the side of the non-resident 
taxpayer, the provision at hand covers three situations, which render evident how it is not a 
typical transfer price measure purely aimed at avoiding the shifting of profits between 
related companies.  
First, it applies to a non-resident company which has ‘any direct or indirect affiliation 
relationship’ with the Belgian transferor. The formula has been broadly interpreted both by 
                                                                                                                                                                                
investments, dividend qualifying for the participation exemption) in connection with profits resulting from 
such unusual advantages. It reads as follows: “Aucune de ces déductions [those provided in Articles 199 to 
206] ou compensation avec la perte de la période imposable ne peut être opérée sur la partie du résultat qui 
provient d'avantages anormaux ou bénévoles visés à l'article 79, ni sur les avantages financiers ou de toute 
nature reçus visés à l'article 53, 24°, ni sur l'assiette de la cotisation distincte spéciale établie sur les 
dépenses ou les avantages de toute nature, non justifiés conformément à l'article 219, ni sur la partie des 
bénéfices qui sont affectés aux dépenses visées à l'article 198, § 1er, 9° et 12°, ni sur la partie des bénéfices 
provenant du non-respect de l'article 194quater, § 2, alinéa 4 et de l'application de l'article 194quater, § 4.” 
455
 See Supreme Court, 1o April 2000, Pas., I, 240, where it is held that “par avantages anormaux, la loi, 
sans exiger nécessairement que le transfert ait été réalisé dans l'intention de soustraire un bénéfice taxable à 
l'impôt, vise les avantages qui, eu égard aux circonstances économiques du moment, sont contraires à l'ordre 
habituel des choses, aux règles ou aux usages commerciaux établis” and that “le caractère anormal de 
l'avantage dans le chef de l'entreprise ou de la personne étrangère relève de l'appréciation en fait du juge du 
fond”; see also Supreme Court, 31 October 1979, Pas., 1980, 280, where the gratuitous advantages are 
defined as “les avantages accordés sans qu'ils constituent l'exécution d'une obligation ou sans qu'ils aient une 
contre-partie”. 
456
 L. De Broe, International tax planning and prevention of abuse. A study under domestic tax law, tax 
treaties and EC law in relation to conduit and base companies, cited above, 81. 
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tax authorities and courts, given its quite general wording
457
. It is commonly believed to 
include not only legal forms of affiliation (like participation in the share capital, the power 
to influence the assembly or the management), but also economic forms of affiliation 
(contractual, for example) and indirect forms of relation (for instance, enterprises of the 
same group or controlled by the same company). 
Second, it applies to non-resident persons or enterprises which are located in a low-tax 
jurisdiction irrespective of any form of affiliation with the Belgian transferor. More exactly, 
the norm does not refer to the regime generally applicable in the foreign country, but it 
seems to account for the concrete tax liability of the non-resident taxpayer therein. Indeed, 
it requests the latter not to be subject to taxation or to be subject to a tax treatment 
considerably lower than the one levied upon the transferor. 
Third, it applies to non-resident taxpayers having a ‘common interest’ with the categories 
of non-residents mentioned in numbers 1 and 2. Such a hypothesis significantly enlarges 
the scope of the provision, not only because it is susceptible to covering any forms of 
relation, but also because it is targeted at triangular schemes. In this way, it seems to play 
the role of a ‘safety clause’, meaning that it is intended to impede the circumvention of the 
first two situations. The legislator assumes that the existence of a common interest between 
the interposed person, who is not related to the Belgian transferor and is subject to a 
normal tax burden, and the ultimate beneficiary, who is related to the Belgian transferor or 
subject to a preferential tax treatment, is a certain index of an abusive scheme aimed at 
passing on the advantages to the non-resident ultimate beneficiary
458
.  
 
8.1.1 Some considerations on the nature of the provisions in Article 26 and interplay 
with Article 185, para 2, CIR ... 
Looking at the first indent of Article 26, one could say that the legislator has aimed at 
securing the taxation of profits where abnormal or gratuitous advantages are granted to 
another taxpayer (individual, association or company), at the same time providing for the 
case in which such advantages have been taken into account in the determination of the 
                                                          
457
 See, COM. CIR 26/37; Supreme Court 9 April 1968, Pas., II, 1041. 
458
 To support this reading of the norm, I quote L. De Broe, International tax planning and prevention of 
abuse. A study under domestic tax law, tax treaties and EC law in relation to conduit and base companies, 
cited above, 92, who underlines that it is not decisive if the advantages are passed on to the ultimate 
beneficiary or they are rather retained by the interposed person. Thus, “The statute provides for an 
irrebuttable presumption that the interposed person does or will do so because of the presence of a common 
interest between that person and the alleged ultimate beneficiary thereof.” 
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transferee’s taxable income, in order to avoid double taxation. The provision has a broad 
scope, as on the one side it does not request any affiliation between the parties involved 
and, on the other side, it does not impose transactions to be concluded at a normal value. In 
the light of this, it may be read as assuming that granting abnormal advantages is an index 
of a manoeuvre aimed at reducing the tax burden, save for the possibility for the transferor 
to prove that the profits are relevant in the forming of the transferee’s taxable base. 
The anti-avoidance rationale is more evident when examining the second indent of Article 
26, which concerns the advantages granted by a resident to non-resident related persons or 
non-residents that are located in tax havens. Under this rule, however, the taxpayer is not 
allowed to escape the application of the provision by claiming that the advantage is taxable 
abroad in the hands of the transferee. He is presumably able to contest, nonetheless, the 
existence of such advantages or their unusual character, that is to say the conditions for the 
application of the norm. Moreover, from the SGI case decided by the EUCJ, which will be 
dealt with in the next chapter, it results that he is given the opportunity to demonstrate the 
commercial reasons justifying the transaction concerned. 
As such, the provision may not be read as a rule imposing certain cross-border transactions 
to be agreed upon under free market conditions, but rather as presuming the aim of 
avoiding taxation. In this view, the tax authorities which claim an abnormal or gratuitous 
advantage bear the burden of proving the existence of such advantage and also that it has 
been attributed against the prevailing marked conditions or without a consideration, 
whereas they are not requested to prove fraud or intention to fraud or to reduce the taxable 
base
459
.  
Ultimately, that Article 26 does not fully match with the arm’s length principle results also 
from Article 185, para 2, CIR, which was introduced in 2004 and lays down such principle, 
in part overlapping Article 26. It applies to two companies which are part of a 
multinational group of associated companies and carry on cross-border dealings. Two 
situations are envisaged, albeit apparently on condition that a request for a ruling to the 
Ruling Committee is filed or there is an international procedure aimed at eliminating 
double taxation
460
.  First, it provides that where commercial relations have been agreed 
                                                          
459
 In this sense, L. De Broe, International tax planning and prevention of abuse. A study under domestic tax 
law, tax treaties and EC law in relation to conduit and base companies, cited above, 81. 
460
 Indeed, Article 185, para 2, after having stipulated the scope of the provision in the first indent, continues 
in the second indent as follows: “L'alinéa 1er s'applique par décision anticipée sans préjudice de 
l'application de la Convention relative à l'élimination des doubles impositions en cas de corrections des 
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upon under conditions which differ from those which would have been made between 
independent companies, the profits that the Belgian company would have accrued if acting 
in arm’s length terms with the foreign associated company, may be adjusted upon the 
former. Second and in parallel, it provides a corresponding adjustment of the Belgian 
company’s profits where the tax authorities of the foreign-related company has adjusted 
the profits of the latter so as to reflect the arm’s length principle461. 
 
8.1.2 ... and Article 49 CIR 
Currently, the wording of Article 26 reads as follows: “Sans préjudice de l'application de 
l'article 49 et sous réserve des dispositions de l'article 54”. This entails that the former 
does not prevail over Article 49, which is the general provision on the deductibility of 
business expenditure. 
The issue of the interplay between Articles 26 and 49 CIR, has been very much debated. 
This, not only before Article 81, Programme-Law 27 April 2007, which has inserted in 
Article 26 a reference to Article 49, but even afterwards. The question is manifestly not 
merely theoretical. Under Article 26, para 1, the taxpayer is allowed to prove that the 
unusual advantages granted to another taxpayer have been taken into consideration when 
determining the taxable income of the latter, so as to escape the application of the profit 
                                                                                                                                                                                
bénéfices des entreprises associées (90/436) du 23 juillet 1990 et des conventions internationales préventives 
de la double imposition.” 
461
 Article 185, para 2, first indent reads as follows: “§ 2. Sans préjudice de l'alinéa 2, pour deux sociétés 
faisant partie d'un groupe multinational de sociétés liées et en ce qui concerne leurs relations 
transfrontalières réciproques: a) lorsque les deux sociétés sont, dans leurs relations commerciales ou 
financières, liées par des conditions convenues ou imposées qui diffèrent de celles qui seraient convenues 
entre des sociétés indépendantes, les bénéfices qui, sans ces conditions, auraient été réalisés par l'une des 
sociétés, mais n'ont pu l'être à cause de ces conditions, peuvent être inclus dans les bénéfices de cette société; 
b) lorsque, dans les bénéfices d'une société sont repris des bénéfices qui sont également repris dans les 
bénéfices d'une autre société, et que les bénéfices ainsi inclus sont des bénéfices qui auraient été réalisés par 
cette autre société si les conditions convenues entre les deux sociétés avaient été celles qui auraient été 
convenues entre des sociétés indépendantes, les bénéfices de la première société sont ajustés d'une manière 
appropriée.” Thus, Article 26 CIR will apply instead of Article 185, para 2, when a transaction between 
related companies of a multinational group is domestic, or one of the party is not an individual enterprise, or 
when parties are not associated. The scope of the provision is delimited into the Circular letter 4 July 2006, 
Ci.RH.421/569.019 AOIF 25/2006, where administrative guidelines on transfer pricing audits and 
documentation are provided. See P. Cauwenbergh, A. Gaublomme, L. Hinnekens, Tranfer pricing in 
Belgium – Rulings and Practice, Bullettin for International taxation, 2008, 382 et seq., for further case-law 
and administrative references. With particular regard to Article 185, para 2, the Authors point out that it 
“allows companies to report a taxable result in their annual tax return which deviates from the result 
demonstrated through financial reporting in the Belgian accounting books. Indeed, if it can be justified that 
the accounting result exceeds the arm’s length result, the difference can be exempt from tax. (…) In other 
words, for a downward adjustment in Belgium, it is not a prerequisite that a profit adjustment was made in 
another country”. From this perspective, Article 185, para 2, has a broader scope than Article 9 OECD 
Convention, as the latter entails double taxation. 
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adjustment. By contrast, Article 49 does not provide for any measure aimed at avoiding 
double taxation. It lays down the conditions for the purpose of the expenses’ deductibility. 
To this end, it rests with the taxpayer the burden of establishing that the expenses were 
made or borne during a certain taxable period with a view to obtain or retain taxable 
business income and to justify the genuineness and amount of them by means of written 
documents or, when not possible, of other (admissible) means of proof
462
. 
In this regard, it has to be noted that the administrative practice shows a tendency to rely 
on Article 49 instead of Article 26 in order to disallow the deduction of excessive 
expenses
463
. In fact, whereas under Article 26 tax authorities must prove the unusual 
advantage, Article 49 rather concerns a circumstance (deduction of expenditure) which 
normally must be proved by the taxpayer. However, once the latter has complied with the 
duty of producing the documents or other means of proof from which the relation between 
such expenses and the exercise of his business activity, the authenticity and amount of 
expenditure result, it is likely that the burden of proving their abnormal character for the 
purpose of disallowing the deduction still lies upon the tax administration
464
. 
Having clarified this, the case may be that Article 26 cannot apply because the unusual 
advantages granted to the beneficiary have been taken into consideration when forming the 
taxable income of the latter (pursuant to Article 26, 1
st
 indent), and nonetheless the 
deduction of the corresponding expenses claimed by the taxpayer granting the advantage is 
denied if they are considered to be excessive pursuant to Article 49 CIR. Notwithstanding 
the risk of economic double taxation under this interpretation of the interplay between 
Articles 26 and 49 CIR, the Constitutional Court has rejected the question of compatibility 
of the former with the principle of equality. In particular, in the light of the risk of abusive 
practices, the Court has excluded that the same treatment for different situations (taxpayers 
granting abnormal advantages which are considered in the forming of the beneficiary’s 
                                                          
462
 Article 49, para 1 reads as follows: “A titre de frais professionnels sont déductibles les frais que le 
contribuable a faits ou supportés pendant la période imposable en vue d'acquérir ou de conserver les 
revenus imposables et dont il justifie la réalité et le montant au moyen de documents probants ou, quand 
cela n'est pas possible, par tous autres moyens de preuve admis par le droit commun, sauf le serment.” 
463
 See J.-P. Bours, Vérité et preuve fiscale, cited above, 6. 
464
 In other words, the provision does not seem to request a heavier proof in respect of the normal burden that 
the taxpayer bears as regards those elements of the taxation that contribute to reducing it. In this sense, also L. 
DE BROE, International tax planning and prevention of abuse. A study under domestic tax law, tax treaties 
and EC law in relation to conduit and base companies, cited above, 82, according to whom it is up to the tax 
authority to prove that an expense, albeit documentarily justified, does not meet the arm’s length standard.  
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taxable income and taxpayers granting abnormal advantages which are not taxed upon the 
beneficiary) is unreasonable
465
. 
 
9.  Disallowance of certain payments to non-residents under Article 54 CIR 
Dealing with the EU law context, we will see in the next chapter how Articles 26 and 54 
CIR have been ruled on by the EUCJ, as in the attempt to tackle (international) tax 
avoidance they give rise to distinctions among national and foreign taxpayers in respect of 
the possibility of escaping the recapture of profits or the disallowance of expenses’ 
deduction. 
Indeed, Article 54, CIR, disallows the deduction of interest, royalties, manufactured 
dividends and fees for services paid, either directly or indirectly, by a resident taxpayer to a 
taxpayer mentioned in Article 227 CIR or to a foreign establishment which, according to 
the laws of the country where they are located, are not subject to income tax or are subject, 
with respect to the above items of income, to a tax regime that is considerably more 
favourable than that applicable in Belgium. This, unless the taxpayer proves that the 
transaction is sincere and genuine and that the payment does not exceed the normal 
amount
466
. 
                                                          
465
 Const. Court 6 November 2008, No 151, orignated by a request for the annulment of Articles 81 and 82, 
Law 27 April 2007, which has introduced in Article 26, first indent, the wording “Sans préjudice de 
l’application de l’article 49 et sous réserve”, in force from the taxable year 2008. In the decision the opinion 
of the State Cousel is reported and the reply of the Minister of Finance. The former underlined the risk of 
double imposition, but the latter replied that the tax position of the parties involved in the transaction 
concerned should be taken aside. The Court recognised that double taxation might follow from the 
autonomous application of Articles 26 and 49 CIR (“B.10.4. Il est vrai que la mesure contestée peut avoir 
pour conséquence que la déduction des indemnités octroyées sera rejetée dans le chef de celui qui les a 
concédées, même lorsqu’il s’agit d’avantages anormaux ou bénévoles qui sont également imposés dans le 
chef du bénéficiaire”). Nonetheless, the interest represented by the contrast to abusive practices prevails in 
the balance with the interest to non-double economic taxation (“En l’espèce, le législateur pouvait considérer, 
eu égard à la nature même des avantages anormaux ou bénévoles, qu’il existe un risque d’usage abusif du 
régime consacré à l’article 26, alinéa 1er, du CIR 1992. Dès lors que la mesure attaquée peut être de nature 
à prévenir ce risque, elle n’est pas dépourvue de justification raisonnable”). Cf. Const. Court 22 December 
2010, No 160, in particular at No B.8.; Const. Court 10 February 2011, No 27. 
466
 More in detail, Article 54, CIR, reads as follows: “Les intérêts, indemnités visées à l'article 90, 11°, qui 
sont payées en compensation de ces intérêts, redevances pour la concession de l'usage de brevets 
d'invention, procédés de fabrication et autres droits analogues ou les rémunérations de prestations ou de 
services, ne sont pas considérés comme des frais professionnels lorsqu'ils sont payés ou attribués 
directement ou indirectement à un contribuable visé à l'article 227 ou à un établissement étranger, qui, en 
vertu des dispositions de la législation du pays où ils sont établis, n'y sont pas soumis à un impôt sur les 
revenus ou y sont soumis, pour les revenus de l'espèce, à un régime de taxation notablement plus 
avantageux que celui auquel ces revenus sont soumis en Belgique, à moins que le contribuable ne justifie 
par toutes voies de droit qu'ils répondent à des opérations réelles et sincères et qu'ils ne dépassent pas les 
limites normales.” 
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Similarly to Article 26 CIR, Article 54 aims at preventing the transfer of profits to low tax 
jurisdictions
467
, with special regard to certain costs met with non-resident companies or 
establishments therein, on the basis of fictitious transactions and abnormal payments. To 
this end, the provision seems to establish a rebuttable presumption that certain payments 
made to non-residents located in tax havens hide a tax–avoidance scheme468. Indeed, the 
taxpayer is requested not only to prove the existence, amount and authenticity of the 
expenditure incurred – as he would be pursuant to the general rule laid down in Article 49 
CIR -, but from the content of the counterproof we infer that he is even expected to 
positively demonstrate that the operation is genuine and that such expense reflects the 
arm’s length standard. 
In other words, when relying upon Article 54 CIR, the tax authorities must only prove the 
conditions provided for by the norm, without being requested to prove that the operation 
has been carried on with the aim of reducing taxation or that the payment corresponds to an 
abnormal amount. Instead, under Article 49 CIR, the taxpayer is permitted to deduct the 
expenditure by complying with the ordinary burden of proof, though the wording of the 
provision suggests a reinforced duty. It rests on the tax administration to contest the 
abnormality of such expenses in order to reject the deduction.  
 
9.1 The proof to the contrary under Article 54 CIR 
The contrary proof that the Belgian taxpayer must give in order to rebut the presumption 
laid down in Article 54 CIR, so as to obtain the deductibility of the expenses incurred with 
                                                          
467
 As the use of the same format in order to identify the beneficiary located in a low tax jurisdiction indicates. 
Both of the provisions refer to non-residents which, according to the law of the country where they are 
established, are not subject to income tax or are subject to a tax treatment there which is considerably more 
favourable than that applicable in Belgium, with regard respectively to the profits ex Article 26 and the 
expenses ex Article 54. 
468
 This classification seems to be supported by L. De Broe, International tax planning and prevention of 
abuse. A study under domestic tax law, tax treaties and EC law in relation to conduit and base companies, 
cited above, at 101-102, where he asserts that “The provision establishes a presumption that the making of 
certain payments to tainted non-residents is inspired by tax avoidance motives. (...) [the provision] presumes 
that such payments relate to artificial or sham transactions and/or do not meet the “arm’s length test” with 
the purpose of dissuading taxpayers from making such payments”. Accordingly, he concludes that under 
Article 54 the taxpayer “is de iure precluded from deducting the payments and, if he wishes to deduct the 
payments, he must rebut to statutorily defined presumptions”. He gives account of the debate among the 
scholars on whether Article 54 CIR introduces a presumption of sham or it merely strengthens the taxpayer’s 
ordinary burden of proof when claiming a deduction for the expenses envisaged in the norm. Not fully 
coherent with the wording reported above, he endorses the second thesis. Arguing from the content of the 
contrary proof envisaged, he assumes that the first presumption included in Article 54 is a presumption of 
sham of the transaction. However, he argues, the case-law does not request from the taxpayer the proof that 
the transaction is real, but rather that it is justified by business need. In this view, the provision simply puts a 
heavier burden on the taxpayer. 
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non-resident persons, is quite heavy. Unlike other anti-avoidance rules, it includes two 
circumstances which are not alternative. 
First, the Belgian taxpayer has to prove that the transaction is genuine (‘opérations réelles 
et sincères’). A literal interpretation of the normative wording would lead to a request for 
the evidence that the operation carried on with the non-resident is not artificial, but that it 
actually took place. However, the prevailing interpretation in the case-law
469
 , which is in 
line with the escapes provided against other anti-avoidance rules in the Income tax Code, 
requests the taxpayer to demonstrate that such transaction is justified by economic, 
financial, industrial, commercial, etc., needs. In other words, to satisfy such burden he 
must prove that the operation concerned and the corresponding costs incurred are 
connected with the needs of the business activity. 
Second and in addition, the taxpayer must prove that the payment does not exceed the 
normal limits. This entails bringing up the evidence that the amount of consideration 
agreed upon by the parties – which are not necessarily related - does not considerably 
differ from that which would have been conveyed between independent parties under free 
market conditions. In other words, the taxpayer has to prove that the payment is at arm’s 
length, i.e. it is comparable to that which would be established for similar operations under 
prevailing market conditions. 
From the content of such counterproof we infer that the legislator assumes the fictitious or 
the non-arm’s length character of certain costs incurred by a resident taxpayer with non-
resident companies or establishments located in low tax jurisdictions. The format of the 
provision is quite explicit in preventing the taxpayer from the exercise of the right to 
deduce such expenses, as it states that “ne sont pas considérés comme des frais 
professionnels”. This, unless the resident taxpayer demonstrates that those expenses were 
met for business reasons and in accordance with the normal market value. 
Notably, the provision has a wide scope, as it covers not only direct but also indirect 
payments, which presumably are those made to interposed persons located in jurisdictions 
with a normal tax burden in order to circumvent the non-deductibility of the enumerated 
expenses. A wide scope that however covers only cross-border situations. This inevitably 
embodies a different tax treatment amongst domestic companies concluding transactions 
                                                          
469
 See Supreme Court 10 November 1964, Pas., 1965, I, 240, where the provision is nonetheless classified as 
a presumption of sham. 
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with resident persons and domestic companies which carry on operations with non-
residents. 
 
10. Limitations to business expenditure’s deductibility 
Concluding the brief overview of the main anti-avoidance presumptive measures included 
in the Belgian legal order, a number of provisions provided for by Article 198 CIR, 
recently amended, must be mentioned. 
Article 198, para 1, CIR, provides a list of cost’s items which are in principle not deemed 
as business expenses, so that their deduction is disallowed. Amongst these, the expenses 
dealt with in Numbers 10 and 11 are of particular interest, as they both are susceptible to 
involve cross-border transactions. 
The former provision (No 10) concerns the payments made directly or indirectly towards 
those countries referred to in Article 307, para 1, indent 3, CIR, and that have not been 
declared. Moreover, the deductibility of the expenses is denied also in relation to those 
payments that have been declared, but for which the taxpayer is not able to prove that they 
correspond to genuine and actual operations carried on with persons other than fictitious 
establishments
470
. The provision has to be read in conjunction with Article 307, para 1, 
indent 3, which places on residents liable to income corporate tax and non-resident legal 
entities liable to income taxation for non-residents, the obligation of reporting in their tax 
return – rectius, in a proper form alleged to the tax return - the payments made directly or 
indirectly to States which are deemed as being tax havens either because they do not meet 
the OECD standards for the exchange of information or because they have a low tax 
regime.
471
 
                                                          
470
 It provides: “10° sans préjudice de l'application de l'article 219, les paiements effectués directement ou 
indirectement vers des Etats visés à l'article 307, § 1er, alinéa 3, et qui n'ont pas été déclarés conformément 
audit article 307, § 1er, alinéa 3, ou, si les paiements ont été déclarés, pour lesquels le contribuable ne 
justifie pas par toutes voies de droit qu'ils sont effectués dans le cadre d'opérations réelles et sincères et avec 
des personnes autres que des constructions artificielles». 
471
 More in detail, the provision reads as follows: “Les contribuables assujettis à l'impôt des sociétés ou à 
l'impôt des non-résidents conformément à l'article 227, 2°, sont tenus de déclarer tous les paiements 
effectués directement ou indirectement à des personnes établies dans un Etat qui: a) soit pour toute la 
période imposable au cours de laquelle le paiement a eu lieu, est considéré par le Forum mondial de l'OCDE 
sur la transparence et l'échange d'informations, au terme d'un examen approfondi de la mesure dans laquelle 
le standard de l'OCDE d'échange d'informations est appliqué par cet Etat, comme un Etat n'ayant pas mis 
substantiellement et effectivement en œuvre ce standard; b) soit figure sur la liste des Etats à fiscalité 
inexistante ou peu élevée”. In the subsequent indents it is added that “Pour l'application de l'alinéa 3, on 
entend par Etat à fiscalité inexistante ou peu élevée un Etat dont le taux nominal de l'impôt sur les sociétés 
est inférieur à 10 pct” and that “La liste des Etats à fiscalité inexistante ou peu élevée est fixée par arrêté 
royal délibéré en Conseil des Ministres. Cette liste est mise à jour par arrêté royal délibéré en Conseil des 
Ministres”. Ultimately, the obligation of declaration is delimited as follows: “La déclaration visée à l'alinéa 
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The provision – Article 198, para 1, No 10 - envisages two different situations. 
First, it disallows the expenses related to payments made to tax havens when the taxpayer 
has not complied with the obligation to declare them in a proper form alleged to his tax 
return. 
Second, it disallows such expenses even though they have been declared, unless the 
taxpayer can demonstrate a) that the payment is inserted in the context of a real and sincere 
operation and b) that the addressee located in the tax heaven is not an artificial 
establishment. In this case, a rebuttable presumption of tax avoidance is set forth, by 
shifting on the taxpayer the burden of proving that not only the operation but also the 
counterparty is real and genuine. 
 
10.1 Thin capitalization 
Article 198, para 1, No 11, deals with the thin capitalization of Belgian companies by 
disallowing the deduction of interest if the debt/equity ratio exceeds 5:1 and the payment is 
made from certain persons or to certain beneficiaries. Such rule is the result of a recent 
amendment mainly justified in the light of rendering the regime more effective. 
Indeed, under the rule previously in force, the disallowance of interest concerned the loans 
granted by resident lenders or lenders located in low-tax jurisdictions, which were not 
necessarily shareholders or members of the same group of the borrower. As such, the rule 
differed from the traditional regimes against the undercapitalization of companies, and 
showed the legislator’s aim to combat the shifting of taxable base towards low tax 
jurisdictions. At the same time, the high ratio provided (7:1) was able to render the 
provision ineffective. 
In the light of the foregoing, the new regulation
472
 resulting from the Law 29 March 2012 – 
and from some amendments made by the subsequent Law 22 June 2012 – has a 
significantly broader scope and a reduced ratio (5:1). 
                                                                                                                                                                                
3 doit être faite uniquement si la totalité des paiements effectués au cours de la période imposable atteint un 
montant minimum de 100.000 EUR. La déclaration est faite sur une formulaire dont le modèle est fixé par le 
Roi et est annexée à la déclaration visée à l'article 305, alinéa 1er.” The list of the low or non-existent tax 
jurisdictions is in Article 179 AR/CIR, and it includes: Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Andorre, Anguilla, Bahamas, 
Bahreïn, Bermudes, Iles Vierges britanniques, Iles CaymanDubaï, Fujairah, Guernesey, Jersey, Jéthou, 
Maldives, Ile de Man, Micronésie (Fédération de), Moldavie, Monaco, Monténégro, Nauru, Palau, Ras al 
Khaimah, Saint-Barthélemy, Sercq, Sharjah, Iles Turks-et-Caicos, Umm al Quwain, Vanuatu, Wallis-et-
Futuna. 
472
 In force from the 1
st
 July 2012. 
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As to the first aspect, the current rule concerns the interest on loans (i.e. any interest due in 
relation to financial arrangements
473
) which is granted to: a) a real beneficiary that is not 
subject to income tax or is, with respect to the interest, subject to a tax treatment that is 
considerably more favourable than the Belgian general tax regime; b) a real beneficiary 
that belongs to the same group
474
 of the borrower. Thus, the provision applies either to 
cross-borders situations where the beneficiary is established in a low-tax State, or to 
domestic situations, where the lender and the borrower belong to the same group. 
As to the second aspect, the legislator has fixed the debt/equity ratio at 5:1, which means 
that the disallowance of the interest deduction operates where, at any time during the 
taxable period, the amount of the debt as above delimitated exceeds five times the equity. 
The latter includes the sum of the taxed reserves at the beginning of the taxable period plus 
the paid-up capital at the end of the same period
475
. The disallowance covers only the 
amount of interest which corresponds to the debt in excess of the ratio.  
The provision includes a few exceptions, taking account of publicly issued financial 
securities, companies working in the financial sectors (but not for payments to tax havens), 
groups that centralize their infra-group financing activities in Belgium. 
Notably, the thin capitalization rule seems to include a number of specific presumptive 
provisions. 
For instance, when the previous provision was in force, it has been observed that the 
reference to the ‘real beneficiary’ in order to define the lender receiving the payment, 
might imply a presumption (of tax avoidance realized through conduit structures) where 
the interest is paid to a person or legal entity that is subject to a general tax regime on the 
interest received, and it passes on this income to a lender located in a low tax jurisdiction. 
This reading seems to force the literal data. It has to be observed, though, that the current 
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 As to the concept of debt, the provision explicitly excludes, in No 11, bonds issued by public offering and 
similar securities. It reads as follows: “11° sans préjudice de l'application des articles 54 et 55, les intérêts 
d'emprunts payés ou attribués si, et dans la mesure de ce dépassement, le montant total desdits emprunts, 
autres que des obligations ou autres titres analogues émis par appel public à l'épargne et autres que les 
emprunts octroyés par des établissements visés à l'article 56, § 2, 2°, excède cinq fois la somme des réserves 
taxées au début de la période imposable et du capital libéré à la fin de cette période: - soit, lorsque les 
bénéficiaires effectifs de ceux-ci ne sont pas soumis à un impôt sur les revenus ou y sont soumis, pour ces 
revenus, à un régime de taxation notablement plus avantageux que celui résultant des dispositions du droit 
commun applicables en Belgique; - soit, lorsque les bénéficiaires effectifs de ceux-ci font partie d'un groupe 
auquel appartient le débiteur». Notably, the provision clarifies that it does not prevail over Articles 54 and 
55 CIR, which deal respectively with the business expense’s and interest’s deductibility. 
474
 Defined by reference to the notion of affiliated company included in Article 11, Belgian Company Code. 
475
 It is also clarified that, for non-profit organisations subject to income tax, the paid-up capital is 
represented by the funds of the association as reported in the balance sheet. 
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format of Article 198, para 1, No 11, still refers to the ‘béneficiaire effectif’, presumably 
with the intent of avoiding the circumvention of the regime.  
Another presumptive measure is included in para 3, second indent, of Article 198, where it 
is stated that loans guaranteed or funded by a tainted third party, which in this way bears 
the risk, are deemed as being granted by this third party
476
. 
 
10.1.1  Thin capitalization and principle of equality. Constitutional Court No 
104/2013 
The anti-abuse presumptive rationale grounding the thin capitalization measures may be 
gathered by referring to a recent judgment of the Constitutional Court
477
 where the 
consistency with the equality principle was questioned. 
In particular, to be contended was the different treatment of the interest depending on 
whether the loan is granted to the company by an entity of the same group or an entity 
falling in the exceptions provided for by Article 198, para 1, No 11. In the former 
hypothesis, the interest deduction is disallowed, whereas in the second hypothesis, which 
includes publicly issued bonds and similar financial securities, the thin cap rule does not 
apply. 
The Court rejects the question by arguing from the objective character of the criterion in 
the light of which a distinction is drawn between different lenders (to simplify, private 
companies rather than public bodies). Such distinction rests on the quality of the lender and 
its relationship with the borrower. When it comes to intra-group loans, then the risks of 
abusive practices related to the regime of interest’s deductibility are higher. In this regard, 
the Court incidentally observes: “Puisque le législateur a entendu lutter contre les 
conséquences fiscales d’une sous-capitalisation destinée à réduire la base imposable de la 
société soumise à l’impôt sur les revenus, il n’est de surcroît pas sans justification 
raisonnable qu’il ait décidé d’exclure du calcul du ratio d’endettement certains emprunts 
qui, comme ceux obtenus via un appel public à l’épargne ou auprès d’institutions 
financières visées à l’article 56, § 2, du CIR 1992, peuvent être présumés, à la différence, 
notamment, de prêts «intra-groupe», avoir été conclus dans un objectif étranger à celui 
contre lequel le législateur entendait lutter. Pour le surplus, la partie requérante reste en 
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 Pursuant to which “En cas d'emprunts garantis par un tiers ou d'emprunts pour lesquels un tiers a 
procuré les moyens au créancier en vue du financement des emprunts, et qu'il subit en tout ou partiellement 
les risques liés aux emprunts, ce tiers est considéré être le bénéficiaire réel des intérêts de cet emprunt, 
lorsque cette garantie ou cette procuration de moyens a comme objectif principal l'évasion fiscale.” 
477
 Const. Court 9 July 2013, No 104. 
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défaut de démontrer quel autre type d’emprunts pourrait bénéficier d’une présomption 
analogue” 478 . The measure is accordingly found non-unreasonable and non-
disproportionate, given that the company is not prevented from being financed through 
intra-group loans, but it simply confines the interest’s deductibility within the ratio 5.1.  
In other words, the Court finds the thin capitalization measure, with particular regard to the 
distinction based on the quality of the lender, to be reasonable on the basis of the 
(reasonable) presumption that the existence of intra-group relationship between the 
borrower and the lender, together with the undercapitalization of the former, are indices of 
an abusive practice. In this context, the regime as drafted in Article 198, para 1, realizes a 
correct balance between the different interests in play: combating undercapitalization and 
abusive practices realized between related companies on the one side, and guaranteeing, 
though under certain limitations, the possibility of intra-groups loans on the other side. 
 
11. Conclusion 
The analysis of some of the most significant presumptive provisions in force in the Belgian 
tax system, with particular reference to VAT and income taxation, shows a symmetry with 
the Italian experience as to the use of legal presumptions. As a matter of fact, the scenario 
includes legal presumptions provided for in the context of the administrative proceedings, 
which are aimed at simplifying the assessment of the VAT, and to detect tax evasion or 
fraud. Though formulated in a quite general way, they do not limit the right of the taxpayer 
to give the proof to the contrary, so that he is able to avoid being taxed upon operations 
that are presumed to have been carried out but they did not (e.g. goods which were lost). 
There is, then, a number of general and specific anti-abuse rules aimed at combating the 
circumvention of national income tax legislation, facing both domestic situations and 
cross-border transactions. These provisions raise issues similar to those that have been 
presented when dealing with the Italian tax avoidance rules. Likewise, a classification of 
the presumptive provisions, which has to be done case by case, is essential in order to 
investigate who has to prove what. For instance, once classified Article 26 CIR, which, a.o., 
entitles the tax authorities to disregard the abnormal advantages granted to non-resident 
taxpayers located in low-tax States or foreign related taxpayers, as a rebuttable 
presumption of tax avoidance, then the taxpayer can prove the absence of any avoidance 
scheme. By contrast, if classified as an irrebuttable presumption of law, or even as a legal 
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definition of a situation that entitles the tax administration to the profits’ adjustment upon 
the resident taxpayer, then the latter would only be able to prove that no advantages were 
granted. In other words, the scope of the contrary proof is narrower in the second case. In 
the latter hypothesis, on the other hand, it would not be technically a contrary proof, but 
rather a proof in exoneration. Notably, the former interpretation is the one which has been 
supported by the Belgian Government in the SGI case before the EUCJ, and it was 
essential in the judgment of compatibility with the freedom of establishment. 
Thus a similar scenario exists in respect to the Italian tax system, but in part a different 
way of dealing with the concept of tax law presumptions. In fact, within the Belgian 
scholars there was not an in-depth discussion concerning the concept itself, meaning the 
role in the context of the administrative procedure, or the possible substantive effects on 
the definition of the tax obligation, or again the distinction with boundary concepts. It is 
significant, for instance, that Article 341 and 342 CIR are plainly deemed as being legal 
presumptions of law. Yet, as underlined above, at least some doubts should be raised on 
this classification, because the former lays down a very general inference and the latter 
entitles the tax authorities to assess the proceeds by means of mere statistical data. 
More recently, however, some scholars have underlined the importance of distinguishing 
between procedural provisions (and presumptions), which concern the exercise of the 
powers of assessment and inquiry by the tax administration, and provisions (and 
presumptive measures) of material law, which end up determining the tax event or the 
taxable base. This issue has been discussed with particular regard to Article 344, para 1, 
both under the previous versions and the formula currently in force. Furthermore, in the 
recent and articulated decision on the new formula, the Constitutional Court has excluded 
that it affects the definition of the tax event or taxable amount, being rather confined to the 
means of proof in the hands of the tax administration. 
Finally, the rulings of the Constitutional Court concerning legal presumptions are only a 
few. At any rate, from them we infer that the principal criterion of evaluation of legal 
presumptions is the principle of equality (and non-discrimination), which basically 
condenses the principle of reasonableness and the principle of proportionality. Again, it is 
under such principle that the possibility for the taxpayer to rebut the presumption is 
evaluated. 
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CONCLUSION 
The aim of this second chapter was to construe the national approach to tax law 
presumptions based on two national experiences. To this end, the legal orders of Italy and 
Belgium have been separately examined, taking into special consideration the 
constitutional context and the main presumptive provisions in force with a view to the 
subsequent analysis of the European Union context. 
As disclosed at the beginning of the Section I, the comparison between the two national 
experiences shows how a more ‘theoretical’ approach in the Italian context has contributed 
to an in-depth debate about the category of legal presumptions in the field of taxation, 
particularly under the aspect of the nature (whether substantive or procedural) and the 
distinction with similar notions. The substantial Italian Constitutional Court’s case law on 
the matter has represented the fuel of the debate and it gives an insight into the role and 
parameters of compatibility of tax law presumptions in the national legal order.  
Precisely by bearing such conceptual frame in mind, the Belgian experience has been 
examined. The approach shown by the doctrine to tax law presumptions has been defined 
to be more ‘pragmatic’. This observation does not concern the category of tax law 
presumptions per se, but it is rather based on the scantiness of an in-depth discussion about 
its role in relation to the contexts in which it is relevant
479
 and the possible consequences in 
terms of nature, effects, and distinction with notions other than fictions. In this regard, 
however, it has to be observed that the more recent doctrine shows a serious reflection on 
the nature of the single presumptive measure concerned and on the consequences in terms 
of compatibility with the Constitution. On the other side, the scant Belgian Constitutional 
Court’s case-law on tax law presumptions has certainly not helped a mature discussion of 
the issues arising from the concept at hand. Although the presumptions taken into 
consideration so far by the Court did not embody evident examples of infringement of the 
equality principle, the Constitutional Court appears to be still entrenched in its position of 
safeguarding the ‘fiscal interest’, sometimes barely debating the upheld reasonableness of 
the provision under examination, and mostly referring to the preparatory works. 
This having been said, and notwithstanding the differences that emerge from the reading of 
the sections dedicated to the two Member States, a few common points should be 
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underlined, which mark out the national approach to tax law presumptions in comparison 
to the EU approach which will be construed in the next chapter. 
The argumentative scheme used by the Italian and Belgian Constitutional Courts has a 
number of similarities, which reflect the common approach to tax law presumptions within 
the national doctrine and the case-law of the Supreme Courts. Both of the Constitutional 
Courts start from the acknowledgement of the fact that tax law presumptions safeguard the 
‘fiscal interest’, that is the interest of the State to the recovery of the tax due (in other 
words, the Treasury interest). This justifies different regulations of the limitations to the 
proof (legal presumptions included) when a tax obligation is at issue, in comparison to a 
civil law obligation
480
. Given the special character of the former (for the conditions of 
application and the aim sought), the principle of  equality (or non-discrimination) cannot 
be deemed as being infringed when a stricter set of rules is provided, in comparison to the 
treatment reserved for situations falling within civil law. On the contrary, the collective 
interest to the recovery of the tax concerned must be balanced with the other interests in 
play. This has been held by the Italian and Belgian Constitutional Courts on several 
occasions, mostly dealing with measures concerning the assessment and collection of the 
tax due. 
Notwithstanding this, the need to secure the tax recovery does not receive an absolute 
protection, but it rather finds a common limitation in the criterion of reasonableness. In the 
Italian legal order, such parameter is founded in the principles of equality and ability to pay, 
and it basically implies tax law presumptions to correspond to a rule of experience and be 
connected to indices concretely revealing the ability to pay. Similarly, in the Belgian tax 
system, such parameter stems from the principle of equality and non-discrimination, and 
entails tax law presumptions to be grounded on objective criteria and above all to be 
rational and proportional, in particular with a view to the aim pursued by the provisions 
including them. 
At any rate, either in the Italian legal order or in the Belgian one, the core of the evaluation 
of compatibility with the Constitutional values is represented by an ‘internal’ parameter, 
meaning a parameter which concerns the scheme of the presumption itself. The latter is 
tested under the point of its rationality (is it arbitrary, does it correspond to the normal 
course of events?) and suitability (is the measure proportionate, does it provide the proof to 
the contrary?) with respect to the purpose that the legislator pursues by providing it.  
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Ultimately, it must be observed that from the examination of the constitutional  case-law a 
very clear distinction of approaches depending on the context in which the tax law 
presumption is called to operate (within the assessment or recovery rather than at the 
substantive level) does not clearly emerge. Despite  this, the excursus of the main 
presumptive provisions currently in force has been undertaken by noting when the 
provision under examination concerned the powers of inquiry and assessment of the tax 
authorities, on the one side, and when it directly affected the position of the taxpayer, on 
the other side. In fact, both the Member States have recourse to tax law presumptions 
either for the purpose of alleviating the burden of the tax administration in terms of 
motivation of the tax decision and proof before the court, or for the purpose of 
conditioning the fruition of tax advantages (deductions, for instance) or avoiding the 
disregarding of the latter through tax regimes directly affecting the juridical position of the 
taxpayer and including presumptions.  
As said, the distinction is not much relevant under the perspective of the constitutional 
parameters of evaluation adopted, but rather under the possible ways in which the balance 
between the fiscal interest and the protection of the taxpayer should be developed.  
Firstly, tax law presumptions governing the powers of inquiries of the tax authorities, 
which are often placed among the rules of the assessment or the recovery of the tax, 
embody legitimate means aimed at simplifying the tax assessment and the ascertainment of 
tax evasion or avoidance by the tax authorities. A number of these kind of presumptions 
examined above are included in the area of VAT, and they allow the tax administration to 
infer from a certain circumstance set by the law (e.g. the absence of the merchandise in the 
place where the activity is carried out) the existence of non-declared operations (i.e. tax 
evasion). The main issue raised by these presumptions, in relation to the principles of 
equality, ability to pay and right if defence,  concern possibility to rebut the presumption 
and the limitation to such proof. In order to avoid the taxpayer being charged an amount of 
tax exceeding the amount concretely due, he should be enabled to give proof to rebut the 
presumption and the object of the contrary proof should be construed so as to secure the 
widest possibilities of defence for the taxpayer. Particularly when a harmonized tax like 
VAT is at issue, we will see how the defence rights broadly intended (thus, including the 
contrary proof and a judicial review) play a fundamental role in order to deem the national 
presumptive measure in line with the EU principles of proportionality and effectiveness. It 
is settled case-law of the EUCJ that “the basis of assessment is the consideration actually 
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received and the corollary of which is that the tax authorities may not in any 
circumstances charge an amount of VAT exceeding the tax paid by the taxable person”481. 
Finally, there are those presumptions or presumptive regimes that may directly and 
immediately affect the situation of the taxpayer. Many of them concern cross-border 
situations or transactions (e.g. limitation to the deduction of costs, transfer pricing), and in 
fact assume certain international elements as indices of tax avoidance or abusive practices. 
Such provisions and regimes need particularly to be checked under the point of view of the 
rationality of the discrimination that they create against situations or operations with an 
international component, as well as of the possible double-taxation effects. Moreover, 
given that they are commonly justified by the difficulties of inquiries by the tax 
administration facing cross-border situations and the (higher) risk of tax avoidance, 
evasion, or abuse, the taxpayer should be entitled to submit all the necessary documents 
required by tax authorities and to demonstrate that the presumed abusive practice does not 
occur in the concrete case.  
In this regard, it must be observed that, as underlined when dealing with the single 
provisions, the national legislator and even tax authorities pay increasing attention to the 
indications resulting from EU law and more in particular from the case-law of the EUCJ as 
regards anti-avoidance measures. As we will see, in this sense, the possibility for the 
taxpayer to effectively escape the application of the anti-avoidance measure limiting the 
exercise of a Treaty freedom, and to a judicial review, are essential in order to overcome 
the last step of the rule of reason. 
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 ECJ 3 July 1997, case c-330/95, Goldsmiths, at para 15, for which see infra, Chapter III. Cf. ECJ 23 
November 1988, case C-230/87, Naturally Yours Cosmetics, at para 16; ECJ 24 October 1996, case C-
317/94, Gibbs, at para 24. 
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National Tax Law Presumptions and EU Law 
 
 
Introduction 
The definition of the concept of tax law presumptions with all the related nuances and the 
outline of the national approach to the matter have been developed in view of the 
subsequent consideration of the European Union context.  
In this regard, it has to be noted at the outset that the difficulties met in dealing with tax 
law presumptions from a national perspective increase when turning to the European 
Union experience, wherein the line between substantive and procedural rules and the 
operating of presumptions on different levels become even more uncertain and it is 
overruled by the predominant interest related to the primacy and effective application of 
EU law. 
This first consideration encompasses also the key element in reading all the EUCJ 
jurisprudence on the matter and a steady point at the same time. 
Due to their own features, tax law presumptions are essential means for simplifying the 
assessment and securing the recovery of the tax due, normally to the disadvantage of the 
taxpayer. As such, at EU level they are mostly looked at under the perspective of the 
limitation to the opportunity of giving (counter) proof, which may affect the exercise of a 
certain EU right or freedom. In the light of this, they need to be scrutinized in view of the 
EU rules, principles, or objectives that are relevant in the main proceedings, in order to 
verify if they may be accepted. Generally speaking, the consistency is basically measured 
through the satisfying of the principle of effectiveness alongside the proportionality test. 
Obviously, these very general considerations need to be tested as regards different tax 
fields. Customs duties, VAT, the right of reimbursement of undue taxes levied in 
contravention of EU law and direct taxes represent micro-systems raising different issues 
and, to a certain extent, expressing their own standards. Hence, the divergent degree of 
harmonization reached in the tax fields covered by EU law  hints at dealing with them 
separately before drawing any (more general) conclusions. 
Prior to this examination, however, it is worthy to look briefly at the stage of minimum 
harmonization reached in the area of procedural law on the basis of settled case law. 
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This Chapter is divided as follows. Firstly, a general overview is offered of the EU law 
framework, in order to set the stage and give an insight in the rules, principles, and case 
law which are relevant for the purpose of discussing more in detail the issue of tax law 
presumptions in the single areas of EU law. The attention is addressed, in particular, to the 
principles of effectiveness and proportionality, and to the issue of the division of the 
burden of proof. Afterwards, two Sections follow, dealing respectively with Customs law 
and harmonized indirect taxes (Section I) and Direct taxation (Section II). Section I, after a 
brief introduction, is divided into three main parts. Part I deals with tax law presumptions 
in the field of Customs law, both provided by the Customs legislation, or included into 
national provisions. Part II concerns tax law presumptions, either substantive or procedural, 
provided in the area of VAT. Part III deals with the issue of the repayment of indirect taxes 
levied in breach of EU law and on the national presumption that they passed on to 
customers. Section II concentrates on tax law presumptions in Direct taxation, by 
examining the relevant case-law under the perspective of the possible justifications for the 
national restrictive measure. Finally, some general conclusions are drawn. 
 
1. EU law and procedural matters 
So far there has not been an overall consideration of the consistency of national tax 
presumptions with EU law. 
In fact, many commentators have focused on issues involving presumptions and resulting 
from single EUCJ decisions, such as distribution of the burden of proof or general 
presumptions of tax avoidance or abuse, without however the attempt to systematize the 
matter under a uniform perspective. 
The initial goal of the economic integration, meaning an internal (earlier “common”) 
market with the “elimination of all obstacles to intra-Community trade”, has enshrined a 
major concern on substantive rules of law – basically, the fundamental freedoms -  and 
principles - amongst which is the non-discrimination principle - whereas  slightly less 
attention has been paid to purely procedural law subjects. 
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This is, however, only amongst scholars and national authorities, as is confirmed by the 
minor number of procedural questions referred to the EUCJ by national courts, especially 
of some Member States, in the past
482
.  
On the contrary, the EUCJ jurisprudence shows to have immediately gathered the impact 
that procedural aspects may have on the enforcement of rights conferred to individuals and 
undertakings by Community law. It is needless to point out that the recognition of a certain 
right would be meaningless if each Member State – through its public institutions – could 
violate it, for instance by approving or retaining a provision in conflict or by hindering the 
access to the judicial system
483
. Hence, the availability of an EU right presupposes the 
primacy of EU law over national (even constitutional) and bilateral law and its 
unconditional enforcement into national legal orders, which among other things requires 
the taxpayer to be entitled to submit the possible violation before a national court on the 
same conditions as if it was a national right. 
Since  the Rewe and Comet rule
484
, the Court has affirmed thereof, in particular by 
developing the (procedural) principle of effectiveness of EU law. Such rule consists of a 
limitation to national procedural autonomy. As it is well known, due to the absence of EU 
procedural rules and the lack of harmonization, the enforcement of EU law is mostly left to 
each Member State, which autonomously has to designate the courts having jurisdiction 
and to lay down procedural rules regulating the protection of EC rights
485
. This, on 
condition that: 
                                                          
482
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Simplification, in The Influence of European Law on Direct Taxation, Recent and Future Developments, (ed.) 
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- national procedural rules governing the exercise of rights derived from EU law are 
not less favourable than those regulating the exercise of similar domestic rights; 
- national procedural rules governing the exercise of EU rights do not render 
practically impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of such rights. 
The first condition is known under the formula of principle of equivalence. Member States 
are not imposed upon to create an autonomous procedure for the enforcement of rights that 
taxpayers derive from EU law. Nevertheless, they are required to secure the same legal 
remedies and procedural rules set up for the protection of similar domestic rights
486
. In this 
way, the principle of equivalence embodies a sort of procedural non-discrimination 
principle, by prohibiting a different treatment of claims/appeals/objections based on 
Community law in respect of those grounding on domestic law.  
The second condition is aimed at securing EU rights to be effective in national legal orders, 
irrespective of the treatment of domestic comparable situations. It requests Member States 
to guarantee not only a formal protection to EU rights, but rather an actual protection so 
that the taxpayer is put in the condition to fully exercise the right he derives from EU law. 
Alongside the above conditions, the EUCJ often refers to the principle of effective judicial 
protection. 
It has been observed that it differs from the former consisting of limitations for being a 
positive standard
487
. From the EUCJ rulings its nature of general principle of Community 
law that derives from the common traditions of EU Member States results
488
.  Thus, 
                                                          
486
 A.o., ECJ 29 Oct. 2009, case C-63/08 Pontin. “The principle of equivalence requires that the national rule 
at issue be applied without distinction, whether the infringement alleged is of Community law or national law, 
where the purpose and cause of action are similar (...). In order to establish whether the principle of 
equivalence has been complied with, it is for the national court, which alone has direct knowledge of the 
procedural rules governing actions in the field of domestic law, to determine whether the procedural rules 
intended to ensure that the rights derived by individuals from Community law are safeguarded under 
domestic law comply with that principle and to consider both the purpose and the essential characteristics of 
allegedly similar domestic actions”.  
487
 M. Lang, Procedural rules in tax law in the context of European Union and Domestic law, cited above, at 
p. 18. 
488
 A.o., ECJ 15 April 2008, case C-268/2006, Impact. After having recalled that “It is the responsibility of 
the national courts in particular to provide the legal protection which individuals derive from the rules of 
Community law and to ensure that those rules are fully effective” (para 42), the Court defined the principle of 
effective judicial protection as a ‘general principle of Community law’ (par. 43) which is embodied by the 
requirements of equivalence and effectiveness (“Those requirements of equivalence and effectiveness, which 
embody the general obligation on the Member States to ensure judicial protection of an individual’s rights 
under Community law, apply equally to the designation of the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction to 
hear and determine actions based on Community law” at par. 47. See also ECJ 13 March 2007, case C-
432/05, Unibet, where it was ruled that “according to settled case-law, the principle of effective judicial 
protection is a general principle of Community law stemming from the constitutional traditions common to 
the Member States, which has been enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (...) and which has been reaffirmed by Article 47 of 
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despite the letter that would lead the interpreter to narrow it to the trial, it appears to be a 
comprehensive principle including both the equivalence and effectiveness criteria. At any 
rate, the outcome of its application is still the full effect of EU law, especially when the 
access to the court or tribunal and the protection before the latter is at issue. So that it ends 
up to be no more than a variation of the principle of effectiveness, from which it mainly 
differs as it is positively enshrined in Article 19, para 2, 2
nd
 indent, of the Treaty on 
European Union (hereafter TEU)
489
. 
In summary, given the absence of EU procedural rules and the lack of harmonization as to 
procedural law, the EUCJ has developed a number of principles in its rulings mainly aimed 
at securing the enforcement of EU rights into the single legal orders. It is in this framework 
that the EU approach to national tax presumptions is to set in, as the latter may undermine 
the enjoyment of EU rights by the European taxpayer. 
 
2. EU legal framework: the principle of sincere cooperation  
Some of the general principles developed by the EUCJ in order to secure the effective 
application of EU law in rulings where the enjoyment of EU rights was at issue or to fill in 
the gaps in matters where, albeit the competence rested on the Member States, a 
fundamental goal of the EU was to be jeopardized, find their basis in the principle of 
sincere cooperation. 
Such principle is provided for by Article 4, para 3, TEU, which after having stipulated that 
both the Union and the Member States have to cooperate by means of a mutual respect and 
assistance in order to pursue the objectives resulting from the Treaties (1
st
 indent), 
specifically puts on Member States a double obligation. They are indeed called upon to 
take any proper measure for the purpose of ensuring the fulfilment of the obligations 
deriving from primary EU law and in general from acts enacted by the EU institutions (2
nd
 
indent); moreover, the cooperation towards the achievement of the EU tasks has to be 
embodied also by avoiding any measure able to undermine such tasks (3
rd
 indent)
490
. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union, proclaimed on 7 December 2000 in nice (OJ 2000 
C 364, p. 1)” (para 37). The case is also the occasion to clarify that such principle does not impose on 
Member States to foresee a free-standing action for the purpose of disputing the compatibility of national 
provisions with Community law as long as the principles of equivalence and effectiveness are observed 
within the national legal orders providing for legal remedies. The nature of general principle of Community 
law was affirmed by the Court already in ECJ 15 Oct. 1987, C-222/86 Heylens. 
489
 By virtue of which “Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in 
the fields covered by Union law”. 
490
 See G. Tesauro, Diritto dell’Unione Europea, Assago, Cedam, 2010, 115 et ss. The principle has been 
explicitly regulated by virtue of Article 10 TCE and afterwards by Article 4, para3, TUE, following the 
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Clearly, it is a very comprehensive and articulated principle, from which the general 
obligation of each Member State to contribute to the implementation of EU law into their 
own legal orders arises. A general obligation that has been in turn filled in with content by 
the EUCJ by reference to primary or secondary law, whose application or execution within 
a domestic system was at issue. 
In fact, the principle of sincere cooperation together with Articles 2 and 19 TEU laying 
down the rule of law
491
 embody the legal basis on which the EUCJ has often relied within 
several matters. As a way of exemplifications, it has been referred to in order to ground an 
interpretation of national law in accordance with EU law or able to grant the “effet utile” of 
EU provisions, yet the State’s liability for damages caused to individuals by serious 
breaches of EU law or the review of definitive decisions based on a wrong 
application/interpretation of EU law. One of its main applications concerns the scope and 
effectiveness of the Union’s legal order and thereby the full efficacy of rights conferred to 
individuals by Unions, provisions
492
. Since for the enforcement of EU law the Union is still 
dependent on the national procedural law, Member States are requested to adopt all the 
measures necessary to guarantee such efficacy and to refrain from measures that might 
undermine its application. Such an obligation lies on all the powers and institutions of the 
State’s organization, albeit the responsibility for infringement of EU law is always borne 
by the central State according to settled case law
493
. Among those bodies, national tax 
administration and tax courts are requested to observe the principle of sincere cooperation 
and accordingly to interpret and apply EU law in such a way that guarantees its full 
efficacy. 
 
3. The principle of effectiveness (in the wide sense)  
It has been observed that “‘first generation’ general concepts of EU law, such as direct 
effect in the national legal order and primacy of EU law over national and bilateral law, 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Treaty of Lisbon. Originally, due also to the absence of a normative rule, it did not have a clear autonomy in 
respect of the substantive provisions to which it was linked. Subsequently, it has vested in the practice the 
role of autonomous parameter of legitimacy. “It mostly applies when the attainment of an objective fixed in 
the Treaty requests a coordinated exercise of competences both of Union’s institutions and national ones”.  
491
 Article 2 TUE lists the values on which the Union is founded including the rule of law. Article 19 dealing 
with the composition and tasks of the European Court of Justice states that “It shall ensure that in the 
interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed” (par. 1, 2nd indent). 
492
 A.o. ECJ 11 July 2000, case C- 62/00, Marks & Spencer I. 
493
 A.o. see ECJ 30 Sept. 2003, case C-224/01, Köbler; ECJ 13 June 2006, case C-173/2003, Traghetti del 
Mediterraneo.  
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seem to have converged into an even more general ‘second generation’ and overarching 
concept of EU law: the principle of effectiveness of EU law”494. 
Once having successfully affirmed that EU rules which are clear, precise and unconditional 
may be relied on by individuals and undertakings before national courts or public 
institutions and that they take priority over national (and bilateral as well) provisions 
contrary to them, the EUCJ has turned to deal with the effects of EU law within national 
legal orders and the hindrances to its full application. 
If the issues of direct effect and primacy concern the relationship between legal sources 
enacted by institutions at different levels and are typical – though with peculiarities – of 
structured international organizations, the principle of effectiveness is an autonomous 
parameter peculiar to the EU experience. The scope of such principle extends to request 
the efficacy of EU law even when it is not unconditional - for instance, through the 
consistent interpretation -, to question national fundamental principles such as the res 
judicata, and in general to directly impact on a non-harmonized matter like procedural law. 
In fact, notwithstanding that in a number of decisions the EUCJ leaves the judge of the 
main proceedings to rule on the suitability of the national provision to secure the actual 
exercise of the EU right or principle relevant in the main case, it gives all the indications 
necessary to decide the pending dispute in such a way that its effectuation is safeguarded 
as fully as possible. 
The principle of effectiveness is not confined to the procedural meaning but within the 
literature it is also referred to in order to cover several mechanisms aimed at guaranteeing 
the full efficacy of EU law. In this sense, which coincides with the ‘effet utile doctrine’, it 
includes, apart from the procedural principle of effectiveness, the principles of primacy, 
direct effect, consistent interpretation, State liability
495
. 
The EUCJ rulings show a frequent use of this principle under both of the meanings
496
 
when dealing with national tax presumptions, as will be explored further below. 
 
                                                          
494
 B.G.M. Terra, B.J. Wattel, European tax law, 6 ed., Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 2012, 
113. “All public institutions of Member States must ensure, any which way but effectively, if necessary of 
their own motion, that EU law is applied and enforced in their national legal order as fully as possible”. 
495
 See B.G.M. Terra and B.J. Wattel, European tax law, cited above, 113-114. 
496
 Though in the jargon of the ECJ no distinctions between a procedural and a substantive principle of 
effectiveness can be found. 
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3.1 Procedural principle of effectiveness and procedural rule of reason  
From the Rewe and Comet doctrine, grounding the procedural principle of effectiveness, it 
also follows that national procedural provisions may, by way of exception to such principle, 
restrict the possibility to exercise rights conferred by EU law under certain conditions. 
Apparently, within the various decisions concerning the repayment of taxes levied in 
breach of EU law
497
, the EUCJ has put forward a procedural rule of reason under which are 
evaluated the possible justifications to procedural restrictive measures. 
Similarly to the judgments where the substantive rule of reason applies, the reasoning is 
developed through three main steps, following the recognition of the conflict of the 
measure at issue with EU law: 
- that measure is indiscriminately restrictive, meaning that it limits claims made 
either under national or EU law; 
- there is a ‘mandatory requirement of general interest’ which is worthy of protection, 
such as legal certainty, the prevention of unjust enrichment or other principles of 
good administration; 
- the restriction is reasonable, in the sense that it does not go beyond what is 
necessary in order to safeguard the relevant interest and embodies a balancing 
between the effectiveness of EU law and the general interest relevant in the 
pending case. 
To illustrate its application, the decisions of the EUCJ on national time-limits in order to 
bring an action for repayment of undue VAT may be referred to. Among these, in Marks 
and Spencer I the Court was asked about the compatibility of a national legislation that 
retroactively curtailed the period of time within which the repayment of VAT collected in 
breach of the Sixth Directive could be claimed with the principles of effectiveness and 
protection of legitimate expectations. The Court held that such a legislation was not per se 
inconsistent with the principle of effectiveness on condition that the new limitation period 
be reasonable and that a transitional arrangement be provided for the taxpayer retroactively 
deprived – or given a too short period of time - of the right to repayment that was 
previously enjoyed. This was not the case, as the UK legislation under examination 
reduced from six to three the time-limit to lodge the claim and extended its application not 
only to subsequent claims, but also to claims made between the date of its enactment and 
                                                          
497
 As regards case-law on presumptions that the indirect tax has passed on to customers, see infra. 
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the date of its entry into force and furthermore to those lodged before the date of entry into 
force and still pending. 
Similarly to a number of other cases, the possible justification and the proportionality test 
enter the evaluation of the possible restrictive nature of the national measure. It was held, 
indeed, that “Member States are required as a matter of principle to repay taxes collected 
in breach of Community law (...), and whilst the Court has acknowledged that, by way of 
exception to that principle, fixing a reasonable period for claiming repayment is 
compatible with Community law, that is in the interests of legal certainty (...). However, in 
order to serve their purpose of ensuring legal certainty limitation periods must be fixed in 
advance (...)”. 
Thus, a national provision restricting the procedural possibility to exercise a repayment 
right deriving from EU law may be held compatible with the latter only as long as the 
time-limit introduced is reasonable and it is justified in the light of the legal certainty. After 
having found the national legislation in contrast with the Sixth Directive and clarified to 
what extent the satisfying of interests other than the effectiveness may render the former 
compatible with EU law, the EUCJ considered the justification raised by the UK 
government. The arguments based on the attempt of striking a balance between the 
individual and the public interest and on the budget planning were rejected, as in the main 
proceedings they would have implied a full denial of the right conferred to individuals by 
Community law. 
More in general, the EUCJ has on several occasions held that “every case in which the 
question arises as to whether a national procedural provision makes the application of 
Community law impossible or excessively difficult must be analysed by reference to the 
role of that provision in the procedure, its progress and its special features, viewed as a 
whole, before the various national bodies. For those purposes, account must be taken, 
where appropriate, of the basic principles of the domestic judicial system, such as 
protection of the rights of defence, the principle of legal certainty and the proper conduct 
of procedure (...)”498. Hence, the Court requests an overall consideration of the procedural 
national provision, which has to be set in the context relevant to the main proceedings. The 
foregoing includes the consideration of national procedural principles which might justify 
the domestic provision whose consistency with EU law is called into question. Principles 
                                                          
498
 ECJ 6 October 2009, case C-40/08, Asturcom Telecomunicaciones, paragraph 39. See also ECJ 1 July 
2010, C-35/09, (Paolo Speranza), in particular paragraph 43; ECJ 14 December 1995, Peterbroeck, in 
particular paragraph 14. 
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that are not necessarily in opposition to the principle of effectiveness, as the reference 
made by the EUCJ to the right of defence shows. 
 
3.1.1 Principle of effectiveness and administrative proceedings 
The scope of the (procedural) principle of effectiveness not only concerns the judicial 
protection (in a narrow sense), but it is extended so as to cover the administrative 
proceedings, meaning the procedure conducted by the tax administration prior to the 
issuing of the tax decision affecting the position of the taxpayer. It is clear, indeed, that the 
duty to safeguard the effective application of EU law is borne by the tax administration as 
well. 
In this regard, the ruling of the EUCJ in the Sopropè case is worthy of attention, as it 
concerns the effectiveness of the right of defence within an administrative procedure in the 
field of customs duty.  
The EUCJ was questioned as to whether a period of eight days granted to a Portuguese 
company by the Customs authority to submit its observation prior to the recovery of import 
duty for incorrect clearing of goods imported from Cambodia was compatible with the 
requirements of Community law, and in particular with the general principle of respect for 
the right of defence. In the case of the proceedings, the opportunity for the importer to be 
heard by Customs authorities had followed an inspection whose findings had been rushed 
into a report and was prior to the decision on the recovery that was taken only five days 
after the submission of observations and expiration of that period. 
After having asserted its jurisdiction on the referred preliminary ruling, given that the 
national rules at issue enter the scope of Community law and their compatibility with a 
fundamental right the observance of which the Court ensures is questioned
499
, the Court 
held that (paras 36 to 38): 
“Observance of the rights of the defence is a general principle of Community law which 
applies where the authorities are minded to adopt a measure which will adversely affect an 
individual. 
In accordance with that principle, the addressees of decisions which significantly affect 
their interests must be placed in a position in which they can effectively make known their 
                                                          
499
 ECJ 18 December 2008, case C-349/07 (Sopropè). “Since the questions referred for a preliminary ruling 
concern the procedures to be followed by national authorities when applying the Community Customs Code, 
the Court has jurisdiction to provide the national court with all the criteria of interpretation required by that 
court to determine whether the national rules at issue are compatible with the fundamental rights the 
observance of which the Court ensures”. 
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views as regards the information on which the authorities intend to base their decision. 
They must be given a sufficient period of time in which to do so (see, inter alia, 
Commission v Lisrestal and Others, paragraph 21, and Mediocurso v Commission, 
paragraph 36). 
The authorities of the Member States are subject to that obligation when they take 
decisions which come within the scope of Community law, even though the Community 
legislation applicable does not expressly provide for such a procedural requirement. As 
regards the implementation of that principle and, in particular, the periods within which 
the rights of the defence must be exercised, it must be stated that, where those periods are 
not, as in the main proceedings, fixed by Community law, they are governed by national 
law on condition, first, that they are the same as those to which individuals or 
undertakings in comparable situations under national law are entitled and, secondly, that 
they do not make it impossible in practice or excessively difficult to exercise the rights of 
defence conferred by the Community legal order.” 
The Court recognized that Member States are permitted to introduce national legislation or 
regulations governing precise time-limits in the context of administrative procedures, 
which also safeguard the principle of equal treatment. When facing a matter that comes 
within the scope of Community law, it is up to them, as they  are closer to the public and 
private interests worthy of consideration, to fix those periods of time. In particular, with 
reference to post-clearance recovery of customs import duties, the time range given to the 
taxpayer to exercise the right to a prior hearing (not less than 8 days and not greater than 
15) does not per se make it impossible or excessively difficult to exercise the right of 
defence conferred by Community law. Accordingly, the decision on whether in the case of 
the main proceedings such time-limit to submit observations is enough in order to 
guarantee the effectiveness of its rights of defence is left to the national court, which for 
this purpose has to take into consideration all the circumstances specific to the case, such 
as the size of the undertakings and the fact that they are professionals having recourse to 
importation on a regular basis, the relations with the local authorities of the country from 
which the importation is carried out or the course of the inspection procedure that might 
weigh upon the actual possibility to produce observations on time.  
From this ruling it follows that the Community law requirements – in primis, the principle 
of effectiveness – entail national tax administrations to be obliged to hear the taxpayer 
whenever it is to take a decision that comes within the scope of Community law and is able 
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to be prejudicial to the taxpayer’s interests. The latter has to be put in the condition to fully 
exercise his right of defence by contesting the data on which the draft decision is grounded 
prior to being taken. As a consequence, the principle of effectiveness applied to time-limits 
given to exercise the right of defence implies not only the possibility for the taxpayer to 
appeal a decision issued by the customs authorities, but also to be heard prior to such 
decision and its observation to be considered in the final decision. 
It has been observed that whether the foregoing can extended so as to cover tax fields other 
than customs duty remains to be seen
500
. In other words, one could wonder if the ‘decisions 
that come within the scope of Community law’ are only those concerning Customs law501. 
In this regard, it cannot be disregarded that customs duties are regulated at EU level, whose 
legislation inter alia provides that undertakings must be able to furnish proof, for the 
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 See B.G.M. Terra, B.J. Wattel, European tax law, cited above, 51: “It will be interesting to see which 
national decisions are covered by this judgment, i.e. which decisions ‘come within the scope of Union law’. 
Cf. in the field of customs duties, ECJ 12 December 2002, C-395/2000, C-395/2000, Cipriani. At para 51 the 
Court held that “Respect for the rights of defence, as the Court has frequently held, is in all proceedings 
initiated against a person which are liable to culminate in a measure adversely affecting that person and, in 
particular, in proceedings which may lead to the imposition of penalties, a fundamental principle of 
Community law which must be guaranteed even in the absence of any rules governing the proceedings in 
question. That principle requires that the addressees of decisions which significantly affect their interests 
should be placed in a position in which they may effectively make known their views (Case C-32/95 P 
Commission v Listestai and Others [1996] ECR I-5373, paragraph 21, and Case C-462/98 P Mediocurso v 
Commission [2000] ECR I-7183, paragraph 36).” 
501
 In this regard, some indications in the field of direct taxation emerges from the very recent case EUCJ, 22 
October 2013, case C-276/12, Jiří Sabou, where the appellant claimed his right to be heard in the context of a 
request for assistance from his Member State to another Member State. The Court confirmed that the 
Directive No 77/799 does not confer specific rights to the taxpayers. It held (para 36): “It is thus apparent 
from an examination of Directive 77/799, the purpose of which is to govern cooperation between the tax 
authorities of Member States, that it coordinates the transfer of information between competent authorities 
by imposing certain obligations on the Member States. The directive does not, however, confer specific rights 
on the taxpayer (see Twoh International, paragraph 31), and in particular it does not lay down any 
obligation for the competent authorities of the Member States to consult the taxpayer”. Then, it echoed its 
ruling in the case Sopropé, where it held that “the rights of the defence is a general principle of European 
Union law which applies where the authorities are minded to adopt a measure which will adversely affect an 
individual (see Sopropé, paragraph 36). In accordance with that principle, the addressees of decisions which 
significantly affect their interests must therefore be placed in a position in which they can effectively make 
known their views as regards the information on which the authorities intend to base their decision (see, 
inter alia, C-32/95 P Commission v Lisrestal and Others [1996] ECR I-5373, paragraph 21, and Sopropé, 
paragraph 37). The authorities of the Member States are subject to that obligation when they take decisions 
which come within the scope of European Union law, even though the European Union legislation applicable 
does not expressly provide for such a procedural requirement (see Sopropé, paragraph 38, and Case 
C-383/13 PPU G and R [2013] ECR I-0000, paragraph 35)” (para 38). However, it concluded that the 
respect of the right to be heard, and in general the right of defence, “does not require that the taxpayer should 
take part in the request for information sent by the requesting Member State to the requested Member State. 
Nor does it require that the taxpayer should be heard at the point when inquiries, which may include the 
examination of witnesses, are carried out in the requested Member State or before that Member State sends 
the information to the requesting Member State” (para 44). It must be noted, though, that the tax decision at 
hand in this case was not directly detrimental to the taxpayer, as it concerned the request for information. 
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purposes of inspection, of the lawfulness of all the transactions that they have carried out
502
. 
Moreover, as recalled by the EUCJ in the decision under discussion, the interest of the 
European Community “in recovering its own revenue as soon as possible mean that 
inspections must be capable of being carried out promptly and effectively”503. As customs 
duties are part of the EU’s own resources, clearly the interest of the Union in the recovery 
of such amounts comes into play in the balance of interests relevant in the main 
proceedings. 
 
4. The Community Customs Code and the administrative cooperation between 
Member States in tax matters as a procedural law harmonization pattern: a brief 
outline 
The lack of harmonization in the field of procedural law undergoes two main exceptions. 
The first one is embodied by customs duties, as  can be foreseen from the reflections laid 
down at the end of the previous paragraph. Except for merely implementing national 
measures, customs duties are currently regulated at EU level by a regulation laying down 
the Community Customs Code
504
. Such legislation covers not only all the events 
concerning the customs duty, meaning the origin, expiration, amendment, repayment, 
remission and so on, but also pure procedural matters. It regulates, on the one hand, the 
formalities to be accomplished by the taxpayer such as the customs declaration, and on the 
other hand, the controls, the decisions relating to the application of customs legislation, the 
appeals against those decisions. Though the controls of trade, the assessment, the recovery 
of customs duty and the treatment of possible tax litigations are decentralised, the 
procedures are envisaged and a minimum standard of common requirements are drawn at 
EU level. In fact, the formalities are performed at and the decisions are taken by national 
customs authorities as well as appeals are brought in front of national designated body, but 
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 Pursuant to the recital N° 13 to the Regulation N° 450/08 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 23 April 2008 laying down the Community Customs Code (Modernised Customs Code) “In accordance 
with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, it is necessary, in addition to the right of 
appeal against any decision taken by the customs authorities, to provide for the right of every person to be 
heard before any decision is taken which would adversely affect him”. 
503
 Para 41 of the judgment. 
504
Regulation (EEC) No 2913/1992 of the European Parliament and the Council. It has to be said that since 
the 30
th
 
 
of October 2013 the Regulation No 952/2013 is in force and it is a recast of the Regulation (EC) No 
450/08, which was thought to replace the Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 
establishing the Community Customs Code, in order to adapt customs legislation to the electronic 
environment for customs and trade and at the same time to re-organize the customs rules and processes so as 
to render them simpler. However, the new Regulation will aplly entirely only from 2016. 
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in accordance with the procedures – including time-limits, for instance -, and rules laid 
down by the above Regulation and by the implementing regulation. 
In the light of the foregoing, the overview of the EUCJ case law will be conducted in this 
chapter starting from the field of customs duties. It is indeed worthy of attention the way 
the Court deals with tax presumptions inserted in a field wherein the rules and procedures 
are of the Union, albeit embryonic for certain aspects and whose application is still under 
the competence of national administrations. 
The second exception is represented by the administrative cooperation between Member 
States as to the assessment and recovery in their own territory of taxes involving cross-
border situations, though the legislation concerned does not seek to harmonize national 
substantive tax law or procedural law. 
The internationalization and the increasing mobility of taxpayers and productive factors 
have stressed the need for a wider cooperation between different administrative authorities 
in order to cope with tax fraud and avoidance, profits shifts through intra-group transfer 
price adjustments, fictitious establishment of the fiscal residence of (especially legal) 
persons or deduction of cross-border payments and similar irregularities. In other words, 
the development of the internal market wherein goods, services, persons and capital can 
freely move, has enlarged the risk of tax abuse and non-payment of taxes due (double non-
taxation) which are likely to remain undetected when the transaction, the economic activity 
or in general the situation concerned is related to two or more Member States. 
In fact, each State’s sovereignty, which entails the power to gather and ask for 
information/documentation on the taxpayer assessed, to inspect the account and run 
investigations or on-the-spot inspection, to recover the tax due, to attach immovable 
property because of unpaid tax claims or as a precautionary/conservative measure and so 
on, is confined to the territory of the State itself and cannot be exercised outside the 
borders. On the other hand, as a rule Member States are prevented by the TFEU from 
introducing in their national legal orders tax measures that discriminate cross-border 
situations from merely domestic ones or restrict the fundamental freedoms without 
proportionate justification. Nor are the arguments based on the need to tackle tax evasion 
or to secure the effectiveness of fiscal supervision per se enough to justify a restrictive tax 
measure, especially when disproportionate
505
. 
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 As regards the suitability of such arguments to justify national presumptive measures restrictive on 
fundamental freedoms, see infra. 
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Not surprisingly, alongside the EU initiatives on the matter of administrative cooperation – 
discussed below - several legal instruments can be counted at international level involving 
different States and promoting exchange of (tax) information, transparency and hindrance 
of distort conditions of competition. Inter alia, the OECD Model Convention includes 
Articles 26 and 27 respectively dealing with the exchange of information between the 
competent authorities of the contracting States and the assistance on the matter of the 
recovery of taxes, meaning every kind of tax due to a contracting State and including 
interest, administrative penalties and costs related to the collection. Article 27 was inserted 
in the model in 2003, so that the “new generation” tax treaties also cover  cooperation in 
the recovery of tax claims. Article 26 has been amended several times, the latest in 2012 in 
order to broaden the possible use of information gathered and it currently excludes that a 
contracting State’s refusal of cooperation be based on bank secrecy. 
Notwithstanding that the changes to the model convention have raised the standard of 
cooperation proposed, the drawback is the bilateral character of such legal instrument, the 
tax treaty being binding only for the contracting States
506
. 
 
5. Administrative cooperation at EU level ... 
International legal instruments on administrative cooperation are overruled – in the event 
of overlapping -   by tools devised at EU level, which are the most far-reaching 
cooperation tools up to the present standard. This can be asserted especially after the very 
recent recast of the legislation of the Union on the matter, i.e. the EU Cooperation and 
Recovery Directives and the EU VAT, excises and customs duties information Regulations. 
The former Community framework for administrative cooperation was mainly embodied 
by the Directive 77/799/EEC regulating the mutual assistance in the area of direct taxation 
and covering also VAT and excise duties respectively from 1979 and 1992 until the 
Regulation No 1798/2003 EC in the field of VAT and Regulation No 2073/2004 EC in the 
area of excise duties were inserted, and lastly the Council Regulation No 515/97 in the 
field of customs and agricultural matters which is currently applicable
507
. 
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 Actually, at international level there are other legal instruments having a multilateral character, though 
they do not involve all the EU Member States. Among these, the Multilateral Convention on Mutual 
Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (MAATM Convention), drawn up in 1988 by the Committee of 
Experts of the Council of Europe (CoE) and the Committee on Fiscal Affairs of the OECD. See B.G.M. Terra 
and B.J. Wattel, European tax law, cited above, at 841-842. 
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 Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97 of 13 March 1997 on mutual assistance between the administrative 
authorities of the Member States and cooperation between the latter and the Commission to ensure the correct 
application of the law on customs and agricultural matters. 
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The first instrument in particular, however, has shown, as far back as its introduction, 
several critical aspects, which have affected its effective application by the competent tax 
authorities of the Member States
508
. It had indeed a relatively limited scope, which was 
confined to the cooperation in view of the correct assessment of direct taxes. For this 
purpose, it provided for three main procedures, that is the exchange on request (Article 2), 
the automatic exchange of information (Article 3) and the spontaneous exchange of 
information (Art. 4) facing some delicate situations involving anomalies or tax base 
erosion and profit shifting. As to the first procedure, which is so far the one with the widest 
range of uses, the requested Member States were not obliged to deliver the information 
facing a series of circumstances laid down in Article 8. The assistance could indeed be 
alternatively refused when (a) the Member State requested was prevented from running the 
enquiries or collecting the data demanded for its own purposes under its law or 
administrative practices, (b) the forwarding of that information would have led to the 
disclosure of a commercial, industrial or professional secret, a commercial process, or of 
information whose divulgation would have been contrary to the public policy, or (c) finally 
when the requiring State would have been, if requested, unable to provide the same 
information. Moreover, in Article 2 it was clarified that the request of information could be 
complied with only if it appeared that the competent authorities of the requesting State had 
not exhausted its own sources and means to get the relevant information. 
Not surprisingly, these restraints - above all, the ones set out in Article 8 - to an actual 
exchange of information have often been acknowledged by the EUCJ in its rulings, in 
accordance with the arguments put forward by the governments in order to strengthen the 
justification grounding on the need to secure the effectiveness of fiscal supervision and to 
confute the counter-justification embodied by the possibility for the national tax authorities 
to have recourse to the mechanism of the exchange of information. 
In the light of this, with the purpose of rectifying the weaknesses emerging in the concrete 
application, the Assessment Assistance Directive has been amended several times, 
basically in a double direction. On the one side, its scope has been extended to taxes other 
than direct ones, like VAT, excise duties and taxation of insurance premiums, though after 
the introduction of dedicated Regulations for indirect taxes it has been conceived as 
focusing on the taxation of income, capital and insurance premiums only. On the other side, 
                                                          
508
 Critical on the real efficacy of the rules concerning the mutual assistance in tax matters G. Marino, La 
cooperazione internazionale in materia tributaria, tra mito e realtà, Rass. Trib., 2010, 433 et seq. 
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particularly by virtue of Directive 2004/56/EC
509
, the procedure for gathering information 
has been speeded up and supplemented with provisions on notification to the addressee of 
a decision issued by the administrative authorities of the requesting Member State and on 
simultaneous controls when two or more Member States share the interest for the tax 
situation of a person liable to tax. Finally, in 2011 the Directive No 77/799 was replaced 
with a new directive on administrative cooperation (Directive 2011/16/EU) to be 
implemented before 1 January 2013, which, among the other things, covers all national 
taxes (except for VAT, customs and excise duties) and concerns “information that is 
foreseeably relevant to the administration and enforcement of the domestic [tax] laws”, 
removes the exception of the bank secrecy, broadens the possible use of the information 
gathered and the cases wherein the automatic exchange of information applies, simplifies 
and standardizes the other procedures like the simultaneous controls, introduces time limits 
for the execution of the request. Notably, the hypotheses when the refusal of cooperation is 
possible are reduced and rendered narrower; in fact, in Article 17 they are confined to the 
following: (a) the requiring State has not exhausted its own sources of information, (b) the 
requested State is prevented from its own statutory law (banking secrecy excluded), (c) the 
applying State would be legally unable to provide similar information if requested, (d) the 
forwarding of the information would cause the disclosure of a commercial, industrial, 
professional secret or a commercial process, or would be contrary to the public policy. 
A similar evolution has concerned the administrative cooperation on tax recovery, wherein 
the Directive No 2010/24/EU, to be implemented before 1 January 2012, has replaced the 
former Directive No 76/308/EEC that, initially conceived for the assistance in the recovery 
of the Union’s own resources, had been gradually extended so as to cover VAT and excise 
duties (from 1979), and also direct taxes (from 2001) 
510
. As with the new Administrative 
Cooperation Directive, the New Recovery Directive has a broader scope (all taxes and 
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 Council Directive 2004/56/EC of 21 April 2004 amending Directive 77/799/EEC concerning mutual 
assistance by the competent authorities of the Member States in the field of direct taxation, certain excise 
duties and taxation of insurance premiums. 
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 On 18 November 2011 the Commission adopted a new Regulation laying down detailed provisions to 
implement the new Council Directive: Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1189/2011 of 18 
November 2011 laying down detailed rules in relation to certain provisions of Council Directive 2010/24/EU 
concerning mutual assistance for the recovery of claims relating to taxes, duties and other measures. As said 
in the text, Council Directive 76/308 EEC originally covering agricultural levies and customs duties as 
sources of Community revenue, was later extended to VAT (Council Directive 79/1071/EEC), excise duties 
(Council Directive 92/108/EEC), taxes on income and capital and taxes on insurance premiums (Council 
Directive 2001/44/EC). Afterwards, a codified version of this legislation was adopted on 26 May 2008 
(Council Directive 2008/55/EC on mutual assistance of claims relating to certain levies, duties, taxes and 
other measures) and detailed implementation arrangements were laid down in Commission Regulation (EC) 
1179/2008. 
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duties levied by or on behalf of a Member State or of the Union)
511
 and possible uses of the 
information gathered in comparison to the forerunner; it does not allow the requested 
Member State to base a refusal on the banking secrecy. More  generally, it is intended to 
render the procedure of recovery assistance more efficient, also by providing for a single 
European enforcement instrument. 
Again, with the purpose of rendering the administrative cooperation more effective in the 
domain of indirect taxation, the above-mentioned Regulation No 1798/2003/EC has been 
recasted into the Regulation No 904/2010/EU on administrative cooperation and 
combating fraud in the field of valued added tax, in force since 1 January 2012, which 
envisages common rules and procedures for administrative cooperation and information 
exchange between national competent authorities in order to correctly apply VAT and 
tackle fraud
512
. In the field of excise duties it is still to be adopted – in 2011 the 
Commission  issued a proposal for a revised regulation - the new Regulation on 
administrative cooperation, being in particular necessary to coordinate the currently 
applicable Regulation No 2073/2004 cited above with the computerised Excise Movement 
and Control System (EMCS) introduced in 2010. 
 
5.1 ... and the division of the burden of proof 
The brief excursus of the relevant legislation governing the administrative cooperation 
between competent authorities of Member States is not intended to be descriptive, as this 
would go further than the scope of this dissertation, but rather to highlight that purely 
procedural aspects are more and more catching the attention of the European Institutions 
(both Council and Commission, the latter responsible for the implementation of the 
measures) with the aim of improving and rendering effective a mechanism that so far has 
not worked very well in terms of concrete use by the tax administration and above all 
practical results. The informative isolation of the Member States as to the tax situation of 
taxpayers enjoying one of the fundamental freedoms or carrying out a trade involving two 
or more of them, coupled with the increasing tax avoidance, evasion or even fraud scheme, 
cannot be coped with other than at a higher level. Leaving the issues related to the lack of 
knowledge on the side of the tax authorities in the hands of the single legal orders would 
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 Cf. Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) of 31 January 2012, No 79, laying down detailed rules 
for implementing certain provisions of Council Regulation (EU) No 904/2010 concerning administrative 
cooperation and combating fraud in the field of valued added tax.  
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be likely to turn  the recourse to measures into a disproportionate increase of the 
administrative (documentary, probative) burdens on the taxpayers exercising a certain EU 
right. 
In other terms, the most recent amendments or recast of the administrative cooperation 
instruments evidently shows the concerns of the European institutions about their efficacy 
and are readable in the light of the need to modernize the mechanism of mutual assistance 
between tax administrations and strengthen those tools in order to live up to the growth of 
tax avoidance and tax fraud when cross-border situations are concerned. 
In addition, it cannot be disregarded that much pressure has come as a way as to improve 
the chances of exchanging information or documents and assisted recovery, by the EUCJ 
rulings dealing with the distribution of the burden of proof between national tax authorities 
and taxpayer in not-merely-domestic situations. There is a link between the opportunities 
of the national tax administrations to gather information from the foreign Member State 
and the possible justifications to restrictions on the taxpayers’ rights or freedoms 513 . 
Generally speaking, the more the former is enabled to directly obtain such information, the 
less a legislation restricting on a fundamental freedom – e.g through the setting out of an 
irrebuttable presumption – is likely to be considered a proportionate provision aimed at 
securing the effectiveness of fiscal supervision. In other words, if a Member State 
introduces or maintains a tax presumption that is restrictive on a fundamental freedom, the 
justification based on the need to secure the effectiveness of fiscal supervision is likely to 
be rejected if the mechanism of the mutual assistance works and the limits are reduced. 
This, even though, as we will see, from a  number of cases it results that the EUCJ 
excludes the right of the taxpayer to ask the tax administration to make use of the 
administrative cooperation instruments and an obligation of the latter to use them. In 
addition, it often refers to the possibility of the tax authorities to request from taxpayer 
himself the necessary information, thereby showing to accept an alteration of the burden of 
proof. 
In the previous chapter of this dissertation, it has been sufficiently stressed  how legal 
presumptions live up to the deficit of knowledge on the side of the tax administration,  the 
taxpayer being the most aware of the tax obligation’s constitutive elements and the one 
closer to the relevant information. Therefore, whereas normally the burden of proof as to 
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 Cf. F. Amatucci, The enlargement duties to  co-operate of taxpayers and the reversal of the burdne of 
proof, in Mutual Assistance and Information Exchange, (eds.) R. Seer and I. Gabert, EATLP International 
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the tax debt lies on tax authorities, the mechanism of legal presumptions causes the shift on 
the taxpayer of such burden (in the event of rebuttable presumptions) or the substantive 
definition of the matter without any opportunity for the latter to give evidence to the 
contrary (in the event of irrebuttable presumptions).  
Given the even greater lack of information that tax authorities cope with in situations 
involving one or more different Member States, the national legislator is led to make use of 
presumptive provisions and in general to shift the risk of the absence of enough 
information in order to, for instance, guarantee a tax relief, delay the recovery of an exit 
tax or to let the related companies fix the prices of intra-group transactions
514
.   
 
5.1.1 EUCJ case-law on the use of administrative cooperation and division of the 
burden of proof 
The approach of the EUCJ as regards the interaction between administrative cooperation 
instruments and distribution of the burden of proof will be individualised with special 
regard to single presumptive provisions or regimes, but in order to set the stage it is useful 
to refer at the outset to some of the more interesting cases on the matter recently dealt with 
by the Court.  
 
5.1.1.1 The Elisa case 
In the Elisa case the question examined was whether the French legislation that exempted 
companies resident in France from the tax on the commercial value of immovable property 
owned in the same country by legal persons while for companies resident in another 
Member State conditioned that exemption to the existence of a convention on 
                                                          
514
 See R. Seer and I. Gabert, European and International Tax cooperation: Legal Basis, Practice, Burden of 
Proof, Legal Protection and Requirements, Bulletin for International Taxation, 2011, at 95. The Authors 
point out that some States have extended a taxpayer’s duties to cooperate with the national tax authorities 
with regard to cross border activities. As a result, a smaller number of information requests regarding direct 
taxes comes from these States, as they can get the information directly from the taxpayer under assessment. 
Such expanded duties can be embodied by the shift of the burden of proof. In this regard, it is noted that in 
the legal bases for the international exchange of information’s instruments there are not provisions dealing 
with the burden of proof, which thus belong to the national procedural law. On the basis of a survey 
regarding the Member States, three ways to (generally) allocate the burden of proof between taxpayers and 
tax authorities are identified. Firstly, in some legislations (such as Belgium) the tax authority bears the 
burden of proof, but it is shifted onto the taxpayer if he does not deliver the requested information. Secondly, 
some other legislations follows the “theory of sphere”, which puts the burden on the party who has the easiest 
access to the information required and possibility of giving evidence. Such rule is in part effected by 
provisions stating that the tax authorities must provide evidence with regard to facts giving rise to tax liability 
while it is up to the taxpayer to give evidence of the facts reducing his duties. Lastly, there are those 
legislations that put the burden of proof upon the party who invokes a fact or claims the enforcement of a law. 
Cf. X. Oberson, Exchange of information and cross-border cooperation between tax authorities - General 
Report, in Cahiers de droit fiscal international, Vol. 98b, 2013, 19.  
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administrative assistance among the two States involved or a treaty including a non-
discrimination clause, was consistent with the free movement of capital. More in detail, 
Article 990E of the French General Tax Code requested legal persons having the effective 
centre of management in France to merely accomplish a formality, which consisted of a 
yearly communication regarding the immovable property owned, information as to the 
members’ identity, the rights held and the evidence of their tax residence. This 
communication was not enough for a legal entity resident outside France. Besides that, 
indeed, the tax relief depended on a further condition; that is the signature of a convention 
on mutual assistance aimed at tackling tax evasion and avoidance or a treaty having a non-
discrimination clause on the basis of nationality. In fact, there was a convention between 
France and Luxembourg, but it did not cover the appellant of the main proceedings, which 
was a holding company formed under the Luxembourg law, so that its request to benefit 
from the exemption was denied. 
Since in this case the legislation was clearly restrictive on the free movement of capital as 
it rendered less attractive for non-residents the investment in immovable properties located 
in France, the Court immediately attempted to verify if it could be justified in the light of 
an overriding requirement of general interest. More precisely, it focused on the 
proportionality of the measure, which on the basis of the argumentation contended by the 
French government was intended to combat tax evasion (of the wealth tax by natural 
persons resident in France) through transparency as to the composition of the legal persons 
owning immovable property in France. 
As recalled by the Court, the prevention of tax evasion represents, according to settled case 
law, an overriding requirement of general interest potentially justifying a restriction to one 
of the fundamental freedoms. However, the restriction has to overcome the last stage of the 
rule of reason, i.e. the proportionality test, here declined in two main steps, i.e. the 
appropriateness to achieve the aim pursued and the proportionality in a narrow sense or 
necessity. While it is plain that the measure is able to cope with the abusive practice 
consisting of the use of companies resident for tax purposes in States from which France 
cannot get the relevant information as screens by natural persons aiming at avoiding the 
payment of the tax on capital, it remains to see if less restrictive measures can be devised. 
In this regard, the French government argued the necessity of the restrictive approach to 
the measure in the light of the difficulties met by tax authorities in giving proof of the tax 
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evasion in the absence of reliable information usable to corroborate the data included in the 
tax return by the taxpayers. 
The Court held that (paras 91 to 96): 
“In that regard it must be recalled that, in accordance with settled case-law, the 
prevention of tax evasion can be accepted as justification only if the legislations is aimed 
at wholly artificial arrangements the objective of which is to circumvent the tax laws, 
which precludes any general presumption of tax evasion. Consequently, a general 
presumption of tax avoidance or tax evasion cannot justify a fiscal measure which 
compromises the objectives of the Treaty (...). 
It is also in accordance with settled case-law of the Court that Directive 77/799 may be 
relied on by a Member State for the purpose of obtaining from the competent authorities of 
another Member State any information which is necessary to enable it to effect a correct 
assessment of the taxes covered by the directive (...). 
It is admittedly clear from the answer given to the third question that, in the context of the 
main proceedings, the restriction on the scope of the Convention of 1 April 1958 is subject 
to the limitation on the exchange of information under Article 8(1) of Directive 77/799, 
with the result that the French tax authorities may find it is impossible effectively to 
combat tax evasion in the case of holding companies incorporated under Luxembourg law. 
However, it is also apparent from the case-law that, although Article 8(1) of Directive 
77/799 does not oblige the tax authorities of the Member States to cooperate when the 
competent authorities are prevented by their laws or administrative practices from 
conducting enquiries or from collecting or using information for those States’ own 
purposes, the fact that it may be impossible to request that cooperation cannot justify 
refusal of a tax benefit. 
There is no reason why the tax authorities concerned should not request from the taxpayer 
the evidence that they consider they need to effect a correct assessment of the taxes and 
duties concerned and, where appropriate, refuse the exemption applied for it that evidence 
is not supplied (...). 
Thus, the taxpayer should not be excluded a priori from providing relevant documentary 
evidence enabling the tax authorities of the Member State imposing the tax to ascertain, 
clearly and precisely, that he is not attempting to avoid or evade the payment of taxes 
(...).” 
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On the basis of the foregoing and of the circumstance that the French legislation did not 
allow the taxpayer to give the necessary evidence in order to prove the absence of tax 
evasions’ objectives when cooperation with the other Member States was not practicable, 
the Court stated that “the French Government could have adopted less restrictive measures 
in order to attain the objective of combating tax evasion”. Therefore, the restrictive 
provision was not proportionate and as such it could not be justified in the light of the need 
to tackle tax evasion. It was indeed found to be inconsistent with the free movement of 
capital. 
The decision reveals the tendency of the EUCJ to broaden the scope of the Council 
Directive 77/799/EEC, so as to support a strained interpretation of Article 1, para 3, that is 
considered to be applicable to the disputed tax, albeit the latter can hardly be classified as a 
tax on the capital rather than on the asset. At first instance, the attempt is to force the use of 
the relevant assistance directive by the national tax authorities in order to get from the 
foreign country that information necessary in order to grant the taxpayer with the tax 
benefit. At any rate, even when not feasible, because, as in the case at issue, the foreign 
State is not obliged to exchange information, then it is up to the taxpayer to give evidence 
of the absence of avoidance/evasion purposes. The Court explicitly says that the “difficulty 
[in checking information] cannot justify a categorical refusal to grant a tax benefit in 
respect of investments made by investors from the Member State”.            
This ruling is in line with the jurisprudence of the EUCJ with regard to tax benefits that are 
denied to the taxpayer because of the transnational character of the situation encompassing 
lack of transparency and a higher risk of tax abuse in comparison to a domestic situation
515
. 
As a rule, the burden of proving that the conditions for granting a certain benefit are met 
lies on the taxpayer submitting the request. On the other hand, pursuant to settled case law, 
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 Ex multis, see ECJ 28 January 1992, case C-204/90, Bachmann, where the Belgian provisions limiting the 
deduction of insurance premiums for tax purposes was found restrictive of the freedom of movement – 
though “justified by the need to ensure the cohesion of the tax system of which they form part”. The Belgian 
government contested the difficulties or even impossibilities of checking certificates relating to the payment 
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collaborate when their laws or administrative practices prevent the competent authorities from carrying out 
enquiries or using information for those States’ own purposes. However, the impossibility to have recourse to 
such collaboration cannot justify per se the non-deductibility of insurance contributions. Indeed, continued 
the Court, “There is nothing to prevent the tax authorities concerned from demanding from the person 
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presumptions infra, when dealing with the field of direct taxation.  
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it is up to the tax authority to prove the existence of tax avoidance or evasion grounding 
the denial of the benefit. 
The ruling at hand, however, goes a bit further by assuming that when the instruments for 
administrative cooperation apply, the national legislation cannot refuse the tax relief by 
arguing from the lack of information as to the cross-border situation, being empowered to 
request from the other Member State the necessary documentary evidence. This seems 
irrespective of the party on which the burden of proof lies according to the national law, 
though in another decision the Court has denied the existence of a taxpayer’s right to ask 
for the use of the assistance instruments by the tax authorities
516
. In addition, the same tax 
authority may ask the taxpayer for the necessary information or documentation before 
denying the benefit. As underlined by the General Advocate in his Opinion to the case, 
especially in the more recent decisions, the Court has started to give primary relevance to 
the circumstance that in cases when a general presumption of tax avoidance or evasion 
applies, the non-resident taxpayer is “best placed for that purpose, to prove the reality of its 
activities which allow it to claim the benefit of the fundamental freedoms”517. 
 
5.1.1.2 The Teleos and Twoh cases 
A similar question relating to the distribution of the risk as to the lack of 
information/documentation has been dealt with by the EUCJ in the cases Twoh and 
Teleos
518
 involving intra-Community supplies of goods within a fraudulent overall design. 
Such decisions are interesting in the extent to which the approach of the EUCJ to the 
                                                          
516
 ECJ 27 Sept. 2007, Case C-184/05, Twoh. It follows an obligation on the tax administration to which it 
does not correspond a right of the taxpayer, but at the most only a legitimate expectation. 
517
 Opinion of Advocate General Mazák delivered on 26 April 2007, at paras 102-103. He observed that “As 
far as the 102-burden of proof is concerned, the Court’s case law provides that it is in principle for the tax 
authorities of the Member States concerned to prove a risk of tax avoidance or evasion in each case. It 
cannot be inferred from the fact that a taxpayer uses his fundamental freedoms to establish his residence in 
another Member State that such a taxpayer pursues a fraudulent objective. A general presumption of tax 
evasion or tax avoidance cannot justify a fiscal measure which compromises the objectives of the Treaty. The 
Court has gone as far as to consider that the laying down of a general rule automatically excluding certain 
categories of operations from a tax advantage, whether or not there is actually tax evasion or tax avoidance, 
cannot be considered as proportionate. More recently, the Court seems to have refined its approach to 
general presumptions of avoidance in the area of direct taxation. In Cadbury Schweppes, it held that such a 
presumptions could be acceptable, provided that it is designed, by the precise conditions it establishes, to 
apply only in very specific circumstances which correspond to cases in which the probability of the risk of 
tax avoidance is highest. In that case, the burden of proof will lie with the non-resident taxpayer, which is 
best placed for that purpose, to prove the reality of this activities which allow it to claim the benefit of 
fundamental freedoms.” 
518
 ECJ, 27 Sept. 2007, C-409/04 (Teleos); ECJ 27 Sept. 2007, C-184/05 (Twoh). Concerning the first 
judgment see M.G. De Flora, Brevi riflessioni in tema di regime probatorio nelle operazioni 
intracomunitarie, Note to EUCJ 27 September 2007, case C-409/04, Riv. Dir. Trib. 2009, 20. 
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allocation of the probative burden can be drawn at the outset, especially in the interaction 
with the administrative cooperation tools
519
. 
Without indulging in the circumstances of the concrete cases, the main issue concerns the 
obligations and the recognition of the right of exemption on the supplier of an intra-
Community supply when the purchaser resident in the other Member State has not (or there 
is the suspicion that he has not) fulfilled his obligations as to the outcome VAT. The 
question arises as to the means of proof requested in relation to the carrying out of a intra-
Community operation, which is exempted in the State where the supplier is resident, and to 
the person (whether the supplier or the tax authority) bearing that burden. 
In both the decisions the Court has recalled that after the abolitions of controls at the 
frontiers between Member States it is mostly on the basis of evidence (declarations, 
statements) produced by taxable persons that national tax authorities are to ascertain if an 
intra-Community transaction took place, for the purpose of which it is requested not only 
the transfer of ownerships on the goods, but also that the latter have physically left the 
territory of the Member State of dispatch. What kind of evidence is to be given to get the 
exemption of intra-Community supplies of goods is a matter left to the single Member 
States, within the limits imposed by Community law
520
, amongst which are the principles 
of legal certainty and proportionality. Such limits are not exceeded, in the Court’s view, 
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giving the counterproof; that is the evidence that he took every step necessary in order to verify the 
genuineness of the supplier-contracting party. 
520
 ECJ, 27 Sept. 2007, C-409/04 (Teleos), par. 63-64. 
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when the burden of proof as to the entitlement to a tax derogation or exemption is put on 
the person who is interested in getting that.  
In Teleos the Court held that (paras 58, 63-64-65): 
“Admittedly, the objective of preventing tax evasion sometimes justifies stringent 
requirements as regards supplier’s obligations. However, any sharing of the risk between 
the supplier and the tax authorities, following fraud committed by a third party, must be 
compatible with the principle of proportionality. Furthermore, rather than preventing tax 
evasion, a regime imposing the entire responsibility for the payment of VAT on suppliers, 
regardless of whether or not they were involved in the fraud, does not necessarily 
safeguard the harmonised VAT system from evasion and abuse by purchasers. The latter, 
were they exempted from all responsibility, could in effect, be encouraged not to dispatch 
or not to transport the goods out of the Member State of supply and not to declare the 
goods for VAT purposes in the envisaged Member States of destination”. (...) 
Since it is no longer possible for taxable persons to rely on documents issued by the 
customs authorities, evidence of intra-Community supplies and acquisitions must be 
provided by other means. Whilst it is true that the regime governing intra-Community 
trade has become more open to fraud, the fact remains that the requirements for proof 
established by the Member States must comply with the fundamental freedoms established 
by the EC Treaty, such as, in particular, the free movement of goods. 
In that regard, it is also important to point out that, under Article 22(8) of the Sixth 
Directive, the Member States may impose the obligations which they deem necessary for 
the correct collection of the tax and for the prevention of evasion, provided that such 
obligations do not, in trade between Member States, give rise to formalities connected with 
the crossing of frontiers. 
Moreover, according to the Court’s settled case-law, which is applicable to the main 
proceedings by way of analogy, it would not be contrary to Community law to require 
supplier to take every step which could reasonably be required of him to satisfy himself 
that the transaction which he is effecting does not result in his participation in tax evasion 
(...).” 
These considerations, together with the principles of fiscal neutrality and legal certainty led 
the Court to interpret Article 28(A)(a), of the Sixth Directive as precluding the tax 
authority from accounting for VAT a supplier who acted in good faith without taking part 
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in the evasion and submitted evidence establishing at first sight his right to the exemption 
of an intra-Community supply of goods. 
Therefore, the EUCJ on the one side observes that obliging the taxable person to provide 
evidence that goods have physically left the Member State of supply does not secure the 
correct application of exemptions (para 51); on the other side it asserts that such 
obligations might be justified for the purpose of preventing tax evasion. 
The balance between the different interests in play is embodied by the principle of 
proportionality, pursuant to which “Member States must employ means which, whilst 
enabling them effectively to attain the objectives pursued by their domestic law, cause the 
least possible detriment to the objectives and principles laid down by the relevant 
Community legislation” (para 52). As asserted in Elisa, this entails that Member States 
cannot introduce tax measures restricting EU freedoms or principles in order to combat tax 
avoidance or fraud when they are empowered to make use of the administrative 
cooperation instruments for this purpose or to ask the taxpayer for the necessary 
information. In Elisa the Court also clarifies that the proportionality implies the latter be 
asked only those obligations necessary in order to grant him an exemption or in general a 
benefit. The same principle, however, does not entail the recognition of the taxable 
person’s right to demand the national tax authorities to avail themselves of the mutual 
assistance directive or the administrative cooperation regulation. In Twoh the Court held 
indeed (para 26-28): 
“(...) the principle that the burden of proving entitlement to a tax derogation or exemption 
rests upon the person seeking to benefit from such a right is to be viewed as being within 
the limits imposed by Community law. Thus, for the purpose of applying the first 
subparagraph of Article 28(A)(a) of the Sixth Directive, it is for the supplier of the goods 
to furnish the proof that the conditions for exemption referred to in paragraph 23 of this 
judgment are fulfilled. 
(...) What is important in this case is the fact that Twoh, being unable to provide the 
necessary evidence to establish that the goods have in fact been dispatched to the 
destination Member State, has requested the Netherlands tax authorities to gather 
information capable of demonstrating the intra-Community nature of its supplies from the 
competent authority of that latter Member State, in application of the mutual assistance 
directive and the administrative cooperation regulation. The question that thus arises is 
whether those tax authorities were required to accede to such a request.” 
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The Court answers the question arguing from the scope and content of the instruments 
concerned, which have been conceived for combating tax evasion/avoidance and 
improving the correct assessment of the tax due by regulating the cooperation between 
national tax authorities. As a consequence, they do not create any rights on individuals, 
also considering the use of “may” when regulating the possible actions. The same holds 
true in the domain of direct taxation, wherein the EUCJ transposes identical conclusions
521
. 
 
5.1.1.3  The Persche case 
What has been said at the end of the previous paragraph particularly results from the ruling 
given by the EUCJ in Persche
522
, which is interesting as the Court focuses again on the 
question of the division of the burden of proof among taxpayers asking for a tax benefit 
and tax authorities when administrative cooperation tools apply, and it confirms its 
previous findings without agreeing with the far-reaching opinion of the General Advocate 
Mengozzi. Indeed, one of the question referred by the national court is whether when 
facing a factual situation which occurred abroad the tax authorities of the Member State of 
residence of the taxpayer are obliged to have recourse to the mutual assistance mechanism 
or are instead entitled to let the burden of proof lie on the taxpayer pursuant to the national 
procedural law. 
In common with the above VAT cases of Teleos and Twoh, there was the difficulty met by 
the taxpayer willing to obtain a certain tax advantage in proving a circumstance that 
involves different Member States, thereby outside his sphere of direct availability. As a 
matter of fact, in Persche at issue was the restriction on the free movement of capital 
caused by the German legislation that allowed the resident donor a deduction for tax 
purposes of the gifts made in favour of national recognized charities whereas such a benefit 
was denied if the gift was made to a charity body established abroad.  
After having found the tax measure to be restrictive on the above fundamental freedom, the 
Court checked whether the lack of objective comparability of the situations concerned or 
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 ECJ 27 Sept. 2007, case C-184/05 (Twoh), par. 35: That finding is also corroborated by the case-law of 
the Court of Justice on mutual assistance between the competent authorities in the area of direct taxation, 
which is transposable by analogy to a situation such as that in the main proceedings. According to that case-
law, the mutual assistance directive may be relied on by a Member State in order to obtain from the 
competent authorities of another Member State all the information enabling it to ascertain the correct amount 
of tax. There is, however, nothing to prevent the tax authorities concerned from requiring the taxpayer 
himself to provide such proof as they may consider necessary in order to determine whether or not the 
deduction requested should be granted (...). 
522
 ECJ 27 Jan. 2009, case C-318/2007 (Persche). See C. Sanò, Note to European Court of Justice, case C-
318/07, Giurisprudenza delle Imposte, 2009, (www.giurisprudenzaimposte.it). 
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the need to safeguard effective fiscal supervision occurred. Both of these arguments were 
rejected: the first one on the grounds that the foreign charitable entities that pursue the 
objectives advocated by the German law are in a comparable situation with domestic 
bodies, the second one in view of the disproportionate character of a measure absolutely 
preventing the taxpayer from proving the charitable status and the genuineness of the gift 
to a body established abroad. 
The Court thus held (paras 53-54): 
“(…) the possibility cannot be excluded a priori that the taxpayer is able to provide 
relevant documentary evidence enabling the tax authorities of the Member State of 
taxation to ascertain, clearly and precisely, the nature and genuineness of the expenditure 
incurred in other Member States (…). 
Nothing would prevent the tax authorities concerned from requiring the taxpayer to 
provide such proof as they may consider necessary in order to determine whether the 
conditions for deducting expenses provided for in the legislation at issue have been met 
and, consequently, whether to allow the deduction requested (…)”. 
As already asserted in Centro di Musicologia Walter Stauffer
523
, disadvantages of a purely 
administrative nature, meaning difficulties in the ascertainment/monitoring of the 
conditions for the benefit that would impose a disproportionate burden on the tax 
administrations in the view taken by the intervening governments, cannot justify a refusal 
of that benefit facing cross-border situations. The EUCJ insisted, indeed, on the possibility 
for tax authorities to get the necessary evidence from the taxpayer submitting the request 
for the exemption, who normally is in the position to produce documentary evidence 
showing that the foreign entity meets all the conditions required by the national legislation 
for the granting of the tax advantages. In addition, the EUCJ recalled that the national tax 
administration may avail itself of the mechanism of the administrative cooperation, though 
it clarified that the latter does not impact on the power of assessment of the conditions 
requested and it does not compensate for the inability of the donor to give enough evidence, 
being rather at the discretion of the single Member State to have recourse or not to the 
mutual cooperation. 
As in the case of Twoh, the EUCJ interprets the content of the mutual assistance directive 
as laying down the possibility (“may”) rather than an obligation of national tax authorities 
to request to the competent authorities of another Member State the “complementary 
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 ECJ 14 Sept. 2006, case C-368/04, Centro di Musicologia Walter Stauffer. 
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information” necessary in order to check the documents produced by the taxpayer. 
Therefore, in the view of the Court, the burden of proving the conditions to obtain a certain 
tax advantage rests on the taxpayer (e.g. the donor), though tax authorities cannot deny 
such advantage – even by means of presumptions of fact, as the case may be - simply 
advancing doubts on the genuineness of the declarations or other evidence enclosed by the 
taxpayer without having controlled such information, even making use of the possibilities 
offered by the Directive 77/799
524
. 
The Court thus shows a disregard of the circumstance that in the case of the main 
proceedings the proofs requested in order to benefit from the exemption for the purpose of 
the income taxation concerned a third person, that is the recipient of the gift established 
abroad; a circumstance that is done away with the consideration that “it is usually possible, 
for a donor, to obtain from that body documents confirming the amount and nature of the 
gift made, identifying the objectives pursued by the body and certifying the propriety of the 
management of the gifts which were made to it during previous years.” 
On this point, the Court disagreed with the view expressed by the General Advocate 
Mengozzi, who asserted that national authorities cannot refuse a tax advantage without 
first taking into due consideration, on the one side the difficulties met by the taxpayer in 
collecting the proofs, and on the other side the possibility to make recourse to the Directive 
77/799. In his Opinion submitted to the case, he seemed to support the existence of an 
“onus” upon Member States to have recourse to that Directive, where the taxpayer appears 
to be unable to produce the necessary documentation. This, for the purpose of securing the 
effective application of the free movement of capital. He acknowledged that the legal basis 
for the assessment of the conditions for granting the tax benefit fall within the residual 
competence of the Member States, which are empowered “to establish, in accordance with 
their procedural rules, as part of an administrative procedure to determine the amount of 
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 Notably, in cases involving a third State, the Court has a more flexible approach. Cf. ECJ, 18 December 
2007, C-101/05, A. The Court held (paras 61 and 63): “In the first place, relations between the Member 
States take place against a common legal background, characterised by the existence of Community 
legislation, such as Directive 77/799, which laid down reciprocal obligations of mutual assistance. Even if, 
in the fields governed by that directive, the obligation to provide assistance is not unlimited, the fact remains 
that that directive established a framework for cooperation between the competent authorities of the Member 
States which does not exist between those authorities and the competent authorities of a third country where 
the latter has given no undertaking of mutual assistance. (...) It follows that, where the legislation of a 
Member State makes the grant of a tax advantage dependent on satisfying requirements, compliance with 
which can be verified only by obtaining information from the competent authorities of a third country, it is, in 
principle, legitimate for that Member State to refuse to grant that advantage if, in particular, because that 
third country is not under any contractual obligation to provide information, it proves impossible to obtain 
such information from that country”.  
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tax payable, the rules of evidence applicable, including the allocation of the burden of 
proof between the taxpayer and the national tax authorities”. However, he submitted that 
“where the evidence requested for allowing a tax advantage does not directly concern the 
taxpayer who claims it, but a third party, in this instance the body which received the gift, 
and which is established in another Member State (...) the national authorities cannot 
systematically refuse to grant the tax advantage if the evidence requested from the 
taxpayer has not been adduced, without first taking into account the difficulties 
encountered by that taxpayer in collecting the evidence requested in spite of all the efforts 
he has already made, and without examining, in the light of those difficulties, whether it is 
actually possible to obtain that evidence with the assistance of the competent authorities of 
another Member State within the framework of Directive 77/799 or, where appropriate, in 
the context of the application of a bilateral convention. Of course, in that situation, it will 
be for the national court to ascertain, in each specific case, whether the refusal to allow 
the tax deduction claimed, without resorting to the cooperation between national 
authorities introduced by Directive 77/799, is based on a serious assessment of the 
abovementioned factors.”525 
If the EUCJ had followed this interpretation, then it would have been conceivable a sort of 
onus on the tax authority facing the described difficulties of proof on the side of the 
taxpayer. 
It remains to be seen in the following if the EUCJ approaches differently the case-law 
where there are not only tax benefits at issue, but rather violations of tax legislation so that 
the burden of proof lies on the tax administration but it is shifted onto the taxpayer by 
means of legal presumptions. 
 
6. The proportionality principle 
The degree of availability of the administrative cooperation instruments by the tax 
administration appears to be one of the criteria that enter the evaluation as to the 
proportionality of national restrictive measures carried out by the EUCJ. An evaluation that, 
as said, is composed of a three-fold step (or, more recently, two) aiming at the verification 
of the appropriateness of the measure to attain the goal, the necessity in terms of non-
availability of less restrictive measures and the proportionality in a narrower sense. In turn, 
the proportionality test represents the last step of the rule of reason; that is the process 
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 Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi, delivered on 14 Oct. 2008, Case C-318/07, at para 110. 
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developed by the EUCJ in order to test the compatibility of national direct tax measures 
with fundamental freedoms.  
If the application of the principle of proportionality is recurrent in direct tax cases (unless 
the rule of reason does not reach the last step) and among these, particularly in cases 
involving tax avoidance or evasion, nonetheless it is not confined to this domain of tax law, 
being  used also in indirect tax cases brought before the Court.  
As a matter of fact, the principle of proportionality is a general principle of EU law
526
. 
Though it stems from the constitutional traditions of Member States, being already known 
especially within administrative law, it has seen an increasing amount of attention by virtue 
of the application by the EUCJ. 
Generally speaking, it implies the balancing between different interests and concerns the 
relation between the means and the aim attained. The first feature is peculiar to all general 
principles of law that are to be distinguished from rules as they do not fix a behaviour to be 
abided by, but they are rather used to weigh the (contrasting) values coming into play and 
also as criteria of interpretation of rules of law. The second feature gathers the essence of 
the proportionality parameter, as it entails the appraisal of the suitability and necessity to 
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 A.o., ECJ 11 July 1989, Case C-265/87 Schräder, where proportionality concerned the validity of EC 
legislation on the common organization of the market in cereals. At par. 21 it was recalled that “The Court 
has consistently held that the principles of proportionality is one of the general principles of Community law. 
By virtue of that principle, measures imposing financial charges on economic operators are lawful provided 
that the measures are appropriate and necessary for meeting the objectives legitimately pursued by the 
legislation in question. Of course, when there is a choice between several appropriate measures, the least 
onerous ones must be used and the charges imposed must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued.” 
Notably, the Court carried out the verification as to the observance of the proportionality by assuming that 
“with regard to judicial review of compliance with the above mentioned conditions [the ones laid down in par. 
21], it must be stated that, in matters concerning the common agricultural policy, the Community legislator 
has a discretionary power which corresponds to the political responsibilities imposed by Articles 40 and 43. 
Consequently, the legality of a measure adopted in that sphere can be affected only if the measure is 
manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent institution intends to pursue 
(...)” (para 22). Cf. H. G. Schermers, Judicial protection in the European communities, Kluwer, Deventer, 
1976, at 49. The Author referred to the Second Schlüter case (ECJ, 24 October 1973, C-9/73), where the 
Court held that “In exercising their powers, the Institutions must ensure that the amounts which commercial 
operators are charged are no greater than is required to achieve the aim which the authorities are to 
accomplish; however, it does not necessarily follow that that obligation must be measured in relation to the 
individual situation of any one particular group of operators. Given the multiplicity and complexity of 
economic circumstances, such an evaluation would not only be impossible to achieve, but would also create 
perpetual uncertainty in the law. An overall assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of the measures 
contemplated was justified, in this case, by the exceptionally pressing need for practicability in economic 
measures which are designed to exert an immediate corrective influence; and this need had to be taken into 
account in balancing the opposite interests.” He also recalled the importance of the principle in cases 
involving the imposition of penalties, such as the Fédéchar case (on which see the following footnote) and 
the Schmitz case (ECJ 19 March 1964, C-18/63) where the Court annulled the decision not to renew the 
contract of a member of the staff as it is “clearly exaggerated”. Two other decisions are cited (ECJ 23 Nov. 
1971, C- 62/70, Chinese Mushroom; ECJ 13 Nov. 1973, C-63-69/72, Werhahn) that show the application of 
proportionality in ruling on the action of, respectively, the Commission and the Council. 
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have recourse to certain means in respect of the goal achieved and the taking into account 
of the interests possibly undermined, as well as the alternative measures (if available) 
which can enable the reaching of the same goal with a lower detriment to the losing 
interests.  
The principle of proportionality, thus, touches on the exercise of (legislative or 
administrative) power in the extent to which such exercise implies the choice among 
different measures or actions. As such, its earlier applications dealt with the scope of the 
Community’s action - for instance, consisting of the imposition of obligations, fines, or the 
accordance of derogations to single Member States - by requesting, in the context of the 
exercise of its competences (both exclusive and concurrent) the use of the instruments that 
most suit the  objective attained
527
. Under this aspect, that is a parameter regulating the 
exercise of Community competences, it has been codified following the Treaty of 
Maastricht in Article 5, para 3 of the EC Treaty, and the Treaty of Lisbon which have not 
changed the substance
528
. 
But the more “revolutionary” side of the principle of proportionality results from its 
application as a sort of reasonableness scrutiny with reference to national tax 
provisions
529
 – thus, entailing the exercise of legislative or administrative power by a 
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 See A. Zalasiński, Proportionality of Anti-Avoidance and Anti-Abuse Measures in the ECJ’s Direct Tax 
Case Law, Intertax, 2007, 310 et seq., who dated back the first appearance of the principle in an ECJ decision 
handed down in the Fédéchar case (ECJ 29 November 1956, C-8/55, Fédéchar). Accordingly, he observed 
that “At this early stage it was predominantly applied within the sphere of inter-institutional dealings, 
especially the Community law-making process. This aspect of the proportionality principle was subsequently 
codified in the EC Treaty as amended by the Maastricht Treaty”. The role of the principle of proportionality, 
however, is not merely confined to the Community legal order’s law making rules, as “Despite the fact that it 
is not codified as such, it is important in balancing the public and private sector’s interests within the 
framework of application of Community law. It constitutes the most important part of the application of the 
rule of reason.” 
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 Pursuant to Article 5, para 1 “The limits of Union competences are governed by the principle of conferral. 
The use of Union competences is governed by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.” At 
paragraph 4 it is then added that “Under the principle of proportionality, the content and form of Union 
action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objective of the Treaties. The institutions of the 
Union shall apply the principle of proportionality as laid down in the Protocol on the application of the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.” This, in accordance to what is set out in Article 3, laying 
down the Union’s basic tasks, para 6: “The Union shall pursue its objectives by appropriate means 
commensurate with the competences which are conferred upon it in the Treaties.” See G. Tesauro, Diritto 
dell’Unione Europea, Assago, Cedam, 2010, 106, who identifies three criteria the exercise of a certain 
competence has to live up to in order to comply with the principle of proportionality. First, it (the exercise of 
the competence) has to be useful and pertaining to the attainment of the objective for which the competence 
has been arrogated. Secondly, it has to be indispensable, meaning that when various means are available for 
the same goal the competence is to be exercised so as to be the least detrimental possible to the other 
objective worthy of equal protection (replaceability criterion). Lastly, a link between the action and the 
objective is requested (causality criterion). 
529
 Hence, the proportionality vests with a transversal function within the Community legal order. Firstly, it is 
“a means for checking the legitimacy of the Community Institution’s actions and the validity of the EC acts, 
in this way operating at a superordinate level, as a limitation to the exercise of the normative power by the 
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Member State - within the context of a reference for a preliminary ruling or an 
infringement procedure. In this event, it offers the EUCJ (in the first instance) a tool for the 
balance between the interests in play, which depending on the tax field are the interest of 
the Union, the interest of the single Member State, and the private interest of the taxpayer 
that, not rarely, matches with the interest of the Union itself to the uniform and effective 
interpretation and application of EU Law. Such division is, however, not that definite, as 
the balance is inevitably affected by the degree of harmonization of the relevant tax field. 
As a way of exemplification, it is not the same thing dealing with the proportionality of a 
national measure in respect of one or more fundamental freedoms, which implies the 
investigation of the national aims that the Member State seeks to attain, or of a national 
measure with the VAT Directive and the principles therein laid down. In the second case, 
indeed, the model is designed at European level and the goals have been fixed uniformly 
by the EU legislator, who has defined a balance between the need for neutrality in respect 
of economic operators on the one hand, and the efficacy of the levy on the other hand. 
Hence, in the second case the objectives of the national measure are relevant and are taken 
into consideration by the Court, but they might find room only in the extent to which a 
derogation to the system of the VAT directive is explicitly permitted or is anyway in line 
with the principles governing the VAT field (like neutrality, right of deduction and so 
on).
530
  
                                                                                                                                                                                
Institutions, and characterized by a certain amount of discretion. Secondly, the proportionality is an 
instrument for the evaluation of the lawfulness of the Member States’ behavior, both in the issuing of the 
measures implementing EC law and in the exercise of the derogations provided for by the Treaties in favor of 
them, by fixing the limits to the Member States’ behavior.” In this perspective, the proportionality principle 
recalls those national administrative principles among which is the ‘power overkill’, which is functional to 
the distinction between permitted and prohibited behaviors within certain norms. See in this way M.C. 
Ciciriello, Il principio di proporzionalità nel diritto comunitario, Napoli, Editoriale scientifica, 1999, 169. 
530
 In this regard, it has been observed that in the area of negative integration the Court has more margin for a 
creative jurisprudence. In the absence of harmonization for direct taxation, the Court does not find rules of 
application of the proportionality principle in the EU (secondary) law. As a consequence, in a number of 
decisions – for instance, facing exit taxes - it goes so far as to suggest alternative models of taxation to the 
Member State involved that would pass muster under the above principle. Here the Court has the chance to 
develop the balance, which is inherent to the principle of proportionality, between the interests in play and to 
propose different models of levy. The rule of application in turn put forward by the Court, however, suffers 
the weakness due to the absence of harmonization and it is subjected to the flexibility of the proportionality 
principle in direct taxation, as it involves an open norm without a defined EU model. By contrast, in sectors 
of positive integration, like indirect taxation and VAT in particular, the Court is bound to the tasks defined at 
EU level, so that it is not allowed to suggest alternative models other than the ones laid down within the 
relevant EU regulation. In this perspective, it is often left in the hands of the judge referring for a preliminary 
ruling the ascertainment as to whether the national implementing measure embodies the due balance between 
the interests in play, in line with the secondary EU legislation. See A. Mondini, Contributo allo studio del 
principio di proporzionalità nel sistema dell’IVA europea, Pisa, Pacini editore, 2012, in particular at p. 115 et 
seq. 
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The foregoing confirms the opportunity to proceed to the analysis of the case law on 
national tax presumptions for sectors. 
 
6.1 Proportionality principle and national tax law presumptions 
Coupled with the principle of effectiveness, the principle of proportionality represents the 
pivot of an analysis aiming at giving an overview of the main EUCJ case law on the matter 
in order to distil conclusions having a general character and enable the foreseeing of the 
future policy of the EUCJ when questioned on national tax law presumptions. 
It goes without saying in which manner the proportionality inevitably happens to interact 
with national presumptive provisions. To simplify, looking at the taxation domain, the 
former – proportionality principle - consists of a weighing of the public (or fiscal) interest, 
that is the interest of the single Member State in achieving the objective chosen on the one 
hand, and the interest of the Union, which depending on the tax field may coincide with the 
recognition of an EU right or principle, or of the exercise of a fundamental freedom to the 
individual taxpayer. The second – tax law presumptions - are means the Member States 
have recourse to exactly for securing the(ir) ‘fiscal interest’, meaning the need to levy the 
budgetary resources for the purpose of providing services to the community. More 
precisely, they lighten the (lato sensu) procedural position of the tax administration by 
considering as proved a certain fact from which detrimental (conclusive) effects derive 
upon the taxpayer (in the event of irrebuttable presumptions) or (more often) by deeming 
as proved a certain circumstance unless the taxpayer gives the counterproof. 
It follows that national tax presumptions embody one of the poles of the mechanism in 
which the proportionality test consists of. They are indeed the means through which, in 
turn, the national legislator aims at tackling tax avoidance, evasion or abuse in general 
(typically, in the field of income taxation but also in the VAT area) or to simplify the 
definition of the tax obligation or its assessment or recovery facing difficulties in 
conducting inquiries or documentary checks by the tax authorities (for instance, in the 
indirect taxation implementing provisions, but in direct taxation as well). Their scope and 
above all effects are scrutinized by the EUCJ with a view to the aims they have been 
conceived for and the EU objective relevant depending on the area. In fact, it is primarily 
with reference to the national intent that the suitability, necessity and possible existence of 
alternatives are to be checked, with a sort of process that investigates the ‘internal 
coherence’ of the presumptive provision concerned. This national aim, however, has to be 
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in line with the EU aims, laid down in the Treaties and/or in the secondary legal sources 
(pursuant to a sort of ‘external coherence’). When dealing with VAT, for example, the 
aims are defined in the Directive No 112/2006; in direct taxation, in the absence of an EU 
model, it has to be regarded the content of the fundamental principle coming into play on 
the one side, and the compelling reasons of public interests accepted by the Court at the 
second step of the rule of reason in the concrete case on the other side, as this  supposes 
that the provision is (at least) not in contrast with the interests worthy of protection at EU 
level. 
In this regard, it has to be further observed that though one may think that the fiscal interest 
is naturally recessive in respect of the EU interest in securing the freedom of movement or 
the exercise of the EU right, national tax presumptions involve values and tasks that the 
Union shares with the single Member States. This is clear, for instance, in the case of anti-
avoidance measures, which very often boil down to presumptive criteria, and that may also 
live up to the EU’s interest in combating the abuse of EU rights and freedoms if certain 
conditions drawn by the EUCJ in its case law are met. Such conditions concern exactly the 
scope of the measure – not too general - in view of the purpose attained and the potential 
effects. 
In conclusion, generally speaking, one should remember that the application of national tax 
law presumptions may determine a limit to the enforcement of a certain EU law rule or the 
enjoyment of a certain EU right or freedom, which thus must be checked precisely in the 
light of EU law and principles. Whether they are construed as anti-avoidance provisions, a 
quantitative limitation as to the deductibility of input VAT, a definition (e.g. of commercial 
imports) introduced implementing the customs legislation, or a limitation to the refund of 
taxes levied in contravention of EU Law, they are enabled to jeopardize the effectiveness 
of EU law. On the other hand, as indirectly recognized by the EU institutions, they are 
important tools, among  other things, for combating abuse. Therefore Member States may 
not be asked to remove them. Given also their procedural autonomy and the possibility to 
choose the means when implementing secondary EU legislation fixing the aims, they are 
free to introduce presumptive criteria, as long as they are in line with the principles of 
proportionality and effectiveness. 
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6.2 The application of the principle of proportionality in non-taxation cases… 
Before starting the examination of cases involving tax law presumptions, it is useful to 
refer to a number of older cases on anti-avoidance provisions in areas other than taxation. 
This is done in order to get into the line of reasoning followed by the EUCJ.  In other 
words, to set the stage of the mental scheme adopted by the European Court when facing 
measures restrictive on Treaty freedoms or rights conferred under secondary EU law which 
are aimed at tackling abuse and suspected of being non-proportional.  
Firstly, from a number of cases involving the infringement of the EU law on freedom of 
services and television broadcasting activities by the Belgian and the Netherlands’ Media 
Law aiming at avoiding the circumvention of their national law, it results that the exercise 
of a right inherent to EC law cannot generally be viewed as avoidance. This represents the 
second part of the puzzle when dealing with, generally speaking and irrespective of the 
area, anti-abuse legislation. The first part is embodied by the Court’s recognition that 
Member States are permitted to introduce measures with the aim of preventing the 
circumvention of their own legislation protecting public interests. Such measures, however, 
cannot be too general, because when the link between the means used and the aim sought 
is vague they turn out to be an altogether limitation of the EU right concerned. 
In the Van Binsbergen case, the Court held that “a Member State cannot be denied the 
right to take measures to prevent the exercise by a person providing services whose 
activity is entirely or principally directed towards its territory of the freedom guaranteed 
by Article 59 for the purpose of avoiding the professional rules of conduct which would be 
applicable to him if he were established within the State”531. In Commission v. Belgium it 
went further saying that “those cases [when “the Member State is entitled to prevent a 
person providing services whose activity is entirely or principally directed towards its 
territory from exercising the freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty for the purpose of 
avoiding the rules which would be applicable to him if he were established within that 
State”, as held in Van Binsbergen, Commission v. Belgium and TV 10], “do not in any 
event authorize a Member State generally to exclude provision of certain services by 
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 ECJ 3 December 2004, case Case C-33/74, Van Binsbergen, at para 13. Notably, the focus of the Court is 
on the effects of the national provision on the Treaty freedom, as in para 11 it said that “a requirement that 
the person providing the service must be habitually resident within the territory of the State where the service 
is to be provided may, according to the circumstances, have the result of depriving Article 59 of all useful 
effect, in view of the fact that the precise object of that Article is to abolish restrictions on freedom to provide 
services imposed on persons who are not established in the State where the service is provided.”. 
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operators established in other Member States, since that would entail abolition of the 
freedom to provide services.”532 
The foregoing has been asserted not only with reference to the freedom of services, but in 
respect of all the fundamental freedoms and secondary EU law as well
533
. 
The question then arises as to requisites that a national measure must have in order to be 
‘accepted’ by the Court. In this sense, an indication results from the Veronica case where, 
unlike the Belgian legislation imposing language constraints or prior authorizations in 
Commission v. Belgium, the Netherland’s legislation prohibiting national broadcasting 
organizations from helping to set up commercial radio and television companies abroad (in 
the main proceedings, in Luxembourg) for the purpose of providing services there towards 
                                                          
532
 ECJ 1 September 1996, case Case C-11/95, Commission v. Belgium, para 63. At issue was the Belgian 
regulation asking for a prior (administrative) authorization for the distribution of foreign programmes, 
thereby overlapping the Directive No 89/552 relevant in the case, equally pursuing cultural objectives. 
Among the provisions involved, there were Articles 26 and 26b of the 1987 decree that, according to the 
Commission, conditioned the issue of the authorization for the broadcasting by foreign broadcasters of 
commercial advertisements and teleshopping programmes for viewers in the French Community to their 
involvement in supporting the French Community television channels and press. In the Belgian government’s 
view, such rules were intended to avoid the circumvention of the legislation of the receiving State, so that 
Article 2, para 2, of the Directive prohibiting Member States from restricting the retransmission in their 
territory of television broadcasts from other Member State did not apply. Similarly, ECJ 16 December 1992, 
Case C-211/91, Commission v. Belgium, where in fact the Court found the regulation at issue to be a barrier 
to the freedom to provide services in the extent to which it prevented broadcasters established in other 
Member States from having programmes transmitted in a language different from the one of the country 
where they were established relayed by the cable networks of the Flemish Community. A barrier that was 
discriminatory, as it did not apply to domestic broadcasters and impeded broadcasters established in countries 
other than the Netherlands the offer of programmes in Dutch towards the Flemish Community’s audience. 
Unlike in the Veronica case (see the following note), the cultural-policy objectives put forward by the 
Belgian government have been rejected as they in fact reveal the intention of protecting national broadcasters 
by restricting genuine competition with them. Accordingly, the Court concluded that “While it is true that, 
according to paragraph 13 of that judgment [Van Binsbergen], the State in which the service is provided may 
take measures to prevent a provider of services whose activity is entirely or principally directed towards its 
territory from exercising the freedom guaranteed by Article 59 for the purpose of avoiding the professional 
rules which would be applicable to him if he were established within that State, it does not follow that it is 
permissible for a Member State to prohibit altogether the provision of certain services by operators 
established in other Member States, as that would be tantamount to abolishing the freedom to provide 
services.” Cf. also ECJ 6 June 1996, Case C-101/94, Commission v. Italy, regarding the Italian legislation 
that confined the activity of dealing in transferable securities to companies or firms having their registered 
office in Italy, which the Italian government justified in the light of the need for effective supervision and 
sanctions. The Court found such legislation to be inconsistent with the right of establishment and with the 
freedom to provide services, as the obligation to establish the registered office in Italy does not constitute the 
only means to secure the effectiveness of controls and sanctions imposed. The Court went further and in 
accordance with the jurisprudence on the distribution of the burden of proof, agreed with the Commission in 
underlying that the Member State may always require the dealers who are willing to operate in the Italian 
market to agree to be subject to checks or to produce all the necessary documents and information certifying 
that they comply with the conditions fixed by the domestic legislation. Particularly with reference to the 
freedom to provide services, the Court observed that “The obligation for operators from other Member States 
to set up their principal establishment in Italy is the very negation of the freedom to provide services and, as 
can be seen from paragraphs 20 to 24 above, does not constitute a condition which is indispensable for 
attaining the aim pursued. It therefore infringes Article 59 of the Treaty”. 
533
 See in ECJ 9 March 1999, case Case C-212/97, Centros, at para. 24 for the reference to further judgments.  
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their territory, has not been deemed inconsistent with the freedom to provide services and 
with the free movement of capital. According to the Court, “the Netherlands legislation at 
issue has the specific effect, with a view to safeguarding the exercise of the freedoms 
guaranteed by the Treaty, of ensuring that those organizations cannot improperly evade 
the obligations deriving from the national legislation concerning the pluralistic and non-
commercial content of the programmes”534. The difference thus appears to rest in the aim 
of the national legislation, which is worthy of legitimate protection and quite specific; the 
same holds for the effects. Both of them are in line with the (also) Community interest in 
avoiding the circumvention of national law by means of the abuse of EC fundamental 
freedoms. 
                                                          
534
 ECJ 3 February 1993, case C-148/91, Veronica, para 13. Veronica was a non-commercial broadcasting 
organization established in the Netherlands, which in the view taken by Commissariaat voor de Media (the 
Dutch body responsible for overseeing broadcasting) contributed to the setting up of and provided material 
support to a commercial station in Luxembourg broadcasting to the Netherlands, thus infringing Article 57, 
para 1, of Mediawet pursuant to which “Apart from producing their programmes the organizations which 
have obtained broadcasting time may not pursue any activities other than those provided for or authorized 
by the Commissariaat voor de Media.”  By referring to its previous judgments involving the Mediawet (the 
Dutch law of 21 April 1987 on the broadcasting of radio and television programmes), the Court recalled that 
such legislation “is designed to establish a pluralistic and non-commercial broadcasting system and thus 
forms part of a cultural policy intended to safeguard, in the audio-visual sector, the freedom of expression of 
the various (in particular social, cultural, religious and philosophical) components existing in the 
Netherlands”, objectives that relate to the public interest legitimately pursued by a Member State with the 
regulation of the statutes of its own broadcasting organizations. The provision relevant in the main 
proceedings is deemed suitable to the attainment of these objectives, as “It seeks to prohibit national 
broadcasting organizations from engaging in activities which are alien to the tasks assigned to them by the 
Law or undermine the aims thereof, in the view of the Commissariaat voor de Media. Thus, in particular, it 
[Article 57, para. 1] provides that the financial resources available to the national broadcasting 
organizations to enable them to ensure pluralism in the audio-visual sector must not be diverted from that 
purpose and used for purely commercial ends.” See also ECJ 5 October 1994, Case C-23/93, TV10 SA, 
where the same premises led the Court to state that “a Member State may regard as a domestic broadcaster a 
radio and television organization which establishes itself in another Member State in order to provide 
services there which are intended for the first State’s territory, since the aim of that measure is to prevent 
organizations which establish themselves in another Member State from being able, by exercising the 
freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty, wrongfully to avoid obligations under national law, in this case those 
designed to ensure the pluralist and non-commercial content of programmes.” As noted by D. Weber, Tax 
avoidance and the EC Treaty freedoms: a study of the limitations under European law to the prevention of 
tax avoidance, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2005, 222, this decision is different from the others 
rendered on similar matters as here the Court skips the proportionality test. The case concerns the 
qualification as domestic broadcaster, by the Dutch Commissioners for the Media, of TV10 that was 
established in Luxembourg. In the reconstruction of the Commissioners, the commercial broadcasting 
undertaking had established itself abroad for escaping the Netherlands legislation applicable to domestic 
associations. As a consequence, it concluded that TV10 had to be deemed a domestic broadcaster and subject 
to the corresponding regulation (stricter than the one applicable to foreign broadcasters), thereby denying the 
transmissions of its programmes by cable in the Netherlands. The Court did not go further into the existence 
of less restrictive measures than the re-qualification as domestic organizations. Moreover, the Author put the 
attention on two further issues that the Court made very short shrift of: it did not explicitly say if the national 
regulation is restrictive on the freedom to provide services; above all, it was silent and seemed to uphold the 
national court’s view that established the avoidance on the basis of objective circumstances per se revealing a 
subjective intention of circumventing the national rules.
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The main concern shown by the EUCJ for the aim and effect of the national measure as 
well as for its coherence with respect to the national aim pursued, emerges also from the 
Centros case
535
, which concerned the refusal by the competent Danish authorities to 
register a branch of a private limited liability company formed  by Danish nationals in the 
UK where it did not carry out any activity, on the grounds that the overall arrangement was 
intended to circumvent the national legislation requiring the paying-up of a minimum 
amount of share capital. Centros is one of the first cases dealing with the issue of abuse of 
EU rights and the boundary with the legitimate use of the possibilities offered by the 
Treaty. In the decision, the Court recognized that a Member State may deny a national to 
rely on Community law when such claim hinders the circumvention of national legislation. 
Nevertheless, it requested the conduct suspected of embodying avoidance be judged on the 
basis of objective evidence and in the light of the objectives pursued by the provisions 
concerned
536
. In this regard, notably the Court underlined the contradiction in which the 
Danish authorities fall when they asserted, on the one side, that the branch would have 
been registered in Denmark if the company had carried out an activity in the UK, while on 
the other side they identified the purpose of the national practice at issue in the protection 
of creditors. In fact, if the company formed under the UK law had conducted business 
there, its branch would have been registered in Denmark, albeit the risk the creditors might 
have been exposed to remained. As a consequence, the measure concerned was found to be 
neither appropriate nor necessary to attain the purpose, and measures that interfere less 
with the fundamental freedoms were conceivable. Under a similar perspective, it can be 
said that the national measure misses a sort of ‘internal coherence’, meaning that there is 
not full correspondence between the aim pursued and the means chosen in the national 
context. Moreover, in the decision a certain lack of ‘external coherence’ is pointed out, as 
the national provisions that would be circumvented in the view taken by national 
authorities concern the formation of companies (which at that stage of European 
integration were not fully harmonized), while the provisions of the Treaty relevant in the 
                                                          
535
 ECJ 9 March 1999, case Case C-212/97, Centros. 
536
 ECJ 9 March 1999, Case C-212/97, Centros. The Court recalled that “according to the case-law of the 
Court a Member State is entitled to take measures designed to prevent certain of its nationals from 
attempting, under cover of the rights created by the Treaty, improperly to circumvent their national 
legislation or to prevent individuals from improperly of fraudulently taking advantage of provisions of 
Community law” (para 24), but then added that “although, in such circumstances the national courts may, 
case by case, take account – on the basis of objective evidence – of abuse or fraudulent conduct on the part 
of the persons concerned in order, where appropriate, to deny them the benefit of the provisions of 
Community law on which they seek to rely, they must nevertheless assess such conduct in the light of the 
objectives pursued by those provisions (Paletta II, paragraph 25)”(para 25). 
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main proceedings (on the freedom of establishment) rather relate to the carrying on of 
businesses
537
.  
 
6.2.1 … and the interaction with the division of the burden of proof under primary 
and secondary EU law 
From Centros, some indications may be inferred as to the distribution of the burden of 
proof and the standard of proof under primary Union law, which constitute a point of 
departure in the examination of the EUCJ’s rulings on tax law presumptions to be 
discussed below. Member States cannot generally refuse the exercise of a fundamental 
freedom
538
 by adducing the suspicion of avoidance purposes
539
. They are permitted to take 
measures for preventing or penalizing abusive conduct, towards the company (also having 
recourse to the cooperation with the State where the company is established) or its 
members, but only as long as “it has been established that they are in fact attempting, by 
means of the formation of the company, to evade their obligations towards private or 
public creditors established on the territory of a Member State concerned
540”. Thus, the 
Court would seem to request an ascertainment, in the concrete case, that in fact – and not 
presumably - the abuse has been carried out,  the proof that the company is not conducting 
any business abroad not being sufficient in this regard.  
Similar considerations led the Court in the Paletta II
541
 case to reject a national 
interpretation whose effect, i.e. the reversal of the burden of proof, contrasted with the aim 
pursued by the Regulation applicable. The facts of the main proceedings concerned the 
refusal by a German employer (Mr Brennet) to pay wages over the six weeks following the 
sickness notification by his Italian employee (Mr Paletta) on vacation with his family in 
Italy, on the grounds that he did not consider himself bound by the medical statement 
supplied in Italy whose truthfulness he doubted. For our purpose, here the question of the 
                                                          
537
 See para 26 of the judgment. As a result, the fact that a national of a Member State sets up a company in 
another Member State where the legislation is less restrictive, and then takes steps to register a branch in the 
former, does not in itself embody abuse of the right of establishment, not even when the parent company does 
not conduct any business. By contrast, the latter circumstance, in the view taken by the Court, does not 
suffice in order to prove the abuse. 
538
 In Centros, as said, to be denied was the registration of the branch. 
539
 In para 29 it is held that, according to para. 16 in the Segers decision, “the fact that a company does not 
conduct any business in the Member State in which it has its registered office and pursues its activities only 
in the Member State where its branch is established is not sufficient to prove the existence of abuse or 
fraudulent conduct which would entitle the latter Member State to deny that company the benefit of the 
provisions of Community law relating to the right of establishment”. Cf. also para 38. 
540
 “In any event” concluded the Court, “combating fraud cannot justify a practice of refusing to register a 
branch of a company which has its registered office in another Member State.” 
541
 ECJ 2 May 1996, case C-206/94, Paletta II. 
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distribution of the burden of proof between employer and employee is noteworthy, notably 
as it involves a matter regulated by secondary EU law. On the one hand, indeed, there was 
the Council Regulation No 574/72/EEC, fixing the procedure for implementing Regulation 
No 1408/71/EEC on the application of social security schemes to employed persons and 
their families moving within the Community
542
, while on the other hand there was the 
case-law referred to by the German referring court according to which, despite the 
Community regulation on the validity of the medical statement issued abroad, the 
employee was required to adduce additional evidence that the incapacity for work resulting 
from that statement was genuine in cases where his employer gave adequate evidence 
supporting serious grounds for doubting  the existence of the adduced sickness. 
Similarly to  Centros, the EUCJ recognized that national courts are entitled to deny the 
worker the benefit of the Community provision he abusively or fraudulently relies on, but 
they have to assess such a conduct on the basis of objective evidence and above all in the 
light of the objectives pursued by the relevant provisions. In this regard, Article 18 of the 
Regulation No 574/72 exactly aims at eliminating the difficulties in collecting evidence 
that a worker becoming sick in a Member State different from the one competent for the 
social security leave would meet
543
. Accordingly, a reversal of the burden of proof on the 
worker would jeopardize the system of the Community regulation on the mutual 
recognition of the certificates concerned. As a consequence, the Court states its 
inconsistency with the objectives laid down by Article 18
544
. This does not imply, however, 
                                                          
542
 In particular, Article 18, paras from 1 to 5. 
543
 In the words of the Court, “A worker whose incapacity for work arises in a Member State other than the 
competent Member State would, as a result, be confronted with difficulties involved in obtaining evidence 
which the Community rules in fact seek to eliminate”. 
544
 Cf. ECJ 4 December 1997, Joined Cases C-253/96 to C-258/96, Kampelmann and others, where at issue 
was the interpretation of Article 2, para 2, c, of the Council Directive 91/533/EEC of 14 October 1991 on an 
employer’s obligation to inform employees of the conditions applicable to the contract or employment 
relationship. Article 2, para 1, of the Directive requires employers to notify the employee of the essential 
aspects of the contract or employment relationship as set out in Article 2(2), while Article 6 of the same 
Directive reserves to national law and practice the regulation of the form and proof of the existence of a 
contract or employment relationship and of the relevant procedural rules. Despite national rules on the burden 
of proof falling outside the scope of the Directive, when questioned about the evidentiary efficacy of the 
notification ex Article 2, para 1, i.e. whether it is binding on the employer until he proves its incorrectness, 
the EUCJ did not refrain from stating that “national courts must apply and interpret their national rules on 
the burden of proof in the light of the purpose of the Directive, giving the notification referred to in Article 2, 
para 1, such evidential weight as to allow it to serve as factual proof of the essential aspects of the contract 
of employment or employment relationship, enjoying such presumption as to its correctness as would attach, 
in domestic law, to any similar document drawn up by the employer and communicated to the employee.” As 
a matter of fact, the Court observed that the objective pursued would be failed if the employee could not rely 
on the information contained into such notification as evidence before national courts. On the other hand, in 
the absence of a set of rules of evidence in the Directive, the employer is not prevented from bringing any 
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that the employer is prevented from contesting the validity of the medical statement and 
thereby avoiding the application of Article 18. On the contrary, he may prove that, despite 
the certificate issued pursuant to Article 18, the worker was actually not sick and that his 
conduct embodies an abuse. But, and this is the point, a direct proof is requested in order to 
get the non–application of the Community Regulation, national courts being prevented 
from presuming the abuse on the basis of mere clues
545
. Where the employer meets this 
proof, then it would be up to the worker to prove his real incapacity to work, according to 
the general rule on the distribution of the burden of proof. 
From Centros and Paletta, one could infer that Member States are not allowed to introduce 
general presumptions of abuse, as the fraudulent conduct needs to be directly proved in the 
concrete pending case. At  first sight, the Court would even seem to reject the use of 
presumptions of fact by national courts as well. Under this perspective, it would be 
possible to see an evolution in the approach of the Court, as in decisions handed down 
thereafter, the role of the contrary proof (when legal presumptions are at issue) emerges as 
a guarantee of a case-by-case evaluation and of a balance between the effectiveness of EU 
law and the need to combat tax avoidance.  
However, the above decisions need to be contextualized. Both in Centros and Paletta we do 
not face a national legal presumption or even a legal provision, but rather the non-
application by administrative or jurisdictional authorities of the legislation normally 
applicable (on the registration of the branch of a foreign company, on the recognition of 
security benefits in relation to a certificate issued abroad) in relation to a conduct which is 
deemed as abusing Community law. Hence, under a more immediate perspective, the 
decisions are readable as prohibiting Member States’ practices from disproportionately 
                                                                                                                                                                                
evidence to the contrary, by proving that the information reported in the notification are incorrect or they do 
not correspond to the facts. National procedural law, therefore, serves the objectives of the Directive. 
545
 D. Weber, Tax avoidance and the EC Treaty Freedoms: a study of the limitations under European law to 
the prevention of tax avoidance, cited above, at p. 224. The Author classified this decision among the case-
law under secondary Community law whereby the proportionality test has been applied to legal presumptions 
of avoidance. Apart from the questionable classification, he correctly observed that from Paletta II, read in 
conjunction with cases like Van de Bijl (C-130/88) and Fitzwilliam (C-202/97) it results that if the 
Community introduces directly or indirectly an evidentiary rule, then the Member State is bound to that proof. 
This is an implication of the principle of mutual recognition of norms, statements, documentary evidence etc., 
which would be undermined if national authorities (meaning the legislator, the administration, the courts) 
were entitled to reverse the burden of proof. He continued as follows: “Given the objective of the Community 
provision, the Court, in this case, did not permit a reversal of the burden of proof if the employer’s evidence 
led only to doubt. Community law may, however, be restricted if the proof is such that there can certainly be 
said to be avoidance. In this case Community law entails that the main rule of Community law may not be set 
aside on the grounds of presumptions but only on the basis of proof of actual avoidance.” It has to be noted 
that, as said in the text, here the Court appears to face two issues: the type of proof requested and the standard 
of proof. It seems to exclude an indirect proof, irrespective of the standard of proof, and to require a direct 
proof about the avoidance. 
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undermining the objectives fixed at EU level. In Centros, the competent authority denied 
the registration of a branch of a foreign company on the basis of its evaluation of the facts, 
according to which Centros was seeking to have in Denmark a principal establishment 
rather than a branch, thereby circumventing the national rules on the paying of a minimum 
share capital. In Paletta, at issue was a judicial trend (it is not clear from the decision how 
much settled) which contravened the rules under secondary Community law on formalities 
when incapacity to work arises abroad, and in this way arrogated to itself the balancing of 
the interests in play that had already been developed at EU level. 
In the light of this, such decisions might be read as requesting the effective proof of the 
abuse – meaning based on objective circumstances - in the administrative and judicial seat, 
thereupon suggesting that the balancing of interests should happen at the legislative level, 
albeit within the limits fixed by the EUCJ as to the case-by-case evaluation and the 
prohibition of too general anti-avoidance provisions having the effect of altogether 
preventing  the exercise of the Treaty rights. This, unless the balancing has not already 
been drawn by the EU legislator, as in this case Member States are bound to the objectives 
established and their implementing measures, whether provided, cannot overlap or 
overcome the EU model so as to jeopardize it. 
Perhaps the above reflections go far beyond what the Court has in fact asserted or meant to 
assert. In any event, from the decisions under discussion it follows that the burden of proof 
as to the existence of an abusive conduct lies in principle on the Member State’s authorities 
rather than on individuals or companies relying on Community law. Though it is not 
certain that this statement may be analogously transposed to the area of tax law, it 
nevertheless represents a point of departure for the examination of the policy of the EUCJ 
on the matter to be discussed thereafter. 
 
6.2.2 Proportionality and national quantitative restrictions 
In accordance with the great attention reserved by the EUCJ to the aim pursued by the 
national provision concerned, from the overview of other judgments outside taxation it 
further stems a (not always explicit) distinction between those provisions aiming at 
tackling avoidance and those ones seeking to bring simplification. The question notably 
arises under secondary EU law of which the abstract model of levy is drawn by the EU 
legislator while it rests on the single Member States the introduction of the concrete model 
or the necessary implementing measures (mostly depending on whether a Directive or a 
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Regulation is at issue). In the field of taxation, this can be verified dealing with 
presumptions in the area of indirect taxation. In some cases, the Court is prone to permit 
national measures that simplify the application of the relevant EU provisions, while it 
appears to be more reluctant facing general rules aiming exclusively at avoiding abuse. 
Among these types of national measures there are those fixing quantitative constraints that 
are not laid down by the secondary EU law applicable, so that their application is 
potentially able to undermine the uniform application of the EU model. Such constraints 
are as a rule rejected by the EUCJ, on the grounds that they threaten the effective and 
homogeneous enforcement of EU law. However, as it will be shown later on, in the area of 
taxation, where needs of simplification linked especially to the determination of the taxable 
base arise, the Court follows more permissible positions.  
To illustrate the question, the Lair case
546
 can be mentioned. It concerned a French national 
(Lair) who was refused by the University of Hanover a maintenance and training grant for 
her University studies (which would lead to a professional qualification), on the grounds 
that she had not been engaged in an occupational activity in Germany for at least five years. 
Indeed, the German law applicable provided that such grants could be awarded not only to 
German nationals, but also to certain categories of foreigners on condition that they had 
resided and had been engaged in regular occupational activity in Germany for five years 
prior to the commencement of the educational or training course. Here the Court, after 
having clarified that a national of a Member State who has undertaken university studies in 
the host Member State where he has been previously engaged in occupational activity 
linked to the subsequent studies keeps the status of worker under the freedom of movement, 
so that he is entitled to the benefit of Article 7, para 2, of Regulation No 1612/68, faced the 
question of the minimum period of prior occupation activity on which German law 
conditioned the granting of such social advantages. The Court rejected the arguments 
submitted by the intervening Member States, which adduced the risk of abuses existing 
when entering a Member State as a worker with the purpose of enjoying the student 
assistance system after having worked for a short period of time. Indeed, noted the Court, 
when ascertained on the basis of objective evidence, these (abusive) conducts are not 
covered by Community law. Above all, the unilateral introduction of a minimum time-
period of occupational activity as a necessary condition for the purpose of enjoying the 
social benefits provided for by Article 7, para 2, of the Regulation is enabled to directly 
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 ECJ 21 June 1988, case Case C-39/86, Lair. 
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affect the regulation established at EU level, with the result that a Community right can be 
relied on under different conditions depending on the host Member State. In this view, the 
Court observed that a student who is a national of a Member State may claim the grant at 
hand for university training only in his capacity as a worker under Article 48 of the EEC 
Treaty and Regulation No 1612/68. The concept of worker “has a specific Community 
meaning and may not be defined on the basis of criteria laid down in national 
legislation”547. In other words, when the definition of a certain right is to be found at EU 
level, then the national legislator is prohibited from interfering with the insertion of further 
quantitative requirements that jeopardize the uniform application. 
This holds true until another interest worthy of protection according to the EU standards 
comes into play, as it will be clear later on when dealing with presumptive provisions in 
tax law. 
 
6.3 Conclusion. Is the legal concept of “general presumptions of avoidance” a 
misleading concept? 
The case-law briefly recalled so far in sectors other than taxation imposes to draw some 
conclusions with special regard to the line of reasoning of the EUCJ that can be inferred. 
First of all, it goes without saying that the EUCJ in principle rejects every national 
statutory provision or practice (either administrative or judicial) that deems the exercise of 
an EU fundamental freedom or right as embodying per se abuse. More precisely, Member 
States are permitted to introduce measures aiming at avoiding the circumvention of their 
own law, but such measures cannot be too general, meaning that they are required to be 
limited both as to the scope and the effects. 
Besides the cases referred to in the previous paragraph, Alpine Investments
548
 can be 
ultimately mentioned, as it confirms that the Court does not refrain from accepting national 
measures that, albeit limiting a Treaty right, are justified in view of a compelling public 
interest and are proportionate. The case concerned the general prohibition issued by the 
Dutch Ministry of Finance on financial intermediaries who offered investments in off-
market commodities futures from cold-calling potential clients resident in other Member 
                                                          
547
 Id., para 41. 
548
 ECJ 10 May 1995, Case C-384/93, Alpine Investments. According to D. Weber, Tax avoidance and the 
EC Treaty Freedoms: a study of the limitations under European law to the prevention of tax avoidance, cited 
above, at p. 218, who with reference, for instance, to Alpine Investments described in the text says: “It would 
appear from Alpine Investments that the Court permits measures that, given the avoidance being prevented, 
contain sufficient specific presumptions of avoidance even though they do not take a party’s subjective 
intention into account.” 
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States. As foreseeable, such a measure was found to be restrictive on the freedom to 
provide services, but the argument put forward by the Dutch government, that is the 
protection of the investor confidence in Netherlands financial markets, was accepted as an 
imperative reason of general public interest capable of justifying such restriction. The 
Court observed, on the one hand, that the measure “cannot be considered to be 
inappropriate to achieve the objective”, thereby rejecting the argument of Alpine 
Investments who contended the controls of the Member State of the recipient to suffice. In 
fact, in the view taken by the Court the Member State of the provider of services is best 
placed to regulate the cold-calling. On the other hand, such measure does not go beyond 
what is necessary in order to achieve that objective, as “the rules at issue are limited in 
scope. First, they prohibit only the contracting of potential clients by telephone or in 
person without their prior agreement in writing, while other techniques for making contact 
are still permitted. Next, the measure affects relations with potential clients but not with 
existing clients who may still give their written agreement to further calls. Finally, the 
prohibition of unsolicited telephone calls is limited to the sector in which abuses have been 
found, namely the commodities futures market.
549” 
The foregoing can be considered a first line in the following examination of the EUCJ 
rulings dealing with national tax presumptions, notably those aiming at preventing 
avoidance, fraud, or abuse in general. 
In this regard, a further consideration needs to be made. Not every national restrictive 
provision aiming at combating abuse is a presumption. Though this might be an obvious 
point of departure, it has to be pointed out that within the case-law of the EUCJ there is a 
certain trend to classify provisions like the ones (outside taxation) just dealt with as general 
presumptions of avoidance or abuse.  
The overview of the general theory on presumptions carried out in the first and second 
chapter of this dissertation imposes, however, to distinguish those provisions where the 
known fact is not demonstrative in respect of the unknown fact and they are not linked by a 
rule of experience or at least by a rational basis. It cannot be denied that a presumptive 
ratio belongs to most provisions aiming at avoiding abuse in cross-border situations, in the 
sense that the legislator seems to presume the existence of a purpose of avoidance basically 
on the grounds of the transnational character of the situation. But this perspective would 
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 Id., para 54. 
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lead to excessively stretching the category of presumptions by covering all the general 
anti-avoidance provisions. 
It is true that when dealing with tax law presumptions in the EU context in respect of 
national contexts a certain amount of leeway has to be given. Nonetheless, this cannot 
result in a distortion of the concept, at least in its fundamental characters as identified so 
far. 
Generally speaking, in the EUCJ case-law and within the tax literature as well, the concept 
of ‘general presumption of avoidance or abuse’ refers to measures, not necessarily legal, 
which discriminate against cross-border situations so as that the exercise of a Treaty 
freedom or a right conferred by a Directive ends up to be considered per se an index of 
abuse. Such trend reflects the approach of the EUCJ to tax law presumptions, which, as it 
will be explained later on, is so much focused on the ‘effects of presumption’ and on the 
need to secure the effectiveness of the EU law relevant in the case concerned that it often 
disregards the structure of the national presumptive measure and the body issuing the latter. 
 
 
Chapter III - Section I 
Customs Law and Harmonized Indirect Taxes 
 
Introduction 
After having framed the issue of tax law presumptions in the context of EU law and in line 
with the choice of paying separate attention to the main domains of tax law before drawing 
more general conclusions, the focus is on indirect taxation, including customs duties and 
VAT, while excise duties will be only briefly referred to. 
To this end, the exploration of the single ambits should be introduced by making reference 
to the legal bases of the ‘positive’ integration, which those taxes reflect, albeit to a 
different degree. 
As is well known, unlike direct taxes where the integration of national legislations mainly 
takes place through the EUCJ decisions declaring national tax measures inconsistent with 
EU law (‘negative integration’), indirect taxes have been increasingly harmonized over 
time by way of regulations and/or directives (‘positive integration’). It is significant that as 
from 1957 the EEC Treaty included in  Chapter II on Tax provisions Article 99, para 1 
(now Article 113 TFEU), which directed the Commission to examine “how the legislation 
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of the various Member States concerning turnover taxes, excise duties and other forms of 
indirect taxation, including countervailing measures applicable to trade between Member 
States can be harmonized in the interest of the common market”. Indirect taxes are – more 
than taxes on income - perceived as visible obstacles to the proper functioning of the 
common (lately internal) market. Precisely the circumstance that they are levied on trades, 
rather than on  personal income, has made it feasible to either repeal or uniformise them. 
Furthermore, the Council Decision No 70/243  might have had a role in the harmonization 
of the divergent system and bases, especially for turnover taxes, as it  introduced the ‘own 
resources’ of the Community, which include the customs duties and a percentage of the 
VAT base. Uniform criteria for determining the taxable base were thus necessary in order 
to secure the equity between Member States. 
Leaving aside any further consideration on the developments in the process of European 
tax harmonization that are of historical interest only, the legal basis of such harmonization 
and the different level of integration achieved as regards the indirect taxes mentioned 
above are worthy of attention, as they impact on the (very little) sovereignty of Member 
States left and on the EUCJ’s case law. 
As to the legal basis for the harmonization of indirect taxes in the Union, Articles 28 TFEU 
et seq. for customs duties, and Articles 110 to 113 TFEU for (other) indirect taxes are 
specifically relevant. 
Article 28, in view of the abolition of the barriers to free movement of goods, provides that 
“The Union shall comprise a customs union which shall cover all trades in goods and 
which shall involve the prohibition between Member States of customs duties on imports 
and exports and of all charges having equivalent effect, and the adoption of a common 
customs tariff in their relations with third countries”. On the grounds of this provision, 
steps are to be taken in a twofold direction: on the one side, the altogether prohibition of 
customs duties on intra-EU imports and exports and charges having equivalent effect (see 
Article 30 TFEU) as well as of intra-EU quantitative restrictions on imports or exports and 
measures having equivalent effect (see Articles 34 and 35 TFEU); on the other side, the 
establishment of a common customs tariff by the Council on a proposal from the 
Commission for the trades with third countries (see Article 31 TFEU). Notably, the 
concept of ‘charge having equivalent effect’ to customs duties has been broadly interpreted 
in several judgments of the EUCJ, by encompassing not only any pecuniary charge that is 
levied by a Member State on the occasion of the border-crossing of products, but also 
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merely internal levies that, albeit charged indiscriminately on domestic and imported 
products, are used so as to compensate domestic producers for the charge
550
. 
In similar cases, for instance where there is not  full compensation for domestic goods so 
that the charge is not ‘equivalent’ to a customs duty, Article 110 may be considered 
applicable, as it prohibits discriminatory (para 1) and protective (para 2) internal taxes
551
. It 
has been observed that this provision has played an important role in the process of 
harmonization of excise duties (of certain products)
552
, since it permits the taxation on 
imported products provided that they are charged in exactly the same  way as domestic 
products. 
More in general, the legal basis for the harmonization of indirect taxes, like excise duties 
and VAT, is represented by Article 113 TFEU, by virtue of which “The Council shall, 
acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure and after 
consulting the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, adopt 
provisions for the harmonisation of legislation concerning turnover taxes, excise duties 
and other forms of indirect taxation to the extent that such harmonisation is necessary to 
ensure the establishment and the functioning of the internal market and to avoid distortion 
of competition”. 
From this provision it results, firstly, that the integration of national indirect taxes is to be 
merely functional for the repealing of the obstacles that hinder cross-border trades and 
competition. Secondly, that the decision-making procedure requires unanimity, which 
means that each Member State has the power to veto EU proposals in the matter of indirect 
taxation. 
In this regard, it should be observed that the unanimity is requested for all tax matters, 
included customs duties and all the more direct taxation. Indeed, Article 114, para 2, TFEU, 
excludes the fiscal provisions from the application of the ordinary legislative procedure for 
the approximation of national rules on matters concerning the establishment and 
                                                          
550
 See ex multis, EUCJ 2 August 1993, case C-266/91, Fazenda Pública. 
551
 It states that “No Member State shall impose, directly or indirectly, on the products of other Member State 
any internal taxation of any kind in excess of that imposed directly or indirectly on similar domestic products. 
Furthermore, no Member States shall impose on the products of other Member States any internal taxation of 
such a nature as to afford indirect protection to other products”. Member States are also prevented from 
introducing protective internal taxes on domestic exported goods pursuant to Article 111 TFEU: “Where 
products are exported to the territory of any Member State, any repayment of internal taxation shall not 
exceed the internal taxation imposed on them whether directly or indirectly.” 
552
 B.G.M. Terra, B.J. Wattel, European tax law, cited above, at p. 463-464. 
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functioning of the internal market. Moreover, Article 115 TFEU, which usually constitutes 
the legal basis for harmonization of direct taxation, requires the unanimity
553
. 
There may be identified though, few tax-related matters where initiatives may be adopted 
with the ordinary legislative procedure, thereby with the qualified majority. Among these, 
Article 33 TFEU empowers the European Parliament and the Council to take measures in 
order to strengthen customs cooperation between the Member States and also between the 
latter and the Commission
554
. Secondly, Article 325 TFEU gives incentives for the 
European Parliament and the Council to adopt the necessary measures for preventing and 
tackling fraud and any other illegal activities affecting the financial interests of the Union. 
Given that customs duties and (in a certain percentage) VAT bolster the own resources of 
the Union, that article may represent a legal basis for measures combating tax fraud under 
the ordinary legislative procedure
555
.  
Save for exceptions, the unanimity represents the rule for decision-making on tax matters, 
also in the domain of indirect taxes. Within such domain, however, a further distinction 
should be made between customs duties on the one side, and the other indirect taxes on the 
other side, under the aspect of the distribution of competences between the Union and the 
Member States. As a matter of fact, only the customs union is an exclusive competence of 
the Union (Article 3, para 1, let. a, TFEU), meaning that Member States have lost their 
sovereignty therein. By contrast, the other indirect (as well as direct) taxes are deemed to 
fall within the heading ‘internal market’ in Article 4, para 2, let. a, TFEU), in the extent to 
which they are able to affect cross-border transactions within the Union’s territory. Article 
                                                          
553
 It states that “Without prejudice to Article 114, the Council shall, acting unanimously in accordance with 
a special legislative procedure and after consulting the European Parliament and the Economic and Social 
Committee, issue directives for the approximation of such laws, regulations or administrative provisions of 
the Member States as directly affect the establishment or the functioning of the internal market”. Furthermore, 
a unanimous consensus has also to be reached on matters of environmental and energy taxation (see Article 
19, para 2, let. a), 194, para 3, both requiring a special legislative procedure and unanimity when measures to 
be taken are “primarily of a fiscal nature”). 
554
 This, “Within the scope of application of the Treaties (…) [and] acting in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure”. 
555
 Article 325, para 4 TFEU: “The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the 
ordinary legislative procedure, after consulting the Court of Auditors, shall adopt the necessary measures in 
the fields of the prevention of and fight against fraud affecting the financial interests of the Union with a view 
to affording effective and equivalent protection in the Member States and in all the Union’s institutions, 
bodies, offices and agencies.” The same Article calls Member States to take against fraud affecting the 
financial interests of the Union the same measures adopted for protecting their own financial interests (para 1 
and 2) and to coordinate their action with the Commission as well (para 3). For completeness sake, it has to 
be said that further exceptions to the unanimity requirement may be represented by the provisions of the 
Treaty in the area of State aid (see Articles 107 and 108) and by Article 116. According to the latter, where 
the Commission finds that a divergence between national legislative or regulatory provisions or even 
administrative practices is distorting the market competition and the consultation with the Member States 
involved does not flow into an agreement for the elimination of such distortion, then the European Parliament 
and the Council shall adopt the necessary directives or any other appropriate measures provided in the Treaty. 
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4 lists the matters where the Union shares the competence with Member States, so that 
both of them are competent, but once the Union has exercised its competence on a certain 
issue, then they lose their power to regulate it
556
.  
The current regulation of customs duties, on the one side, and other indirect taxes, like 
excise duties and VAT, on the other side, reflects such different allocation of competence 
set forth in the Treaty. The former are governed almost completely at EU level through a 
Regulation
557
: a customs union necessarily entails a free trade area within the customs 
territory and a uniform customs tariff at the outside cross-borders. The latter (i.e. VAT, 
excise duties), instead, have been regulated by means of directives, thereby leaving to the 
Member States room as to the means to adopt in order to pursue the objectives chosen at 
EU level. This is evident when confronting the VAT Directive
558. It lays down a ‘model’ 
of regulation of valued added tax which Member States are requested to comply with and 
to implement in their own legal orders, so that 28 VATs can still be counted in the 
European Union.  
This also influences to a certain extent the EUCJ case-law, as whereas in one case the 
Court is confronted with a national measure in respect of a Regulation directly applicable 
in each Member State, in the other case it checks the conformity of a national provision 
with a model that in abstracto is to be implemented in 28 different ways. 
Below, customs law will be dealt with first (Part I), afterwards the focus will turn to VAT 
(Part II), and ultimately on the issue of the repayment of indirect taxes levied in breach of 
EU law. As to the excise duties, they will be briefly referred to. Notwithstanding they 
represent a conspicuous financial resource for Member States, their harmonization is not as 
advanced as the one of customs duties and VAT and has concerned only some products 
(alcohol, tobacco, energy )
559
. 
                                                          
556
 This category of competence conferred upon the Union is defined as ‘shared competence with 
preemption’ and distinguished either from the exclusive competence in Article 3 or from the ‘shared 
competence without preemption’ in Article 6. The latter lists a series of matters when the Union has 
“competence to carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of Member States”.  See 
B.G.M. Terra, B.J. Wattel, European tax law, cited above, 2012, at p. 9. Similarly, P. Craig and G. De Búrca, 
EU law: text, cases, and materials, 5 ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, 84. 
557
 Regulation 2008/450/EC. 
558
 Directive 2006/112/EC. 
559
 As is well known, excise duties are indirect taxes on the consumption or use of certain products. Unlike 
VAT, they are specific taxes, meaning that they are usually  expressed as a monetary amount per quantity of 
the product. Another important difference with VAT, and customs duties as well, is that the revenue from 
excise duties flows entirely into the States’ Treasury. As it will be explained infra, excise duties are regulated 
by Directive 2008/116/EC, laying down the general rules, and by further Directives concerning single 
products categories.  
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1. A brief outline on excise duties 
As said, the focus is mainly on customs duties and VAT. These domains are interesting for 
several reasons. They embody two different, though similar to a certain extent, ways of 
regulating the tax matter at EU level: the former is governed by a Regulation which is 
directly applicable in all the Member States, whereas the latter is regulated by a directive 
which is binding only as regards the aim to be pursued by Member States. Both of them, 
though under very different quotas, fuel the own resources of the Union. Ultimately, they 
have given rise, over the last years, to a number of issues and case-law dealing with tax 
law presumptions.  
In this context, the choice of merely mentioning the domain of excise duties is guided by 
the absence, to my knowledge, of particular questions or relevant case-law on the 
compatibility of national presumptive measures with the relevant EU law. Before dealing 
with the case-law in those areas, however, a brief mention to excise duties should be done. 
In this regard, as recalled above, the regulation of the matter is mainly articulated into the 
Directive 2008/118/EC, which has replaced the previous Directive 92/12/EEC and contains 
the general arrangements for all the excise duties, and three further directives, which 
harmonize the structures, the possible exemption and the minimum rate of duty of the 
excise duties covered by the former directive. While the latter are quite technical and 
concern specific excise duties, a few considerations can be developed by making reference 
to the general rules. 
First, excise duties embody taxes which are levied directly or indirectly on the 
consumption of certain goods (energy products, alcohol and alcoholic beverages, 
manufactured tobacco) and are due at the time of their production within, or their 
importation into, the territory of the Community
560
. This field is not completely 
harmonized, as Member States are permitted to levy other indirect taxes on excise goods 
for specific purposes, provided that they comply with certain rules governing excise duties 
and valued added tax
561
. Likewise, they may introduce (and maintain) taxes levied on 
products other than excise goods and on supply of services, as long as they do not give rise 
to formalities at frontiers in trades between Member States
562
. 
                                                          
560
 See Article 1, para 1, and Article 2, Directive 2008/118/EC. 
561
 Article 1, para 2, Directive 2008/118/EC: “Member States may levy other indirect taxes on excise goods 
for specific purposes, provided that those taxes comply with the Community tax rules applicable for excise 
duty or value added tax as far as determination of the tax base, calculation of the tax, chargeability and 
monitoring of the tax are concerned, but not including the provisions on exemptions.” 
562
 Article 1, para 3, Directive 2008/118/EC: “3. Member States may levy taxes on:(a) products other than 
excise goods; (b) the supply of services, including those relating to excise goods, which cannot be 
Chapter III 
  
 
 284 
Second, Article 9 of the Directive explicitly refers to each Member State the regulation of 
the procedure concerning the levy, the collection, and, where appropriate, the 
reimbursement and the remission of the duty, on condition that it does not discriminate 
goods from other Member States in respect of national goods
563
. As a result, Member 
States have room for regulating these procedural aspects of the excise duties, though they 
must comply with the non-discrimination principle. 
Besides this explicit limitation, further criteria may be inferred from other articles of the 
Directive or from the preamble, which reflect general principles inspiring the excise duties’ 
rules. For instance, given the importance of defining uniformly the concept and conditions 
of chargeability of excise duties for the proper functioning of the internal market, the 
directive deals in detail – also by means of presumptions or legal definitions in Article 8564 – 
with the moment when goods are released for consumption and who the person liable to 
pay the duty is (unlike the previous directive which was vague in this regard)
565
.  
Such provisions therefore give the measure of the extent to which the national legislator 
may introduce presumptions affecting these profiles (person liable to tax, moment of 
chargeability) of the tax obligation. Similar considerations hold true with regard to certain 
                                                                                                                                                                                
characterised as turnover taxes. However, the levying of such taxes may not, in trade between Member States, 
give rise to formalities connected with the crossing of frontiers.” 
563
 See point (10) Preamble to the Directive 2008/118/EC. Cf. ECJ 5 April 2001, case C-325/99, Van de 
Water. At paras 40 and 41 it is held: “However, by ensuring, in Article 6(1) [now, Article 9(1)] of the 
Directive, that the rules governing the chargeability of excise duty are the same in all the Member States, the 
Community legislature was clearly not seeking to harmonise the procedures for the levying and collection of 
duty by those States. On the contrary, in Article 6(2) [now, Article 9(2)], it expressly left it to the Member 
States to determine those procedures, subject to the non-discrimination requirement referred to in paragraph 
38 of this judgment.Lastly, it should be noted that, whilst Article 6 [now, Article 9] of the Directive does not 
specify the person liable to pay the duty chargeable, it follows from the scheme of the Directive, and from the 
ninth recital in its preamble, that the national authorities must in any event ensure that the tax debt is in fact 
collected.” 
564
 The person liable to pay the excise duty is broadly identified, by explicitly including any other person 
involved in irregularities and providing for their joint and separate liability: “(a) in relation to the departure 
of excise goods from a duty suspension arrangement as referred to in Article 7(2)(a): (i) the authorised 
warehouse keeper, the registered consignee or any other person releasing the excise goods or on whose 
behalf the excise goods are released from the duty suspension arrangement and, in the case of irregular 
departure from the tax warehouse, any other person involved in that departure; (ii) in the case of an 
irregularity during a movement of excise goods under a duty suspension arrangement as defined in Article 
10(1), (2) and (4): the authorised warehouse keeper, the registered consignor or any other person who 
guaranteed the payment in accordance with Article 18(1) and (2) and any person who participated in the 
irregular departure and who was aware or who should reasonably have been aware of the irregular nature 
of the departure; (b) in relation to the holding of excise goods as referred to in Article 7(2)(b): the person 
holding the excise goods and any other person involved in the holding of the excise goods; (c) in relation to 
the production of excise goods as referred to in Article 7(2)(c): the person producing the excise goods and, in 
the case of irregular production, any other person involved in their production; (d) in relation to the 
importation of excise goods as referred to in Article 7(2)(d): the person who declares the excise goods or on 
whose behalf they are declared upon importation and, in the case of irregular importation, any other person 
involved in the importation.” 
565
 Point (8), Preamble to the Directive 2008/118/EC. 
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circumstances, like the destruction or the irretrievable loss of the excise goods, which in 
accordance with the taxable event of the excise duty (consumption of certain goods), 
should not give rise to taxation
566
. Again, for the purpose of securing the collection of the 
tax and above all of avoiding disputes among two or more Member States, the Directive 
deals with the hypothesis in which an irregularity was committed and the place where it 
occurred cannot be established. Similarly to what is provided in the Regulation on customs 
duties, the irregularity is presumed – or is established – to have been committed in the 
State where the irregularity was detected, or, when goods do not arrive at their destination, 
where the dispatch took place
567
. 
Therefore, the EU legislator deals with the constituting elements of the tax obligation. It 
does not lay down  detailed procedural rules, which thus fall in the competence of Member 
States. However, they are limited by the observance of the substantive criteria resulting 
from the EU directives on the matter, by the principle of non-discrimination, and not least 
by the principle of effectiveness. The latter, in particular, is likely to entail that the rights 
conferred to individuals by the directives on excise duties which are to be implemented 
into national legal orders, cannot be jeopardized by irrebuttable presumptions in contrast 
with the provisions of such directives. By contrast, it can be foreseen that rebuttable 
presumptions, on condition that they are in line with the criteria inspiring the directives and 
permit the taxpayer to give the counterproof, may be admitted. 
Later on in the dissertation, national tax law presumptions in the field of excise duties will 
be dealt with under a particular perspective, which is the right of the taxpayer to obtain the 
refund of the excise duties – and more in general indirect taxes – levied by a Member State 
in contravention of EU law. 
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 Point (9), Preamble to the Directive 2008/118/EC. See Article 7, para 4, Directive 2008/118/EC, pursuant 
to which “The total destruction or irretrievable loss of excise goods under a duty suspension arrangement, as 
a result of the actual nature of the goods, of unforeseeable circumstances or force majeure, or as a 
consequence of authorisation by the competent authorities of the Member State, shall not be considered a 
release for consumption. For the purpose of this Directive, goods shall be considered totally destroyed or 
irretrievably lost when they are rendered unusable as excise goods. The total destruction or irretrievable loss 
of the excise goods in question shall be proven to the satisfaction of the competent authorities of the Member 
State where the total destruction or irretrievable loss occurred or, when it is not possible to determine where 
the loss occurred, where it was detected.” Next paragraph of the same article provides then that “Member 
State shall lay down its own rules and conditions under which the losses referred to in paragraph 4 are 
determined”. 
567
 See Article 10, Directive 2008/118/EC. 
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Chapter III - Section I - Part I 
Customs Law 
 
1. The reasons for dealing with tax presumptions in the domain of Customs law 
Customs law constitutes a peculiar field in the domain of taxation, as the core of the 
discipline is covered by a Council Regulation
568
 (complemented by its implementing 
provisions) which is directly applicable and enforceable within the single legal orders by 
virtue of Article 288, para. 2, TFEU. 
It has been observed, at the beginning of this chapter, that alongside the tools on 
administrative cooperation, customs law represents a derogation from the common lack of 
EU provisions dealing with procedural law. Now is the moment to clarify that they – 
customs law and administrative cooperation - reflect two very different mechanisms of 
regulation the EU legislator avails itself of. In fact, the administrative cooperation 
instruments embody horizontal coordination between national (also customs) authorities 
with the aim of tackling tax avoidance and fraud. As such, they mainly turn out to be 
obligations put on national competent authorities without any harmonization of the main 
procedure, which remains regulated on a national level. By contrast, Customs legislation is 
based on the task of creating a customs union where the free movement of goods in the 
internal market is secured. It covers procedural aspects as well, which are only to be 
applied as such by national customs authorities; in summary, coordination of national 
procedural rules versus harmonization of national rules. 
The Customs Union, which entails the free movement of goods within the EU territorial 
space without any barriers and the application of one single customs tariff for trade with 
third countries, is the pivot for the functioning of the internal market. Accordingly, it 
belongs to the range of matters wherein the Union has exclusive competence pursuant to 
Article 3, para 1, let. a), TFEU, meaning that “only the Union may legislate and adopt 
                                                          
568
 Regulation 2913/92/EC. In this dissertation, references are made to the latter, i.e. to the Community 
Customs Code. It has to be said, however, that on the 30th of October 2013 the Regulation (EU) No 
952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2013 laying down the Union Customs 
Code (recast) entered into force, though not every provision of the latter is immediately applicable. See point 
56 of the Preamble: “The provisions of this Regulation setting out the delegation of power and the conferral 
of implementing powers and the provisions on charges and costs should apply from the date of entry into 
force of this Regulation. The other provisions should apply from 1 June 2016.” 
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legally binding acts, the Member States being able to do so themselves only if so 
empowered by the Union or for the implementation of Union acts.”569 
However, the EU regulation – i.e. not only the Community Customs Code (hereinafter also 
CCC), but also the implementing provisions
570
 - does not exhaust all the aspects, especially 
the procedural ones, of the customs matter. On the one hand, it leaves to Member States – 
either explicitly or implicitly – to lay down the rules on certain issues. On the other hand 
and all the more so, the daily execution of customs legislation remains in the hands of 
national administrative and judicial authorities, though the essence of the procedures is (at 
least at minimum) harmonized. Though, such execution is placed under the supervision of 
the European Commission and the European Court of Justice, which has the last word on 
the interpretation of Community legislation and national rules that come within the scope 
of customs law. 
Article 1 of the CCC presupposes this relation between Community and national 
(procedural) law where it states that “Customs rules shall consist of this Code and the 
provisions adopted at Community level or nationally to implement them”, and similarly 
does Article 4, para 23 of the CCC, which establishes that, for the purposes of the Code, 
‘Provisions in force’ means Community or national provisions. 
In practice, while the Community Customs Code covers the substantive discipline of 
customs duties, the procedural aspects are mostly circumscribed in a cursory way, meaning 
that only the essential features are regulated, leaving to Member States the discipline of the 
aspects related to the practical or daily application
571
. Customs duties are a kind of indirect 
tax levied on individual transactions on occasion and at the moment when the goods pass 
the customs frontiers. In the absence of a Union’s administrative body, the rules set out in 
the CCC are inevitably to be applied by national tax administration; more precisely by 
national customs authorities. In fact, the Customs code assumes the existence of an 
                                                          
569
 Article 2, para. 1, TFEU. 
570
 Amongst these, Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 of 2 July 1993 laying down provisions for the 
implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code. 
571
 By way of exemplification, the legal form of decisions issued by customs authorities of a Member State, 
which among the other things fixes the amount of customs duty or may express its repayment, remission or 
reduction (see Article 4, para 23, CCC) and have the same legal effects in all other Member States (see 
Article 250 CCC), is determined according to the national procedural law, so that in many Member States it 
corresponds to that of the legal form used in other tax matters. Again, against such decisions Member States 
are requested by Article 243 et seq. CCC, to introduce appeals procedures, though respecting the 
(rudimentary) provisions laid down in the Code in that regard.  
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administrative organization entitled to take care of procedural aspects like the levying, the 
assessing, the controlling, the collecting and the enforcing of the duty
572
.  
The foregoing implies, at the outset, two corollaries, which must be borne in mind in the 
following. 
Firstly, most litigations brought before the EUCJ concern not only the content of a certain 
provision of the CCC, but they presuppose solving the question of what the relation 
between Community and national law is
573
. More in detail, the main problems of national 
measures’ inconsistency with the EU regulation barely concern legislative provisions, but 
rather (more often) administrative practices or (settled) judicial interpretations. 
Secondly, here, more than in other areas, the Court is oriented to secure the primacy of EU 
law and the uniformity of the rules on which the Customs Union is based, since customs 
duties, among the other things, embody one of the own resources of the Union’s budget. 
On the other hand, the fact that a certain percentage (the collection costs) remains in the 
hands of the Member States entails that they retain a certain interest in affirming their 
jurisdiction to charge a certain transaction. In this regard, it has been observed that the 
EUCJ, which is entitled to strike a balance between several interests, that is jurisdiction, 
                                                          
572
 See A. van Eijsden, B.-R. Killmann, G. T.K. Meussen (final editor) with assistance of J. van Dam and D. 
Smit, Procedural Rules in Tax Law in the Context of European Union and Domestic Law - General Part, 
(eds.) M. Lang, P. Pistone, J. Schuch and C. Staringer, Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer, 2010, 35. On the 
grounds of a comparison between Member States’ legal orders, the Authors underline that most of them have 
adopted a multi-layer legislative approach consisting of setting out specific national procedural rules. Their 
systems have foreseen a domestic Act for procedural rules in tax matters, which embodies a complementary 
set of rules to Community law. Where such Act, read together with the CCC, does not address a certain 
situation, then they normally refer to the application of the general procedural rules provided for other taxes. 
573
 B.R. Killmann, Community Customs Law: An Example of Balancing Harmonization and Procedural 
Autonomy of Member States, in Procedural Rules in Tax Law in the Context of European Union and 
Domestic Law, (eds) M. Lang, P. Pistone, J. Schuch and C. Staringer, Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer, 2010, 49 
et seq. The Author observes that though one would expect that uniform implementation would not mean  
tolerance from the central power towards deviating de-centralized legislation, this is not the case. “Although 
the CCC provides uniform customs procedures for the whole European Community in a wide range of fields, 
it deliberately falls short of completely removing any impact of domestic procedural law”. After having 
underlined the peculiarities of the customs union, he individualises three main patterns of relation between 
national (procedural) law and Community law in the context of the Community Customs Code. First, the 
CCC includes provisions that ‘fully harmonize’ certain aspects of customs procedures, so that “they prevail 
over and remove contradictory or even only complementary national law.” Some other articles reflect a sort 
of ‘minimum harmonization’,  so that they leave in force complementary national law as long as “it does not 
contradict or undercut the aims of the CCC”. Second, in the CCC there are provisions that presuppose 
already existent procedures, thereby they merely coordinate administrative activities either between the 
national authorities of the Member States (‘horizontal coordination’) or between one single national customs 
authority and the Commission (‘vertical coordination’) which has wide inspection powers towards Member 
State. Lastly, some articles of the CCC include ‘specific references’ to applicable national law (typically, for 
the appeal against a decision). Further, some provisions are considered to contain ‘general or implicit 
references’ to applicable national law, thereby permitting the latter to co-exist with the Community customs 
law. On methodological approaches cf. the reference to the legal literature in Opinion of the Advocate 
General Trstenjak 3 May 2007, C-62/06, Fazenda Pública, fns 14 and 17. 
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legal protection and effectiveness of Community law, is inclined to leave room for 
“regulatory competition in procedural matter” between Member States as long as it does 
not affect essential features of Community law
574
. 
We will see below what that means in practice. For the purpose of this dissertation, such 
interaction between the Union legislation and the national implementing measures is 
interesting from a double angle. On the one side, it offers the possibility to test the 
(possible) use of presumptions by the EU legislator and to see how the EUCJ interprets 
them. On the other side, it raises the question as to the way the EUCJ reacts to national 
presumptive measures which overlap EU law provisions in a sector that represents a model 
of unified Union fiscal system. 
Accordingly, below, after having set the stage by referring to the principles inspiring 
Customs regulation, some of the most significant EUCJ judgments concerning presumptive 
measures are examined. First, the EUCJ case-law on some presumptions included in the 
Customs legislation is at issue, and afterwards a number of decisions on national 
presumptions which, by departing from the Customs legislation, ended up  affecting the 
uniform application of the latter. 
 
2. Uniformity, Legal Certainty, Effectiveness: principles founding the EUCJ case-law 
in the field of customs duties 
Looking at the decisions of the EUCJ in this sector, one has to have in mind that either 
when ruling on presumptions included in Community law itself or in national 
implementing measures, the Court refers to some of the fundamental principles of 
Community law, which are inextricably related to the peculiarities of customs law. 
Amongst these, the most relevant is the criterion of the uniform application, which is 
intended to secure the equal treatment of traders within the customs territory. It is precisely 
in the light of such principle that several provisions of the CCC can be read, one for all the 
legal effects erga omnes (meaning for all Member States) recognized to decisions issued 
by a national customs authority (see Article 250 CCC). 
                                                          
574
 A. van Eijsden, B.-R. Killmann, G. T.K. Meussen (final editor) with assistance of J. van Dam and D. Smit, 
Procedural Rules in Tax Law in the Context of European Union and Domestic Law - General Part, cited 
above, 34 et seq., in particular at 42-43. The Authors take into special consideration customs law as it is “the 
one field of Community policy that has advanced the most in integrating the procedural treatment by 
national authorities.” From the analysis of the interaction of Community customs law with national law, they 
conclude that both the Community legislator and the EUCJ appear to interpret the Community provisions on 
the matter in such a way as to respect procedural autonomy and keep regulatory competition (between the 
different national jurisdictions) going. Nonetheless, they do not refrain from setting strict parameters with a 
view to avoiding distortion and securing overall coherence. 
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The principle of the uniform application grounds the interpretation of single Customs 
provisions made by the EUCJ, which in this case might be compared to a national Supreme 
Court, since it is the body entitled to guarantee the homogeneous application of the 
regulation at issue. Above all, the need to secure such uniformity arises with reference to 
national implementing measures, which the Court rules on with the aim of ensuring equal 
customs treatment. We will see that the uniform application (and the related need to avoid 
the customs union being jeopardized) embodies the main substantive criterion the EUCJ 
avails itself of when dealing with national presumptive measures. 
The uniform application presupposes another basic principle in customs law, which is legal 
certainty. Customs legislation and implementing provisions have to be as clear as possible, 
so as to speed up trades and guarantee the Community with the rapid availability of 
customs duties resources for its policies. This also implies the necessary protection of 
legitimate expectations claimed by traders, which national administrative and judicial 
authorities are requested to comply with. 
When speaking of traders’ protection, the principle of uniform application, which entails 
the equal treatment of economic operators, can also be discussed as it is also interrelated 
with their right of defence, which the EUCJ has had occasions to recognize, for instance in 
the already cited Sopropé case
575. It basically consists of the trader’s right to be heard 
before national customs authorities, before a decision adverse to him can be issued. In turn, 
this criterion is strictly related to the principle of equivalence and effectiveness, which the 
Court refers to for the purpose of guaranteeing the protection of traders’ rights enshrined in 
the Community customs code. 
Not surprisingly, however, the principle of equivalence and effectiveness is further referred 
to by the EUCJ in order to promote Community obligations towards traders. As in other 
areas of taxation, the EUCJ holds that, in the absence of Community law on the matter, it is 
for the Member States to lay down the detailed rules and conditions for the collection of 
Community revenues. In this regard, it requests that “procedural rules may not render the 
system for collecting Community charges less effective than that for collecting national 
charges or render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the implementation of 
Community legislation”576. Precisely the intention of securing the rapid flow of its own 
                                                          
575
 Cf. also ECJ 4 March 2004, C-290/01, Derudder. 
576
 See B.R. Killmann, Community Customs Law: An Example of Balancing Harmonization and Procedural 
Autonomy of Member States, cited above, 51, where also further references as to the EUCJ case law (fn. 8). 
The Author, with reference to the relation between national law and Community law, observes that the 
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resources and  simplification leads the EUCJ to apply the principle of effectiveness in a 
more feasible way
577
, in the sense that national law, albeit interfering with the Community 
regulation, may be accepted in the extent to which it is deemed to be more effective in 
terms of recovery of the customs debt and provided that it complies with another general 
principle of EU law applicable in customs law, namely the proportionality
578
. 
 
3. Tax law presumptions and Customs law 
Before examining some of the most significant EUCJ decisions in the attempt to infer the 
approach to legal presumptions, a few considerations need to be made. 
Looking at Customs law, some presumptive provisions may be identified, mostly dealing 
with the definition of the taxable person, event and place of incurring a customs debt. 
Without indulging now on the question as to whether such provisions are technically 
presumptions or would  be better qualified as legal definitions, typifications, 
predeterminations, it has to be observed that they respond to interests similar to the ones 
grounding national presumptions. They indeed respond to the need of securing the 
collection of the customs duties due and to simplify the elements giving rise to the tax debt 
(or obligation) as well. 
Such interests appear to permeate the overall jurisprudence of the EUCJ, which shows in 
its rulings on customs duties a more pragmatic approach in respect of the one followed 
facing national presumptions in customs law and all the more so in other areas of taxation. 
Notably, many of the presumptive criteria included in the CCC vest in a substantive nature, 
as they concern the design of the customs debt. On the other hand, as it has been 
                                                                                                                                                                                
former “has to withstand a ‘double check’ on its performance with regard to implement Community law, 
balancing rights and obligations with the same fervour.” In this view, “In customs matter effectiveness seems 
to reach beyond the mere assessment of national law compliance with Community law. The customs union 
must work well with the outside world so as to fulfil its prime purpose: promoting free circulation of goods 
within the Community. One should bear in mind that, in organizing its customs union, the European 
Community also has to make it function in a way that is in conformity with the requirements of the General 
Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which requires inter alia transparency and predictability, non-
discrimination and judicial review.” (p. 54). 
577
 More exactly, in view of the pursuing of Community customs code’s purposes, the Court balances 
supremacy of the EC law with effectiveness by putting the latter first when it comes to the collection of 
customs duties. It takes a more ‘pragmatic approach’, according to the formula used by B.R. Killmann, 
Community Customs Law: An Example of Balancing Harmonization and Procedural Autonomy of Member 
States, cited above, 57, where there are also references to the case-law that shows such trend. 
578
 A.o., ECJ 7 December 2000,case C-213/99, De Andrade, in particular at paras 14 et seq., as regards an 
administrative penalty applied ad valorem by the Portuguese law for failure to meet the time-limits 
prescribed for declaring goods for release for free circulation of for requesting another customs-approved 
treatment or use; ECJ 16 October 2003, case C-91/02, Hannl + Hofstetter, on Austrian legislation providing 
for an increase in duty as interest on arrears, which were not conceived in the CCC provisions on incurring a 
customs debt and its subsequent recovering in cases when the Community customs law is infringed. 
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underlined, the detailed regulation of the procedural aspects (inquiries included) are left in 
the hands of the single Member States’ legal orders. Among these procedural aspects, there 
are the issues related to evidence. In this regard, the EUCJ has held two basic statements. 
Firstly, given the lack of Community rules on the concept of proof, the question of 
admissibility of proof (for customs law purposes) falls under the procedural law of the 
Member States, which nonetheless have to comply with the principle of equivalence
579
. 
Secondly, in a case where the customs authority contested the regularity of the fulfilments 
by the trader, the Court held that, according to the traditional general rule of the Member 
States,  that authority bears the burden of proving such irregularity, and only after that it is 
for the trader to give evidence to the contrary
580
. 
It has to be borne in mind, ultimately, that in this dissertation the aim is not to make a list 
of the presumptions included in the Customs legislation. Instead, the intention is to recall a 
few presumptive provisions, or deemed as being such by the EUCJ, on which the latter has 
                                                          
579
 ECJ 23 March 2000, C-310/98 and C-406/98, Sagpol. 
580
 ECJ 9 March 2006, C-293/04, Beemsterboer. Among the several questions, the Court was asked about the 
division of the burden of proof on the circumstance provided for in Article 220(2) (b), 3
rd
 subparagraph as 
amended by Regulation No 2700/2000 (“The issue of an incorrect certificate shall not, however, constitute 
an error where the certificate is based on an incorrect account of the facts provided by the exporter, except 
where, in particular, it is evident that the issuing authorities were aware or should have been aware that the 
goods did not satisfy the conditions laid down for entitlement to the preferential treatment.”). The Court held 
that, in accordance with generally accepted rules on the allocation of the burden of proof, “the person who 
relies on the third subparagraph of Article 220, para 2, let. b) of the Customs Code, as amended by 
Regulation No 2700/2000, must adduce the evidence necessary for claim to succeed. It is therefore in 
principle for the customs authorities which wish to rely on the beginning of the third subparagraph of that 
Article 220, para 2, let. b) in order to carry out post-clearance recovery to adduce evidence that the 
incorrect certificates were issued because of the inaccurate account of the facts provided by the exporter. 
Where, however, as a result of negligence wholly attributable to the exporter, it is impossible from the 
customs authorities to adduce the necessary evidence the EUR.1 certificate was based on the accurate or 
inaccurate account of the facts provided by the exporter, the burden of proving that the certificate issued by 
the authorities of the non-member country was based on an accurate account of the facts lies with the person 
liable for the duty.” Similarly, it is up on the person who relies on the exception set out at the end of the third 
subparagraph of Article 220, para 2, let. b) of the Customs code to bear the burden of proving that it is 
evident that the authorities which issued that certificate were or should have been aware that the goods did 
not satisfy the conditions laid down for entitlement to the preferential treatment. Cf. ECJ 14 May 1996, 
Joined Cases C-153/94 and C-204/94, at par. 60 where it is stated that “Rules as to the burden and means of 
proof of the originating status of goods are governed by national law only in so far as they are not covered 
by Community law” and para 61 “It is necessary, therefore, to examine whether such rules may be deduced 
from the Community rules which apply in this area. In this respect, Article 9 of Regulation No 3184/74 
provides that an EUR.1 certificate is to be issued on application in writing by the exporter, who is required 
by Article 21, para 2) of the same regulation to submit any appropriate supporting document proving that the 
goods to be exported qualify for the issue of a certificate.” Hence, the division of the burden of proof in 
customs matters are governed by national law, unless their regulation is fixed at Community level. To this 
end, the (also substantive) regulation of the matter under examination needs to be considered, as it might 
include indications in that regard. Cf. ECJ 17 July 1997, Case C-97/95, Pascoal & Filhos, (particularly at 
paras 39-41). See B.R. Killmann, Community Customs Law: An Example of Balancing Harmonization and 
Procedural Autonomy of Member States, cited above, 64.  
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ruled, for the purpose of testing the coherence of the Court’s line of reasoning with the 
cases wherein the presumption is introduced by the national legislator. 
Turning to national tax presumptions in the field of customs duties put under the length of 
the EUCJ, given the ambiguous nature of legal presumptions the focus cannot be confined 
to procedural rules only, but on national measures affecting the customs debt as well. 
Precisely on the grounds of the substantive nature surely attributable to irrebuttable 
presumptions of law, one would expect that the Court rejects them when they diverge from 
one or more provisions of the Regulation. More uncertainties arise as regards rebuttable 
presumptions of law. In this case, the possibility for the trader to give proof to the contrary 
might render them ‘acceptable’ as in this way they represent a non-conclusive arrangement 
of a certain matter. This, of course, when there is a public interest worthy of protection in 
play, like for instance the need for simplification or the efficacy of the customs’ collection. 
It cannot be disregarded, however, that unlike other areas where the model is drawn by the 
EU legislator (VAT, excise duties) with directives so that the ‘means’ for attaining the aim 
set up are left in the hands of the Member States, here the matter finds its regulation in an 
EU autonomous legal source. As a consequence, a national measure intervening on an 
issue already dealt with in the Regulation and diverging from the latter might be, per se, in 
contrast with EU law. 
At issue is not only the effectiveness of EU law, but also and primarily the supremacy of 
EU law, and the correct exercise of the competences as distributed by the Treaty. The 
judgments of the EUCJ on national legal presumptions are normally the result of a balance 
between these two principles of the scale. 
Lastly, it has to be warned that the confirmation of  such hypothesis may be found only in 
the extent to which the Court has ruled on the above matters. To put it differently, the 
conclusion as to the approach to national legal presumptions are inevitably affected by the 
circumstance that not  many preliminary questions on national presumptive measures have 
been brought in front of the Court (or infringement procedures have been run). This is not 
so frequent in respect of other areas of taxation, as customs duties are governed on an EU 
level. 
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4. Presumptions in the context of Customs legislation 
 
4.1 The presumption of competence 
That presumptions set up by the EU legislator live up to interests similar to those 
grounding national legal presumptions results clearly from some provisions included in the 
Commission Regulation No 2454/93 implementing the Community Customs Code, which 
established the so-called presumption of competence
581
. In fact, pursuant to Articles 378
582
 
and 454
583
, when the goods have not been consigned or presented at the place of 
destination in the context of the external Community transit procedure and it is not possible 
to identify where the offence or irregularity was committed, such offence or irregularity is 
deemed to have been committed respectively in the Member State of departure and where 
it was detected, unless proof of the regularity of the operation or of the place where the 
offence or irregularity actually occurred is furnished (and it is deemed to be satisfactory by 
the customs authority). 
                                                          
581
 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 of 2 July 1993, laying down provisions for the 
implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code. 
582
 Article 378 of the Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 stipulates that “1. Without prejudice to 
Article 215 of the Code, where the consignment has not been presented at the office of destination and the 
place of the offence or irregularity cannot be established, such offence or irregularity shall be deemed to 
have been committed: - in the Member State to which the office of departure belongs or  – in the Member 
State to which the office of transit at the point of entry into the Community belongs, to which a transit advice 
note has been given, unless within the period laid down in Article 379 (2), to be determined, proof of the 
regularity of the transit operation or of the place where the offence or irregularity was actually committed is 
furnished to the satisfaction of the customs authorities. 2. Where no such proof is furnished and the said 
offence or irregularity is thus deemed to have been committed in the Member State of departure or in the 
Member State of entry as referred to in the first paragraph, second indent, the duties and other charges 
relating to the goods concerned shall be levied by the Member State in accordance with Community or 
national provisions.( …)”.  
583
 More in detail, it states that “2. Where it is found that, in the course of or in connection with a transport 
operation carried out under cover of a TIR carnet or a transit operation carried out under cover of an ATA 
carnet, an offence or irregularity has been committed in a particular Member State, the recovery of duties 
and other charges which may be payable shall be effected by that Member State in accordance with 
Community or national provisions, without prejudice to the institution of criminal proceedings. 3. Where it is 
not possible to determine in which territory the offence or irregularity was committed, such offence or 
irregularity shall be deemed to have been committed in the Member State where it was detected unless, 
within the period laid down in Article 455 (1), proof of the regularity of the operation or of the place where 
the offence or irregularity was actually committed is furnished to the satisfaction of the customs authorities. 
Where no such proof is furnished and the said offence or irregularity is thus deemed to have been committed 
in the Member State in which it was detected, the duties and other charges relating to the goods concerned 
shall be levied by that Member State in accordance with Community or national provisions. If the Member 
State where the said offence or irregularity was actually committed is subsequently determined, the duties 
and other charges (apart from those levied, pursuant to the second subparagraph, as own resources of the 
Community) to which the goods are liable in the Member State shall be returned to it by the Member State 
which had originally recovered them. In that case, any overpayment shall be repaid to the person who had 
originally paid the charges. (…)”. 
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The Court has had more than one occasion to judge on this rule. Indeed, its interpretation 
has raised questions related to the jurisdiction entitled to apply customs duties and charges 
related to the irregularity committed, as well as to the proof to be given by the economic 
operator. 
Before examining the view taken by the EUCJ in this regard, it is worthy to point out that 
such a provision embodies a typical rebuttable presumption introduced with the aim of 
simplifying the ascertainment of a certain fact; that is the place where a certain irregularity 
in the context of an operation falling within the Community external transit regime has 
taken place. This would be a (unknown) fact from which very important legal 
consequences derive, more specifically the individualization of the Member State 
competent to charge the person liable for the irregularity. The place where the irregularity 
occurred is identified in the State of departure or in the one where the irregularity is 
detected, according to a presumption that can be rebutted by the economic operator by 
proving, within a fixed time-limit, the regularity of the operation or the place where the 
irregularity happened if different from the place of departure or where it was detected. 
At the end of the day, the rationale of the provision is to release customs authorities, 
issuing a recovery notice of import customs duties, from a proof – and earlier, a motivation 
of the tax decision – that would be hard, if not impossible, to furnish, because it would 
imply an investigation on a large scale. In this way, when a certain irregularity is detected, 
it is already determined by the law what  the Member State is entitled to charge the trader 
liable for customs duties so as to avoid a delay of the customs’ collection. As regards the 
contrary proof, it appears to have been provided not only for the protection of the trader’s 
position, but primarily in view of a correct distribution of competences between Member 
States in collecting the customs duties (as well as the charges related to the irregularity) 
and for the protection of the Community’s financial interests. 
 
4.1.1 The Militzer and Münch case 
The question of which Member State had jurisdiction to recover customs duties has been 
dealt with by the EUCJ in the Militzer and Münch case
584
. 
Here, the Italian customs authority, after having ascertained that the goods originating in 
the Czech Republic and transported from Germany had not arrived at their destination due 
to a forgery of the transit documents, ordered the customs forwarding agent (M&M, 
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 ECJ 3 April 2008, case C-230/06, Militzer & Münch. 
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established in Germany) to pay the customs duties on the goods dispatched. M&M, which 
was not implicated in the forgery, asked for the remission of the duties, but the request was 
rejected by the courts of first and second instance. Thus, the dispute arrived before the 
Supreme Court, which decided to stay the proceedings and to refer to the EUCJ, among 
other issues, the question of the interpretation of the Customs provisions on the 
determination of the Member State having jurisdiction in the case at hand. 
At issue, in particular, was the relation between Article 215 CCC
585
, which referred to the 
place where the customs debt incurred (or it is deemed to have incurred according to 
customs authorities) and if not possible to determine, to the place where the goods entered 
the Community under a certain procedure that has not been discharged, and Article 378 of 
the Commission Regulation No 2454/93 laying down the abovementioned presumption of 
competence. In this regard, M&M and the Commission contested the jurisdiction claimed 
by the Italian customs authority, as in their view, Article 378, para 1, applied, in the quality 
of lex specialis in respect of Article 215 CCC, for assigning the jurisdiction on the 
recovery of customs duties under the external Community transit procedure. By contrast, 
the Italian government grounded its jurisdiction on Article 215, para 2, as the irregularity 
was committed, or at least emerged, in Italy. 
The view taken by the Court results from the conjunct reading of Articles 203, para 2, and 
215, para 2 CCC, and Articles 378 and 379 of the implementing Regulation. From the first 
two articles it can be inferred that in case of forgery the customs debt arises where the 
goods were unlawfully removed from customs supervision
586
. Where, however, the place 
of the forgery cannot be determined by the customs authority, the procedure set up by 
Article 379 applies, and in accordance with Article 378, a presumption of competence 
operates in favour of the Member State to which the office of departure belongs, thereby 
                                                          
585
 To be more precise, pursuant to Article 215 of the CCC, in the version applicable at the time of the 
proceedings (which is in practice the same as the version currently applicable), “1. A customs debt shall be 
incurred at the place where the events from which it arises occur. 2. Where it is not possible to determine the 
place referred to in paragraph 1, the customs debt shall be deemed to have been incurred at the place where 
the customs authorities conclude that the goods are in a situation in which a customs debt is incurred. 3. 
Where a customs procedure is not discharged for goods, the customs debts shall be deemed to have been 
incurred at the place where the goods: - were placed under that procedure, or – enter the Community under 
that procedure. 4. Where the information available to the customs authorities enables them to establish that 
the customs debt was already incurred when the goods were in another place at an earlier date, the customs 
debt shall be deemed to have been incurred at the place which may be established as the location of the 
goods at the earliest time when existence of the customs debt may be established. (…)” 
586
 For definition of the concept of “unlawful removal from customs supervision see, a.o. ECJ 15 September 
2005, Case C-140/04, Unamar and Seaport Terminals. It basically refers to “any act or omission the result of 
which is to prevent, if only for a short time, the competent customs authority from gaining access to goods 
under customs supervision and from carrying out the monitoring required by Article 37(1) of the Customs 
Code” (para. 28). 
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entitling them to recover the customs duties
587
. The Court went further to clarify that such 
presumption “can be rebutted in favour of the jurisdiction of another Member State only if 
it is established that the first offence or irregularity was actually committed in the territory 
of that State. Nevertheless, proof to that effect must be furnished to the satisfaction of the 
authorities of the Member State to which the office of departure belongs, in accordance 
with the procedure laid down in Article 379 of the implementing regulation, which entails, 
inter alia, compliance with the time-limits laid down in that provision”. Precisely with 
reference to these time-limits (11-month for notifying the principal of the irregularity and 
3-month for the contrary proof)
588
 the Court notably observed that they are intended to 
“ensure diligent and uniform application, by the administrative authorities, of the 
provisions relating to the recovery of customs debts in order to secure rapid availability of 
the Community’s own resources(…). Moreover, the three month time-limits is also 
intended to protect the interests of the principal by allowing him sufficient time in which to 
furnish, where appropriate, proof of the regularity of the transit operation or the place 
where the offence or the irregularity was actually committed (…). Finally, the three-month 
time-limit is intended to encourage the principal to produce the evidence available to him 
within a mandatory time-limit, with a view to determining without delay the State with 
jurisdiction to recover duty (…).” 
Besides what has been said at the beginning of this paragraph, from the foregoing one can 
also infer that the Court finds in the counterproof the core of the balancing between the 
interest to a rapid customs recovery and the protection of the traders’ rights. Accordingly, 
                                                          
587
 Notably, according to a tendency that will be pointed out in the dissertation, the Court put the attention 
exclusively on the effect of the presumption. In par. 34 it concludes: “In order to determine whether, in the 
case in the main proceedings, the Italian authorities had jurisdiction to recover the duties in question, it is 
for the referring court to verify whether, having regard to all the relevant information available at the time 
when it came to light that the consignments had not been presented at the office of destination, it was 
possible to establish the place in which the first offence or irregularity capable of being classified as a 
removal from customs surveillance was committed. If that is not the case, the effect [italic of the Author] of 
the presumption of competence in favour of the Member State to which the office of departure belongs, 
established by Article 378(1) of the implementing regulation, is that the Federal Republic of Germany is the 
Member State with jurisdiction to recover the customs duties.” 
588
 Provided for by Article 379 of the implementing regulation, by virtue of which “1. Where a consignment 
has not been presented at the office of destination and the place where the offence or irregularity occurred 
cannot be established, the office of departure shall notify the principal of this fact as soon as possible and in 
any case before the end of the 11
th
 month following the date of registration of the Community transit 
declaration. 2. The notification referred to in paragraph 1 shall indicate, in particular, the time-limit by 
which proof of the regularity of the transit operation or the place where the offence or irregularity was 
actually committed must be furnished to the office of departure to the satisfaction of the customs authorities. 
That time-limit shall be three months from the date of the notification referred to in paragraph 1. If the said 
proof has not been produced by the end of that period, the competent Member State shall take steps to 
recover the duties and other charges involved. In cases where that Member State is not the one in which the 
office of departure is located the latter shall immediately inform the said Member State.” 
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an appropriate time-limit for giving evidence so as to rebut the presumption of competence 
appears to be considered favourably, because it conciliates the legal certainty and the 
uniformity of the procedure in the Community territory on the one side, and the possibility 
for the trader to avoid the effect of the (procedural) presumption on the other side. 
 
4.1.2 The  Met-Trans and Sagpol case 
Further indications on the approach of the EUCJ as regards presumptions having EU origin 
may be inferred from the Met-Trans and Sagpol case
589
, where several probative aspects 
were at issue. 
The dispute originated from the recovery notice addressed towards Met-Trans, a TIR 
carnet holder that placed a consignment of goods from Poland to Portugal under the 
Community external transit regime at a German customs office. The German authorities 
found the TIR carnet to have been forged, and therefore informed Met-Trans that the goods 
had not been produced at the office of destination. They added that, being unable to 
determine the place where the offence had been committed, such offence would have been 
presumed, by virtue of Article 454, para 2 and 3 of the implementing Regulation, to be 
committed in the State where it was detected (i.e. Germany), save the proof of the 
regularity of the transit operation or of the place where it was actually committed. The 
proof alleged by the trader, however, consisting in a statement of the driver about the 
consignment in the free area of the commercial port of Porto, was considered not to be 
sufficient by the German authority to prove to its satisfaction that the offence had occurred 
in Portugal and to rebut the presumption that it was committed in Germany. Similar 
circumstances concerned another TIR carnet holder, Sagpol, which also produced before 
the German customs authority  the consignment note bearing an acknowledgment of 
receipt by a Spanish company. The Court was then questioned about the type of (contrary) 
proof which the trader is requested to furnish for the purpose of rebutting the presumption. 
More specifically, whether the admissible evidence be limited to documents issued by the 
customs authorities only. 
In answering the question, the EUCJ delineates the relation between Community law and 
national law on the matter of evidence. It correctly interpreted the Community legislative 
data as not laying down any limit on the types of evidence admissible to prove where the 
offence was committed. Consequently, “given that there is no legislation at Community 
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 ECJ 23 March 2000, Joined cases C-310/98 and C-406/98, Met-Trans and Sagpol. 
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level governing the concept of proof, any type of evidence admissible under the procedural 
law of the Member States in similar proceedings is in principle admissible.”590 Hence, “it 
is for the national authorities to determine, according to the principles of their national 
law of evidence, whether, in the specific case before them, and in the light of all the 
circumstances, the place where the offence or irregularity was committed has been proved 
to their satisfaction; for example, it is for them to determine whether, for instance, 
particular testimony is to be admitted or not, and whether it should be considered to have 
probative force. In particular, it is for the national authorities to assess the reliability of a 
witness who participated in the transportation operation affected by the irregularity at 
issue.” 
As long as a certain procedural issue, here the possible limitation to and probative force of 
the contrary proof, is not regulated at Community level, then it is up to the national 
legislator to fill  the gap. In the case of the main proceedings, Article 455, para 3, of the 
implementing Regulation, in the formula applicable ratione temporis, provided for a list of 
documents which “inter alia” may be furnished to the satisfaction of the customs 
authorities. Precisely the use of the words “inter alia” led to them being interpreted  as 
being merely exemplifications. Such words have been removed by an amendment in 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 12/97 of 18 December 1996. Notwithstanding this, from 
the decision we can infer that the Court is oriented to interpret the provision strictly, by 
confining it to the proof of the regularity of the operation, and not even of the place where 
the offence was committed
591
. 
From the foregoing one could even infer that rebuttable presumptions with a limited proof 
to the contrary are not censured by the EUCJ, though they are interpreted strictly. On the 
                                                          
590
 Indeed, Article 455 provided that “2. Proof of the regularity of the operation carried out under cover of a 
TIR carnet or an ATA carnet within the meaning of the first subparagraph Article 454(3) shall be furnished 
within the period prescribed in Article 11(2) of the TIR Convention on Article 7(1) and (2) of the ATA 
Convention, as the case may be. 3. Such proof may be furnished to the satisfaction of the customs authorities 
inter alia: a) by production of a document certified by the customs authorities establishing that the goods in 
question have been presented at the office of destination. This document must include information enabling 
the goods to be identified; or b) by the production of a customs document issued in a third country showing 
release for home use, or a copy or photocopy thereof; such copy or photocopy must be certified as a true 
copy either by the body which endorsed the original document, or by the authorities of the third country 
concerned, or by the authorities of one of the Member States. This document must include information 
enabling the goods in question to be identified; or c) for the purpose of the ATA Convention, by the evidence 
referred to in Article 8 of that Convention.” 
591
 In fact, Article 455, para. 3, Regulation 2454/93 mentions only the proof of the regularity of the operation. 
Accordingly, the Court held that “As the Advocate General has pointed out at points 96 to 101 of his opinion, 
Article 455(3) relates to a different matter, namely proof of the offence or irregularity as such. It cannot be 
assumed that because, as from 1997, the Community legislature limited the type of admissible evidence for 
establishing the regularity of transit operations, it intended, by implications, to do the same in relation to the 
question of establishing where an offence or irregularity was committed.” 
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other hand, the Court notes that irrespective of the interest in requesting an objective proof 
of the place of the irregularity put forward by the national government and agreed by the 
Commission, the Court itself cannot replace the Community legislature and interpret the 
provision differently to what results from its wording, as it is up to the Commission the 
initiative for proposals to that end. It appears that the Court does not disregard the need for 
objectivity of the proof to be adduced, which comes with legal certainty. Notably, instead, 
in this decision it does not consider the limit to the type of proof in the perspective of the 
difficulties that the person liable to pay customs duties might meet in furnishing it. 
In any event, the EUCJ gathers the rationale of the presumption at hand read in conjunction 
with the compensation regime provided for by the same provision (Article 454 of the 
implementing Regulation). Such regime consists of the restitution of the duties originally 
recovered, according to the presumption, by the Member State where the offence was 
detected to the Member State where the offence actually took place, if subsequently 
determined
592. It is indeed held that such compensation system “institutes a mechanism for 
simplifying the administrative aspect and recovering duties and other charges in cases 
where uncertainty as to the place where the offences or irregularities vis-à-vis the customs 
provisions were committed might result in the sums owed being lost altogether. With that 
situation in mind, it is provided that, where the Member State in which the offence was 
committed cannot be determined with certainty, a provisional presumption arises that the 
Member State in which the offence or irregularity was detected has competence. Where it 
is subsequently established that the first State did have competence, the presumption in 
favour of the second State is rebutted and a compensation mechanism comes into 
operation between the two Member States, thus preventing the first State from being 
barred through lapse of time from recovering the duties and other charges”593.  
Once again emerges the priority assigned to the safeguard of the customs’ collection and to 
the legal certainty facing a situation where the unknown fact would hardly be ascertained 
by the tax administration. 
                                                          
592
 Pursuant to Article 454, para. 3, 3rd and 4th subparagraph “If the Member State where the said offence or 
irregularity was actually committed is subsequently determined, the duties and other charges (apart from 
those levied, pursuant to the second subparagraph, as own resources of the Community) to which the goods 
are liable in that Member State shall be returned to it by the Member State which had originally recovered 
them. In that case, any overpayment shall be repaid to the person who had originally paid the charges. 
Where the amount of the duties and other charges originally levied and returned by the Member State which 
had recovered them is smaller than that of the duties and other charges due in the Member State where the 
offence or irregularity was actually committed, that Member State shall levy the difference in accordance 
with Community or national provisions.” 
593
 ECJ 23 March 2000, Joined Cases C-310/98 and C-406/98, Met-Trans and Sagpol, at para 37. 
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4.2 The presumption as to the representativeness of samples 
In a number of decisions, the EUCJ has reasoned on the possibility for traders to challenge 
the representativeness of the samples of goods taken by customs authorities on occasion of 
exportations or importations, which is presumed by the Community Customs Code. 
The issue of the representativeness of samples is a very good example of how the EUCJ 
struggles to find a balance between rapidity of the recovery and legal certainty on the one 
side, and effectiveness of Customs law, which in these kind of cases coincides with the 
safeguard of the taxpayers’ right of defence, on the other side, when dealing with 
presumptions of law or legal fictions. The EUCJ has been asked for a preliminary ruling on 
this issue several times, as the provision which lays down the presumption of 
representativeness leaves the question open as to what  extent (in terms of formalities, 
time-limits and size of the sample, for instance) the trader is permitted to contest such 
representativeness. 
As is well known, it belongs to the power of control at the disposal of customs authorities 
the examination of all or part of the goods entering the Community territory and on this 
occasion also to take samples for analysis or for more detailed examinations
594
. The result 
of the verification of the declaration and possibly of the goods is particularly relevant, as it 
determines the amount of customs duties payable and in general the provisions governing 
the customs procedure under which the goods will be placed. As a matter of fact, the 
classification of a certain good under one or another nomenclature impacts on the 
applicable customs regime
595. In this context, Article 70, para 1, CCC, states that “Where 
only part of the goods covered by a declaration are examined, the results of the partial 
examination shall be taken to apply to all the goods covered by that declaration. However, 
the declarant may request a further examination of the goods if he considers that the 
results of the partial examination are not valid as regards the remainder of the goods 
declared.” 
                                                          
594
 Indeed, Article 68, CCC, provides that “For the verification of declarations which they have accepted, the 
customs authorities may: (a) examine the documents covering the declaration and the documents 
accompanying it. (...) (b) examine the goods and take examples for analysis or for detailed examination”. 
Moreover, Article 78, CCC, stipulates that “1. The customs authorities may, on their own initiative or at the 
request of the declarant, amend the declaration after release of the goods. (...) 3. Where revision of the 
declaration or post-clearance examination indicates that the provisions governing the customs procedure 
concerned have been applied on the basis of incorrect or incomplete information, the customs authorities 
shall, in accordance with any provisions laid down, take the measures necessary to regularise the situation, 
taking account of the new information available to them.” 
595
 Pursuant to Article 71 CCC “The results of verifying the declaration shall be used for the purposes of 
applying the provisions governing the customs procedure under which the goods are places.” 
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Hence, Article 70 presumes the samples taken by customs authorities to be representative 
of all the goods reported in the declaration, according to a rule of experience that is based 
on statistical data. However, if the declarant contends that the samples taken are not 
representative of the whole (for instance, because of the methodology used), then he may 
require the customs authority to proceed to a further examination. From this we infer that 
the presumption of representativeness of the samples is not conclusive, meaning that it can 
be contested before the competent customs authority first, and presumably also in the 
course of  legal proceedings. In fact, the wording of Article 70, para. 1, second 
subparagraph, does not delineate a real counterproof, as it confines the defence of the 
trader to the request of a further verification of the goods concerned. Nonetheless, as it will 
be said below, the Court clearly refers to the possibility for the trader to raise objections, 
from which it follows that in practice the foundation of the complaint is vested in a sort of 
counterproof aimed at confuting the representativeness of the samples taken. 
More in general, looking at the theory on the concept of (legal) presumptions drawn in the 
first chapter of this dissertation, the ambiguous nature of the provision at hand may be 
gathered. Here, the unknown fact ends up  coinciding with a rule of experience. In this way, 
it in fact appears as the crystallization of a certain rule of experience. To a certain extent it 
resembles the ‘improper presumptions, one for all the presumptions of bona fide, meaning 
that a certain circumstance is presumed provided (and as long as) the contrary is not 
proven. On the other hand, precisely the possibility to contest the representativeness of the 
sample seems to exclude it belonging to the category of legal fictions, though in one of the 
judgments discussed below the EUCJ appears inclined to adopt such classification as 
suggested by the referring national Court. 
 
4.2.1The Derudder case  
The question concerning to what extent the declarant is allowed to dispute the 
representativeness of the samples taken by the customs authorities - under the profile of 
time-limits and possible lapse - has been dealt with by the EUCJ in the case Derudder
596
. 
                                                          
596
 ECJ 4 March 2004, case C-290/01, Derudder. The question was raised in the context of a dispute between 
the customs declarant (Derudder & Cie SA) and the Receveur Principal des douanes of Villepinte (France), 
with regard to the demand issued by the latter for payment of duty on the import of rice on the basis of 
analysis of samples. By a declaration registered on 8 November 1989 (thus, before the entry into force of the 
CCC) at the customs office of Villepinte, Derudder released for free circulation, on behalf of Tang Frères, a 
consignment of goods originating from Thailand that were declared as ‘broken rice’. On this occasion, the 
officials took samples of the merchandise, which were sent to a laboratory for analysis. At the time when the 
goods were checked, a representative of Derudder was present, and neither the representativeness of the 
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In more detail, the referring court asked if the applicable Community rules permitted to a 
customs declarant (or his representative) who was present at the time when the sample of 
imported goods was taken by the customs authorities and he did not dispute its 
representativeness, to contest such representativeness when requested to pay additional 
import duties on the basis of the analysis of the sample. 
At the time when the facts of the main proceedings took place, the Community Customs 
Code was not yet in force, while Articles 9 and 10 of the Directive No 79/695 and Article 
11 of the Directive No 82/57
597
 applied. However, these provisions basically were in line 
                                                                                                                                                                                
samples were challenged, nor they asked to take additional samples. Immediately after that date, the goods 
were released, as the declarant wished to sell them quickly. However, from the analysis of the samples taken 
it resulted that the consignment did not contain at least 90% broken rice (as defined in point 3 of Annex A to 
Regulation No 1418/76), so that the import duty corresponding to that Combined Nomenclature subheading 
originally applied was found to be incorrect. Pursuant to Article 2, para 2, 2
nd 
indent, of Regulation (EEC) No 
2729/75 on the import levies on mixture of cereals, rice and broken rice (“The import levy applicable to 
mixtures composed either of rice classifiable under several different processing groups or stages or of rice 
classifiable under one or more different processing groups or stages and of broken rice shall be that 
applicable: (…) – to the component liable to the higher or highest import levy, when no component 
represents at least 90% of the weight of the mixture”), the customs authorities applied the higher duty 
applicable to imports of whole-grain rice and issued the collection notice. Against this decision, Derudder 
brought an action before the Tribunal d’instance of Bobigny seeking its annulment by contesting the method 
used by the customs authorities to analyse the samples and their representativeness. Such Court upheld 
Derudder’s claim and annulled the demand for payment on the basis of the report of an expert who, albeit 
arriving at the same conclusions submitted by the customs authorities as to the average length of the whole 
grains present in the samples and the proportion of broken rice contained in them, expressed reservations on 
the method of analysis used and the representativeness of the samples. As to the latter, he observed that the 
samples had been taken “without reference to any statistical sampling plan and that the results of the 
analysis of those samples, although they appeared to be correct, could not be extrapolated to cover the 
entirety of the imported goods.” The judgment was confirmed by the Cour d’Appeal de Paris, thereby the 
dispute arrived before the Supreme Court, where the Principal Collector of Excise Duties of Villepinte 
contended the breach of Article 70 CCC in that the judgment of second instance had held that the result of the 
examination of the samples taken of the imported goods could not be considered as valid for the entirety of 
the goods despite the fact that the party was present and did not raise any request. The Supreme Court 
decided to stay the proceedings and refer the question of the interpretation of Article 70 (1) CCC to the ECJ 
for a preliminary ruling. As said in the text, the Supreme Court presented the question under the profile of the 
time-limits to challenge the representativeness of the sample taken, i.e. whether it is possible to do it before 
the court hearing the application for additional import levies albeit the importer was present on the date of the 
checks and he did not raise any objections.  
597
 Afterwards replaced by the Community Customs Code and the implementing Regulation No 2454/93. 
Article 9 of Council Directive 79/695/EEC of 24 July 1979 on the harmonisation of procedures for the 
release of goods for free circulation (OJ 1979 L 205, p. 19), provided that “1. Without prejudice to any other 
means of control at its disposal, the customs authority may examine all or part of the goods entered. (...) 4. 
The declarant shall be entitled to be present at the examination of the goods or to be represented at it. (...) 5. 
When examining the goods, the customs authority may take samples for analysis of fro more detailed 
examination. (...).” Pursuant to Article 10, “1. The results of the examination of the entry and the documents 
attached to it, whether or not combined with examination of the goods, shall be used for calculating the 
import duties and for applying any other provisions governing the release of goods for free circulation (...).” 
Article 11 of the Commission Directive No 82/57/EEC corresponds to Article 70 of the CCC. It stated that 
“Where it decides to examine a part of the goods only, the customs authority shall inform the declarant or his 
representative which items it wishes to examine. The authority’s choice will be final. The findings of such 
partial examination shall apply to all goods covered by the entry in question. However, the declarant may 
request a further examination should he consider that the findings of the partial examination are not valid for 
the remainder of the goods declared.” 
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with the wording of the Community customs code on the matter, so that the ruling of the 
Court holds true even in the current legal context, as confirmed by the circumstance that 
the Court itself refers to both. 
The interpretation of this legal framework given by the EUCJ embodies a compromise 
between the different interests in play. Indeed, it did not find in the wording of the relevant 
provisions any limitation to the right of the party to contest the legal presumption as to the 
representativeness of the samples at a later stage, but at the same time it identified, on the 
basis of those provisions, a lapse (of the exercise) of that right. Accordingly, the line of 
thought of the EUCJ can be divided into two main parts. 
First, it observed that from the customs legislation it can be inferred that though the 
declarant must be informed about the taking of samples by customs authorities, he is not 
required to be present when they are taken, so that in this situation he could not raise any 
objection. But even when present, his freedom of action is restricted, as the taking of 
samples rests upon those authorities. As a consequence, the Court concluded that (para  42): 
“(...) the right to challenge the representativeness of a sample of the imported goods taken 
by the customs authorities cannot a priori be denied to the declarant or his representative, 
even if he made no objection in this regard at the time the samples were taken. In addition 
to the fact that such an interpretation is in no way precluded by the wording of the 
abovementioned provisions, it also coincides fully with the actual aim of the Community 
customs rules, as stated in particular in the ninth recital in the preamble to Directive 
79/695 and the fifth recital in the preamble to the Community Customs Code, that is to say 
to ensure the correct application of duties, charges and levies laid down by that legislation. 
Whilst to that end the customs authorities must be regarded as having wide powers of 
inspection, traders must also have the right to contest decisions taken by those authorities, 
in particular where, as in the main proceedings, they consider that the samples taken for 
analysis by those authorities are not representative of the whole of the goods imported and 
because of that have led to incorrect assessment of import duties.” 
However, the individual right recognized by the Court, which in practice consists of the 
possibility to rebut the presumption of representativeness of the sample taken from 
imported goods, does not receive an unlimited protection, at least in terms of time-limits 
for its exercise. There are, indeed, further interests receiving safeguard under the umbrella 
of the Community Customs Code and that are to be put on the scale. The Court held, 
indeed (para 43): 
National Tax Law Presumptions and EU Law 
 
 
305 
“(...) both the principle of legal certainty and the need to give practical effect to Directives 
79/695 and 82/57 and the Community Customs Code require that the possibility of raising 
the objection be restricted in time. It must lapse when the customs authority releases the 
goods concerned, except where it can be shown that the condition of those goods was not 
altered in any way whatsoever after the release, so that the possibility remains of 
conducting inspections and, if necessary, of taking additional samples.”  
In the view taken by the Court, such an interpretation not only results from the legislative 
data and is coherent with the overall discipline
598
, but it is also in line with the interest both 
of the trader and the customs system. Under the second profile, with regard to the position 
of the importer, that interpretation “serves primarily to meet obvious practical needs”, as 
generally he is not in the condition to challenge the representativeness of a sample once the 
merchandise has been released and sold. With particular regard to the system of the 
customs duty, the Court pointed out that (para 45): 
“Restricting in time the possibility of challenging the representativeness of a sample taken 
from those goods also satisfies the actual aim of Directives 79/695 and 82/57 and of the 
Community Customs Code, which are intended to guarantee rapid and efficient procedures 
for the release for free circulation since, if the declarant could challenge that 
representativeness for an unlimited period, the customs authorities would be forced, in 
order to guard against such a risk, to make a detailed inspection of all goods declared to 
customs as a matter of course, which would serve neither the interests of traders, who are 
in general concerned to obtain the release, as was the case in the main proceedings, in 
order to be able rapidly to sell the goods declared by them, nor the interests of those 
authorities, for whom a systematic examination of declared goods would mean a 
considerable amount of extra work.” 
Especially from the last wording of the judgment, the role played by the presumption under 
discussion in the context of the verification carried out by the customs authorities on 
import duties clearly emerges. The presumption of representativeness responds to the need 
of securing the rapidity of trades, by avoiding the customs authorities from having to check 
all the goods declared. In this perspective, the establishment of a period of time within 
                                                          
598
 In the sense that the challenging of the representativeness of samples presupposes that the merchandise is 
still available (i.e. that it has not been released or, if so, it has not been altered in any way whatsoever, which 
is for the declarant to prove) leads, in particular, Article 78, para 2 CCC, pursuant to which "The customs 
authorities may, after releasing of the goods and in order to satisfy themselves as to the accuracy of the 
particulars contained in the declaration, inspect the commercial documents and data relating to the import 
or export operations in respect of the goods concerned” and “examine the goods where it is still possible for 
them to be produced.”. See also Article 13(3) of Directive 79/695. 
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which the right to contest such representativeness may be contested conciliates the 
recognition of the individual right to a correct taxation with the efficiency of the trades that 
is the main task of the customs regulation. One could even infer from this that the Court 
positively considers those presumptive mechanisms which have primarily a simplification 
rationale. This, save for the possibility offered to the trader to contend the correspondence 
of the presumption’s effect with the reality (in view of a   correct and effective levy). 
 
4.2.2 The Nowaco case  
In the Nowaco case, in addition to the provisions of the Community Customs Code on the 
taking of samples, further Community provisions on the same matter were at issue, which 
contributed to give content to the presumption as laid down in Article 70 CCC. 
In brief, the case concerned the export of goods which, on the basis of the samples taken, 
had been considered by the customs authorities as being defective, thereby not qualified for 
export refund according to the applicable Community regulation
599
. Given that the taking 
of samples in the case of export declaration relating to (agricultural) products qualifying 
for export refunds was also regulated by Regulation No 386/90 (under the point of view of 
the monitoring)
600
 and Regulation No 1538/91(under the aspect of minimum quality 
requirements and tolerance margin) the Court was first asked by the German referring 
court to clarify the interrelation between the different Community legal sources, and after 
that to answer “whether the legal fiction relating to uniform quality in the first 
subparagraph of Article 70(1) of the Customs Code also applies if the size of the sample 
                                                          
599
 The case of the main proceedings originated from the denial of the export refund for two consignments of 
frozen chicken declared for export by Nowaco respectively in 1997 and 1998. The German customs authority, 
which had examined the goods and taken a sample and a reserve sample, found that some of the chicken in 
the two samples taken in 1997 had protruding broken thigh bones, while only the first sample taken in 1998 
contained defects. The Finance Court, before which Nowaco brought an action against that decision, ordered 
the customs authority to pay Nowaco half of the export refund due for the consignment of 1998, while it 
dismissed the remainder of the action on the grounds that the goods did not meet the standards laid down by 
Regulation No 1538/91. Both the parties to the main proceedings brought an appeal before the Federal 
Finance Court, which decided to question the ECJ. 
600
 Council Regulation (EEC) No 386/90 of 12 February 1990 on the monitoring carried out at the time of 
export of agricultural products receiving refunds or other amounts (OJ 1990 L 42, p. 2). In particular, 
pursuant to Articles 2 and 3, Member States are to carry out physical checks on goods at the time when 
export formalities are completed and before authorisation for the export is given. Such physical checks must 
take the form of spot checks conducted frequently and without prior warning. Moreover, they must relate to a 
representative choice of not less than 5% of the export declarations in respect of which applications are 
submitted for export refunds. Cf. Commission Regulation (EC) No 2221/95 of 20 September 1995 laying 
down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EEC) No 386/90(OJ 1995 L 224, p. 13), in 
particular Article 7 (1) and (2). 
National Tax Law Presumptions and EU Law 
 
 
307 
taken is insufficient having regard to Article 7 of Regulation No 1538/91
601
 and, 
consequently, it is not possible to establish whether the tolerance margin laid down therein 
have been exceeded or not”. 
The Court clarified that Article 70 CCC is one of the general customs provisions which 
apply to export declarations relating to goods qualifying for Community aid without 
prejudice to special rules
602
. This entails that where the lex specialis provides for further 
requirements on occasion of the taking of samples, then such requisites must be respected 
for the purpose of the presumption of representativeness set out by the first subparagraph 
of  Article 70, para 1, to apply. 
In saying this, the Court notably refers to Article 70, para 1, with the term of “legal 
fiction”603. While it is noteworthy that the Court classifies the Community provision at 
hand by using the (national) concept of legal fiction, one has to be cautious in generalizing 
and assuming that it reflects the awareness of the distinction with legal presumptions. In 
fact, the EUCJ makes use of the label adopted by the German court in the order of 
reference for a preliminary ruling. As always, its attention is rather upon the effects and 
more in general on the effectiveness of the Community provisions on export financial 
subsidy. 
The foregoing is corroborated by the further statements laid down by the Court on the 
division of the probative burden. 
Indeed, in the decision it went beyond the questions asked by the referring court and found 
appropriate to clarify the rights, obligations and responsibility lying upon the exporter and 
customs authorities with regard to the verification of the exports qualifying for refund. In 
the frame of a relation based on cooperation, the EUCJ thus recalled that, on the one hand, 
                                                          
601
 Article 7 of the Regulation No 1538/91 states that decisions arising from failure to comply with Article 6 
of the same Regulation (listing the minimum requirements that poultry carcases and cuts have to meet in 
order to be graded into classes A and b) may only be taken for the whole of the batch which has been 
checked in accordance with Article 7. It also stipulates that a sample is to be drawn at random from each 
batch (see table set out in para. 3) and fixes the tolerable number of defective units. 
602
 This results from the conjunct wording of Article 1 of the CCC “Customs rule shall consist of this Code 
and the provisions adopted at Community level or nationally to implement them. The Code shall apply, 
without prejudice to special rules laid down in other fields – to trade between the Community and third 
countries (…)” and Article 4, para. 16, let. h, which includes ‘exportation’ among the ‘Customs procedure’.  
603
 It held that (para 56): “That legal fiction relating to uniform quality does not apply only to examinations 
carried out on the basis of the customs legislation, but is relevant (...) as regards checks carried out pursuant 
to the legislation concerning the system of export refunds on agricultural products and that concerning 
marketing standards for poultry meat”. For the legal fiction relating to uniform quality to be applied, it is 
necessary that the conditions and operation of the examination satisfy the criteria laid down by the said 
legislation. As a result, it concluded that when the size of samples taken by the customs authorities is 
insufficient having regard to Article 7 of the Regulation No 1538/91 that sets out the tolerable number of 
defective units in relation to the size of the batch and of the sample, Article 70(1) does not apply, as it is 
impossible to check compliance with that tolerance margin. 
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national authorities are requested to comply with the Community requirements, among 
which are the ones on the taking of samples. On the other hand, according to the national 
rules of evidence, it lies on the exporter who lodges an application for a refund by asserting 
the fair marketable quality of the products (thereby, their eligibility for refund) the proof of 
such circumstance, if his declaration is questioned by national authorities
604
. 
Having specified this, the Court left in the hands of the national administrative and judicial 
authorities the evaluation of the evidence. Such evaluation is governed by national 
(procedural) law, nonetheless the Court appears to suggest an overall consideration of the 
evidence, including the available samples, and also other information, such as the 
examination account produced by the customs officer who carried out the physical 
checks
605
. Thus, the Court appears to indicate that once the exporter contests the denial of 
the export refund based on the legal fiction as to the uniform quality, the widest probative 
allegation should be secured and the probative items should be freely evaluated by the 
judge. If the samples have not been taken in accordance with the fulfillments set out in the 
relevant Community provisions, then the presumption (or the fiction, as defined in the 
judgment) cannot operate and they degrade from elements of a legal proof binding for the 
judge to pure clues freely evaluable by the judge. This is so evidently true that when the 
facts cannot be conclusively established the EUCJ indicates to the national court to rule on 
the refund by considering the conduct (in terms of rights exercised and obligations fulfilled) 
of the exporter and customs authorities, which in national legal orders normally embody 
arguments of proof freely evaluable by the judge
606
. 
One could lastly infer from the foregoing that the counterproof which the trader is 
permitted to give against the presumption of representativeness of sample may not 
                                                          
604
 See para. 65 of the judgment, where the Court continues: “In the case in the main proceedings, even if the 
size of the samples taken was insufficient, the result of the customs checks and the decisions of the 
Hauptzollamt show that the national customs authorities did question the exporter’s declaration." 
605
 See para. 68 of the judgment. Pursuant to Article 7, para 2, Commission Regulation (EC) No 2221/95, 
“The competent customs officer must produce a detailed examination account on each physical check carried 
out. (…)” In this regard, see also Article 247 of Commission Regulation 2454/93 of 2 July 1993 provides that 
“1.When the customs authorities verify the declaration and accompanying documents or examine the goods, 
they shall indicate, at least in the copy of the declaration retained by the said authorities or in a document 
attached thereto, the basis and results of any such verification or examination. In the case of partial 
examination of the goods, particulars of the consignment examined shall also be given. (…) 2. Should the 
result of the verification of the declaration and accompanying documents or examination of the goods not be 
in accordance with the particulars given in the declaration, the customs authorities shall specify, at least in 
the copy of the declaration retained by the said authorities, or in a document attached thereto, the 
particulars to be taken into account for the purposes of the application of charges on the goods in question 
and, where appropriate, calculating any refunds or other amounts payable on exportation, and for applying 
the other provisions governing the customs procedure for which the goods are entered. (…)” 
606
 See paras 62 et seq. of the judgment under discussion. 
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encounter any limitation. It has to be noted, however, that in the case of the main 
proceedings the dispute concerned the right to the export refund, which might explain the 
extensive interference of the Court in the field of the evaluation of the evidence that 
belongs to the competence of national legal orders. On the other hand, the presumption of 
representativeness of the samples constitutes a very general inference, as it does not 
include any indication on the methodology with which samples are to be taken. It is mainly 
thought of in order to speed up the monitoring and verification at the frontiers, but such 
generality might give rise to arbitrary acts by customs authorities. This is why it is essential 
that the possibility to challenge such presumption be widely recognized to the trader.  
 
4.3 The case-law on the theft of goods as a further example of the EUCJ’s 
effectiveness-oriented interpretation of Customs law 
The judgments in the field of customs law illustrated so far concerned presumptions laid 
down in the Customs legislation, with regard to the territorial competence to collect the tax 
debt in case of irregularities and the representativeness of samples. These are ancillary 
aspects in respect of the definition of the tax obligation, but may nonetheless affect the 
position of the trader and the amount of the tax obligation. 
It is now worth mentioning, incidentally,  a further decision wherein at issue was the 
definition of the event giving rise to taxation as the effect of a presumptive rationale 
attributed by the EUCJ to the relevant legislation. It confirms that the jurisprudence of the 
EUCJ is mostly oriented in striking a balance between the interests in play so as to endorse 
the interpretation that guarantees the most  effective application of Customs legislation. 
This is the case even when this entails a fictio iuris to the detriment of the traders 
themselves.  
The first approach seems to emerge from the very recent case Harry Winston
607
, wherein 
the Court has ruled on the suitability of the theft of goods to determine the extinction of the 
customs debt, or, which is the same, on whether it can be deemed as a chargeable event 
giving rise to the customs obligation. 
                                                          
607
 ECJ 11 July 2013, Case C-273/12, Harry Winston. The case in the main proceedings originated from a 
collection notice issued by the French customs administration, in which Harry Winston were asked payment 
of the customs duties and VAT applicable to items of jewellery placed under customs warehousing 
arrangement that were stolen through an armed robbery with hostage-taking. 
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The Court follows its own precedent handed down in Esercizio Magazzini Generali and 
Melline Agosta
608
, which diverges from the ruling in British American Tobacco on VAT
609
. 
The decision is interesting as it shows how the Court does not refrain from giving a broad 
interpretation of the event giving rise to the customs debt on the basis of a presumption 
extrapolated from the relevant provisions. The concept of chargeable event for the purpose 
of customs duties is extended so as to include even the theft on the grounds that the goods 
(liable from import duties and unlawfully removed from customs supervision) enter the 
economic circuit after the theft. In the view taken by the Court, the same presumptive 
rationale, mutatis mutandis, grounds Article 206 of the Community Customs Code, where 
it makes the extinction of the customs debt conditional to the proof that the non-fulfilment 
of the customs obligations
610
 is due “to the total destruction or irretrievable loss of the said 
goods as a result of the actual nature of the goods or unforeseeable circumstances of force 
majeure, or as a consequence of authorisation by the customs authorities”. 
The French legislation at issue in the main proceedings implementing such provisions 
provided that duties were payable on the quantity of goods which had disappeared, unless 
the trader proved that it was a case of unforeseeable circumstances of force majeure. The 
                                                          
608
 ECJ 5 October 1993, Joined Cases C-186/82 and C-187/82, Esercizio Magazzini Generali and Melina 
Agosta. The case of the main proceedings originated from the collection notice issued by the customs 
authorities of Catania for customs duty and valued added tax on the goods belonging to Mellina Agosta that 
were stolen from the customs warehouse managed by Esercizio Magazzini Generali. On the grounds that a 
presumption of the definitive release for consumption of the stolen goods had been raised, the Italian customs 
authorities thus proceeded to issue the tax claim towards the undertakings. In fact, under the Italian 
Legislation (Consolidated Customs Laws, approved by Decree No 43 of the President of the Republic of 23 
January 1973), in the case of goods on which customs duty was payable, the event giving rise to the fiscal 
obligation was constituted by their release for consumption in the customs territory; goods were regarded as 
being definitively released for consumption if they had been unlawfully removed without compliance with 
the customs obligations. The event giving rise to the obligation was considered not to have  occurred – 
according, it would seem, to a fiction – when the taxable person proved that the failure to fulfil his customs 
obligation was due to the loss or destruction of the goods because of unforeseeable circumstances or force 
majeure or as the result of events attributable to the minor negligence of a third party or the taxable person 
himself, or from natural or technical causes. Such provisions, and in particular the word ‘loss’, were 
interpreted by the Italian Court as including the theft among the unforeseeable circumstances or force 
majeure. In response to this, Law No 891/1990 gave an authoritative interpretation of the term, by confining 
it to the ‘dispersion’ and not to the ‘removal’ of the products. The question referred to by the Italian Court of 
Appeal then, concerned the interpretation of the concept of ‘force majeure’ for the purpose of the Community 
Customs Law. After having recalled the Community provisions on the event giving rise to the fiscal 
obligation and to its extinction, the ECJ held that “It appears from the above-mentioned articles together with 
the ninth recital of the preamble to the directive that the reasons for the extinction must be based on the fact 
that the goods have not been used for the economic purpose which justified the application of import duties. 
In the case of theft, it may be assumed that the goods pass into the Community commercial circuit. It follows 
that “loss” of the goods for the purposes of the directive does not embrace the concept of theft, regardless of 
the circumstances in which it has been committed.” 
609
 ECJ 14 July 2005, case C-435/03, British American Tobacco International. 
610
 Meaning the obligations which arise from various customs provisions which have the effect of delaying 
the release for consumption of the goods. 
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question then concerned the possibility to subsume the theft within the circumstances of 
force majeure to which the legislation conditioned the extinction of the customs debt on 
the basis of the assumption that lost goods are not marketed. In particular, the referring 
Supreme Court underlined that the Customs code did not include a provision similar to the 
ninth recital in the preamble to Directive No 79/623 referred to in the decision Esercizio 
Magazzini Generali and Mellina Agosta, which in its view made the extinction of the 
customs debt depend on the fact, “whether actual or presumed, that the goods did not find 
their way back to the economic circuit after the theft”. 
The EUCJ did not find such amended legal framework as relevant for a different decision 
of the pending case. It thus confirmed its previous ruling by holding that “a theft committed 
in a customs warehouse results in those goods being removed from the customs warehouse 
without having been cleared through customs. The Court’s presumption in its judgment in 
Esercizio Magazzini Generali and Melina Agosta, according to which, in the case of theft, 
the goods enter the economic circuit of the European Union, is therefore still relevant 
notwithstanding the fact that the Customs Code no longer contains the wording of the ninth 
recital in the preamble to Directive 79/623 referred to in that judgment
611.” 
It must be noted that at issue was not a legal presumption. The insertion of the theft among 
the chargeable events for customs purposes only, appears to be the result of interpretation 
based on the rationale of the provisions concerned. Per se, the legislative data (Article 203 
on the origin of customs debt, Article 206 on the extinction) does not establish a 
presumption of entrance in the economic circuit with reference to stolen goods. 
Nonetheless, the Court extrapolates such presumptive rationale from the relevant EU 
provisions and in different decisions applies it with the effect that the chargeable event 
covers a circumstance where such entrance occurs by hand of a third person in respect of 
the one liable to pay customs duties. Here, as said, budget considerations seems to prevail, 
as the only one who can be charged is the holder of the stolen goods. Moreover, even 
though not explicitly, the Court may have considered that, as the Italian government 
maintained in the case Esercizio Magazzini Generali and Melina Agosta, a different 
conclusion would have encouraged ‘arranged thefts’, i.e. theft organized for the purpose of 
                                                          
611
 In any event, the Court held that Article 206 of the Customs Code, laying down the hypotheses of 
extinction of the customs debt, did not apply in the case of the main proceedings. Indeed, Article 206 only 
derogates from Articles 202 and 204, para1, let. a), of the Code, as it is explicitly said in its first paragraph. 
However, a theft of goods placed under a suspensive procedure (customs warehousing arrangements) is 
covered by Article 203, which links the origin of the customs debt to the unlawful removal from customs 
supervision of goods liable to import duties from the moment of the removal and it is not referred to in 
Article 206. 
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evading customs duties. It being impossible for national customs authorities to ascertain 
the actual release for consumption of goods, this event is thus presumed facing theft. On 
the other hand, it has to be said that such conclusion is in line with the legislative data. An 
interpretation that classified a theft of goods as a loss due to force majeure, would have 
meant forcing beyond measure the applicable legislation.  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
As said, several presumptive provisions may be identified in Customs law. Among these, it 
can be further mentioned the presumption of origin laid down in Article 41 of the 
implementing regulation
612
, or the presumption as to the amount of the customs debt for 
the purpose of the guarantee provided for by Article 379 of the same Regulation
613
. The list 
could continue. However, for our purpose, it is sufficient to underline the following. 
Legal presumptions play in EU customs law the same role that is assigned to them at 
national level. They basically live up to the uncertainties as to the determination or 
ascertainment of certain elements of or ancillary to the tax obligation, in order to secure a 
simplification of the proceedings and above all a rapid collection. This, even when the 
taxation ends up  having a fictitious basis, like when the holder of stolen goods 
(irrespective of the ascertainment of his negligence) is called upon to pay customs duties 
and other charges. Looking at some judgments, the Court appears inclined to interpret the 
relevant Community legislation literally, or said differently, to give a close interpretation 
of the legislative data, taking into consideration primarily the effective application of 
                                                          
612
 Pursuant to which “1. Accessories, spare parts, or tools delivered with any piece of equipment, machine, 
apparatus or vehicle which form part of its standard equipment shall be deemed to have the same origin as 
that piece of equipment, machine, apparatus or vehicle. 2. Essential spare parts for use with any piece of 
equipment, machine, apparatus or vehicle put into free circulation or previously exported shall be deemed to 
have the same origin as that piece of equipment, machine, apparatus or vehicle provided the conditions laid 
down in this section are fulfilled.”  
613
 Article 379 stipulates that the principal is allowed to make use of a comprehensive guarantee or a 
guarantee waiver up to a reference amount. As to the calculation of such amount, it establishes that “2. The 
reference amount shall be the same as the amount of customs debt which may be incurred in respect of goods 
the principal places under the Community transit procedure during a period of at least one week. The office 
of guarantee shall establish the amount in collaboration with the party concerned on the following basis: (a) 
the information on goods he has carried in the past and an estimate of the volume of intended Community 
transit operation as shown, inter alia, by his commercial documentation and accounts; (b) in establishing the 
reference amount, account shall be taken of the highest rates of duty charges applicable to the goods in the 
Member State of the office of guarantee. Community goods carried or to be carried in accordance with the 
Convention on a common transit procedure shall be treated as non-Community goods. A calculation shall be 
made of the amount of the customs debt which may be incurred for each transit operation. When the 
necessary data is not available the amount is presumed to be EUR 7 000 unless other information known to 
the customs authorities leads to a different figure. 3. The guarantee office shall review the reference amount 
in particular on the basis of a request from the principal and shall adjust it if necessary.”  
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Customs law (and budgetary interests) and putting into the second place the protection of 
the traders.  
Nonetheless, when corroborated by the wording of the Community Customs regulation, as 
in the case of the presumption of representativeness of the samples, the Court does not 
refrain from giving an interpretation that conciliates the effectiveness of Customs law (as 
well as the EU’s and Member States’ financial interests) with the protection of the taxpayer, 
through the recognition of the widest possibility of contrary proof. This is in line with the 
overall customs framework, and in particular with what is stated in the ninth recital of the 
preamble to the Community Customs Code, according to which “in order to secure a 
balance between the needs of the customs authorities in regard to ensuring the correct 
application of customs legislation, on the one hand, and the right of traders to be treated 
fairly, on the other, the said authorities must be granted, inter alia, extensive powers of 
control and the said traders a right of appeal”. 
 
5. National tax law presumptions in the field of Customs law 
Given that customs duties are governed by Community legislation, there is not much room 
for purely national legal presumptions in this field. There are though a few significant 
judgments wherein the EUCJ has dealt with national presumptive measures implementing 
single Community provisions and mostly introduced with the purpose of simplifying the 
ascertainment of the customs debt or the collection of the customs duty owed. Some of 
these judgments are illustrated below as they give an insight into how the Court considers 
national presumptions in the field of Community customs law; that is, in a legal context 
where the integration between EU law and national rules is far-reaching. 
In this regard, it has to be immediately said that the cases to be discussed below concern 
irrebuttable presumptions of law only. There are not, to my knowledge, cases concerning 
national rebuttable presumptions. In fact, presumptions introduced at national level in the 
field of customs law are mostly aimed at guaranteeing the collection of the customs debt 
and to simplify as much as possible the determination of such debt by customs authorities, 
so that the ascertainment of the real facts, for the purpose of which normally the contrary 
proof is provided, is undermined. As such, they appear to embody more fictions or legal 
definitions than presumptions, as it is hard to see a rule of experience. 
Consequently, while some conclusions can be drawn as regards the approach to 
irrebuttable presumptions on the grounds of the EUCJ rulings, the question is still open 
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with reference to rebuttable presumption of law which interfere with Community customs 
law. In this regard, it is nonetheless possible to foresee the view that the EUCJ would take 
if ever questioned, on the basis of the rulings analysed so far and the ones to be discussed 
below, as well as in the light of the general principle permeating the case-law in customs 
law. 
 
5.1 National irrebuttable presumptions and Customs law 
The examination of the case-law on national irrebuttable presumptions in the area of 
customs law is to be conducted taking into consideration two main points of departure, 
which represent the key of the reading of any other decision on the same matter. Both of 
them result from considerations already expressed, respectively in the previous chapters 
dealing with the concept of presumptions, particularly in tax law, and in the previous 
paragraph of this chapter dealing with the principles guiding the EUCJ rulings in customs 
matters. 
First, irrebuttable presumptions of law have a substantive nature, which means that they 
may affect the tax obligation, for instance under the profile of the persons liable, or the 
amount of levy, and so on. This entails that in introducing such measures the national 
legislator interferes with the regulation that the EU legislator has chosen to give to a 
certain issue. Unlike when the EU law is covered by a directive, from the use of a 
regulation it follows that national implementing measures are normally not only 
superfluous, but even prohibited in the light of the principle of sincere cooperation when 
they depart form the former. Such principle requires, among  other things, Member States 
to refrain from introducing any measures that could jeopardise the attainment of the 
Union’s objectives. 
In the light of the foregoing, one expects that the Community Customs law precludes not 
only national measures that are in contrast with what is stated in the Customs legislation, 
but also those ones that, albeit not diverging from any explicit Customs provision, adds 
further provisions, for example in terms of requisites for  benefits or extent of tax liability. 
Second, the importance of avoiding the introduction of further (presumptive) provisions, 
when not-requested, is obviously readable in the light of securing the uniformity as to the 
application of Customs law within the Community territory. This principle, which arises 
also when dealing with EU law rules, is even more cogent when facing national 
(presumptive) measures in customs law. In the latter hypothesis, indeed, the risk of 
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diverging applications is higher and so is the risk of a non-equal treatment of traders, 
which must be combated in an internal market. Not surprisingly, before the Court are 
brought not only legislative provisions, but also administrative or judicial practices due to 
the unlawful interpretation of the legislation in force, which exactly like the former are 
able to jeopardise the application of customs law. 
 
5.1.1 The Spedition Ulustrans Case 
The Spedition Ulustrans case
614
 is a good example for the purpose of showing the Court’s 
line of thought when confronting irrebuttable presumptions of law. Here, the Austrian Act 
implementing customs law (Paragraph 79(2) of the ZollR-DG) was at issue, which 
provided as follows: “When an employee or other person contracted by an undertaking 
incurs liability for a customs debt because that person has, in the discharge of the affairs 
of his employer or the undertaking which engaged him, acted unlawfully with regard to 
customs obligation, the employer or undertaking shall simultaneously incur liability for 
that customs debt in so far as it has not become the customs debtor in respect thereof 
pursuant to any other provision.” 
The provision was considered to lay down an irrebuttable presumption of imputability of 
the employee’s conduct to the employer. Indeed, the case of the main proceedings 
originated from the demand for payment, following the unlawful introduction of goods in 
the Community’s territory, not only to the driver who had failed to fulfil the customs 
obligations, but also to his employer (Spedition Ulustrans). The latter, in particular, was 
notified of the same amount of duty claimed from its employee in its capacity as joint and 
several co-debtor, on the basis of the combined provisions of Articles  202, para 1, let. a), 
of the Community Customs Code
615
 and Paragraph 79, para 2, of the Austrian 
implementing legislation. Spedition Ulustrans brought an action against that decision by 
contending that it could not legally be considered as a debtor of that duty as it had not 
taken part in the commission of the driver’s offences. The appeal was rejected in the first 
and second instance, and therefore the dispute arrived before the Austrian Court of last 
instance, which doubting  the compatibility of the Austrian provision with the notion of 
‘customs debtor’ resulting from Article 202, para 3, CCC, decided to stay the proceedings 
and to refer to the Court such question for a preliminary ruling. 
                                                          
614
 ECJ 23 September 2004, case C-414/02, Spedition Ulustrans. 
615
 Pursuant to which “1. A customs debt on importation shall be incurred through: (a) the release for free 
circulation of goods liable to import duties (…)”. 
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In the order of reference the referring Court made two interesting remarks, which are 
worthy of attention in order to frame the main question. 
On the one side, it gave account of the different interpretations, among the academic 
scholars, of the concept of ‘debtor’ set out in Paragraph 79, para 2, and of its possible 
(in)consistency with the Community regulation. As a matter of fact, the Customs Code 
itself, at Article 202, para 3, defines who the debtor is of the customs debt on importation 
incurring because of the unlawful introduction in the Community’s customs territory of the 
goods liable to import duties. It includes, apart from the person who introduced the goods 
infringing customs obligation (1
st
 indent), “any persons who participated in the unlawful 
introduction of the goods and who were aware or should reasonably have been aware that 
such introduction was unlawful” (2nd indent) and “any persons who acquired or held the 
goods in question and who were aware or should have been aware at the time of acquiring 
or receiving the goods that they had been introduced unlawfully” (3rd indent). Some 
authors inferred from this provision the necessity of taking into account the subjective 
conditions. Given that Paragraph 79(2) extended the meaning of ‘debtor’ so as to include 
employers or principals irrespective of their participation to the infringement carried out by 
their employees or agents, it was incompatible with Article 202, para 3, second indent. 
According to other authors, instead, the extent of the concept of ‘debtor’ depended on the 
interpretation of the first indent of Article 202, para3, which refers to the person who 
introduced the goods unlawfully. This person, it was argued, is always, at least indirectly, 
the undertaking, as it has the legal custody of the transported goods. In this view, 
Paragraph 79, para 2, is not incompatible with the second indent of Article 202, 3, CCC, 
but it is rather superfluous in respect of the first indent, thereby in line with the Community 
frame. On the other side, the referring court submitted that Paragraph 79, para 2, is a ‘rule 
on liability’, thereby falling in the competence of the Member States. In fact, such 
provision might at first sight appear as concerning the collection of the duty, rather than the 
design of the tax obligation under the subjective point of view. Not surprisingly, it is on 
this argument that the observations submitted by the Austrian government rotated, by 
contending that it falls within the competence of Member States the choice of the methods 
that they consider the most effective for the purpose of securing the recovery of customs 
duties
616
. 
                                                          
616
 In particular, the Austrian government referred to Article 8(1) of the Council Decision 2000/597/EC, 
Euratom of 29 September 2000 on the system of the Euratom Communities’ own resources (OJ 2000 L 253, 
p. 42), according to which Common Customs Tariff duties are collected by the Member States in accordance 
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The Court did not embrace such perspective. Instead, it framed the rule at hand in a 
substantive setting. In this view, far from being a pure procedural rule on the recovery of 
customs duties which is normally left in the hands of Member States, it is regarded as a 
provision capable of widening the subjective scope of the customs obligation beyond the 
scope defined by the Community legislation. In this regard, the Court observed that if it is 
true that from the wording of Article 202, para 3, CCC the attempt to give a broad 
definition of ‘debtor’ can be inferred, nonetheless that provision “does not make the 
employer automatically co-debtor of the customs debt of an employee who has unlawfully 
introduced the goods”. 
By using a formula which is used in many other judgments dealing with presumptions, the 
Court thus shows to reject of a national provision that presumes automatically a certain 
circumstance or a qualification, thereby overlapping the wording of the Community 
legislator; automatically and, I would add, also conclusively, given that the national 
measure was construed as an irrebuttable presumption of law, or a legal definition, without 
permitting the employer to prove that he was not involved in the irregularity committed.  
To reach such conclusion, the Court made reference, firstly, to what is provided by Article 
202, para 3, CCC, by underlying that the first indent presupposes that the person (in 
hypothesis, the employer) is by his own action responsible for the unlawful introduction of 
the goods, while the second and third indents request the knowledge of the unlawful 
introduction or the culpable ignorance
617
. In other words, in order for the employer to be 
called upon for the payment of the customs debt it is requested either his actual (physical) 
                                                                                                                                                                                
with the national provisions imposed by law, regulation or administrative action, which are, where 
appropriate, to be adapted to meet the requirements of Community rules. In such a frame, Paragraph 79, para 
2, is aimed at rendering more effective the customs collection, by making co-debtors the employers who 
derive an economic benefit from their employees’ acts and are notoriously economically less weak than the 
latter. By contrast, the Commission observed that if interpreted as an irrebuttable presumption of the 
imputability of the employee’s conduct to the employer, then Paragraph 79, para 2, fell outside Article 202(3). 
617
 See paras. 26-27-28. At paras 29 and 30 the Court summarized as follows: “It follows from the 
examination of the first, second and third indents of Article 202(3) of the Customs Code that the Community 
legislature has distinguished between cases covered by the first indent and those set out in the second and 
third indents. In the circumstances provided for by the first indent, the employer can be regarded as having 
itself unlawfully introduced the goods and as becoming, as a result, liable for the customs debt, either solely 
or jointly with its employee. In the circumstances covered by the second and third indents, the employer has 
only ‘participated’ in such introduction and can be regarded as a joint debtor only if certain subjective 
conditions are met. In those circumstances, where it appears that the unlawful introduction of the goods 
cannot be attributed to the employer but is the act of the employee, the employer may be a debtor of the 
customs debt if he has participated in that introduction, which may be the case, in particular, if the unlawful 
introduction was made using the resources or staff of his business, and if he knew or should reasonably have 
known that such introduction was unlawful.” The Court confuted the opinion of those authors who argued 
that Paragraph 79, para 2, specified the condition for applying the first indent of Article 202(3). Such an 
interpretation, indeed, by regarding the employer as the ‘person who has unlawfully introduced the goods’, 
would render the second indent superfluous. 
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participation in the infringement of the customs obligation or his even indirect participation 
accompanied by a subjective condition (he knew or should reasonably have known that the 
introduction carried out by his employee was unlawful). Hence, the employer cannot sic et 
simpliciter be considered as liable for the customs debt without carrying out an 
ascertainment as to the existence of such objective or subjective elements. 
Besides that, the Court went over the normative evolution that had been brought to the 
current definition of ‘debtor’ included in Article 202, para 3. This, in order to show, on the 
one side, that Article 202, para 3, is more specific, in respect of the previous regulation of 
the same matter, as to the individualization of the persons ‘participating’ in the unlawful 
introduction, thereby indicating the intent of the Community legislator to lay down 
exhaustively the conditions for determining the debtors. On the other side,  the normative 
evolution reveals the need for harmonization, legal certainty and uniformity of 
interpretation and implementation which since from the beginning have grounded any 
provisions on the definition of customs debtors
618
.  
In the light of the foregoing, the national provision relevant in the main proceedings 
betrays 
619
 both the wording and the ratio of the Community definition of debtor facing an 
unlawful introduction of goods. The EUCJ left to the referring court its interpretation, but 
not before having ‘warned’ that “if Paragraph 79(2) of the ZollR-DG were interpreted as 
meaning that it establishes an irrebuttable presumption that the employer is co-debtor of 
the employee’s debt, that paragraph would be incompatible with Article 202, para 3, of the 
Customs Code”620. This holds true even where such provision applied only when the 
                                                          
618
 Though, at para. 38 the Court recognizes that “all those regulatory amendments were not intended to and 
did not even have the effect of depriving the Member States of the possibility of adopting measures to 
contribute effectively to the implementation of the objectives of the customs regulation, in particular the 
recovery of the customs debt. Nor did they prevent the Member States from prescribing, if appropriate, rules 
specifying, in compliance with those objectives and in accordance with the principle of proportionality, the 
conditions for applying the Community texts (…).” 
619
 See para 40: “The provision of a national law contradict that clearly manifested intention of the 
Community legislature and the very letter and purpose of Article 202(3) of the Customs Code, as described 
in this judgment, if, disregarding the subjective conditions set out in the second and third indents of Article 
202(3), they automatically extend to the employer the employees’ status as debtor, without it being 
established that the employer has taken part in the introduction of the goods, in particular when he knew or 
ought reasonably to have known that the said introduction was unlawful.” 
620
 On the contrary, in his opinion to the case (Opinion of Advocate general Tizzano delivered on 6 May 
2004, OJ 1992 L 302, p. 1), the General Advocate concluded that the Austrian provision complied with 
Article 202, para 3, second indent of the CCC as “By limiting liability to cases of infringement of customs 
obligations by employees in the performance of the tasks allocated to them, it ensures that employers are to 
be responsible for customs debts only in the exact instances envisaged by that provision of the Code. The 
employer will first of all be liable for having delegated the task of transporting goods into the Community 
and for having thus participated in the introduction of those goods into the customs territory. 44. In addition, 
the employer will be liable because, owing to his position, it is reasonable to believe that he knew (or should 
have known) the manner in which the employee discharges his duties; and in any event it is for him to ensure 
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employee acts “in the conduct of his employer’s affairs”, because in this case its 
responsibility would request the ascertainment of the subjective element
621
.  
From this decision, one could thus infer that, as a rule, national irrebuttable presumptions 
affecting the tax obligation are inconsistent with the Customs law. This is because they are 
capable of jeopardizing the harmonized customs regulation as established by the 
Community legislator. The main concern is undoubtedly the uniform application of Article 
202, para 3, by national customs authorities. Notably, the decision does not mention the 
preclusion to the counterproof, from which the effect of the automatic definition as 
‘debtor’ follows. The circumstance that the Court rejects the national provision if 
interpreted as automatically presuming the status of debtor upon the employer leaves open 
the question of whether this might entail that the same provision laid down as a rebuttable 
presumption of law would have been judged differently. 
In the particular case of the main proceedings, it depends on the interpretation of Article 
202, para 3, under the aspect of the distribution of the burden of proof as to the objective or 
subjective elements requested in order to regard a person liable to pay. If the burden of 
proving that the employer has himself introduced unlawfully the goods into the 
Community or that he was aware or should have been aware of that, lies on the customs 
authority, then even a rebuttable presumption may be considered inconsistent with the 
Community regulation, as it would not comply with the latter. However, from the decision 
conclusive arguments in favour of one or another division of such burden cannot be 
inferred. Neither the reference to the need of an ascertainment of the conditions for the 
definition of debtor, nor the mention of the possibility for the employer to claim his 
ignorance about the customs infringement, are indicative enough. One could further rely on 
the general rule on the division of the burden of proof, which in other decisions the EUCJ 
has referred to, for the purpose of arguing that it is up to customs authorities the proof of 
the above conditions, so that a reversal of such burden as the effect of a rebuttable 
presumption would not be in line with Article 202, para 3. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
that the employee complies with the relevant rules in the course of those duties.” (paras 42 et seq.) This 
interpretation of the national provision, however, ends up to be what the Court rejects in its decision, i.e. an 
irrebuttable presumption of imputability of the employees’ conduct to the employer. By contrast, the ECJ 
requests the actual ascertainment of this requisite, in particular of the subjective requirements.  
621
 Moreover, the Court took into consideration the possibility for the employer to obtain repayment or 
remission of the customs debt under Article 239 of the CCC, once he paid it. Even then, there remain doubts 
as to the proportionality of the extension of the status of debtor to the employer with the objectives pursued. 
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On the other side, precisely the rejection of the national provision in the extent to which it 
‘automatically’ presumed the liability to pay upon the employer may suggest that a 
rebuttable presumption would instead be in line with the relevant Customs legislation.  
 
5.1.2 The Kenny Roland Lyckeskog case 
Further indications as to the extent to which Member States are allowed to have recourse to 
presumptions in the area of customs law result from the case Kenny Roland Lyckeckog
622
. 
At issue was the Swedish provisions which apparently established an irrebuttable 
presumption of commercial nature of imports – as such, not admitted to free-import 
duties – where they concerned an amount of goods exceeding a certain quantity. More in 
detail, in the main proceedings the measure of the customs’ authorities assumed the 
commercial character of the import on the grounds that an amount higher than 20 kg of rice 
per person was imported (equivalent to the price of SEK 240)
623
. 
Such provision, in the extent to which it had the effect of excluding the relief from customs 
duties for the import of a quantity of goods higher than the maximum fixed, beyond which 
the commercial nature of the operation was presumed, diverged from the wording of the 
Regulation on the Community system of relief from customs duties
624
. As a matter of fact, 
by virtue of the combined provisions of Articles 45 and 47 of that Regulation the goods 
contained in the personal luggage of the travellers coming from a third country were 
admitted free of import duties on condition that such operations did not have a commercial 
nature and within the limit of 175 ECU (equivalent to 1700 SEK) for each traveller
625
. 
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 ECJ 4 June 2002, Case C-99/2000, Kenny Roland Lyckeckog. 
623
 The case originated from a decision of the Sweden District Court which had found Mr Lyckeskog guilty 
of attempted smuggling as he had sought to import 500 kg of rice from Norway without declaring that 
importation. 
624
 Council Regulation (EEC) No 918/83 of 28 March 1983 (OJ 1983 L105, p. 1) setting up a Community 
system of reliefs from customs duty. 
625
 More in detail, Article 45 provided that “1. Subject to Articles 46 to 49, goods contained in the personal 
luggage of travelers coming from a third country shall be admitted free of import duties, provided such 
imports are of a non-commercial nature.” The same article, at para 2, let. (b) defined the notion of ‘imports 
of a non-commercial nature’ as those ones which “- are of an occasional nature, and consist exclusively of 
goods for the personal use of the travelers or their families, or of goods intended as presents; the nature and 
quantity of such goods should not be such as might indicate that they are being imported for commercial 
reasons.” Article 47 granted such relief, with reference to goods other than those listed in Article 46625 (a 
series of goods, like tobacco products, alcoholic beverages, perfumes and toilet waters, to which particular 
quantitative limits per traveller apply), up to a total value of ECU 175 per traveller, meaning that for any 
higher amount the import was considered as having a commercial nature. In the case of the main proceedings, 
given that the quantity of rice admitted free of import duties by virtue of the national provision was much 
below the amount established by the Community provision albeit under a different parameter, the question of 
the compatibility of the former with the latter arose. 
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The EUCJ, by underlying the ratio grounding the Regulation No 918/83, which is the 
creation and the application of a uniform system of reliefs from customs duties within the 
Community, excluded that Member States are allowed to introduce “irrebuttable 
presumptions that imports are commercial”. Differently, the uniform application of such 
system, which the Regulation itself aims at, would be jeopardized. The Court further 
specified that, by contrast, customs authorities of the Member States are permitted to issue 
mere non-binding ‘instructions’ or ‘practices’ – presumably, addressed towards the 
customs officials - which for the purpose of simplifying the customs procedure fix, for 
certain type of goods, the threshold below which the traveller is released from giving 
evidence of the non-commercial nature of the import carried out. 
This, at least, seems the be the sense of the wording of the EUCJ, where it held that (para 
32): 
“If Member States were entitled to impose quantitative restrictions on the grounds other 
than morality or public policy, the uniform nature of the system of relief from customs 
duties throughout Community territory would be jeopardised. However, instructions drawn 
up by the customs authorities, as long as they are not an indirect way of introducing  an 
irrebuttable presumption that imports are commercial, but are simply a non-binding 
criterion designed to facilitate customs procedure, are not incompatible with the system 
established by Regulation No 918/83”. 
Accordingly, in answering the question on the criteria determining the commercial nature 
of an importation pursuant to Article 45, para 1, the Court requested a case-by-case 
assessment, because the reference to the ‘personal use’ in that article implies that “the 
designation, for reference purposes of a typical use would be for that reason 
unsatisfactory”. In this view, authorities cannot confine their examination to the type or 
quantity of products imported (i.e. objective factors), but they have also to take into 
consideration, where appropriate, further indicators such as the traveller’s and his family’s 
lifestyle and habits
626
. 
Notably, in his opinion to the case the Advocate General also pointed out that the national 
measure at hand did not comply with the principle of effectiveness. In his view, the 
probative burden upon the traveller does not have to be as such to render difficult or 
impossible to prove the non-commercial nature of the import
627
. 
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 See in particular paras 26-27 of the judgment. 
627
 Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano delivered on 21 February 2002. He agreed with the observations 
submitted by the parties, according to which “Member States cannot adopt binding provisions laying down 
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Before the attempt to infer some general indications from the judgment under discussion, it 
has to be observed that from the latter it is not possible to understand if the national 
measure of the main proceedings actually embodies a presumption. It is not clear if the 
provision fixes a proper presumption of commercial nature of the imports on the grounds 
that the established maximum quantities are exceeded, or it rather sets the quantity of 
goods importable free of customs duty thereby considering the overcoming of such limit an 
index of the commercial nature of the operation. Above all, as underlined by the European 
Commission in its observations submitted to the Court, it is not clear if such provisions are 
binding or not and which position of the legal sources’ hierarchy they cover. While it 
seems to be plain that they are issued by customs authorities, it does not evidently result 
whether this is under the form of a decision, a general act or a settled practice
628
.  
Nonetheless, these considerations cannot refrain from the attempt of inferring from the 
judgment at hand some indications as to the approach of the EUCJ facing national 
presumptions. Similarly to the ruling handed down in Spedition Ulustrans, the Court 
explicitly rejects any irrebuttable presumptions, even where construed as quantitative 
restrictions, on the grounds that they may counter the uniform nature of the relief from 
customs duties in the Community’s territory. 
As often, here the Court puts on the same level national legislation and administrative 
practices. Accordingly, while it disregards the nature of the national provision - one thing 
                                                                                                                                                                                
quantitative limits on duty-free imports or even an absolute presumption that an import is of a commercial 
nature because of the quantity of goods imported. At most, the customs authorities may issue administrative 
instructions indicating the quantity of certain goods that may be admitted free of duty, on the understanding 
that the traveller may prove that a larger quantity is not being imported for commercial reasons”. In addition, 
he underlined that Regulation No 918/83 is based on the recognition that common rules are required in the 
area concerned under the international conventions to which Member States are parties. As a result, he 
specified that “while it is legitimate to allow any Member State to issue ‘instructions’ or ‘recommendations’ 
to customs officers, laying down quantitative limits not provided for in the Regulation, even if such 
instructions or recommendations are not binding, that must not jeopardise in practice the uniform 
application of the Community system of reliefs from customs duty”. This entails that “any quantitative limit 
on imports indicated in a national administrative measure must be reasonable and appropriate”. Ultimately, 
he observed, as refereed in the text, that “the traveller should be able to protect his own interests without too 
much difficulty, as regards both knowledge of the precise content of his own right to relief from customs duty 
as defined in Regulation No 918/83 and the evidence he is required to provide, which should not be too 
rigorous or such as to make it effectively impossible to prove that the import is of a non-commercial nature”. 
628
 In the order of reference, the Swedish Court asked “What is the legal significance of a national authority’s 
provisions which indicate the duty-free quantity of a certain product – to which Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 918/83 of 28 March 1983 setting up a Community system of reliefs from customs duty is applicable – 
normally to be admitted?”. But in the judgment the relevant provisions are not reported. This leads one to 
think that they were administrative practices. In his opinion, the Advocate general explained at para. 12 that 
the total value of ECU 175 fixed in Article 47 of the Regulation No 918/83 was calculated by the 
Generaltullstyrelse (the Swedish Board of Customs) and subsequently by the Tullverket to be equivalent to 
SEK 1700. Then, a decision of the customs authorities set the permitted duty-free quantity for private imports 
of rice at 20 kg per person. 
National Tax Law Presumptions and EU Law 
 
 
323 
is if it was a normative provision, another thing if it was a mere administrative practice – it 
focuses on the effects, by distinguishing between binding instructions on the one side, and 
pure indicative measures on the other side. The evaluation of Community (in)compatibility 
developed by the Court is exclusively centred on the effects of the national presumption in 
turn under examination, as in the extent to which it is binding and it does not give the 
possibility to give the counterproof, it is capable of affecting the customs obligation. Such 
evaluation is functional to the effective application of the Community customs regulation. 
In this perspective, the interest of the Member State to tackle abusive practices
629
, or, 
which is more the case of the main proceedings, to simplify the assessment of the (non-) 
commercial nature of a certain operation, must be balanced with the need to secure the 
effectiveness of the above regulation. Thus, the EUCJ regards as inconsistent with the 
                                                          
629
 Such interest was put forward by the Danish government in the context of an infringement proceedings 
brought before the Court by the Commission: ECJ 6 December 1999, Case C-208/88, Commission v 
Kingdom of Denmark. The case concerned a question similar to the one referred to in the text, though with 
regard to turnover taxes and excise duties on intra-Community imports. At issue was an Order of the Minister 
of Finance which fixed an allowance limited to 10 litres for beer imported in a traveller’s personal luggage, 
thereby presuming the commercial character of imports of a higher quantity. In the view taken by the 
Commission, such measure was in contrast with Articles 2(1) and 3(2) of the Council Directive 69/169/EEC 
(of 28 May 1969 on the harmonization of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action 
relating to exemption from turnover tax and excise duty on imports in international travel, as amended by 
Council Directive 87/198/EEC of 16 March 1987) “on the grounds that imports of more than 10 liters of beer 
cannot be regarded as automatically having a commercial character”. Indeed, the beer was not included 
among the goods for which the Directive provided quantitative limits (Article 4(1), so that it could be 
imported in travel between Member States free of turnover and excise duty on condition that the import had 
not a commercial character and that the total value of the goods did not exceed ECU 390 per person (Article 
1(2), meaning that they are intended for personal or family use or as presents (Article 3(2)(b)). The Danish 
government justified the introduction of the presumption in view of numerous abuses of the right to duty-free 
allowances committed by travellers (who imported a large quantity of beer free of duty for the purpose of 
subsequent retail sale) and also the difficulties to conduct case-by-case checks of the (non-)commercial 
nature. After having recalled that in the area concerned the left powers of Member States are confined to 
what is assigned to them by that Directive, the Court states that “the contested measure raises an irrebuttable 
presumption that an importation has a commercial character where it exceeds 10 liters of beer, which is 
tantamount to adding to the wording of Article 4 of the directive goods not referred to therein” (para. 9). In 
this case, the ECJ does not draw a distinction between binding and not-binding measures, while the Advocate 
General does in his opinion (Opinion of Mr Advocate General Darmon delivered on 3 July 1990, in particular 
at para. 18). By supporting the position maintained by the Commission, he observes that “As the Commission 
acknowledged at the hearing, it seems reasonable, and in conformity with the directive, for customs officers 
to be able to presume that over and above a certain quantity an importation has a commercial character, 
without barring a traveller altogether from furnishing proof to the contrary. The issue here is the difference 
which exists between laying down a mandatory rule, which precludes consideration of specific situations, 
and laying down, for instance by means of internal administrative regulations, quantitative criterion which 
permits a presumptions to be raised without, however, preventing it from being rebutted. The implementation 
of the latter procedure would not seem to be in any way incompatible with Article 7a of the directive in so far 
as the possibility for travellers ‘to confirm tacitly or by a simple oral declaration that they are complying 
with the authorized limits and conditions for the duty-free entitlements may be deemed to be set aside once 
the limit is reached which in practice raises a simple presumption that an importation has a commercial 
character. Moreover, the Commission’s Agent has informed the Court that, provided the quantitative limit 
viewed in those terms corresponds to a level that is reasonable and is not excessively low, the national 
authorities may be exacting as regards the proof they require to be adduced in order to rebut the 
presumption of a commercial character”. Cf. also ECJ 6 December 1990, case C-367/88, in particular at para 
9. 
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customs regulation those presumptions (or similar notions, like fictions or legal definitions) 
that are conclusive, meaning that they cannot be contested, while this makes safe non-
binding guidelines intended to simplify the customs procedure. 
Having said this, one could further question whether the response of the Court would be 
negative also facing a rebuttable presumptions of law. 
In this regard, precisely the interest consisting in the simplification of the customs 
procedure may justify not only practical instructions, but also rebuttable presumptions of 
law which through the escape of the counterproof would guarantee the concrete situation to 
be considered. Especially in a field where the tax obligation is owed instantly at the 
moment of the customs operation, practical instructions and all the more rebuttable 
presumptions – which, given the normative nature, would imply more certainty for the 
economic operators - would contribute to speeding up trade.  
Looking at the facts of the case in Kenny Roland Lyckeskog, the national provision was 
probably aimed at speeding up the customs procedures at the frontiers. In fact, asking the 
customs officers to ascertain the price of the goods carried by travellers in their luggage in 
order to verify if the duty-free tariff applied would have meant excessively burdening them. 
In this view, the provision of specific maximum quantities for different goods, which if 
overcome give rise to the customs debt, is able to avoid the difficulties of controls and also 
to meet the need of certainty to a certain degree. From the perspective of the traveller, 
which the Court takes into consideration while re-affirming the observations submitted by 
the parties, such a provision implies that when a quantity of products below the maximum 
is imported he is not required to provide other evidence that the importation is non-
commercial
630
. One may conjecture from this that, a contrariis, should a national 
legislation lay down a rebuttable presumption of commercial nature with regard to imports 
of a certain quantity of goods which departs from the quantitative limit fixed in the 
Community provision, it would not be in contrast with the latter insofar as the traveller had 
the possibility to prove the non-commercial nature of the import. Yet, the Court appears to 
be inclined to accept non-binding instructions only. 
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 At para. 31 of the judgment, the Court states that “the parties which have submitted observations contend 
that Community law does not preclude non-binding instructions drawn up by the customs authorities 
indicating, for a particular product, the maximum quantity below which a traveller is not required to provide 
other evidence that the importation is non-commercial” and at para. 32 “Such an analysis of Regulation No 
918/83 is in accordance with the reply given to the third person”. 
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6. Conclusion 
Before exploring the role of national legal presumptions in other areas of taxation, with 
special reference to the approach of the European Court of Justice, a few general 
considerations should be emphasized. 
As a matter of fact, though the case-law concerning presumptions (or deemed as such), 
some of which are illustrated in the previous paragraphs, might be indicative of the view 
normally taken by the Court when confronting national presumptive measures, nonetheless, 
it (the case-law) may reflect contingent circumstances, meaning that the rulings are 
inextricably linked to the facts of the main proceedings. Hence, one has to be cautious in 
elaborating general principles or schemes. 
In the light of this, the analysis of the case-law has been conducted by bearing in mind the 
relation between the European Union on the one side, and the national legal orders on the 
other side, in the context of customs law. Having recalled at the beginning of this section 
the legal basis, the main characters of customs law and the general principles of 
Community law applicable, and having reported a few significant judgments of the 
European Court, we have the necessary ‘tools’ for fixing some lines. 
Unlike other fields of indirect taxation, customs law is governed almost entirely at EU 
level, as the use of a Regulation (having a general and binding nature and directly 
applicable in each Member State) instead of a Directive renders it also formally evident. If 
this entails that the positive integration goes further than a mere harmonisation, it 
nonetheless does not embody an altogether uniformity, at least under few residual aspects. 
In fact, due to the absence of a Community (administrative) service, Member States 
continue to play a crucial role in administering customs law, both with legal provisions and 
administrative measures, as well as with their judicial systems. 
Generally speaking, Member States may govern those aspects that explicitly (one for all, 
the appeal procedure) or implicitly the Customs Code refers to their competence. In 
addition, they may regulate those areas where the rules of the Code are rudimental or not 
even existent, in order to fill in the gap. 
Among the latter, Member States are engaged with the collection of the customs duties, 
which not surprisingly represent the major sector of ‘interference’ of national measures 
with Community customs law. Given the importance of customs duties in financing the 
common expenditure of the Community and the fact that a percentage of the levies is 
retained at national level as collection costs, Member States are inclined to introduce 
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presumptive measures aiming at securing the recovery of the duty by simplifying the 
procedure of control, assessment and collection. Looking at the observations submitted by 
the governments in these types of cases, they contend that the Community Customs 
legislation lays down a minimum harmonisation in the field of customs collection, leaving 
them the possibility to pursue the recovery in the most effective way  possible and possibly 
to tackle abusive practices. 
The room for national provisions is not, however, unlimited, as it has to comply with the 
principle of equivalence and effectiveness. In this regard, the Court of Justice has clarified, 
with regard to national measures on the recovery of duties or in general on procedural 
aspects, that, albeit the absence of relevant provisions of Community law, it falls in the 
competence of national legal orders to set out the necessary rules, the latter cannot be less 
effective than those provided for merely internal situations and cannot render impossible or 
even excessively difficult the implementation of Community legislation or the rights which 
individuals derive from the direct effect of Community law
631
. This is all the more so 
where national presumptive provisions fashioned as recovery measures actually embody 
rules that do not leave the customs obligation unaffected. By presuming, for instance, that 
the employer is liable for the payment of the levies where his employee infringes customs 
obligations, the national provision is not a merely procedural measure on the collection of 
the duty, but it rather touches the customs debt under the subjective point of view.  
In this regard, from the case-law on national and also EU presumptive provisions in the 
field of customs law it results that irrebuttable presumptions and similar concepts, like 
fictions or legal definitions, are normally susceptible to be inconsistent with the relevant 
Community law applicable, as they may threaten the effective and uniform application of 
the latter. Nonetheless, the Court does not disregard the interest grounding such provisions, 
namely the guarantee of the customs recovery and in general the simplification of the 
procedures. The latter, together with the legal certainty, is considered by the Court as being 
in the interest both of the customs authorities entitled to conduct controls and to assess the 
additional duties owed, and the economic operators themselves. It follows that rebuttable 
presumptions of law may not be per se in contrast with the Community law in the extent to 
which they embody a balance between the different values in play. Indeed, always 
generally speaking, they are capable of securing the legal certainty which is fundamental 
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 See T. Lyons, EC customs law, 2 ed., Oxford, Oxford University press, 2008, and in particular at p. 120 et 
seq. 
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for traders operating in an international market and for customs authorities entitled to 
ascertain the facts. At the same time, the possibility to give proof to the contrary may entail 
the verification of the concrete circumstances and the effective application of the relevant 
Community law. 
However, precisely on this issue the Court, and the same holds true for the European 
Commission and the Advocate General, seems to overlap the question of the effects 
assigned to different measures with the question of the contrary proof. When stating that 
non-binding instructions issued by the customs authorities are consistent with the 
Community law, as long as they are not an indirect way to introduce an irrebuttable 
presumption, it mixes up merely administrative practices (or acts) with normative sources 
(the law). 
Though the lack of accuracy in the order of reference may not help, such (at times) non-
technical recourse to national categories should be read in the light of the spasmodic 
statement by the Court of the need to guarantee the primacy and uniformity of Community 
customs law. 
 
 
Chapter III - Section I - Part II 
VAT 
 
1. VAT and national tax law presumptions 
Valued added tax is commonly deemed as representing a Community tax, meaning that it 
finds its root in the Community legal order. Indeed, it was introduced  from 1967 in order 
to replace all other national turnover taxes, in view of the realization of the single market. 
In addition, a quota of the tax collected by Member States falls within the own resources of 
the European Union. 
Similarly to excise duties, VAT is harmonised by means of a directive, which is to be 
transposed by Member States in their own legal orders. Yet, many of the provisions 
included in the Directive 2006/112/EC, which is a recast of the Sixth Directive 
77/388/EEC and is currently the essential piece of VAT legislation, are directly applicable 
within the national tax systems, insofar as they clearly recognise rights to taxpayers. 
As a matter of fact, more than in the area of excise duties, in the field of VAT there is an 
extensive and quite detailed legislative body. From this, two main corollaries follow. 
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Firstly, Member States are requested to faithfully transpose the text of the directive in their 
own legal order. In the event that Member States are permitted to derogate from a certain 
provision, they must comply with the procedure envisaged and strictly interpret the 
exception. Secondly, whereas in the area of direct taxation the shortcoming of 
harmonisation has contributed to a massive interference of the EUCJ case-law on national 
legislation through the application of general EU law law principles, when it comes to 
VAT the Court rules based on the set of provisions included in the directive, in addition to 
geral principles. 
In this context, the recourse to tax law presumptions by the national legislator is in 
principle limited by the existence of a detailed set of rules. This statement has, however, to 
be clarified. Indeed, the extent to which the national presumptive measures are permitted 
or not varies in relation to the kind of presumption, in particular if rebuttable or irrebuttable. 
The reason is that while the former mostly impact on the distribution of the burden of proof, 
the latter irretrievably affect the definition of the situation envisaged in the norm. Besides 
that, national presumptive measures embody mechanisms which are susceptible to fall 
either in the derogations from single provisions of the VAT Directive or within the 
procedural law rules left to the competence of Member States. 
As to the first aspect, we will see how a number of national tax law presumptions which 
the Court has ruled on have been laid down in accordance with a decision of the Council 
authorising an exception. In fact, the Directive 112/2006/EC contains – and so did the 
Sixth Directive – several provisions which permit Member States to introduce measures 
derogating from a certain provision of the Directive for the purpose of simplifying the 
assessment, securing the payment or combat tax avoidance or evasion, normally on 
condition that a certain procedure implying a decision of the Council or a proper 
Committee is followed. Tax law presumptions are precisely the main instruments 
employed by national legislators to attain such objectives. Once they are introduced into a 
national legal order, even though fully in accordance with the procedure to be followed, 
they may nonetheless be found inconsistent with one of the principles inspiring the VAT 
Community legal system and the decision authorising them to be invalid.  
As to the second aspect, the regulation of the exercise of rights set forth in the Directive 
(e.g. forms, time-limits, procedures) is mainly left in the hand of Member States and their 
implementing measures. This room may be covered with legal presumptions or similar 
measures. Nonetheless, in the extent to which such measures restrict the content of rights 
National Tax Law Presumptions and EU Law 
 
 
329 
that the taxpayer derives from the Directive, then the Court may be called upon to verify 
their correspondence to the principles governing the system of VAT. In this event, the 
provision of juridical instruments aimed at securing the effectiveness of EU rights, such as 
a reasonable division of the burden of proof, the possibility to give proof to the contrary 
and in general the defence rights, may compensate for the limitation to the substantive 
content of the right and lead to a positive ruling. 
In the light of the foregoing, after having briefly recalled the fundamental principles 
peculiar to the VAT system, the more significant EUCJ decisions on tax law presumptions 
(or deemed as such) are examined, in order to infer the interpretative trends regarding the 
Court’s case-law on the matter and to draw some general conclusions. 
 
2. EU VAT principles: fiscal neutrality and right of deduction 
In the field of VAT, the general principles of Community law apply, such as the principle 
of non-discrimination, proportionality, legal certainty and legitimate expectations, and 
recently the (prohibition of) abuse of law. In addition, there is a number of principles 
peculiar to the system of VAT, which are constantly referred to in the EUCJ case-law, as 
they embody the reasons for the introduction of such tax and the aim pursued at the same 
time.  
Among these, the principle of fiscal neutrality and the right to deduct the input VAT 
represent the pillars on which the entire structure of  VAT rests.  
On several occasions (for example, with regard to reduced rates, exemptions or illegal 
activities) the EUCJ has reiterated that “the principle of fiscal neutrality [is] inherent in the 
common system of VAT”632 and Member States are required to transpose the Directive 
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 ECJ 3 May 2001, C-481/98, Commission v. France, at par. 21. In the subsequent paragraph, the Court 
clarified the content of the principle and agreed with the Commission as to the inclusion of certain sub-
principles: “That principle in particular precludes treating similar goods, which are thus in competition with 
each other, differently for VAT purposes (see, to this effect, the eighth recital in the preamble to the First 
Directive and paragraphs 21 and 27 of the judgment in Case C-283/95 Fischer [1998] ECR I-3369). (...)The 
principle of fiscal neutrality for that reason also includes the other two principles invoked by the Commission, 
namely the principles of VAT uniformity and of elimination of distortion in competition. Cf. ECJ 29 June 
1999, case C-158/98, Coffeeshop Siberië, at para 21, where the Court held that “the principle of fiscal 
neutrality prevents any general distinction in the levying of VAT as between lawful and unlawful transactions. 
Consequently, the mere fact that conduct amounts to an offence is not sufficient to justify exemption from 
VAT. The exception applies only in specific situations where, owing to the special characteristics of certain 
products or certain services, any competition between a lawful economic sector and an unlawful sector is 
precluded”. Given the fact that the activity to be taxed was the supply of services consisting of making a 
place available for the sale of narcotic drugs, rather than the sale of those products per se, the Court 
concluded (para 22) that the former fell in the scope of VAT in accordance with the neutrality criterion: “In 
this case, however, there is no such special situation. Renting out a place intended for commercial activities 
is, in principle, an economic activity and therefore falls within the scope of the Sixth Directive. The fact that 
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concerned in compliance with it. Basically, it refers to the conditions of competition for 
economic operators, which are equal by virtue of the fact that in each Member State similar 
goods and services bear the same tax burden, irrespective of the length of the production 
and distribution chain
633
.  
The neutrality of VAT upon economic operators is guaranteed through the mechanism of 
the taxation on consumption on the one side, and the deductibility of the input VAT on the 
other side. This manifestly results by Article 1, para 2 of the Directive 112/2006/EC, 
pursuant to which “The principle of the common system of VAT entails the application to 
goods and services of a general tax on consumption exactly proportional to the price of the 
goods and services, however many transactions take place in the production and 
distribution process before the stage at which the tax is charged. On each transaction, VAT, 
calculated on the price of the goods or services at the rate applicable to such goods or 
services, shall be chargeable after deduction of the amount of VAT borne directly by the 
various cost components”. 
In fact, VAT is a tax which ends up  being borne by the consumers, who are charged with 
it on occasion of receiving the supply of goods and services falling into the scope of the 
Directive and are not allowed  any deduction. Instead, the tax does not in principle weigh 
on economic operators, though they bear several administrative and accounting 
requirements and are formally the persons liable to pay VAT to the State when they carry 
on taxable operations. From this perspective, they are a sort of VAT collector in place of 
the State, thereby playing a pivotal role in view of the VAT recovery.  
On the other hand, from the tax for which the economic operators are liable in respect of 
their taxable operations, they are entitled to deduct the amount of tax invoiced to them in 
relation to goods or services supplied to them or (intra-Community) acquired or imported 
by them in the exercise of their economic activity. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
the activities pursued there constitute a criminal offence, which may make the renting unlawful, does not 
alter the economic character of the renting and does not prevent competition in the sector, including that 
between lawful and unlawful activities. Not to charge VAT thereon would undermine the principle of fiscal 
neutrality of the VAT scheme”. 
633
 See No (7), Preamble to the Directive 112/2006/EC: “The common system of VAT should, even if rates 
and exemptions are not fully harmonised, result in neutrality in competition, such that within the territory of 
each Member State similar goods and services bear the same tax burden, whatever the length of the 
production and distribution chain”. That neutrality is interrelated with the right of deduction results 
immediately from the Preamble, which at No (30) provides that “In order to preserve neutrality of VAT, the 
rates applied by Member States should be such as to enable, as a general rule, deduction of the VAT applied 
at the preceding stage”. Thus, the principle of fiscal neutrality requires economic decisions to not  be 
influenced by tax factors. 
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The right to deduct given to taxable persons embodies in this way a fundamental principle 
of the EU VAT system. As said, it is interlinked with the principle of fiscal neutrality and 
actually it is a corollary of the latter. Since its earlier decisions, the EUCJ has underlined 
that the deduction system “is meant to relieve the trader entirely of the burden of the VAT 
payable or paid in the course of all his economic activities”634 and that limitations and 
derogations to such right are consented to only if explicitly envisaged in the Directive and 
in any case are to be interpreted strictly
635
. 
                                                          
634
 ECJ 14 February 1985, C-268/83, Rompelman, at para 19, which continued as follows: “The common 
system of value-added tax therefore ensures that all economic activities, whatever their purpose or results, 
provided that they are themselves subject to VAT, are taxed in a wholly neutral way”. In the same decision, 
the Court stated at the outset (para 16) that “a basic element of the VAT system is that VAT is chargeable on 
each transaction only after deduction of the amount of the VAT borne directly by the cost of the various 
components of the price of the goods and services and that the deduction procedure is so designed that only 
taxable persons may deduct the VAT already charged on the goods and services from the VAT for which they 
are liable”. 
635
 The right to deduct arises at the moment when the deductible tax becomes chargeable, it must be exercised 
immediately and it is confined to goods and services that are used for the purpose of taxable transactions 
(direct link between a particular input and a particular output transaction). See Articles 167 et seq. Directive 
112/2996/EC. Ex multis, ECJ 11 July 1991, C-97/90, Lennartz. At para 27, in particolar, the Court held that 
“As the Court observed in its judgment in Case 50/87 Commission v France [1988] ECR 4797, paragraphs 
16 and 17, it is apparent from the scheme of the Sixth Directive, and in particular from Articles 4 and 17, 
that in the absence of any provision empowering the Member States to limit the right of deduction granted to 
taxable persons, that right must be exercised immediately in respect of all the taxes charged on transactions 
relating to inputs. Such limitations on the right of deduction must be applied in a similar manner in all the 
Member States and therefore derogations are permitted only in the cases expressly provided for in the 
directive”. Cf. ECJ 8 June 2000, C-98/98, Mindland Bank. See also ECJ 21 March 2000, Joined cases C-
110/98 to C-147/98, Gabalfrisa. At issue was a national legislation that, in the event of an economic activity’s 
start-up, conditioned the exercise of the right of deduction to heavy administrative burdens (in terms of 
request and time-limits), and envisaged the deferment of the deduction or even the disregarding of the right 
amongst the possible consequences of the infringement of such fulfilments. As such, it was found in contrast 
with the principle of proportionality, as embodied an excessive restriction to the right of deduction. The 
decision gives to the Court the occasion for reiterating statements of previous judgments on the matter as 
follows (paras 43-47): “It should be noted, first, that the Court has consistently held that the right to deduct 
provided for in Article 17 et seq. of the Sixth Directive is an integral part of the VAT scheme and in principle 
may not be limited. The right to deduct must be exercised immediately in respect of all the taxes charged on 
transactions relating to inputs (see, in particular, Case C-62/93 BP Supergas v Greek State [1995] ECR I-
1883, paragraph 18). Next, it must be recalled that the deduction system is meant to relieve the trader 
entirely of the burden of the VAT payable or paid in the course of all his economic activities. The common 
system of VAT consequently ensures that all economic activities, whatever their purpose or results, provided 
that they are themselves subject to VAT, are taxed in a wholly neutral way (see, in particular, Case 268/83 
Rompelman v Minister van Financien [1985] ECR 655, paragraph 19, and Case C-37/95 Ghent Coal 
Terminal [1998] ECR I-1, paragraph 15). As the Court held in Rompelman, paragraph 23, and in Case C-
110/94 INZO v Belgian State [1996] ECR 1-857, paragraph 16, the principle that VAT should be neutral as 
regards the tax burden on a business requires that the first investment expenditure incurred for the purposes 
of and with the view to commencing a business must be regarded as an economic activity and it would be 
contrary to that principle if such an activity did not commence until the business was actually exploited, that 
is to say until it began to yield taxable income. Any other interpretation of Article 4 of the directive would 
burden the trader with the cost of VAT in the course of his economic activity without allowing him to deduct 
it in accordance with Article 17, and would create an arbitrary distinction between investment expenditure 
incurred before actual exploitation of a business and expenditure incurred during exploitation. Article 4 of 
the Sixth Directive does not, however, preclude the tax authority from requiring objective evidence in support 
of the declared intention to commence economic activities which will give rise to taxable transactions. In that 
context, it is important to state that a taxable person acquires that status definitively only if he made the 
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3. EU law principles in the field of VAT: the principles of proportionality and the 
principle of effectiveness 
Although in interpreting the VAT system the EUCJ may count on a detailed legislative 
body, it is not rare the recourse to general principles of EU law in order to solve questions 
which do not find an immediate answer in a provision of law and imply a balance between 
different interests in play. 
An instructive example of this is represented by the event that a Member State avails itself 
of a derogation from the Directive in order to simplify the recovery of the tax or to prevent  
fraud or avoidance. In cases like that the Court bases its decisions on general principles 
peculiar to VAT (for instance, when the national measure restricts the right of deduction) 
and also on general EU law principles, some of which have been mentioned at the 
beginning of the previous paragraph. 
Amongst such principles, for our purpose a pivotal role is played by the principle of 
proportionality and the principle of effectiveness, as they are relevant in one way or  
another for the evaluation of tax law presumptions. 
The essence of the proportionality principle has been illustrated at the beginning of this 
third chapter, with particular regard to the rule of reason applied in direct tax cases, of 
which it constitutes the last step. Nonetheless, the general character of such principle 
implies that it is increasingly invoked by the Court in its judgments even in the area of 
VAT. This is especially in relation to national measures limiting the rights conferred by the 
VAT system to the taxable persons or governing the forms of exercise of such rights. The 
consistency of measures of this kind with the VAT legislation very much depends on their 
capacity of balancing the attainment of fiscal interests (to the recovery, to combat tax 
                                                                                                                                                                                
declaration of intention to begin the envisaged economic activities in good faith. In cases of fraud or abuse, 
in which, for example, the person concerned, on the pretext of intending to pursue a particular economic 
activity, in fact sought to acquire as his private assets goods in respect of which a deduction could be made, 
the tax authority may claim repayment of the sums retroactively on the ground that those deductions were 
made on the basis of false declarations (Rompelman, paragraph 24, and INZO, paragraphs 23 and 24). It 
follows that a person who has the intention, confirmed by objective evidence, to commence independently an 
economic activity within the meaning of Article 4 of the Sixth Directive and who incurs the first investment 
expenditure for those purposes must be regarded as a taxable person. Acting in that capacity, he has 
therefore, in accordance with Article 17 et seq. of the Sixth Directive, the right immediately to deduct the 
VAT payable or paid on the investment expenditure incurred for the purposes of the transactions which he 
intends to carry out and which give rise to the right to deduct, without having to wait for the actual 
exploitation of his business to begin”. The Court then recognised that Member States are permitted, pursuant 
to Article 22, para 8 Sixth Directive, to introduce measures aimed at ensuring the correct levying and 
collection of VAT and at preventing fraud, but they must not go beyond what is necessary to attain such 
objectives. In other words, “They may not therefore be used in such a way that they would have the effect of 
systematically undermining the right to deduct VAT, which is a fundamental principle of the common system 
of VAT established by the relevant Community legislation”. 
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avoidance or evasion etc.) with the most reduced sacrifice of the EU right concerned. Put 
otherwise, national measures affecting principles or rights that the single taxable persons 
derive from the VAT Directive may be deemed as consistent with the latter insofar as they 
are appropriate to pursue the objective for which the derogation is permitted, necessary to 
pursue it and no alternative measures that are less restrictive may be envisaged
636
.  
Therefore, the content of the principle does not vary in relation to the area in which it is 
applied. There are slight differences, though. For instance, whereas in direct taxation the 
proportionality of the national measure is normally confronted with respect to Treaty 
freedoms, in the field of VAT the effects of such measure are confronted with a right 
whose content is often regulated in detail at EU level. 
Notwithstanding this, the outcomes of the EUCJ’s reasoning based on the proportionality 
principle are not easily predictable. On the other hand, when the Court has the occasion to 
depart from the strict wording of the VAT legislation, it has at its disposal a wider 
manoeuvre for a teleological interpretation
637
. 
Looking at tax law presumptions, the evaluation of proportionality entails a severe 
examination of the national measure, which indeed is at times left to the judge of the main 
case. In fact, an overall reading of such measure may reveal that a limitation to the content 
of a certain right is not systematic but founded on specific circumstances (e.g. certain 
indices of fraud), or that it constitutes a good compromise between the need for 
simplification and the recognition of the right, or that it is accompanied by procedural 
instruments (e.g. the hearing of the taxpayer during the administrative proceedings, the 
proof to the contrary) in order to safeguard the effectiveness of the right concerned.  
Precisely the principle of effectiveness represents the other general principle relevant in 
order to gain the EUCJ’s interpretative trends in relation to tax law presumptions. 
Although it is not often invoked in VAT case-law, it appears to permeate especially those 
decision where at issue are procedural rules that create obstacles to the exercise of a right 
conferred to taxable persons by the VAT directive. 
                                                          
636
 For an in-depth examination of the principle of proportionality in the field of VAT, see A. MONDINI, 
Contributo allo studio del principio di proporzionalità nel sistema dell’IVA europea, Pisa, Pacini editore, 
2012. 
637
 Meaning a method “that entails an interpretation in light of the objectives, purposes and aims of the 
provisions of Community law”. R. de la Feira, The EU VAT System and the Internal Market, Amsterdam, 
IBFD Doctoral Series, No 16, 2009, 261. The Author identified three kinds of interpretative methods adopted 
by the ECJ in reaching its decisions on VAT cases: the strict interpretation, the historical interpretation, and 
the teleological interpretation. The decisions handed down employing the last method have caused the most 
significant impact on the VAT system. They are based on the purpose of the provision concerned, the 
objective of the Directive, and above all on the principles of the EU VAT system and the general principles 
of EU law. 
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4. Scope of derogations from the VAT Directive and room for tax law presumptions 
In the Preamble to the VAT Directive, at the recital No (59), it is stated that “Member 
States should be able, within certain limits and subject to certain conditions, to introduce, 
or to continue to apply, special measures derogating from this Directive in order to 
simplify the levying of tax or prevent certain forms of tax evasion or avoidance”. 
Thus, holding the obligation of Member States to transpose the provisions of the Directive 
in their own legal systems, they are nonetheless permitted to derogate from one or more of 
such provisions, provided that the conditions laid down at EU level are observed. The 
limits which No (59) refers to are presumably the principles proper to the VAT system as 
well as the general EU law principles. The conditions may diverge depending on the type 
of derogation, and, if provided, they may consist of a supervision by a special committee or 
a decision of the Council. Even the general interests which solely can justify any 
derogations from the Directive are established, so that national measures may depart from 
the wording of the VAT legislation insofar as they are intended either to simplify the 
procedures or to combat frauds. 
Accordingly, the Directive 2006/112/EC includes a number of articles dealing with 
specific aspects of the tax and governing the possible derogations. Some of these articles 
replace provisions included in the Sixth Directive (e.g. for deductions, persons liable to tax 
etc.), whereas some others have been amended or introduced ex novo (e.g. the transfer 
pricing for VAT taxable amount). 
The most general provisions in this regard are Articles 394 and 395, Directive 
2006/112/EC. Article 394 authorizes Member States to retain the special measures aimed 
at simplifying the procedure for recovering VAT or preventing tax evasion or avoidance 
schemes which were in force at 1 January 1977. However, it makes this conditional to the 
double circumstances that they have been notified by the Commission prior to 1 January 
1978 and that they do not considerably affect the amount of the tax revenue collected by 
the single Member State on consumers. Besides the already (i.e. before the Sixth Directive) 
existing measures, Member States are permitted to introduce ex novo measures derogating 
from the Directive with the same aim (simplification of tax collection, prevention of 
certain forms of tax evasion or avoidance), provided that they obtain the authorization by 
the Council on a proposal from the Commission and that, with particular regard to the 
provisions for the simplification of tax recovery, they do not impact, except to a slight 
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extent, on the overall amount of the tax revenue collected at the stage of final 
consumption
638
. 
The above articles apply in the matter of derogations insofar as other specific provisions 
are not provided. In fact, the Directive includes further rules governing derogations from 
specific aspects of taxation. 
Among these, Article 273, Directive 2006/112/EC, placed under the Title XI dedicated to 
the obligation of taxable persons and certain non-taxable persons
639
, stipulates that 
Member States are permitted to impose further obligations, in respect to those established 
by the Directive, which are necessary to secure the correct collection of the tax and to 
prevent evasion. This is on the condition that such obligations do not discriminate 
transactions between Member States with respect to domestic transactions, or do not create 
formalities connected with the crossing of frontiers with regard to intra-EU trades,  save 
for the prohibition to enact additional invoicing obligations
640
. We will see how this 
provision represents – and has already, in the previous format included in the Sixth 
Directive – the legal basis for extending the obligation to pay VAT on a person other than 
                                                          
638
 See Article 395, para 1. The provision requests a unanimous decision of the Council. In the subsequent 
paragraphs of the same article, the fulfilments to be complied with by a Member State willing to introduce a 
special measure and the procedure to be followed are regulated in detail. They read as follows: “2. A Member 
State wishing to introduce the measure referred to in paragraph 1 shall send an application to the 
Commission and provide it with all the necessary information. If the Commission considers that it does not 
have all the necessary information, it shall contact the Member State concerned within two months of receipt 
of the application and specify what additional information is required. [2
nd
 ind.] Once the Commission has 
all the information it considers necessary for appraisal of the request it shall within one month notify the 
requesting Member State accordingly and it shall transmit the request, in its original language, to the other 
Member States. 3. Within three months of giving the notification referred to in the second subparagraph of 
paragraph 2, the Commission shall present to the Council either an appropriate proposal or, should it object 
to the derogation requested, a communication setting out its objections. 4. The procedure laid down in 
paragraphs 2 and 3 shall, in any event, be completed within eight months of receipt of the application by the 
Commission”. Clear time-limits by which the EU institutions must act are laid down in order to secure in 
view of the Member State’s interest to legal certainty, as affirmed in No (60) of the Preamble to the VAT 
Directive. It reads as follows: “In order to ensure that a Member State which has submitted a request for 
derogation is not left in doubt as to what action the Commission plans to take in response, time-limits should 
be laid down within which the Commission must present to the Council either a proposal for authorisation or 
a communication setting out its objections”. It has to be recalled that Article 395 corresponds, albeit with 
some amendments, to Article 27 of the Sixth Directive, which is relied on in many of the decisions analysed 
in the following. Cf. Also Article 199 VAT Directive. 
639
 This Title of the Directive includes numerous provisions dealing with the obligation to pay VAT to tax 
authorities and accounting fulfilments, with particular regard to the issuing of the invoice.  
640
 As this matter is fully harmonized in the Directive. The limitations are intended to balance the flexibility 
in allowing Member States to introduce special measures with the need to safeguard the uniform application 
of the VAT system. Cf. No (45) of the Preamble to the Directive 112/2006/EC, pursuant to which “The 
obligations of taxable persons should be harmonised as far as possible so as to ensure the necessary 
safeguards for the collection of VAT in a uniform manner in all the Member States.” 
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the one liable to tax, which as a general rule coincides with any taxable person carrying out 
a taxable operation
641
.  
Turning to the taxable base, the VAT Directive dedicates several provision to the 
determination of the taxable amount for supply of goods and services, intra-Community 
acquisitions of goods and importation of goods. As a rule, a subjective value applies, 
which refers to the consideration agreed upon by the parties. This results from Article 73, 
Directive 112/2006/EC, pursuant to which “In respect of the supply of goods or services, 
other than as referred to in Articles 74 to 77, the taxable amount shall include everything 
which constitutes consideration obtained or to be obtained by the supplier, in return for 
the supply, from the customer or a third party, including subsidies directly linked to the 
price of the supply”. In further articles, particular situations are envisaged and regulated, 
such as self-supplies or private use etc., to which an objective value applies, like the 
purchase price, the cost price, or the market value. 
Besides those provisions, where the EU legislator instructs Member States as regards the 
taxable amount to be considered, Article 80 of the VAT Directive is particularly interesting. 
It has to be noted that the taxable amount may be altered by the parties of a certain 
transaction in view of different factors, such as the alteration of the pro-rata fraction. For 
this reason, it is not rare that the national legislator has recourse to a minimum taxable base 
or a certain forfait as criteria for the determination of the taxable amount. Indeed, it goes 
without saying that abusive practices may be avoided by establishing an objective value to 
be adopted by the parties. In the light of the foregoing, Article 80 has been inserted into the 
Directive 2006/112/EC, by crystallizing certain anti-avoidance rules that Member States 
have over the last years introduced as derogation from the Sixth Directive pursuant to 
Article 27. Article 80 seems to introduce, albeit as an option for Member States, a sort of 
transfer pricing for VAT purposes, thereby implicitly suggesting that such instrument is 
suitable to combat tax fraud. It entitles Member States to (re)determine the taxable amount 
at the open market value
642
 when a certain transaction takes place among connected parties 
                                                          
641
 See, No (44) of the Preamble to the VAT Directive, which provides that: “Member States should be able 
to provide that someone other than the person liable for payment of VAT is to be held jointly and severally 
liable for its payment”, and Article 205 VAT Directive, pursuant to which “In the situations referred to in 
Articles 193 to 200 and Articles 202, 203 and 204, Member States may provide that a person other than the 
person liable for payment of VAT is to be held jointly and severally liable for payment of VAT”. Cf. Article 
21, para 3, of the Sixth Directive. 
642
 Which in Article 72 is defined as follows:“For the purposes of this Directive, ‘open market value’ shall 
mean the full amount that, in order to obtain the goods or services in question at that time, a customer at the 
same marketing stage at which the supply of goods or services takes place, would have to pay, under 
conditions of fair competition, to a supplier at arm's length within the territory of the Member State in which 
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and one of the following conditions alternatively applies: a) the consideration is lower than 
the open market value, VAT has been charged and the recipient of the supply does not 
have a full right of deduction; b) the consideration is lower than the open market value, the 
supply is exempt from VAT and has not been charged, and the supplier has not a full right 
to deduct; c) the consideration is higher than the open market value, VAT has been charged 
and the supplier has not a full right to deduct
643
.  
Ultimately, with regard to the right of deduction, any limitation or derogation from the 
provisions of the Directive may be introduced only insofar as they are envisaged in the 
Directive and in accordance with the necessary requirements in terms of procedure therein. 
Given the pivotal role recognised to such right in the VAT system and within the EUCJ’s 
case-law, Article 176 of the Directive 112/2006/EC, is quite strict in providing that “The 
Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, shall determine the 
expenditure in respect of which VAT shall not be deductible.”644 
As we will see later on, various national presumptive measures aimed at simplifying the 
determination of the tax, reducing the administrative or probative burden and tackling 
abusive schemes, are precisely targeted at the right to deduct. In particular, the national 
interests to simplification and prevention of abuse emerge facing mixed-use goods or 
services (i.e. used for both business and private purposes) or situations where the taxable 
person carries on both transactions in respect of which VAT is deductible and transactions 
in respect of which VAT is not deductible. This being the case, the ascertainment of the 
correct amount of VAT that is to be deducted according to the rules of the Directive may 
                                                                                                                                                                                
the supply is subject to tax. Where no comparable supply of goods or services can be ascertained, ‘open 
market value’ shall mean the following: (1) in respect of goods, an amount that is not less than the purchase 
price of the goods or of similar goods or, in the absence of a purchase price, the cost price, determined at the 
time of supply; (2) in respect of services, an amount that is not less than the full cost to the taxable person of 
providing the service.” 
643
 According to A. Mondini, Contributo allo studio del principio di proporzionalità nel sistema dell’IVA 
europea, cited above, 375, the provision uses the technique of the pure typification or of the irrebuttable 
presumption (of the existence of a risk of fraud or tax avoidance), according to the method of the 
generalization. Under this format, the provision does not deem as necessary permitting the taxpayer to escape 
the application of the revaluation by demonstrating the divergence between the concrete/personal situation 
and the situation envisaged in the norm (i.e. there is not any risk of fraud). In this regard, the provision leaves 
the question open as to whether national measures fixing the minimum taxable amount at the market value 
are requested or not to allow the proof to the contrary. The question arises in particular as the provision does 
not fix a presumption of sham (of the consideration), but it rather presumes that the effective consideration 
has been manipulated in view of the sole aim of obtaining tax advantages. 
644
 It continues by stating that “VAT shall in no circumstances be deductible in respect of expenditure which 
is not strictly business expenditure, such as that on luxuries, amusements or entertainment. Pending the entry 
into force of the provisions referred to in the first paragraph, Member States may retain all the exclusions 
provided for under their national laws at 1 January 1979 or, in the case of the Member States which acceded 
to the Community after that date, on the date of their accession”. This article replaces para 6 of Article 17, 
Sixth Directive. 
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be hard on the side of the tax administration, and the taxpayer may on the other side be 
tempted to carry on abusive practices. For these reasons, when the above situations occur 
Member States tend to limit in various forms the right of deduction, by excluding it or 
more often by establishing the percentage of deduction, a forfait, or other simplified 
methods of determination.  
Having illustrated to what extent Member States are allowed to depart from the provision 
of the Directive, it must be observed that, generally speaking, the normative techniques 
which the legislator has recourse to the most are legal presumptions, both irrebuttable and 
rebuttable, and similar categories as defined in the previous chapter, like typifications or 
legal definitions or predeterminations. 
Below, three main groups of possible derogations from the Directive, which may  be 
construed by national legislators as presumptive measures, are examined through the 
reference to the EUCJ case law and with a view to infer the interpretative trends. They are 
the provisions concerning the obligations for the payment of VAT, the taxable amount and 
the right of deduction. Especially with regard to the last issue, there is a wide case law on 
national presumptive measures limiting such right, not only by means of substantive rules 
(affecting directly the position of the taxpayer) but also through rules falling into the 
‘formal’ tax law, i.e. governing the procedures (assessment, recovery) but equally 
susceptible to impact on the content of the right. 
 
5. Possible legal presumptions as to the joint and several tax liability. The FTI case 
Among the measures aimed at securing the tax recovery and above all preventing tax 
avoidance or evasion, there are those extending the liability to pay VAT to a person other 
than the taxable person, for instance a party of the transaction or even a third party. A 
measure of this kind may be construed under the form of a typification or a legal definition, 
an assimilation, or a presumption of joint and several liability to pay of a certain person 
based on objective indices of abusive conduct. Always generally speaking, the 
presumption may be irrebuttable, thereby presuming in an irrefutable way that the non-
liable person for that particular operation shared the avoidance aim. In this case, however, 
the fact-base should be drawn as  specifically as possible, so as to render the presumption 
proportionate and in line with the purpose of combating tax avoidance. A provision 
systematically extending the obligation to pay to a person other than the one liable to pay 
would hardly be deemed proportionate. Yet, the absence of the possibility for the taxpayer 
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concerned to give proof to the contrary might be deemed as infringing the principle of 
proportionality. By contrast, a rebuttable presumption, which entails the possibility to 
contest the result of the inference, may overcome the proportionality test, at least insofar as 
the contrary proof may be effectively given.  
At the beginning of this third chapter, some judgments concerning the distribution of the 
probative burden facing VAT abusive schemes, wherein one the party who was denied tax 
benefits was in good faith, have been recalled.  Those cases put the focus on the possibility 
to disregard a certain right when a party – in casu, claiming the right of deduction - 
involved in a VAT abusive scheme did not know or could not reasonably know that the 
transaction was part of a tax evasion.  
Now, the question is more precisely whether and above all to what extent national 
legislative measures that presume the joint and several liability to pay of a person other 
than the person liable to VAT, based on certain circumstances, are in line with the EU law. 
To answer this question, some indications may be inferred from the Federation 
Technological Industries case
645
, where at issue was a national legislation including 
various provisions combating the missing-trader intra-Community fraud. Among these, it 
established the joint and several liability of traders in the supply chain of certain goods 
where the tax went unpaid and the recipient of the supply at the time of the supply “knew 
or had reasonable grounds to suspect that some or all of the VAT payable in respect of that 
supply, or on any previous or subsequent supply of those goods, would go unpaid”. To this 
purpose, it added that “a person shall be presumed to have reasonable grounds for 
suspecting matters to be as mentioned in paragraph (b) of that subsection if the price 
payable by him for the goods in question (a) was less than the lowest price that might 
reasonably be expected to be payable for them on the open market, or (b) was less than the 
price payable on any previous supply of those goods”. 
The Court recognized that Member States are permitted, under the conditions that at the 
time of the proceedings were laid down in Article 21, para 3, Sixth Directive, to make a 
person, other than the one actually liable, jointly and severally liable to pay VAT. 
Nonetheless, the exercise of such option envisaged in the Directive must comply with the 
general principles of Community law, among which are the principles of proportionality 
and legal certainty. The former is particularly relevant in resolving the question of the 
above national measure’s compatibility with EU law. The Court held that (paras 30-31-32): 
                                                          
645
 ECJ 11 May 2006, case C-384/04, Federation Technological Industries.  
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“With more particular regard to the principle of proportionality, it must be pointed out 
that, whilst it is legitimate for the measures adopted by the Member State, on the basis of 
Article 21(3) of the Sixth Directive, to seek to preserve the rights of the public exchequer 
as effectively as possible, such measures must not go further than is necessary for that 
purpose (see, to that effect, Molenheide and Others, paragraph 47). 
While Article 21(3) of the Sixth Directive allows a Member State to make a person jointly 
and severally liable for the payment of VAT if, at the time of the supply, that person knew 
or had reasonable grounds to suspect that the VAT payable in respect of that supply, or of 
any previous or subsequent supply, would go unpaid, and to rely on presumptions in that 
regard, it is none the less true that such presumptions may not be formulated in such a way 
as to make it practically impossible or excessively difficult for the taxable person to rebut 
them with evidence to the contrary. As the Advocate General observed in point 27 of his 
Opinion, those presumptions would, de facto, bring about a system of strict liability, going 
beyond what is necessary to preserve the public exchequer's rights. 
Traders who take every precaution which could reasonably be required of them to ensure 
that their transactions do not form part of a chain which includes a transaction vitiated by 
VAT fraud must be able to rely on the legality of those transactions without the risk of 
being made jointly and severally liable to pay the VAT due from another taxable person 
(see, to that effect, Joined Cases C-354/03, C-355/03 and C-484/03 Optigen and Others 
[2006] ECR I-483, paragraph 52).” 
Having ruled this, the Court concluded by referring to the judge of the main proceedings 
the ascertainment of the compatibility of the national measure with the principles of EU 
law indicated. At any rate, it appears to suggest that even a rebuttable presumption is not 
per se compatible with the principle of proportionality. To this end, the taxpayer must have 
the concrete possibility to exercise his defence rights. The proportionality, in other words, 
is ascertained also as regards the means (are all the means of proof available?) and object 
(is it a positive or a negative fact to be proved?) of the contrary proof
646
. 
 
                                                          
646
 As observed by A. Mondini, Contributo allo studio del principio di proporzionalità nel sistema dell’IVA 
europea, cited above, 404, the EUCJ’s jurisprudence rejects a system of strict liability, as it is not 
proportionate in respect of the aim of combating tax evasion. But at the same time, it requests the means and 
content of the contrary proof (or more in general the evidence for avoiding the tax liability) to be construed 
as objective and ‘positive’, so as to allow the taxpayer the proof that he took all the precautions that could be 
reasonably asked of him to ensure that the operation(s) is not part of a tax evasion. This format paradoxically 
is a reminder of the proof normally required to rebut the presumption of liability peculiar to the hypotheses of 
strict liability.  
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5.1  The Vlaamse Oliemaatschappij NV case 
As said, in principle, the joint and several liability may be established even upon a third 
party that  was in contact with a certain transaction. In this event, the liability of that party 
should nonetheless ground all the more on objective circumstances indicating the 
awareness of involvement in an abusive scheme, which was conceived by one or more 
parties carrying on the transaction concerned. Moreover, the third party bearing the joint 
and several liability should be allowed to demonstrate his non-involvement in the tax 
evasion.  
In this regard, it is worth mentioning the decision handed down by the EUCJ in the 
Vlaamse Oliemaatschappij NV case
647
. At issue was Article 51-bis, para 3, of the Belgian 
VAT Code, which provided that, in case of warehousing arrangements other than customs 
warehousing, the warehouse keeper, the person responsible for the transport of the goods 
from the warehouse, as well as, where applicable, his principal, are jointly and severally 
liable towards the State for the payment of the tax, together with the persons who are liable 
for the tax. On the basis of such provision, the Belgian tax authorities proceeded to recover 
from the warehouse-keeper the unpaid VAT on goods supplied for valuable consideration 
and released by the (insolvent) owner from the warehouse where they had been stored. 
The EUCJ’s decision does not differ from the ruling in Federation Technical Indutries 
examined above. 
It must be observed that at first sight the provision appeared not to be technically construed 
as a presumption, but at most as a legal definition, as it merely imposed the liability to pay 
on a party different than the one initially liable to pay. Yet, the ruling on such provision is 
significant, because it seems to reflect a certain ‘preference’ of the Court for presumptive 
measures which permit the taxpayer to demonstrate that the concrete case does not 
correspond to the situation envisaged in the norm. On the other hand, even when the 
liability of a third party is established by means of a mechanism other than a presumption, 
it has nonetheless a presumptive ratio, meaning that it is based on the presumption that the 
third party (the warehouse-keeper, for example) did not comply with one of his (juridical) 
duties, such as taking the necessary precautions not to get involved in a fraud. If this is the 
case, the national legislation has to let the taxpayer prove that he took all the measures 
which could reasonably be asked of him to avoid that result
648
. 
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 ECJ 21 December 2011, case C-499/10, Vlaamse Oliemaatschappij NV.  
648
 A. Mondini, Contributo allo studio del principio di proporzionalità nel sistema dell’IVA europea, cited 
above, 403, observes that from the judgment in Federation Technical Indutries a dichotomy between the joint 
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In reaching the above conclusion, the Court makes reference to the principle of legal 
certainty, and above all to the principle of proportionality, which entails that “Member 
States must employ means which, whilst enabling them effectively to attain the objectives 
pursued by their domestic laws, cause the least possible detriment to the objectives and 
principles laid down by the relevant European Union legislation”649. 
The focus is once again on the effects of the provision, which are not proportionate in 
respect of the aim to combat tax evasion. The EUCJ held, indeed, that (para 24):  
“(...) national measures which bring about, de facto, a system of strict joint and several 
liability go beyond what is necessary to preserve the public exchequer’s rights 
(see Federation of Technological Industries and Others, paragraph 32). Imposing 
responsibility for paying VAT on a person other than the person liable to pay that tax, even 
where that person is an authorised tax warehouse-keeper bound by the specific obligations 
referred to in Directive 92/12, without allowing him to escape liability by providing proof 
that he had nothing whatsoever to do with the acts of the person liable to pay the tax must, 
therefore, be considered contrary to the principle of proportionality. It would clearly be 
disproportionate to hold that person unconditionally liable for the shortfall in tax caused 
by acts of a third party over which he has no influence whatsoever (see, to that 
effect, Netto Supermarkt, paragraph 23).” 
On the contrary, the Court found to be in line with the principle of proportionality 
requiring from the person other than the one initially liable to pay the VAT a duty of 
                                                                                                                                                                                
liability to pay on the one side, and the obligation to provide securities, on the other side, emerges, as the 
latter implies the former. In his opinion, such dichotomy can be explained only by attributing to the joint 
liability to pay VAT a foundation different from the mere guarantee for a debt. This theory, he argues, finds a 
confirmation in the Vlaamse Oliemaatschappij NV decision, where it has been held that a third party (the 
warehouse-keeper) may not be made liable to pay VAT debt instead of the taxable person (the owner of the 
goods stored in the warehouse) without a participation, albeit indirect and with neglicence or in non-good 
faith, of the former to the tax fraud. See Id., Falso materiale e ideologico nelle frodi Iva e tutela 
dell’affidamento e della buona fede del contribuente nell’apparenza di situazioni fattuali e giuridiche 
prodotta da terzi, cited above, p.1788, where he argues that the issue of the distribution of liabilities among 
the economic operators, when a fraud is ascribable to one of the parties of the transaction or even to a third 
party, appears to be faced through two different ‘juridical models’. On the one side, the EU model, which 
make the (joint) liability to pay conditional to the infringment of a duty of diligence and the awareness (albeit 
potential) of the fraud. Under this pattern, the status of good-faith or mala fide are relevant, but there are not 
clear indications as to what kind of objective elements could ground the existence of one subjective status or 
another. For this reason, only rebuttable presumptions are conceivable, and not even irrebuttable ones. On the 
other side, the national model, which “instead of explicitly laying down irrebuttable presumptions of 
participation or knowledge to the fraud committed by another party (or, at most, with a limited contrary 
proof) prefers conceal them by introducing specific and objective event giving rise to the liability to pay of 
the supplier or the receipient (see Article 60-bis, Italian D.P.R. No 633/72) when the other contracting party 
does not comply with his obligation to pay. In the perspective of the taxpayers’ protection, the former model 
appears to guarantee more than the second one that the aim of combating tax evasion is pursued in 
accordance with the proportionality principle”. 
649
 Paragraph 21 of the judgment. 
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diligence, consisting in doing what is necessary in order to exclude that he is taking part in 
a tax evasion. By illustrating the content of the duty of diligence which a national measure 
may impose on the third party, the Court also suggests the content of the possible contrary 
proof to be given by the latter. Indeed, before referring to the national judge the 
ascertainment as to the proportionality of the national measure pursuant to the criteria 
indicated in the decision, the EUCJ concluded that “the fact that the person other than the 
person liable to pay the tax acted in good faith, exhibiting all the due diligence of a 
circumspect trader, that he took every reasonable measure in his power and that his 
participation in fraud is excluded are important points in deciding whether that person can 
be obliged to account for the VAT owed”650. 
Following the above judgment, Article 51-bis, para 3, CTVA, has been amended by adding 
a further indent which permits the third party held by tax authorities jointly and severally 
liabe for unpaid VAT debt to escape from the liability by proving that he acted in good 
faith and was not guilty of fault or negligence
651
. 
Notably, the Italian legislation in the field of VAT includes a provision concerning the 
liability to pay of a person different from the taxable person. Article 60-bis, of the 
Presidential Decree No 633/72 provides, with regard to the goods that are to be identified 
in a ministerial decree, that when the supplier does not pay the VAT on goods sold at a 
                                                          
650
 Paragraph 21 of the judgment. 
651
 The French version of Article 51-bis, para 3, CTVA reads as follows: “Dans le régime de l'entrepôt autre 
que douanier, l'entreposeur des biens, la personne qui se charge du transport des biens hors de l'entrepôt 
ainsi que son mandant éventuel sont solidairement tenus au paiement de la taxe envers l'Etat avec la 
personne qui en est redevable en vertu des articles 51, § 1er, 1° et 2°, § 2, alinéa 1er, 3°, 4° et 5°, ou 52, § 
1er, alinéa 2. Sous réserve de l'article 55, § 4, alinéa 2, la personne visée à l'alinéa 1er qui démontre sa 
bonne foi ou l'absence de faute ou de négligence dans son chef est déchargée de la responsabilité solidaire ». 
According to I. Lejeune, S. Vandenberghe, T. Racquet, Limited Third-Party Liability in EU VAT Matters, 
International Vat Monitor, 2012, 397 et seq., who commented on the judgment of the ECJ in the case 
Vlaamse Oliemaatschappij NV, the effect of such decision ‘is not limited to the joint and several VAT 
liability of keepers of excise duty and VAT warehouses. The same principles should equally apply to all other 
third-party liabilities for VAT debts that are laid down by the national VAT legislation, such as the 
unconditional joint liability of VAT representatives (article 55 of the Belgian VAT Code), of anyone who is 
also liable for payment of import duties (article 68 of the VAT Code and article 8 of Royal Decree No. 7) and 
of suppliers and customers involved in supplies of goods or services, as the case may be”(at p. 398). They 
also underline how the Belgian legal provision on chain liability is now aligned with the Court’s decision in 
the case Federation Technological Industries. The reference is to Article 51-bis, para 4, CTVA, introduced 
with the Law 20 July 2006, pursuant to which “Tout assujetti est solidairement tenu d'acquitter la taxe avec 
la personne qui en est redevable en vertu de l'article 51, §§ 1er et 2, si, au moment où il a effectué une 
opération, il savait ou devait savoir que le non-paiement de la taxe, dans la chaîne des opérations, est 
commis ou sera commis dans l'intention d'éluder la taxe”. It must be noted that, as regards to Article 68 and 
Article 8 of the Royal decree mentioned by the Authors, the latter has been amended by Article 4, Royal 
decree 13 June 2013 (M.B. 24.06.2013, p. 40184). Article 8, para 2 of the Royal decree currently provides as 
follows: “Les personnes visées au paragraphe 1er, alinéa 1er, 1° à 3° et alinéa 2, qui démontrent l'absence 
de faute ou de négligence dans leur chef, sont déchargées de la responsabilité solidaire. En tout état de 
cause, ces personnes ne peuvent être déchargées de cette responsabilité lorsqu'elles savaient ou devaient 
savoir que la taxe due à l'importation n'est pas versée ou ne sera pas versée à l'Etat.” 
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price lower than the normal value, the transferee is jointly and severally liable to pay such 
VAT. However, the same provision allows the latter to prove, by means of documents, that 
the lower price is due to objective and detectable circumstances, or to specific provisions 
of law and that in any event it is not related to the non-payment of the VAT debt
652
.  
 
6. Presumptive criteria of determination of the taxable amount. Minimum taxable 
amount and VAT transfer pricing 
The taxable base represents one of the basic elements of the structure of VAT and it is in 
fact harmonized under the rules laid down in Article 11 et seq. of the Directive 
112/2006/EC. Member States may in principle introduce measures derogating from the 
provisions of the Directive, insofar as they are strictly necessary to combat tax evasion or 
avoidance and the procedures envisaged in the Directive are followed. 
In a number of judgments, the EUCJ has reiterated that the exercise of the power to 
derogate from the ordinary way of determination of the taxable amount has to be tested 
against the proportionality principle. Precisely in the light of the latter, a national measure 
that systematically derogates from Article 11 of the Directive, by introducing a minimum 
taxable base, for instance, is deemed as going beyond what is necessary to prevent tax 
evasion and avoidance.  
The EUCJ has ruled on a national measure that derogated from the Directive by imposing a 
minimum taxable amount in the cases Commission v. Belgium
653
 and K LINE AIR
654
. 
Summarizing, in both of them the provisions concerned were enacted pursuant to Article 
35 CTVA, which authorised the government to provide a minimum taxable amount for 
                                                          
652
 Such presumption operates only as regards the goods listed in the Ministerial decree 22 December 2005. 
See M. Miccinesi, Le frodi carosello nell’Iva, cited above, at p. 1101, who classifies it as a rebuttable 
presumption of law and supports its compatibility with EU law, on the basis of the FTI case. Moreover, with 
Article 1, para 164, Law 24 December 2007, No 244, a further paragraph (3-bis) has been inserted. It 
stipulates that when the amount of consideration indicated in a contract for the transfer of an immovable 
property and in the related invoice is different from the real one, the tranferee (even if he does not operate in 
the quality of economic operator) is jointly liable to pay together with the supplier for the difference between 
the real amount and the amount declared as well as for the fine.  
653
 ECJ 10 April 1984, case C-324/82, Commission v. Belgium. At issue were in particular special measures 
governing the basis for charging VAT on new cars, either sold in Belgium, or imported, and on the so-called 
‘voitures de direction’. 
654
 ECJ 9 July 1992, case C-131/91, K Line Air. The national meaure concerned provided, in particular, a 
minimum basis of assessment for sale of second-hand cars between taxable persons. The Court concluded 
that “Measures of the kind at issue in the present case derogate from the general rules laid down in Article 
11 of the Sixth Directive even more completely and generally than those on which the Court had occasion to 
adjudicate in its judgment in Commission v Belgium. In that case, the Belgian State was criticized for not 
taking into account, in determining the basis of assessment, the discounts or rebates allowed on prices. In the 
present case, it is the price itself as agreed between the parties which was not taken into account and was 
replaced by the minimum basis of assessment.” 
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certain goods and services
655
, and concerned certain transactions in the sector of the motor 
trade. In the first judgment, the Court held (paras 30-31): 
“It is not disputed that the Belgian Government was justified in taking the view that there 
was a real risk of tax evasion or avoidance in the motor trade which justified the adoption 
of measures of the kind which Article 27 of the Sixth Directive allows to be retained. Such 
measures may, where appropriate, entail the application of standard amounts, provided 
that the special measures do not derogate from the rules laid down by Article 11 further 
than is necessary to avoid the risk of tax evasion or avoidance. 
However, by applying to all new cars the catalogue prices notified to the Belgian 
authorities, the Belgian legislation entails such a complete and general amendment of the 
basis of assessment that it is impossible to accept that it contains only the derogations 
needed to avoid the risk of tax evasion or avoidance. In particular, it has not been proved 
that, in order to attain the aim in view, it is necessary that the taxable amount should be 
fixed on the basis of the Belgian catalogue price or that the taking into account of any form 
of price discount or rebate should be excluded in such a comprehensive manner.” 
As such, the national measure at hand was susceptible to cover even situations in which 
there was not a risk of tax avoidance or evasion, as it did not envisage any possibility to 
demonstrate the absence of that risk or that the taxable amount is actually lower than the 
minimum fixed in the legislation. 
Significantly, in another case (Skripalle) where the national measure applied by tax 
authorities imposed for certain transactions involving associated parties to consider the 
cost-price, even if the consideration agreed upon by the parties was at the market value, the 
Court held that “there is nothing to prevent a provision formulated in fairly general or 
abstract terms from excluding cases in which the agreed rent is lower than the amount 
normally necessary to amortize building costs but is in accordance with normal market 
rent”656.  
                                                          
655
 Currently, Article 35 CTVA reads as follows: “Le Roi peut fixer une base minimale d'imposition pour les 
livraisons, les acquisitions intracommunautaires et les importations: 1° de voitures automobiles, 
motocyclettes et autres véhicules terrestres à tous moteurs, et leurs remorques; 2° de yachts, bateaux et 
canots de plaisance; 3° d'avions, hydravions, hélicoptères et autres appareils analogues, et de planeurs. Il 
peut aussi fixer la base d'imposition de la prestation de services visée à l'article 18, § 2, alinéa 2, à un 
pourcentage du total des sommes que l'agence de voyages au sens de l'article 1er, § 7, alinéa 1er, 2°, porte 
en compte au voyageur». 
656
 ECJ 29 May 1997, case C-63/96, Skripalle. By reiterating its previous case-law, the Court confirmed that 
(paras 24-25-26) “As the Court has already held, national derogating measures designed to prevent the 
evasion or avoidance of tax must be strictly interpreted and may not derogate from the basis for charging 
VAT laid down in Article 11 of the Sixth Directive, except within the limits strictly necessary for achieving 
that aim (Case 324/82 Commission v Belgium [1984] ECR 1861, paragraph 29). The question to be esamine 
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To this puzzle a further piece must now be added, that is Article 80, VAT Directive, 
illustrated above. First, the reference to the ‘open market value’ facing certain transactions 
among related parties and other alternative circumstances concerning the taxable amount 
(overvaluation, undervaluation) and the right of deduction, suggests that the reference to 
that value embodies a suitable criterion for combating tax evasion or avoidance. However, 
for any evaluation in terms of proportionality, the single national measure implementing 
Article 80 has to be considered, which is designed as being merely optional. If a national 
measure transposing Article 80 was construed as an irrebuttable presumption of law, as the 
case may be, by imposing taxpayers to determinate the taxable amount at the open marke 
value, its consistency with the proportionality principle would be questionable. This is 
even though Article 80 is quite specific in drawing objective circumstances from which a 
considerable risk of tax evasion or avoidance may be inferred. In fact, such provision 
derogates from the ordinary rule applicable for the determination of the taxable amount, 
which is the consideration effectively obtained by the supplier from the purchaser. As such, 
it has to be intepreted (and implemented) strictly, and tested against all the general 
principles of Community law
657
. If it was construed as a procedural presumption, by 
                                                                                                                                                                                
is whether those conditions are satisfied in this case. It is not disputed that, as between family members or 
associated persons, there may be a certain risk of tax evasion or avoidance justifying measures of the type 
which Article 27 of the Sixth Directive permits. However, there is no such risk where the objective facts show 
that the taxable person has acted properly. In retaining as the taxable amount the costs incurred where there 
is a relationship between associated persons, including cases where it is clear that the agreed income, which 
corresponds to normal market rent, is lower than those costs, the German rules are not confined to 
introducing the derogations strictly necessary to deal with the risk of tax evasion or avoidance. They are not, 
therefore, covered by Article 27 of the Sixth Directive.” 
657
 This clearly results from ECJ, 26 April 2012, case C-621/10 and C-129/11, Balkan, where at issue was the 
Bulgarian VAT legislation imposing the open market value even under circumstances that are not envisaged 
in Article 80 of the VAT Directive, and in particular when there is a full right of deduction. Though the 
national provision was not enacted to implement Article 80 and the latter envisages an option rather than an 
obligation upon Member States, the ECJ reasoned the possibility for the complaiant in the main proceedings 
to rely upon Article 80 in order to oppose the application of the national measure that was not in line with  it. 
With regard to the strict interpretation to be given to Article 80, the ECJ held as follows (paras 43 to 48)“In 
accordance with the general rule set out in Article 73 of the VAT Directive, the taxable amount for the supply 
of goods or services for consideration is the consideration actually received for them by the taxable person. 
That consideration is thus the subjective value, that is to say, the value actually received, and not a value 
estimated according to objective criteria (...).Article 73 of the VAT Directive is the expression of a 
fundamental principle, the corollary of which is that the tax authorities may not collect as VAT an amount 
exceeding the tax paid to the taxable person (...).  By allowing the taxable amount to be taken as the open 
market value of the transaction in certain cases, Article 80(1) of the VAT Directive lays down an exception to 
the general rule stated in Article 73 of the directive, which must as such be interpreted strictly (...). It should 
be recalled that, as stated in recital 26 in the preamble to the VAT Directive, the objective of Article 80(1) is 
to prevent tax evasion or avoidance. As the Advocate General observes in point 30 of her Opinion, where 
goods or services are supplied at an artificially low or high price between parties who both enjoy a full right 
of deduction of VAT, there cannot be any evasion or avoidance of tax at that stage. It is only at the stage of 
the final consumer, or of a mixed taxable person enjoying only a proportional right of deduction, that an 
artificially low or high price can lead to a loss of tax revenue. Consequently, it is only where the person 
concerned by the transaction does not enjoy a full right of deduction that there is a risk of tax evasion or 
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entitling tax authorities to correct the taxable amount of a transaction between related 
parties when certain conditions established in the legislation occur, then it would 
presumably be considered in line with the principle of proportionality, especially provided 
that the defence rights of the taxpayers involved (the right to be heard during the 
administrative proceedings, the right to demonstrate that there is not any tax fraud) are 
secured
658
. 
 
7. Restrictions on the right of deduction by means of legal presumptions 
The right of the VAT input deduction represents not only a principle inherent to the system 
of the VAT, but a right immediately and directly recognised upon the economic operators 
by the VAT Directive
659
. As a result, every national measure departing from the rules set 
forth in the Directive must be authorised and comply with the general principles of EU law. 
Under these conditions, Member States are allowed to limit the right to deduct insofar as 
strictly necessary to simplify the recovery of the tax and to combat VAT. On the other 
hand, the Directive itself envisages certain mechanisms aimed at simplifying the 
determination of the deductible VAT, as the case is for the pro-rata.  
Generally speaking, a limitation to the right of deduction with a national measure may be 
construed under different forms. It may be irrefutably excluded with an irrebuttable 
                                                                                                                                                                                
avoidance which Article 80(1) of the directive allows the Member States to prevent”. The Court employs a 
teleological interpretation of Article 80, para 1: if it is intened to prevent from tax avoidance or evasion, then 
it may not apply to cases where such a risk does not exist. A broader interpretation of the option given by 
Article 80, para 1, to Member States, could have the effect of legitimating the collection of an amount of 
VAT exceeding the amount actually paid to the taxable person. 
658
 According to A. Mondini, Contributo allo studio del principio di proporzionalità nel sistema dell’IVA 
europea, cited above, 376, even where a provision proposing to consider the normal value was construed as a 
procedural provision, i.e. as a provision affecting only the content of the motivation that tax authorities must 
satisfy in the notice of assessment, the consistency with the proportionality principle would still be 
questionable. In this regard, he reminds the legal presumption introduced by the Law decree No 223/2006 in 
the Italian legal order (within Article 54 of the VAT legislation) and abrogated by the Law No 88/2009 
following an infringement procedure initiated by the European Commission (No 2007/4575). In brief, the 
provision under discussion inferred the ‘direct and certain’ proof of the existence of more VAT taxable 
operations or the inaccurate indication of the operations giving rise to deduction, from the divergence 
between the consideration reckoned in the accounting records and the invoice on the one hand, and the 
normal value of a certain immovable property on the other hand. By virtue of such provision, in the 
administrave stage the motivation of the analytical assessment was fulfilled by referring to that divergence, 
from which the manipulation of the invoicing consideration was inferred. By contrast, the provision did not 
introduce a minimum taxable amount. Nonetheless, according to the Commission, it was “a non-
proportionate provision as it shifts the onus of proof on the persons liable to tax in the absence of any other 
proof of tax fraud”. Cf. T. Tassani, L’accertamento dei corrispettivi nelle cession immobiliari e la nuova 
presunzione fondata sul valore normale, Rass. Trib., 2007, 137; A. Pischetola and T. Tassani, 
L’accertamento immobiliare in base al valore normaledopo la legge comunitaria n. 88/2009, Studi e 
Materiali, 2009, 1489.  
659
 Ex multis, see A. van Doesum and G.-J. Van Norden, The Right to Deduct under EU VAT, International 
VAT monitor, 2011, 323 et seq. 
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presumption of law, or the taxpayer may be given the possibility to prove that, in the 
concrete case, the risk of fraud or avoidance that justify the restriction do not occur. 
Instead of the technique of the presumption, the legislator may prefer to use a typification 
or a predetermination of the amount deductible and so on. Yet, the limitation may concern 
the entire amount of deductible VAT or fix a flate-rate limit for the deduction. 
In this regard, some indications as to the interpretative trends of the EUCJ, result from two 
cases dealing with the restriction on the right of deduction in relation to the VAT charged 
on certain mixed (i.e. for business and private purposes) expenditure.  
 
7.1 The total exclusion of the right to deduct. The Ampafrance and Sanofi case 
In the Ampafrance and Sanofi case
660
, the Court was called upon to rule on the validity of 
the Council Decision 89/487/EEC that, on request of France, had authorised the latter to 
introduce a measure excluding the right to deduct expenditure consisting of 
accommodation, food, hospitality and entertainment, thereby derogating from the VAT 
Directive.  
In the view taken by the Member State involved, which was shared by the Council and the 
Commission as well, the measure was justified by the high risk of abuse and the 
(administrative) difficulty in analytically checking the nature of the expenditure
661
. On 
their side, the appellants (Ampafrance and Sanofi) contended the invalidity of the decision 
because of its inconsistency with the principle of proportionality. In fact, it introduced a 
general and systematic exclusion of the deduction based on the presumption of the risk of 
tax avoidance and evasion facing certain expenditure having a mixed nature. In their view, 
the measure would have been proportionate by providing either the necessary proof (by tax 
                                                          
660
 ECJ 19 September 2000, joined cases C-177/99 and C-181/99. 
661
 The Council and the French government also recalled the exclusion of deduction in relation to similar 
expenditure provided for in Article 17, para 6, of the Sixth Directive. See at para 52: “(…)Decision 89/487 is 
justified independently of the finding of intended or actual systematic tax evasion or avoidance. By its very 
nature, expenditure in respect of accommodation, hospitality, food and entertainment can be used as a means 
of tax evasion and avoidance owing to the risk that final consumption will not be subject to VAT, which is 
difficult for the authorities to control since it is not easy to determine whether such expenditure was incurred 
in order to satisfy business or private needs. It is relevant in that regard that the first subparagraph of Article 
17(6) of the Sixth Directive provides that under the Community rules to be adopted VAT is in no 
circumstances to be deductible from expenditure which is not strictly business expenditure, such as that on 
luxuries, amusements or entertainment.” They also contended (para 53) the specific scope of the limitation: 
“(…) the exclusion of the right to deduct VAT charged on expenditure in respect of accommodation, 
hospitality, food and entertainment is not a disproportionate means in the light of the objective of combating 
tax evasion and avoidance defined in Article 27 of the Sixth Directive since, in the present case, the exclusion 
of the right of deduction was expressly limited to situations in which there were genuine risks of tax evasion 
and avoidance, which correspond to situations in which it is impossible to determine whether the expenditure 
was of a business or a private nature.” 
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authorities) of the existence of such risk or the possibility for the taxable person to 
demonstrate the absence of any evasion or avoidance and the actual incurrence of the 
expenses for business purposes. Though this was the main complaint, they also argued that 
the measure was introduced for reasons other than those envisaged in Article 27 of the 
Sixth Directive, as the French government aimed at bypassing the controls on the nature of 
the expenditure concerned. Ultimately, they underlined that the national tax system 
included already means less detrimental to the principles of the Directive equally able to 
combat  evasion and avoidance
662
. 
The EUCJ upheld the arguments put forward by the appellants and deemed the Decision to 
be in contrast with the proportionality principle, and was thereby invalid. To reach this 
decision, the Court took into primary consideration the ‘effects of irrebuttable 
presumption’ that ensue from a systematic denial of the right of deduction with regard to 
business expenditure, which impacts on the neutrality of the tax. 
In the words of the Court (para 58): 
“It follows that the application of the system of exclusion of the right of deduction 
authorised by Decision 89/487 may have the effect that undertakings are unable to deduct 
the VAT charged on business expenditure which they have incurred and that VAT is thus 
charged on certain forms of intermediate consumption, contrary to the principle of the 
right to deduct VAT, which ensures the neutrality of that tax.” 
As a result, the Court concluded that (paras 61-62):  
“A measure which consists in excluding as a matter of principle all expenditure in respect 
of accommodation, hospitality, food and entertainment from the right to deduct VAT, 
which is a fundamental principle of the VAT system established by the Sixth Directive, 
although appropriate means less detrimental to that principle than the exclusion of the 
right of deduction in the case of certain expenditure can be contemplated or already exist 
in the national legal order, does not appear to be necessary in order to combat tax evasion 
and avoidance.” 
Notably, after having found the measure not in line with the proportionality principle, the 
Court went further by suggesting the existence of less detrimental measures, either because 
of the lower (in terms of quantity) impact on the right of deduction itself or because of the 
apportionment of procedural instruments (like the contrary proof) by virtue of which the 
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 Id. at paras 44-45-46. 
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taxable person would be entitled to demonstrate the absence of tax evasion or avoidance. 
More in detail, it held: 
“Although it is not for the Court to comment on the appropriateness of other means of 
combating tax evasion and avoidance which might be contemplated, including limiting 
authorised deductions to a fixed amount or introducing a control modelled on that 
employed in connection with income tax or corporation tax, it must be pointed out that, as 
Community law now stands, national legislation which excludes from the right to deduct 
VAT expenditure in respect of accommodation, hospitality, food and entertainment without 
making any provision for the taxable person to demonstrate the absence of tax evasion or 
avoidance in order to take advantage of the right of deduction is not a means 
proportionate to the objective of combating tax evasion and avoidance and has a 
disproportionate effect on the objectives and principles of the Sixth Directive.” 
In conclusion, one could infer from this decision that a national measure systematically 
excluding the right to deduct the VAT charged on specific (mixed) expenditure is deemed 
to be non-proportional. This is because it does not request the tax authority to prove the 
existence of the risk of avoidance or evasion (which is presumed); in addition, it prevents 
the taxable person from proving that a certain expenditure has been incurred for business 
reasons and there is not such a risk in the concrete case. According to the Court “it cannot 
be disputed that there may be a risk of tax evasion or avoidance justifying special 
measures of the type which Member States may be authorised to introduce pursuant to 
Article 27 of the Sith Directive”, but “that risk does not exist where it follows from 
objective evidence that the expenditure was incurred for strictly business purposes”663. As 
a consequence, though such general measure may be appropriate to tackle tax avoidance or 
evasion, it nonetheless goes beyond what is strictly necessary to pursue such objective, 
being possible to have recourse to alternative measures less detrimental to the principle of 
neutrality.  
It has to be noted that notwithstanding Member States tend to construe measures limiting 
the right of deduction or other rights conferred to taxable persons by the Directive under 
forms other than legal presumptions
664
, the Court gathers their presumptive ratio and tends 
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 Id. para 56. 
664
 For instance, Article 7, first indent, of the Decree 27 July 1967, No 67/604 relevant in the case 
Ampafrance and Sanofy, stated: “The tax on expenditure incurred in order to provide accommodation or 
login for the management and staff of undertakings shall not be deductible”. Likewise, Article 11, first indent: 
“The tax on expenditure incurred in order to provide accommodation or lodging for the management and 
staff of undertakings shall not be deductible”. 
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to put the attention on the probative side. As we will see, this is a corollary of the overall 
EUCJ approach which focuses on the effects of the presumptive provisions. Such effects, 
in case of irrebuttable presumptions, do not differ from those of other similar legal 
concepts. 
 
7.2 The partial exclusion of the right to deduct. The Sudholz case 
The conclusion reached by the Court in Ampafrance and Sanofi appears to clash with the 
decision handed down on a similar case (Sudhoz
665
), referred to the European Court a few 
months later than that judgment. 
The case was similar because it concerned a Council Decision (2000/186) which 
authorised a measure derogating from the Directive as regards the right of deduction in 
respect of certain expenditure. There were, though, two main differences, which apparently 
led the Court to rule differently, i.e. in favour of the validity of the Decision. 
First, whereas in Ampafrance and Sanofi the French measure implied a complete exclusion 
of the right to deduct, in Sudholz at issue was the German measure which set at 50% the 
flat-rate limit on permitted deduction of the input VAT paid on the purchase of vehicles 
used primarily for business purposes
666
. Thus, the taxable person was not prevented from 
deducting the VAT charged on certain (mixed) expenditure, but that right was limited to 
50% of the input VAT, without any possibility to demonstrate that the proportion of 
business use, for which his vehicle was used, was higher
667
. 
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 ECJ 29 April 2004, case C-17/01, Sudholz. See, for a comment of the decision, and a general overview of 
the case-law on special measures introduced or retained under Article 27 of the Sixth Directive found 
incompatible with the principle of proportionality, J. Swilkels, Impact of Walter Sudholz on Special 
Measures, International VAT Monitor, 2005, 23 et seq. 
666
 The Court observed indeed (paras 51-52): “(...) unlike the facts underlying the main proceedings, the 
decision at issue in Ampafrance and Sanofi involved a complete exclusion of the right to deduct and not a 
flat-rate limit on that right. Moreover, the purpose of that decision was solely the prevention of tax evasion 
or avoidance, and not the simplification of the procedure for charging VAT. Lastly, the expenditure in 
question was subject to effective verification by checks on the documents or on the premises for income tax or 
corporation tax purposes. By contrast, the German authorities have not referred to any method for ensuring 
effective verification in the main proceedings. It must also be noted that in paragraph 62 of the judgment in 
Ampafrance and Sanofi the Court reserves its position on the question whether other possible methods of 
preventing tax evasion and avoidance may exist, including imposing a flat-rate limit on authorised 
deductions, without commenting on their validity.” 
667
 In the case of the main proceedings, Mr. Sudholz, who ran a painting business, had purchased a passenger 
car that he had allocated to his business. He contended that he had used it as to 70% for business purposes 
and as to 30% for non-business purposes. But, as explained in the text, he could not deduct input VAT 
beyond the flat-rate fixed by the para 15(1b) of the Germal Law of 1999 on turnover taxes, pursuant to which 
“Amounts of input tax charged on the purchase or manufacture, importation, acquisition within the 
Community, hire or operation of vehicles within the meaning of Paragraph 1b(2) which are also used for the 
private purposes of the trader or for other non-business purposes shall be deductible only at the rate of 50%”.  
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Second, the request for authorisation submitted to the Council by the German authorities 
was primarily justified in view of simplifying the procedures for charging VAT and 
rendering verifications more straightforward, and only secondarily at preventing tax 
evasion and avoidance
668
. Moreover, the German authorities underlined how the 
percentage chosen was not arbitrary, as it corresponded to the average use of the vehicles 
concerned for private purposes.  
The latter circumstance is incidentally considered by the Court, and it seems to embody a 
further factor leading to deem the national measure as being proportional. In this regard, 
the Court also considered that the same flat-rate limit in relation to the purchase of vehicles 
had been adopted by other Member States, and by the Commission as well in a proposal 
for an amendment to the Sixth Directive. These circumstances indicated, in the view taken 
by the Court, that the limit was reasonable
669
. 
In the light of the foregoing, the Court disagreed with the opinion of the Advocate 
General
670
 and the observations of the Commission
671
, which argued the non-
proportionality of the measure because it did not allow any contrary proof, and with 
particular regard to the appropriateness and proportionality of the measure in respect of the 
aim pursued, stated as follows (paras 54-55-57): 
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 Id., at para 30 (“it must be held that the Council was entitled to treat the terms of the request for 
authorisation made by the German authorities as meaning that it was directed specifically at simplifying the 
procedures relating to returns and verification of VAT and not only at preventing tax evasion and avoidance. 
It follows that the Council did not go beyond the wording of that request in the statement of the reasons on 
which Decision 2000/186 was based”) and at para 47. 
669
 Id., at para 58: “The Court notes that the accuracy of the figure stipulated by the German authorities for 
the average use of vehicles for private purposes has not been challenged. Furthermore, the fact that the same 
flat-rate limit has been adopted by other Member States and by the Commission in the proposal for a 
directive referred to above suggests that such a limit is reasonable”. The Court continued by underlying that 
the Decision envisaged the non-application of the flat-rate when the use of the vehicle for private purposes 
was negligible. At para 59 it observed: “Moreover, as the 5 0% limit on deductions of the input VAT paid is 
an average, the Council took the view that it was necessary to avoid the figure applying to cases involving 
use below a certain level, that is to say where the use of the vehicle for private purposes does not exceed 5% 
of its total use. Decision 2000/186 accordingly excludes the application of that limit in those particular 
cases.” 
670
 See Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed to the case C-17/01, at para 59: “The case of Ampafrance and 
Sanofi related to a complete exclusion from the right to deduct VAT, whilst the present case concerns a flat-
rate ceiling on that right. However, since in both cases the right to deduct is subject to a quantitative 
restriction — entirely or to a considerable extent — the principie of proportionality requires that in both 
situations the taxable person must have an opportunity to demonstrate that there is no tax evasion or 
avoidance in his case”. He also pointed out the proposal of the Commission provided the possibility for the 
taxable person to demonstrate that the purchased vehicles would be used more than 50% for business 
purposes (see para 63). 
671
 As reported by the Court at para 48, “According to the Commission, that decision is not necessary and 
appropriate for the attainment of the first objective referred to, that is to say the prevention of tax evasion 
and avoidance, and infringes the principle of proportionality in that ataxable person, such as Mr Sudholz, 
who uses his passenger car as to 70% for business purposes, and can prove that he does so, is nevertheless 
permitted to deduct only 50% of the amount of the input VAT paid on the purchase of the vehicle.” 
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 “(…) it is necessary to consider the factors mentioned by the German authorities, which 
are not contested by either the Commission or the Council, that is to say the difficulty for 
the taxable person of establishing in advance the proportions of private and business use 
to which his vehicle will be put, the difficulty, for verification purposes, of proving 
precisely what use is made of the vehicle, and the discovery of irregularities in almost all 
cases where verification is carried out.” 
These factors disclose a serious risk of tax evasion or avoidance. In those circumstances, 
the imposition of a flat-rate limit on the right to deduct would appear to be a measure to 
prevent that risk, while at the same time making verification more straightforward and 
simplifying the system for charging VAT. 
(…)  German authorities have stated that that percentage corresponds to the average use 
for private purposes of the vehicles concerned. It also corresponds to the figure applied in 
other Member States and to the figure put forward by the Commission in its proposal for a 
Council directive of 17 June 1998 amending Directive 77/388 as regards the rules 
governing the right to deduct value added tax (OJ 1998 C 219, p. 16).”  
The Court acknowledged that under such measure the taxable person who actually uses his 
vehicle as to  more than 50% for business purposes is prevented from deducting a 
corresponding proportion of the input VAT even when he is able to prove that 
circumstance. Nonetheless, it noted, this is a mere corollary of measures aimed at 
simplifying the procedures for charging VAT, which cannot in principle regard the 
personal situations. 
 
7.3 The relevance of the justification for restrictions on the right to deduct: tax 
avoidance and evasion versus simplification   
The decision in Sudholz is quite interesting because it seems to draw a distinction among 
those presumptive measures (derogating from the Directive) aimed at combating tax 
avoidance or evasion on the one side, and those presumptive measures primarily justified 
by the need of simplifying the procedures for charging VAT, and to treat them differently 
under the lenght of the proportionality principle. 
The reasoning developed by the Court is as follows. In the first event, the right of 
deduction is excluded on the basis of a presumption of tax avoidance or evasion. As a 
result, the taxable person should be permitted to prove that the circumstance which justifies 
the denial of the right does not exist, i.e. that in the concrete case there are not risks for the 
Chapter III 
  
 
 354 
State’s budgetary. By contrast, when the measure concerned is primary inspired by the 
need of simplification, it merely reflects a legislative predetermination of the amount of 
input VAT deductible on the basis of average values. In this event, in the view taken by the 
Court, the possibility for the taxable person to prove a higher percentage of business use 
would undermine the aim pursed by the measure concerned. The Court does not find the 
ruling given in Sudholz as being in contrast with the decision previously handed down in 
Ampafrance. Therein, it had envisaged alternative measures in respect of the complete 
exclusion of the right of deduction, among which either the contrary proof or a flat-rate 
limit, though without explicitly ruling on their proportionality.   
Although it is controversial, in the cases Ampafrance and Sanofi and Sudhoz the Court 
seems to interfere with the way in which the national legislator is expected to construe the 
norm limiting the right of deduction. When such right is completely excluded based on a 
presumption of tax evasion or avoidance in relation to certain expenditure, then the 
Member State is requested – in order to comply with the proportionality principle - to 
apportion a juridical instrument (the counterproof) capable of guaranteeing that the limit 
applies only when the risk of tax avoidance and evasion actually exists. In other words, the 
measure has to be construed as a rebuttable presumption of law. Instead, when the right to 
deduct input VAT is subject to a quantitative restriction justified by the need of 
simplification, the legislator may have recourse to an irrebuttable presumption (or a 
predetermination, a typification, a fiction), provided that it is reasonable. This is due to two 
interrelated reasons: the possibility to prove a higher amount of deductible VAT would 
jeopardize the aim pursued by the measure. As a result, the balance between the different 
interests in play, which is the essence of the proportionality test, is found in a flat-rate limit 
which, in the arguments of the Member State involved, reflects the average private use
672
.  
 
8. National procedural autonomy in the field of VAT and tax law presumptions 
So far, the analysis of the EUCJ’s approach to tax law presumptions in the field of VAT 
has mostly concerned provisions having a substantive nature, i.e. directly affecting one of 
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 A. Mondini, Contributo allo studio del principio di proporzionalità nel sistema dell’IVA europea, cited 
above, 391, observes that the distinction made by the Court (on the basis of the aim pursued by the national 
measure) may be put in relation with the distinction between presumptive mechanisms in a proper sense and 
typifications. The flat-rate deduction corresponds to the typification of certain quantitative values, and in 
view of the Constitutional tradition of some Member States, it does not imply the need of the contrary proof, 
being only requested the reasonableness in respect of the reality. However, in the EU context, the recourse to 
such category could not justify a complete exclusion of the right of deduction, being in this event necessary 
to permit the contrary proof.  
National Tax Law Presumptions and EU Law 
 
 
355 
the fundamental rights conferred by the Directive to the taxable person. As explained, 
Member States often construe the provision limiting the right of deduction, exemption, or 
defining the persons liable to tax or the taxable amount differently from the Directive, by 
having recourse to legal concepts other than presumptions, like predeterminations, legal 
definitions, and so on. Irrespective of this, however, the Court basically tends to frame 
such provisions among legal presumptions of tax avoidance or evasion, thereby requesting 
the possibility for the taxpayer to escape the application of the provision by demonstrating 
that the risk of tax avoidance or evasion does not exist. This is particularly the case where 
the scope of the provision is general and does not provide for exceptions so as to include 
even hypotheses in relation to which the effects of the provision are non-proportionate. 
In addition to substantive and direct limitations to fundamental rights derived from the 
VAT Directive, the examination of the EUCJ case-law shows that further, albeit indirect, 
limitations may be embodied by national measures, which may be construed under the 
form of legal presumptions, concerning the exercise of those rights (in terms of conditions, 
time-limits and so on) or, in general, procedural aspects. 
As is well known, the latter are not fully harmonized, meaning that the VAT Directive 
does not include detailed provisions in relation to the practical conditions of exercise of the 
rights conferred to taxable persons, tax audits, inquiries, tax assessment, tax recovery and 
so on. As a consequence, the regulation of these aspects  is up to the single Member States, 
so as to render effective the EU rights which individuals may rely on. In doing so, they are 
requested to secure the effectiveness of the juridical positions granted by the VAT 
Directive to taxpayers (principle of effectiveness), and in the event of procedural limits 
justified by the need to safeguard the fiscal interest, they are required to sacrifice such 
juridical positions only in the extent to which it is necessary (principle of proportionality). 
Therefore, the discretionary power of Member States finds a first bind in the aims, 
principles and rights laid down in the Directive. A second bind is represented by the 
principle of equivalence and effectiveness, on the basis of which they have to guarantee to 
a taxable person who relies on a right deriving from the VAT Directive the same protection 
given to similar domestic juridical positions, and the possibility to effectively exercise that 
right. A third bind is the principle of proportionality, which, given that it implies the 
balance between the national fiscal interest and the VAT right or principle in respect of 
national procedural means, is susceptible to have important repercussions on national legal 
orders. 
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There is a rich case-law dealing with the conditions set by Member States in order to 
exercise a certain right that the taxable person derives from the VAT Directive. The major 
problems arise when the infringements of formalities cause the denial of the right, as this 
would exceed the aim pursued at national level
673
. This will presumably happen less 
frequently, at least with regard to certain formalities related to the issuing of the invoice, 
which are currently harmonized. By contrast, the regulation of the application of the tax, i.e. 
the assessment, the recovery, the means of proof of the event or conditions giving rise to 
the right, the judicial stage, continue to fall in the competence of Member States, as they 
imply the existence of administrative and judicial bodies. In this regard, the case-law offers 
two decisions interesting for our purpose, as they concern presumptive measures affecting 
the procedure of refund of VAT credit. They show how incisive the impact of the EU law 
can be, through the ruling of the EUCJ, on procedural aspects and in particular on the 
extent to which legal presumptions may be used by national legislators. 
 
8.1 Legal presumptions as to the conditions for refundable VAT credit retention. The 
Garage Molheneide case 
One of the most significant rulings as regards tax law (procedural) presumptions in the 
field of VAT is Garage Molheneide
674
. The decision is often recalled by the scholars in 
order to demonstrate the impact of the principle of proportionality on aspects of the 
taxation that in principle fall outside the scope of the Directive
675
.  
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 One for all, ECJ 8 May 2008, Joined cases C-95/07 and C-96/07, Ecotrade. 
674
 ECJ 18 December 1997, Joined cases C-286/94, C-340/95, C-401/95 and C-47/96, Garage Molenheide. 
See A. Mondini, Principio di proporzionalità ed attuazione del tributo, in Attuazione del tributo e diritti del 
contribuente in Europa, (ed.) T. Tassani, Roma, Aracne, 2009, 99. 
675
See P. Pistone, Presunzioni assolute, discrezionalità dell’amministrazione finanziaria e principio di 
proporzionalità in materia tributaria secondo la Corte di Giustizia, Note to ECJ 18 December 1997, Joined 
cases C-286/94, C-340/95, C-401/95 and C-47/96, Riv. Dir. Trib., 1998, 91 et seq. He highlighted how the 
proportionality principle, for the first time, showed its potential influence on issues concerning the tax 
proceedings, in particular the use of presumptions and the limitations as regards the attribution of 
discretionary powers to tax authorities. With particular reference to the scope of the proportionality principle 
with respect to presumptions, the Author inferred from the cases Garage Molenheide and Goldsmiths the key 
for reading the evolution of the Court’s position on the use of presumptions in tax law. In his opinion, such 
key is represented by “the need, perceived by the ECJ jurisprudence, of limiting, in the extent to which it is 
possible, the use of irrebuttable presumptions as legal means of proof in the area of taxation”. To this end, 
on the one side the Court avails itself of the proportionality principle in order to screen the hypotheses where 
irrebuttable presumptions are indispensable for securing the tax recovery; on the other side, it prods the 
national legislator to opt for presumptions of fact. More in general, the Author concluded that the decision in 
Garage Molenheide made a breach in the traditional favor fisci of the national legislator, which was reflected 
in a number of measures that weighed on taxapayers beyond what was necessary to secure an effective tax 
recovery. Accordingly, he foresaw a higher protection of the taxpayers’ juridical position facing (irrebuttable) 
presumptions, stemming from Community law and the ECJ jurisprudence (“the Court places itself as the first 
guarantor of the taxpayer”) rather than national legal orders and Constitutional Courts, the latter being bound 
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At issue were the Belgian measures
676
 which presumed the existence of the requisites 
(urgency and necessity) for the preventive attachment of a refundable VAT credit where 
either there were serious grounds for a presumption (or proof) of tax evasion or there was a 
VAT debt claimed by tax authorities and contested by the taxpayer. Therefore, the 
situations envisaged in the norm and alternatively occurring in each of the joined cases 
referred to the EUCJ, were essentially two. Both of them, though, implied the, albeit 
temporary, denial of the VAT credit to the taxable person claiming it in his tax return. This, 
based on certain circumstances that were assumed as founding a presumption of urgency 
                                                                                                                                                                                
by the structure of their domestic systems. In this sense, he found instructive that the Belgian measures 
discussed in the case and the similar measures included in Article 38-bis of the Italian VAT legislation, 
which were both in line with the Constitutional framework (p. 107). It has to be clarified that the judgment to 
which the Author refers, apart from Garage Molenheide, is  ECJ 3 July 1997, case C-330/95, Goldsmiths, 
commented by P. Pistone, Il processo di armonizzazione in materia di Iva ed i limiti alla derogabilità della 
normativa comunitaria, Riv. Dir. Trib., 1997, 794 et seq. In this decision, at issue was the UK legislation 
(section 11 of the Finance Act 1990) which excluded the refund where the reduction of the taxable amount 
due to non-payment of consideration concerned a consideration that was not expressed in money, as in this 
case there was a greater risk of evasion. See, in particular, para 22, where the Court stated: “By excluding, 
generally and systematically, all transactions alike in which the consideration is not expressed in money 
from the refund of VAT, legislation of the kind at issue in the main proceedings alters the taxable amount for 
that class of transactions in a manner which goes beyond what is strictly necessary in order to avoid the risk 
of tax evasion. That is all the more obvious because in the circumstances of the case, as the United Kingdom 
Government acknowledges in its written observations, there was no risk of evasion”. The Author pointed out 
that here the inconsistency of irrebuttable presumptions with the proportionality principle concerns the 
concrete existence of the risk of avoidance or evasion. 
676
 Article 8, paras 3 and 4, Royal decree No 4, enacted on the basis of the VAT legislation. Article 76, para 1, 
CTVA, provided, in the first indent, that any excess outstanding at the end of the calendar year is to be 
refunded in accordance with the conditions to be established by the King, on application by the taxable 
person, and in the second indent, that the King can permit the grant of refunds even before the end of the 
calendar year. Ultimately, the third indent, which is relevant in the case of the main proceedings, stipulated 
that “[W]ith respect to the requirements laid down in the first and second subparagraphs, provision may be 
made by Royal Decree for a retention in favour of the VAT, Registration and Property Authority, having the 
effect of a preventive attachment within the meaning of Article 1445 of the Judicial Code”. Based on the 
latter provision, Article 8, Royal decree No 4 of 29 December 1969, para 3 stated as follows: “If the tax debt 
referred to in the first paragraph does not constitute, in favour of the administration, a debt which is, in 
whole or in part, certain, definite and due for payment, which is inter alia the case where it is disputed or has 
given rise to an order for recovery within the meaning of Article 85 of the Code, execution of which is 
opposed by an objection within the meaning of Article 89 of the Code, the tax credit shall be retained by the 
administration up to the amount of the tax claimed. That retention shall take effect as a preventive 
attachment until the dispute has been definitively resolved, either in the administrative procedure or by a 
final court judgment. The condition laid down by Article 1413 of the Judicial Code shall be deemed to have 
been satisfied as regards the implementation of that retention [fourth subparagraph]”. At para 4 a second 
further hypothesis of retention was laid down: “If, with regard to the balance refundable resulting from the 
return referred to in Article 55(1)(3) of the Code, and in respect of which the taxable person has or has not 
opted for a refund, either there are serious grounds for presuming or there is evidence that the aforesaid 
return or returns concerning previous periods contain inaccurate information and if such grounds for 
presumption or evidence point to the existence of a tax debt the actual existence of which cannot, however, be 
established before the time for the payment order or for the operation equivalent to payment, no payment 
order shall be made in respect of the balance nor shall the balance be carried forward to the following tax 
period, and the tax credit shall be retained in order to permit the administration to verify the accuracy of the 
information [fifth subparagraph]”. Both of the hypotheses of retention of the refundable VAT credit are 
relevant for the decision. Indeed, the judgment is handed down on four preliminary rulings made by Belgian 
courts: two of them deal with para 3 and the other two with para 4. They manifestly present the same issues, 
though the events on which the presumption is based are different. 
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and necessity of a retention of the VAT credit. Such circumstances embodied, in the view 
of the legislator, a serious risk for the possible recovery of the tax debt, which would have 
taken place if the tax evasion or the claim lodged by tax authorities were finally 
ascertained.  
The measures under discussion, as underlined by the applicants, were not covered by the 
Sixth Directive, at that time in force, which at Article 18, para 4, (now, Article 183, 
Directive 112/2006/EC) stated that “where for a given tax period the amount of authorized 
deductions exceeds the amount of tax due, the Member States may either make a refund or 
carry the excess forward to the following period according to the conditions which they 
shall determine”. Article 18 only provided for the main criteria inspiring the exercise of the 
right of deduction, whereas, as resulting from the cited wording of para 4, it was left to 
each Member State the detailed regulation.  
In fact, the decision of the Court started from the premise that the issue relevant in the 
proceedings falls within the competence of Member States
677
, which are therefore 
permitted to introduce measures of the kind taken into consideration
678
. Nontheless, in the 
extent to which such measures may impact on the authorities’ obligation to make an 
immediate refund, and to the correspondent right of the taxable person, they have to 
comply with the principle of proportionality. The latter entails a balance between the 
national interest (preserving the rights of the Treasury) and the Community principles and 
objectives (as laid down in the Directive) to be realized through means (national) which are 
the least detrimental to the common system of VAT. In this sense, the Court reiterated that 
these means “may not therefore be used in such a way that they would have the effect of 
systematically undermining the right to deduct VAT”679, because this goes beyond what is 
necessary for the purpose of attaining the domestic interests. 
                                                          
677
 As contended by the Commission, the Belgian, Greek, Italian and Swedish governments, which classified 
the retentions provided for by the Belgian legislation under the label of protective ‘measures of recovery’ 
(see paras 40-41). Notably, various Member States presented observations, as measures similar to the one 
examined in the decision are included in several legal orders. As to Italy, see Article 38-bis, para 3, 
Presidential decree No 633/72. 
678
 See paras 42: “It is clear from the Sixth Directive as a whole that it is intended to establish a uniform 
basis so as to guarantee the neutrality of the system and, as indicated in the 12th recital in its preamble, to 
harmonize the rules governing deductions 'to the extent that they affect the actual amounts collected' and to 
ensure that 'the deductible proportion [is] calculated in a similar manner in all the Member States”  and 43: 
“It follows that Title XI of the Sixth Directive, which deals with deductions, and in particular Article 18, 
relates to the normal functioning of the common system of VAT and does not in principle concern measures 
such as those described in paragraph 41 above”. 
679
 Id. at para 47. 
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Similarly to what has been stated in the Ampafrance case, the Court rejects national 
provisions that have the effect of authomatically jeopardizing a right which is fundamental 
to the functioning of the common system of VAT and that the taxable persons derive 
directly from the Directive. This, irrespective of the nature of the provision concerned, 
whether substantive (thus, affecting directly the content of the right) or procedural 
(concerning the powers of the tax authorities, but equally capable of concretely affecting 
the juridical position of the taxpayer). 
With regard to the specific case examined, the Court left to the judges of the main 
proceedings the evaluation of proportionality of the measures concerned. Nonetheless, it 
provided them with clear and unequivocal criteria, which did not leave much room for 
alternative solutions. It basically agreed with the arguments put forward by the appellants, 
which showed that the retention applied authomatically (“by virtue of the actual wording of 
that provision”) whenever one of the situation envisaged in the norm occurred (a dispute 
between tax authorities and taxpayer, serious grounds of tax evasion), without any 
possibility to contest before the court  the matter of the necessity of the retention or the 
urgency of the matter. Notably, in this regard the Court basically excluded the 
proportionality of irrebuttabale presumptions, as follows (para 51-52): 
“It must be held that, where a preventive attachment procedure constitutes a derogation 
from the ordinary law applicable to preventive attachments, in that necessity and urgency 
are irrebuttably presumed, doubts may legitimately be entertained as to whether it is an 
indispensable instrument for ensuring recovery of the sums due. 
It must therefore be held that an irrebuttable presumption, as opposed to an ordinary 
presumption, would go further than is necessary in order to ensure effective recovery and 
would be contrary to the principle of proportionality in that it would not enable the taxable 
person to adduce evidence in rebuttal for consideration by the judge hearing attachment 
proceedings.” 
From the overall overview of the ruling, the absence of contrary proof appears to be per se 
decisive in order to reach a decision of inconsistency with the proportionality principle, as 
the purpose attained by the national legislator may be pursued through means that are less 
detrimental to the fundamental right of deduction. Among these, the Court incidentally 
refers to the ‘ordinary presumptions’. This term is translated in other versions of the same 
judgment as indicating the presumptions of fact
680
, which as is well-known are left to the 
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 The Italian version reports ‘presunzioni semplici’; the French one ‘présomption simple’. 
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discretion of the tax administration and the judge. Nonetheless, in my opinion the reference 
could be extended to rebuttable presumptions of law, which, alike presumptions of fact, 
permit the proof to the contrary, and in addition guarantee legal certainty, which is one of 
the general EU law principles applicable in the field of VAT.  
It must be noted that the measures under discussion, unlike those commented on above 
which excluded (altogether or partially) the right of deduction, did not deny the right, but 
they delayed sine die
681
 the refund of the VAT credit, until the definition of the controversy 
or the ascertainment as to the existence of the evasion. Nonetheless, such (procedural) 
limitation was deemed by the Court as exceeding what was striclty necessary to secure the 
tax recovery. 
To reach this conclusion, the Court took into consideration further factors that contributed 
to the evaluation of non-proportionality. Among these, the absence of a judicial review of 
the retention, either before the judge hearing the attachment proceedings or before the 
judge adjudicating on the substance of the case, as well as the absence of the possibility to 
request a different protective measure, should be mentioned. These are corollaries of the 
legal and irrebuttable nature of the presumption concerned, wherein the inference is drawn 
by the legislator, so that it cannot be challenged in legal proceedings. As a result, the judge 
was prevented from issuing, and the taxable person was prevented from obtaining, a lift in 
whole or in part of the retention of the refundable balance or an alternative protective 
measure that was less onerous for the taxpayer. These adversary effects on the right of 
deduction were deemed by the Court disproportionate in respect of the aim to ensure the 
effective recovery. It thus concluded as follows (para 64):  
“The answer to be given must therefore be that it is for the national court to examine 
whether or not the measures in question and the manner in which they are applied by the 
competent administrative authority are proportionate. In the context of that examination, if 
the national provisions or a particular construction of them would constitute a bar to 
effective judicial review, in particular review of the urgency and necessity of retaining the 
refundable VAT balance, and would prevent the taxable person from applying to a court 
for replacement of the retention by another guarantee sufficient to protect the interests of 
the Treasury but less onerous for the taxable person, or would prevent an order from being 
made, at any stage of the procedure, for the total or partial lifting of the retention, the 
national court should disapply those provisions or refrain from placing such a 
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construction on them. Moreover, in the event of the retention being lifted, calculation of 
the interest payable by the Treasury which did not take as its starting point the date on 
which the VAT balance in question would have had to be repaid in the normal course of 
events would be contrary to the principle of proportionality.” 
In this way, the decision of the EUCJ is not solely able to affect the use of certain means of 
proof when an EU right is at hand, by expressing a certain favour towards those probative 
mechanisms that allow the proof to the contrary. It goes further: it sets out a number of 
minimum procedural guarantees, which are basically embodied by the judicial review of 
the measure and end up interfering with the powers of the tax administration and the 
administration of justice. The formula ‘need of a judicial review’, which occurs also in 
direct tax cases, reflects the need, in the view taken by the Court, of a concrete 
examination of the case, against an authomatic application of any measures affecting an 
EU right.   
 
8.2 The Sosnowska case 
The Garage Molenheide case confirms that the VAT deduction mechanism is an essential 
elment of the VAT system, which may in principle not be limited. Possible derogations or 
procedural limitations to such principle must be strictly intepreted and comply with the 
proportionality principle. At any rate, national legislation or tax authorities may not make 
the exercise of such right impossibile or excessively difficult, pursuant to the principle of 
effectiveness. 
More recently, such rules have been reiterated by the EUCJ in the case Sosnowska
682
. At 
issue was the Polish legislation which extended from 60 to 180 days, starting from the date 
of submission of the VAT return, the period of time available to tax authorities for 
repayment of excess VAT to taxable persons who had started up the economic activity less 
than 12 months earlier and had carried out intra-community purchases. The provision was 
expressly justified by the need to allow the inquiries necessary to prevent tax evasion and 
avoidance, and was based on the (irrebuttable) presumption that for new economic 
operators a longer period is required to ascertain the entitlement to the VAT credit, as they 
are not known to the tax office. Similarly to the measure relevant in Garage Molenheide, 
the right to the refund of the VAT credit emerging from the taxable person’s VAT return 
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 ECJ, 10 July 2008, case C-25/07, Sosnowska. See the Note to the case of A. Mondini, Giurisprudenza 
delle Imposte, 2008, in www.giurisprudenzaimposte.it. 
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was not altogether denied, but rather delayed. In addition, it was possible to escape the 
application of such delay by lodging a security deposit. 
Notwithstanding this, the EUCJ found the provision to have disproportionate effects on the 
principles and objectives of the VAT Directive. Once again, although the national 
legislator construed the measure as a mere rule of law, at most a typification, the Court 
moved the question to the probative level, by deeming as decisive the absence of the 
possibility for the taxable person to demonstrate that the risk of tax evasion or avoidance 
(which is assumed by the provision concerned) did not occur in the concrete case. After 
having premised that the means which Member States avail themselves in view of 
(legitimately) protecting their financial interests have to comply with the proportionality 
principle, the Court held that (paras 24-25): 
“It is clear from the case-law that national legislation determining conditions for 
repayment of excess VAT which are more onerous for one category of taxable persons 
because of a presumed risk of evasion, without making any provision for the taxable 
person to demonstrate the absence of tax evasion or avoidance in order to take advantage 
of less restrictive conditions, is not a means proportionate to the objective of combating 
tax evasion and avoidance and has a disproportionate effect on the objectives and 
principles of the Sixth VAT Directive (see, by analogy, in relation to exclusions from the 
right to deduct, Joined Cases C-177/99 and C-181/99 Ampafrance and Sanofi [2000] ECR 
I-7013, paragraph 62, and, in relation to preventive attachment, Molenheide and Others, 
paragraph 51).  
(...) 
It is clear from the order for reference that Article 97(5) and (7) of the Law on VAT apply 
generally and preventively to new taxable persons, without making any provision for such 
persons to demonstrate the absence of a risk of tax evasion or avoidance.” 
In the view taken by the Court, this conclusion was not mitigated, but rather supported, 
either by the length of the period provided for new taxable persons, which was much 
longer in respect to the normal time-limits applied to other taxable persons
683
, or by the 
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 Id., at para 27: “Similarly, the national provisions at issue do not appear to be in conformity with the 
condition laid down in the case-law, as stated in paragraph 17 of this judgment, that repayment of the excess 
VAT must be made within a reasonable time. As was stated in the order for reference, the period for 
repayment of 180 days laid down for new taxable persons is, on the one hand, six times longer than the one 
month applicable accounting period for VAT and, on the other hand, three times longer than the period 
applied to other taxable persons, while the Polish authorities have offered no argument capable of 
explaining why it is necessary, in order to prevent tax evasion and avoidance, to establish a difference in 
treatment of such a scale.”  
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possible security deposit, whose amount was not connected with the amount of excess 
VAT or with the size of the taxable person
684
.  
 
9. Conclusion 
The examination of the most relevant case-law on national presumptive measures in the 
area of VAT offers a significative sample of how the EUCJ approaches to the latter. 
The key factor is represented by the exclusive focus on the effects of the single 
presumptive measure with respect to the principles, rights and objectives set forth in the 
common system of VAT. This results from the reasoning followed by the Court and it is 
even immediately evident from the wording of some rulings, where the Court refers to the 
‘effects of irrebuttable presumption’, by underling their systematic and general characters.  
In the light and as corollaries of the foregoing, the distinction between substantive 
presumptive measures and procedural presumptive measures, the former affecting 
harmonized matters whereas the second falling within the competence of the Member 
States, does not significantly influence the evaluation of EU (in)consistency. The same 
holds true for the dichotomy legislative measures and administrative or judicial practices or 
intepretation, which in the perspective of the EUCJ are susceptible of having similar 
effects on the functioning of the VAT system. 
As long as a certain provision undermines a right or principle laid down in the Directive, 
albeit authorised or retained under the procedure provided for derogations from the 
Directive, the EUCJ places it under the length of the principles of proportionality, legal 
certainty, effectiveness and equivalence. The evaluation is mainly the result of the 
interaction between two general principles of EU law, that is the principle of 
proportionality and the principle of effectiveness. Both of them concern the effects of a 
certain national provision. The former, under the perspective of the relation between means 
employed and aim pursued, requires the least sacrifice possible for the principles and 
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Id., paras 31 and 32: “In particular, the lodging of such a security deposit is likely, contrary to what is 
required by the case-law referred to in paragraph 17 of this judgment, to entail a not inconsiderable 
financial risk for undertakings which have just commenced their activities and may, consequently, lack 
significant resources. In reality, the effect of the obligation to put in place such a security deposit, in order to 
be able to take advantage of the period which ordinarily applies, is only to replace the financial burden 
associated with the fact that the amount of the excess VAT is tied up for a period of 180 days with the burden 
consequent on the amount of the security deposit being tied up. There is even less justification when, first, the 
latter amount may, as in the case in the main proceedings, be greater than the amount of the excess VAT at 
issue, and, second, the length of time over which the security deposit is tied up is greater than the period for 
repayment of the excess VAT laid down for new taxable persons. Under Article 97(6) of the Law on VAT, the 
security deposit can be released only after a period of 12 months, on condition that the taxable person has 
paid all of the taxes relating to that period for which he is liable to the State.” 
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objectives of the VAT system; the second, under the perspective of the conditions of 
exercise and proof of the rights conferred to taxable persons by the VAT Directive, 
requests to effectively guarantee the exercise of such rights and the ‘effet utile’ of the 
relevant EU provision. The principle of effectiveness comes into play, in particular, when 
procedural provisions (i.e. falling into the ‘formal’ tax matter) are at issue, even though it 
is rarely explicitly mentioned by the Court in its decisions. 
In this framework, irrebuttable presumptions and in general all those similar mechanisms, 
which do not operate on the probative level, being rather construed as mere rules of law, 
are deemed as being disproportionate insofar as they assume the existence of certain facts 
(risk of avoidance or evasion, fumus boni iuris and periculum in mora
685
 etc.) from which 
adverse effects on a right or principle of the VAT system systematically follow, without 
any chance for the taxable person to give the proof to the contrary and to obtain a judicial 
review of his personal situation.  
Rebuttable presumptions of law may embody, in this sense, a good balance between the 
different interests in play and appropriate and proportionate means, insofar as the taxable 
person is concretely and effectively enabled to give proof to the contrary. Where, instead, 
the reversal of the onus of proof renders excessively difficult or even impossibile the 
exercise of a right conferred to the taxable person by the Directive, it may likewise be 
deemed inconsistent with the common system of the Directive. This may be the case, for 
instance, because of the limitations regarding the means of proof available to the taxpayer, 
or to the facts that he is entitled to prove (negative facts, probatio diabolica).  
With particular reference to the difficulties met by taxpayers in giving the contrary proof, 
there is an extensive case-law concerning the presumption of the passing on of indirect 
taxes levied in contravention of EU law, to which the reimbursement of the unduly 
collected tax was made conditional in some Member States. This case-law will be briefly 
examined in the next part, with a view of inferring further elements on the EUCJ’s 
approach to legal presumptions in the domain of indirect taxation.  
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Chapter III - Section I - Part III 
Reimbursement of Overpaid (Indirect) Taxes 
Levied in Contravention of EU law 
 
1. Presumptions of passing on of overpaid indirect taxes levied in contravention of EU 
Law 
Dealing with tax law presumptions in the area of indirect taxation, separate attention must 
be paid to  an extensive EUCJ case-law concerning national provisions that restricted on 
the right to the refund of indirect taxes levied in contravention of EU law. 
To set the stage, it has to be clarified that the situation from which the right of 
reimbursement arose, in the cases at issue, is the imposition by Member States of unlawful 
taxes or charges, meaning prohibited by EU law, or the levy of taxes or charges in an 
unlawful manner, meaning in contrast with EU law, as the case may be for discriminatory 
levies. Once the contrast with EU law has been ascertained, typically by a judgment of the 
EUCJ, then the Member State concerned is prevented from continuing to levy the unlawful 
charges and is further requested to refund the amount of charges that have been unlawfully 
collected. In the absence of EU rules governing the procedure of reimbursement, the 
refund is regulated under national rules, which nonetheless must neither be discriminatory 
nor render the exercise of the refund impossible or excessively difficult (EU principle of 
equivalence and effectiveness). 
Leaving for the next paragraph the examination of the EUCJ’s rulings, it is convenient to 
hold now a domestic perspective, in order to illustrate how the issue of the right to the 
refund of undue charges touches the issue of tax law presumptions. 
In this regard, it has to be noted that when the refund of indirect taxes is at issue, Member 
States normally meet several difficulties in ‘quantifying’ the amount of the repayment. As 
a matter of fact, most indirect taxes are not separately recharged by the undertakings who 
remit the tax to the authorities to their customers, because they are not set aside from the 
selling price. As a result, it is likely that the undertaking who has remitted to the Treasury 
the taxes levied in breach of EU law, has shifted the burden of such taxes onto his 
customers, by incorporating them in the prices of goods and services supplied. Sometimes, 
they are even legally obliged to do that. Based on these features peculiar to indirect taxes 
and with the aim of alleviating the burden of proof on the side of the tax authorities as well 
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as of avoiding the unjust enrichment of undertakings, a number of Member States had 
introduced in the past presumptions that indirect taxes are passed on to customers. 
The EUCJ case-law on the above national measures offers several elements of interest for 
our purpose, for three main reasons. First of all, from a large number of judgments issued 
precisely on the right of refund, the Court interferes with national procedural rules to such 
an extent that it rejects a reversal of the burden of proof on the undertaking. As a 
consequence, even a rebuttable presumption of law, which shifts onto the taxpayer the 
burden of proving that the unjust enrichment did not occur, or a presumption of fact, are 
deemed as being not in line with EU law. To reach this conclusion, the EUCJ takes into 
consideration that the object of the contrary proof is construed so as to render impossible 
or excessively difficult the exercise of the EU right, because it is a negative fact. In 
addition, the Court, perhaps for the first time, argues the inconsistency of presumptions 
from the fallaciousness of the inference, which in its view is based on a wrong 
individualization of the known fact. In drawing such reasoning, the EUCJ avails itself of 
the principle of effectiveness and, though not invariably and not explicitly, the principle of 
proportionality. To which extent the scheme followed at EU level resembles or diverges 
from the rationale of a national Constitutional Court, may be verified with regard to the 
presumption of transfer of certain taxes collected in breach of EU law provided in the 
Italian tax system, as the EUCJ and the Italian Constitutional Court have on various 
occasions ruled on it. 
Below, after an overview of the main rulings on the issue of repayment of indirect taxes 
unlawfully levied, the attention is put on a few significant judgments in order to infer some 
indications as regards the limitations to the division of the burden of proof and the use of 
legal presumptions met by national legislators in this area. 
 
2. The right to repayment of undue taxes under EU law and possible restrictions 
The question of the repayment of taxes inconsistent with EU law has originated in various 
EUCJ judgments, mostly in relation to the actions or juridical tools available to taxpayers 
in their own national legal orders. From the case law, it is thus possible to infer a few 
principles or rules which can be held true in the matter. 
First of all, it is settled case-law that the right to a refund of taxes or charges levied in a 
Member State in breach of EU law is the “consequence of, and completement to, the rights 
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conferred on individuals by the Community provisions”686. As a result, the Member State is 
in principle ‘obliged’ to repay taxes and charges levied in contravention of EU law. It 
follows that the right to the refund of unlawful taxes embodies a general principle of EU 
law, which is ancillary to other general principles of EU law
687
. Indeed, looking at the 
decisions of the Court, such right derives from the conjunct application of the EU rule of 
law which has been contravened by the Member State, the principle of cooperation, and the 
principle of equivalence and effectiveness
688
. 
Therefore, such right may not in principle be limited. Moreover, in the absence of any 
harmonization on the repayment of taxes or charges wrongly levied, it falls within the 
competence of each Member State the definition of detailed procedural rules governing 
actions for the protection of rights conferred upon individuals by EU law.Yet, Member 
States are basically bound in the exercise of such competence by the principle of 
effectiveness and equivalence. It entails that procedural rules governing the refund of taxes 
collected in breach of EU law are neither less favourable than those regulating similar 
domestic actions (i.e. not discriminatory), nor render impossibile or even excessively 
difficult the exercise of the right of EU origin
689
. 
However, from the same settled case-law it results that there are a few delimited 
exceptions to the above obligation. There are, in other words, hypotheses in which a 
Member State may restrict the exercise of reimbursement rights derived from EU law. 
Again, the EUCJ clarifies that the limitation to national procedural possibilities must not 
discriminate actions based on EU law against domestic actions, and above all, confines the 
legitimacy of such a limitation to the existence of a general interest justifying it
690
. This 
may be represented, looking at the case-law, by the principle of legal certainty for both 
taxpayers and tax administration, which may justify the setting out of (reasonable) time-
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 ECJ, 21 September 2000, Joined cases C-441/98 and C-442/98, Michailidis, at para 30. See the decision in 
Dir. Prat. Trib., II, 2003, 979, with the comment of E. Frixione, Sui tributi incompatibili con il diritto 
comunitario e la ripetizione dell’indebito, Dir. Prat. Trib., 2003, 987. 
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 See ECJ 11 July 2002, case C-62/00, Marks & Spencer, at para 39: “Member States are required as a 
matter of principle to repay taxes collected in breach of Community law”. 
688
 See, among the others, ECJ, 16 December 1976, case C-33/76, at para 5; ECJ 15 December 1976, case C-
45/76, Comet, at paras 11-12-13. While in the latter paragraph the principle of equivalence and effectiveness 
is recalled, in the other two it is stated that “The prohibition laid down in Article 16 of the Treaty and that 
contained in Article 10 of Regulation No 234/68 have direct effect and confer on individuals rights which the 
national courts must protect. Thus, in application of the principle of cooperation laid down in Article 5 of the 
Treaty, the national courts are entrusted with ensuring the legal protection conferred on individuals by the 
direct effect of the provisions of Community law.” 
689
 Ex multis, ECJ 27 March 1980, case C-61/79, Denkavit Italiana, paras 25-26; ECJ 27 February 1980, case 
C-68/79, Just, paras 25-26. 
690
 This, on the basis of a procedural rule of reason that the ECJ establishes starting from the principle of 
effectiveness, according to B.J.M. Terra and P.J. Wattel, European tax law, cited above, 126. 
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limits for bringing proceedings
691
. A further collective interest which may entitle Member 
States to resist refund to the undertaking of a tax levied in breach of EU law is the 
prevention of unjust enrichment
692
. 
The Court has explicitly acknowledged that Member States may refuse to the trader the 
reimbursement of taxes levied in breach of EU law when he has shifted the burden of the 
tax onto other persons. Otherwise, the repayment would result in an unjust enrichment of 
the trader himself. However, similarly to the justification of legal certainty, the Court 
makes the consistency of national measures which impose restrictions on the right of 
reimbursement conditional to certain requirements. First, presumably on the basis of the 
proportionality principle, the Court clarifies that the amount of the denied refund has to 
correspond to the amount of charge passed on to third persons. In practice, the right may be 
denied altogether if the burden of the tax has been borne in its entirety by someone other 
than the undertaking. If, instead, such burden has been transferred only in part, the trader is 
due the amount that he has effectively borne. This first condition implies a further 
requirement for national measures limiting the right of repayment: the ascertainment of the 
concrete occurring of an unjust enrichment. In this regard, the question arises as to which 
party (tax authorities or undertaking) has to bear the burden of proving the existence or the 
inexistence of that circumstance from which the reimbursement depends on. 
As explained in the previous paragraph, due to the feautures characterising most indirect 
taxes, the determination of the if and amount of repayment owing to the trader is not an 
easy challenge. This is particularly so, as in the view taken by the Court the ascertainment 
of the shifting of the tax burden onto third parties does not per se entail an unjust 
enrichment. In other words, from the circumstance that the transfer of the economic burden 
of the undue tax took place, cannot be authomatically inferred the unjust enrichment of the 
trader claiming reimbursement. The Court, thus, requests an overall economic analysis of 
all the factors and circumstances relevant in the concrete case
693
. It may happen, for 
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 Insofar as the time-limits apply indiscriminately, they are reasonable and established in advance and 
provide for transitional arrangments. The compatibility of a national legislation curtailing the period within 
which recovery may be claimed is thus made by the Court conditional to certain requirements. See in this 
regard, ECJ 11 July 2002, case C-62/00, Marks & Spencer, in particular at para 35 to 39. 
692
 J.J.P. Swinkels, Unjust Enrichment under EU VAT, International VAT Monitor, 2011, 249 et seq. The 
Author gives an overview of the case-law where the Court has defined the conditions for the principle of 
unjust enrichment (which is not a general principle of EU law) to apply. Interestingly, the Author shows how 
these conditions are different depending on whether the refund concerns a tax levied in breach of EU law or 
instead VAT charged by an undertaking to his customers because of a mistake.  
693
 From the judgment in the case Comet, cited above, one would infer that national courts are entrusted with 
ensuring that all the factors influencing the determination of the repayment are taken into account. The ECJ 
has on several occasion reiterated that “The Court has already observed on several occasions that it would be 
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instance, that the undertaking suffered as a consequence of such tax levied in breach of EU 
law, because an increase in the prices of his merchandise due to the incorporation of the 
tax has caused the effect of reducing the turnover. In this event, an unjust enrichment 
would not occur, or would occur only partially.  
In principle, the existence of the unjust enrichment, established according to the manner 
indicated by the EUCJ, falls within the probative burden of tax authorities. It is up to the 
latter to give evidence of the actual unjust enrichment of the party claiming the refund of 
taxes that he has remitted to the Treasury and have been collected in breach of EU law so 
as to deny the reimbursement
694
.  
 
3. Legal presumptions of passing on of indirect taxes levied in breach of EU law. The 
San Giorgio case 
As said at the end of the previous paragraph, according to the Court it lays upon tax 
authorities the burden of proving that the charge levied in breach of EU law has been 
passed on to third persons and that a reimbursement would constitute an unjust enrichment. 
The corollary of this statement is the inconsistency with EU Law of any presumptions or 
rules of evidence which, by reversing the burden of proof onto the taxpayer or limiting the 
means of proof available, render impossible or excessively difficult the repayment of 
charges unduly paid. 
The Court has stated that in several decisions where national legislation, or administrative 
or even judicial practices where at issue. 
Among these cases, the judgment handed down with reference to Article 19, Italian Law 
Decree 20 September 1982, No 688 is worth mentioning. Article 19 made the repayment of 
charges unduly levied conditional to the documentary proof that the charge had not been 
                                                                                                                                                                                
compatible with the principles of Community law for courts before which claims for repayment were brought 
to take into consideration the damage which the trader concerned might have suffered because measures 
such as the disputed charge had the effect of restricting the volume of exports (Just, paragraph 26; and 
Comateb, paragraph 30).” The case-law on reimbursement of tax levied in breach of EU law shows how the 
Court mostly disregards the legislative rather than administrative or judicial source of the measure in contrast 
with EU law. As we will see infra in the text (case C-129/2000), even a jurisprudential interpretation which 
causes the denial of a right derived from EU law may be found inconsistent with the latter. 
694
 In this regard, as it will be explained in the next paragraph, the Court reiterated that “(…) any rules of 
evidence which have the effect of making it virtually impossible or excessively difficult to secure repayment of 
charges levied in breach of Community law are incompatible with Community law. That is so particularly in 
the case of presumptions or rules of evidence intended to place upon the taxpayer the burden of establishing 
that the charges unduly paid have not been passed on to other persons or of special limitations concerning 
the form of the evidence to be adduced, such as the exclusion of any kind of evidence other than documentary 
evidence”. See ECJ, 21 September 2000, Joined cases C-441/98 and C-442/98, Comateb, at para 36. 
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passed on to other persons
695
. In this way, the provision governed the refund of customs 
duties and other charges on consumption that the taxpayer had remitted to the Treasury, by 
relieving tax authorities from the burden of proving the transfer of the charge. It was based 
on the presumption that normally economic operators shift the indirect taxes onto 
customers, and indeed it was intepreted as laying down a rebuttable presumption of law, 
with a contrary proof confined to documentary evidence. In fact, the same provision 
included in a previous law decree, which was not converted into law because of the expiry 
of the time-limits, was explicitly construed as a rebuttable presumption of law
696
. As such, 
an order for a preliminary ruling was submitted by an Italian national court to the European 
Court of Justice, asking in essence if the probative restriction to the claims for refund was 
compatible with Community law
697
.   
Notably, in the observations submitted to the Court, the Italian government underlined how 
the Italian provision was justified in the light of preventing unjust enrichment, according to 
a principle applicable in other Member States
698
, and in pursuing this aim it did not 
discriminate depending on the legal basis of the right of refund (Community law or 
national law). Similarly, the European Commission, albeit espressed doubts about the 
retroactivity of the norm, argued that “the presumption, as regards taxes on consumption 
on certain goods, that the charge is passed on to other traders when the goods are 
transferred merely reflects a normal commercial practice” and accordingly found that the 
probative burden put on the undertaking “does not seem, in practice, extremely difficult to 
fulfil”. 
                                                          
695
 Converted into law by the Law 27 November 1982, No 873. At para 1, Article 19 stated as follows: “Any 
person who has paid import duties, manufacturing taxes, taxes on comsumption or State taxes which have 
been unduly levied, even prior to the entry into force of this decree, is entitled to repayment of the sums paid 
if he provides documentary proof that the charge in question has not been passed on in any way whatsoever 
to other persons, except in cases of substantive error”. Cf. G. Marongiu, Il rimborso dei diritti doganali e ... 
le fatiche d’Ercole, Dir. Prat. Trib., 1991, 961; L. Comucci, Osservazioni in ordine ai tributi doganali 
incompatibili con la normativa comunitaria e alla ripetizione dell’indebito, Riv. Dir. Trib., 1998, 142; L. del 
Federico, Azioni e termini per il rimborso dei tributi incompatibili con l’ordinamento comunitario, 
Giurisprudenza delle imposte, 2003, 275. 
696
 Article 10, Law decree 10 July 1982 No 430, which at the first paragraph was exactly alike Article 19 
cited in the text. At the second paragraph it added that “The charge is presumed to have been passed on 
whenever the goods in respect of which the payment was effected have been transferred, even after 
processing, transformation, erection, assembly or adaptation, in the absence of documentary proof to the 
contrary”. From the decision it clearly results that Article 10, which was applicable when the national court 
decided to refer the case to the ECJ, was subsequently reproduced in Article 19, which is ‘substantially 
identical’. See para 6 of the judgment. 
697
 ECJ 9 November 1983, C-199/82, San Giorgio. See F. Amatucci, I vincoli posti dalla giurisprudenza 
comunitaria nei confronti della disciplina nazionale del rimborso d’imposta, Riv. Dir. Trib., 2000, 291 et seq. 
698
 It noted that Article 10, Law-decree No 430, was alike Article 4 of the French Law of Finance for 1981, 
and reflected a principle common to other Member States, such as Denmark. 
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The Court dismissed such arguments and held as follows (para 14-15): 
“(…) any requirement of proof which has the effect of making it virtually impossible or 
excessively difficult to secure the repayment of charges levied contrary to Community law 
would be incompatible with Community law. That is so particularly in the case of 
presumptions or rules of evidence intended to place upon the taxpayer the burden of 
establishing that the charges unduly paid have not been passed on to other persons or of 
special limitations concerning the form of the evidence to be adduced, such as the 
exclusion of any kind of evidence other than documentary evidence Once it is established 
that the levying of the charge is incompatible with Community law, the court must be free 
to decide whether or not the burden of the charge has been passed on, wholly or in part, to 
other persons.  
In a market economy based on freedom of competition, the question whether, and if so to 
what extent, a fiscal charge imposed on an importer has actually been passed on in 
subsequent transactions involves a degree of uncertainty for which the person obliged to 
pay a charge contrary to Community law cannot be systematically held responsible.” 
Notably, the Court puts the attention on the difficulty of proof as regards the actual transfer 
of indirect taxes onto third persons. The burden of such proof, in its view, cannot lay upon 
a taxpayer claiming for the refund of a tax that a Member State is responsible for having 
collected in breach of EU law. 
To reach this conclusion, the EUCJ refers to the principle of effectiveness, which prohibits 
national probative provisions that render impossible or excessively difficult the repayment 
of a tax levied contrary to EU law. Besides that, it seems that the decision is in part 
influenced by the circumstance that the tax to be refunded was collected by a Member 
State contrary to EU law. As a consequence, the right to refund that is conferred upon the 
taxpayer from EU law, cannot be undermined by ‘systematically’ burdening him with the 
proof of a fact that is per se difficult to give. Notably, in suggesting a different distribution 
of the burden of proof between tax authorities and taxpayer, the Court does not make 
reference to the reasonableness of the criterion, but is rather guided by the need to secure 
the effective exercise of the EU right. 
 
Chapter III 
  
 
 372 
3.1 … and the subsequent cases Bianco and Girard, Comateb 
In a number of decisions handed down after the case San Giorgio, the Court had the 
occasion to clarify the reasoning surrounding the conclusion of inconsistency of legal 
presumptions in the matter under discussion. 
In the case Bianco and Girard
699
, the Court acknowledged that indirect taxes are normally 
shifted upon customers, but added that it is not possible to assume that such translation 
concretely took place, as it depends on several factors. In other words, “it is quite probable, 
depending on the nature of the market, that the charge has been passed on. However, the 
numerous factors which determine commercial strategy vary from one case to another so 
that it is virtually impossible to determine how they affect the passing on of the charge”. 
One would expect that, on the basis of the above statements, the Court rejects irrebuttable 
presumptions of law, which systematically assume the passing on of the charge upon third 
parties, while it accepts rebuttable presumptions of law. This is not the case. By contrast, 
the Court appears to reject every means of proof that establishes the burden of proving the 
non-transfer (i.e. a negative fact
700
) upon the taxpayer claiming for the refund. The 
question as to whether the undertaking has passed on to customers the tax is a question of 
fact which, in the view taken by the Court, must be assessed by the national court freely, 
meaning without being bound by evidence having effects of legal proof
701
. 
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 ECJ, 25 February 1988, Joined cases C-331/85, C-376/85, C-378/85, Bianco and Girard. The decision 
concerned the French legislation (Article 13 (V), Fiannce Law of 31 December 1980) pursuant to which: 
“'Where a person has unduly paid indirect duties governed by the General Tax Code or national duties and 
charges collected according to the procedures of the Customs Code, he may, except in cases of substantive 
error, only obtain repayment if he can demonstrate that the duties were not passed on to the buyer”. In the 
view of the French government, especially when indirect taxes are involved, the presumption that they have 
been passed on is justified, since they are by their own nature to be borne ultimately by consumers. 
700
 By rejecting the argument put forward by the French government contending that a positive fact was to be 
proven the Court observed, at para 11 of the judgment, that “The provision contained in the French 
legislation at issue in fact requires traders to prove a negative fact inasmuch as where the authorities merely 
allege that traders have passed on the taxes, these traders must prove that they have not passed on the 
unduly paid parafiscal charge to other persons. The fact that the provision at issue may have been framed in 
positive terms is irrelevant for the person upon whom the burden of proof rests”. 
701
 Id., at para 17 stated as follows: “In this respect it must be stressed that, even though indirect taxes are 
designed in national law to be passed on to the final consumer and in commerce are normally passed on in 
whole or in part, it cannot be generally assumed that the charge is actually passed on in every case. The 
actual passing on of such taxes, either in whole or in part, depends on various factors in each commercial 
transaction which distinguish it from other transactions in other contexts. Consequently, the question 
whether an indirect tax has or has not been passed on in each case is a question of fact to be determined by 
the national court which may freely assess the evidence. However, in the case of indirect taxes, it may not be 
assumed that there is a presumption that they have been passed on and that it is for the taxpayer to prove the 
contrary. This in no way prejudges the solution of the specific problem that arises as regards the burden of 
proof where the taxpayer has been obliged to pass on a charge by the relevant legislation itself.” 
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In a subsequent judgment (Comateb)
702
, the Court clarified two points, which incidentally 
or implicitly resulted already from its previous decisions in the matter. First, the conclusion 
reached as regards the inconsistency with EU law of rebuttable presumptions that the 
indirect tax passed on, holds true even when the undertaking is legally obliged to 
incorporate the tax in the cost price of his products
703
. Moreover, the Court excluded that a 
causal direct link exists between the passing on of the tax to third parties  and the unjust 
enrichment of the undertaking, which only can ground the denial of the right of refund
704
. 
Again, the unjust enrichment constitutes a question of fact which must be freely 
ascertained by the national court. The latter will take into consideration the amount of 
damages that the undertaking has suffered, in terms of a decrease in sales, because of the 
incorporation of the tax in the prices of his products. 
The foregoing confirms the primary role assigned by the Court to the national judge, which 
is entrusted with ensuring the effective enforcement of the EU right to a refund of taxes 
levied in breach of EU law. It is up to the national judge to ascertain, based on the facts of 
the pending case, if and to what extent the passing on of the tax and the unjust enrichment 
took place. None of these two events may be presumed by national legislation, as this 
would imply binding its decision in the concrete case. 
 
4. The presumption of passing on of indirect taxes levied in breach of EU law as the 
effect of the national and judicial practice 
One of the most interesting decisions, dealing with probative restrictions on the right of 
refund, is Commission v. Italy
705
, handed down following an infringement procedure. It is 
often recalled not only for the issue at hand, but also because it represents a cornerstone 
                                                          
702
 ECJ, 14 January 1997, Joined cases from C-192/95 to C-218/95, Comateb. 
703
 Id., para 26: “The same applies where taxpayers have been obliged by the relevant legislation to 
incorporate the charge in the cost price of the product concerned. The fact that such a legal obligation exists 
does not mean that there is a presumption that the entire charge has been passed on, even where failure to 
comply with that obligation carries a penalty”.  
704
 Id., at para 29: “It should be borne in mind, however, that even where it is established that the burden of 
the charge has been passed on in whole or in part to the purchaser, repayment to the trader of the amount 
thus passed on does not necessarily entail his unjust enrichment”. 
705
 ECJ 9 December 2003, case C-129/00, Commission v. Italy. See the decision in Rivista di diritto 
finanziario e scienza delle finanze, II, 2004, 57, with the comment of C. Attardi, Presunzione di translazione 
del tributo: in tema di responsabilità di uno Stato membro per inadempimento degli obblighi comunitari, Riv. 
Dir. Fin. Sc. Fin., 2004, 65. The Author infered from the ruling the prohibition of presumptions in 
Community law, as they conflict with the principle of effectiveness. Cf. the comment to the same judgment 
of V. Mercurio, La ripetizione dei tributi riscossi in violazione del diritto comunitario tra “diritto vivente” e 
principio di effettività, Riv. Dir. Trib., 2004, 85; see also N. Pennella, Il caso italiano della presunzione di 
traslazione dei tributi sui consumi, Note to case C-129/2000, Rass. Trib. 2004, 114. 
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with regard to the State’s responsibility for the operating of its administrative and judicial 
bodies. 
At issue was again the Italian legislation on the refund of taxes levied in breach of EU law. 
In particular, Article 29, para 2, Law No 428/90, provided that such taxes were reimbursed 
“unless the amount thereof has been passed on to others”. The provision was per se 
‘neutral’706, meaning that it did not establish any presumption as regards the relevant facts. 
It was instead supposed to imply that the burden of proof rested upon tax authorities 
pursuant to the ordinary rule. Indeed, it was introduced to replace Article 19, Law decree 
No 688/82, which was twice found to be inconsistent with Community law
707
. 
Notwithstanding this, Article 29, para 2, was applied by Italian courts as laying down a 
presumption of translation of the tax on customers
708
. In other words, the practice showed 
                                                          
706
 This term is used by the Court itself in the decision, at para 31, where it held that “Such a provision is in 
itself neutral in respect of Community law in relation both to the burden of proof that the charge has been 
passed on to other persons and to the evidence which is admissible to prove it. Its effect must be determined 
in the light of the construction which the national courts give it.” 
707
 In the decision San Giorgio cited above, and also in another decision of the Court handed down in an 
action brought by the Commission against Italy for failure to fulfil obligations: ECJ 24 March 1988, case C-
104/86, Commission v. Italy. See M. Olivieri, Normativa italiana in tema di rimbosrso di imposte nazionali 
corrisposte in violazione dei principi comunitari, Dir. Prat. Trib., 1990, 473 et seq. Notably, following the 
judgments of the ECJ on Article 19, the Italian legislator regulated the claims for refund in a different way 
depending on the legal basis, whether national or of Community law. The result was that Article 19 
continued to apply to domestic actions for refund of undue taxes, while Article 29 applied to actions for 
refund based on Community law. 
708
 As such, it had also give rise to a judgment of the European Court of Justice following a reference for a 
preliminary ruling. It is ECJ, 9 February 1999, case C-343/96, Dilexport, where the Court held that “If, as the 
national court considers, there is a presumption that the duties and charges unlawfully levied or collected 
when not due have been passed on to third parties and the plaintiff is required to rebut that presumption in 
order to secure repayment of the charge, the provisions in question must be regarded as contrary to 
Community law”, whereas “If, on the other hand, as the Italian Government maintains, it is for the 
administration to show, by any form of evidence generally accepted by national law, that the charge was 
passed on to other persons, the provisions in question are not to be considered contrary to Community law”. 
A similar interesting judgment is ECJ 2 October 2003, case C-147/01, Weber’s Wine World. With particular 
reference to the relationship established within the practice between the passing on of the tax and the unjust 
enrichment the Court held as follows (para 113-114): “Although the tax authority and the Austrian 
Government contend that the burden of proof is wholly borne by the national authority, it is also apparent 
from the order for reference that the tax authority concluded that the economic burden of the duty on 
alcoholic beverages had not been borne by the claimants in the main proceedings simply because the price 
invoiced to consumers of those beverages included that duty. That approach might constitute a presumption 
that the duty has been passed on to third parties, and also of unjust enrichment of the taxable persons, of 
such a kind as to render repayment of the duty levied though not due impossible or at least excessively 
difficult, which is contrary to Community law. It is for the national court to determine whether, in the 
absence of a statutory presumption, the tax authority's practice has the effect of establishing such a 
presumption of unjust enrichment”. The Court thus concluded that (para 117) “(...) the principle of 
effectiveness referred to at paragraph 103 of this judgment precludes national legislation or a national 
administrative practice which makes the exercise of the rights conferred by the Community legal order 
impossible in practice or excessively difficult by establishing a presumption of unjust enrichment on the sole 
ground that the duty was passed on to third parties.” 
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that the probative regime under Article 19 cited above, which was found by the EUCJ to be 
inconsistent with Community law, was restored by tax authorities and judges
709
. 
In accordance with its previous case-law, and disregarding the fact that the presumption 
was a result of interpretation, the EUCJ found Italy responsible for having failed to amend 
Article 29, para 2, which was interpreted and applied by administrative authorities and the 
majority of courts in such a way that it rendered excessively difficult for the taxpayer the 
right to repayment of charges levied in breach of Community rules. 
Apparently, there is nothing new in respect of other decisions, as the Court grounds its 
conclusion on the principle of effectiveness. Though, presumably due also to the detailed 
frame presented by the Commission and the need to consider the interpretation of the 
provision given by Italian courts, the EUCJ gives an insight of the structure of the 
presumption concerned and seems to question its rationality. 
The European Commission argued that the jurisprudence of the Italian Supreme Court, 
which was followed by the lower courts, resulted in the establishment of a presumption 
that a taxpayer claiming refund of charges incompatible with Community law on the basis 
of Article 29, para 2, Law No 428/90, has passed on the tax to subsequent sales. National 
courts’ reasoning rested mainly on the assumption that normally commercial companies 
pass on indirect taxes to their customers. In particular, the Commission gave account of a 
specific decision of the Italian Supreme Court
710
 and of some circular letters issued by 
Italian tax authorities. In the former, the Italian judge identified a series of elements 
capable of grounding a presumption of translation: the commercial/industrial nature of the 
activity carried out by the taxpayer, the normality of the trading and the absence of 
insolvency, the undue charges had been applied over a long period in the entire territory 
without any objection being raised, the failure to produce accounting documents (even 
when the period of obligatory preservation was expired). Such widespread judicial 
approach, in the view taken by the Commission, “establishes a de facto presumption that 
taxpayers pass on to third parties the charges contrary to Community law of which they 
seek repayment, a presumption which it is then for them to rebut by adducing evidence to 
the contrary, in disregard of the Court's holding in paragraph 52 of the judgment in 
Dilexport”. Moreover, the Commission underlined that the reasoning developed by the 
                                                          
709
 This appears a typical example of a ‘jurisprudential presumption’, which refers to a certain inference that, 
born as a presumption of fact, ends up to be costantly applied by courts, as if it was a presumption provided 
for by the law. 
 
710
 Supreme Court 28 March 1996, No 2844. 
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Italian courts was illogical, as the premise (companies usually pass on indirect taxes) of the 
presumption coincides with the result of the premise, and the elements sometimes put 
forward in such reasoning (nature of the taxpayer, non-insolvency, general application of 
the charge) were arbitrary. Likewise, in some circular letters
711
 the passing on of charges to 
third parties was inferred by the circumstance that such charges had not been accounted for, 
for the year of their payment, as payments to the public purse for undue tax and credited as 
an asset in the balance sheet of the taxpayer claiming their refund. In such line of thought, 
the lack of this accounting record showed that the undertaking had considered the charges 
as being ordinary expenses and thus had passed them on to customers. 
The Court agreed with the arguments put forward by the Commission, and held as follows 
(para 35):  
“The reasoning followed in the cited judgments of the Corte suprema di cassazione is itself 
based on a premiss which is a mere presumption, namely that indirect taxes are in 
principle passed on by subsequent sales by economic operators where they have the 
chance. The other factors, if any, taken into account, namely the commercial nature of the 
taxpayer's business, the fact that its financial situation is not parlous and the levying of the 
tax in question throughout the national territory for an appreciable period without 
objection, permit the conclusion that an undertaking which has carried on its business in 
such a context has in fact passed on the charges in question only if one relies on the 
premiss that all economic operators act thus, save in special circumstances such as the 
absence of one or other of those factors. However, as the Court has already held (see San 
Giorgio, cited above, paragraphs 14 and 15; Joined Cases 331/85, 376/85 and 378/85 
Bianco and Girard [1988] ECR I-1099, paragraph 17; Commission v Italy, cited above, 
paragraph 7, and Comateb and Others, paragraph 25), and for the economic reasons 
pointed out by the Advocate General in points 73 to 80 of his Opinion, such a premiss is 
unjustified in a certain number of situations and is merely a presumption which cannot be 
accepted in the context of the examination of claims for repayment of indirect taxes 
contrary to Community law.”712 
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 In the decision the following are mentioned: Circular letter 11 March 1994, No 21/2/VII; Circular letter 12 
April 1995, No 480/VIII. 
712
 In the subsequent paragraphs, the Court focused on the documentary requirements that national authorities 
asked from the taxpayer and that, if not fulfilled, gave rise to a presumption of passing on the charges. It 
stated as follows (paras 37 to 40): “Such a requirement, concerning the years for which repayment is claimed, 
which is raised during the period for which the accounting documents in question must obligatorily be 
preserved, cannot be regarded in itself as reversing, to taxpayers' disadvantage, the burden of proof that the 
charges have not been passed on to third parties. Such documents provide neutral factual information from 
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In the reasoning of the EUCJ, the judicial approach goes to deny the right of refund on the 
basis of a premise which is itself a presumption, according to which indirect taxes are 
passed on to customers by commercial companies. On such presumption further inferences 
are added and are based on certain elements, such as the nature of the activity, the non-
insolvency, the general and undisputed collection of the tax due, the failure to comply with 
acoounting requirements and so on. The result is, in the view taken by the Court, a sort of 
double presumption (i.e. a presumption based upon another one), wherein the first 
inference is wrong and contrary to Community law. In fact, the passing on to customers of 
indirect taxes does not systematically happen and the uncertainty related to the occurring 
of such circumstance in the concrete case cannot be put upon the taxpayer. Accordingly, 
the presumption that the indirect tax passed on to customers cannot be admitted in the 
context of claims for refund of taxes levied in breach of EU law
713
. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
which, in particular, the authorities may try to show that the charges have been passed on to others (see, to 
that effect, Case C-147/01 Weber's Wine World and Others [2003] ECR I-11365, paragraph 115). In that 
situation, and in the absence of special circumstances upon which the claimant could rely, failure to produce 
accounting documents when they are requested by the authorities can be regarded by them or by the courts 
as a factor to be taken into account in showing that the charges have been passed on to third parties. 
However, that factor cannot, by itself, be sufficient for it to be presumed that those charges have been passed 
on to third parties nor, a fortiori, to impose on the claimant the onus of rebutting such a presumption by 
proving the contrary (see, to that effect, Weber's Wine World and Others, cited above, paragraph 116). In 
any event, in situations where the authorities seek the production of those documents after the expiry of their 
statutory preservation period and the taxpayer fails to produce them, the fact of drawing the conclusion 
therefrom that the taxpayer has passed on the charges in question to third parties or of drawing the same 
conclusion subject to the taxpayer proving the contrary amounts to establishing to the taxpayer's 
disadvantage a presumption which results in making excessively difficult the exercise of the right to 
repayment of charges contrary to Community law. In relation to the fact that the authorities consider that the 
passing on of a charge to third parties is established if the amount of that charge has not been accounted for, 
from the year of its payment, as a payment to the public purse for undue tax, and credited as an asset in the 
balance-sheet of the undertaking seeking its repayment, it must be held as follows. Such reasoning leads to 
the establishment of an unjustified presumption to the claimant's disadvantage. In view of the conditions in 
which a claim for repayment of a charge occurs, to add the amount of that charge as an asset to the balance 
sheet for the year of its payment assumes that the taxpayer immediately considers that it has a high chance of 
successfully disputing its payment, although, under the very terms of Article 29(1) of Law No 428/1990, it 
has a period of several years to bring such claim. Furthermore, the taxpayer may very well, even while 
challenging the payment of the charge, consider its chances of success insufficiently sure to take the risk of 
accounting for the corresponding amount as an asset. In that regard, in view of the difficulties of obtaining a 
favourable outcome to a claim for repayment in the circumstances revealed in this case, such an entry could 
even be alleged to be contrary to the principles of lawful accounting. In addition, to consider that the passing 
on of the charge to third parties is established on the ground that its amount has not been added as an asset 
to the balance sheet already depends on the presumption that indirect taxes are usually passed on by 
subsequent sales, a presumption which has been declared to be contrary to Community law in the course of 
the consideration of the first aspect criticised by the Commission.” 
713
 Notably, following the ECJ’s judgments, the Italian legislator has amended, with Article 21, Law 6 
February 2007, No 13, the wording of Article 29, para 2, Law No 428/90, by adding that the passing on of 
the tax may not be assumed by the tax offices by means of presumptions. See C Sanò, Le presunzioni 
tributarie nazionali alla luce del diritto comunitario, in Attuazione del tributo e diritti del contribuente in 
Europa, (ed.) T. Tassani, Roma, Aracne, 2009, at 115. 
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4.1 Some considerations on the EUCJ’s line of reasoning as to the rationality of the 
presumptive inference in Commission v. Italy 
It must be observed at the outset that the construction given by the EUCJ in the case 
Commission v. Italy as regards the national judicial reasoning is not completely correct. In 
fact, at issue was not a double presumption (or a chain of presumptions), but rather a series 
of indices (notorious facts and known facts) which led the judge to assume that, in the 
pending case, a passing on to the customers had taken place. Such presumption may be 
classified as a ‘jurisprudential presumption’, because it is almost systematically applied by 
lower courts and the Supreme Court as if it was a legal presumption. 
Having clarified this, it is still worthy of attention that the EUCJ pauses to reflect on the 
structure of the national presumption, under the point of view of its reasonableness. It is 
illogical a presumption wherein the premise coincides with the result and the former is 
wrong and contrary to Community law. Notably, when the Court goes to examine some 
single indeces, especially those related to documentary burden upon the taxpayer, it 
explicitly finds certain facts as being inappropriate to ground a presumption (of law or 
even of fact)
714
 or as establishing to his disadvantage a presumption which results in 
making excessively difficult the exercise of the right to repayment of charges levied in 
breach of EU law
715
. 
However, the peculiar reasoning developed by the EUCJ in the decision at hand, which to 
a certain extent resembles the reasoning of a national Constitutional Court, while 
undoubtedly it deserves to be emphasized, it has also to be properly contextualized. In fact, 
from the jurisprudence of the EUCJ in the field of presumptions or rules of evidence 
restricting on the claims of refund, it results that the EUCJ rejects basically every means of 
proof which, by shifting the burden of proof (as to the passing on of the tax or the unjust 
enrichment) upon the claimant, excessively hinders the right of refund of the unduly levy. 
With particular regard to presumptions, the disfavour of the EUCJcovers not only 
irrebuttable presumptions, but also rebuttable (and irrespective of any limitations 
concerning the counterproof) or jurisprudential presumptions. One could argue that unlike 
tax law presumptions provided in other areas of law, in this case the EUCJ rejects even 
presumptions that may be rebutted precisely in view of the lack of reasonbleness of the 
inference. Another (more likely) explanation is that in the balance of the interests in play 
                                                          
714
 See Id., para 37. 
715
 This, in particular, when the presumption is based on the taxpayer’s failure to produce documents for 
which the compulsory preservation period. See Id. at para 38.  
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the protection of the effectiveness of a right conferred to undertakings by Community law 
(right of refund) prevails over the interests to simplify national administrative procedure or 
to avoid unjust enrichment of economic operators when the latter are raised by a Member 
State responsible for having collected taxes contrary to EU law
716
.  
 
5. Some conclusions on the EUCJ’s approach to presumptions of passing on of taxes 
levied in breach of EU law confronted with the approach of the Italian Constitutional 
Court 
The case of Article 19, Law decree No 688/82 is an extraordinary example of how the 
reasoning of a national Constitutional Court diverges from the one developed by the EUCJ, 
and at the same time of how the EU context is able to impact on national legal orders and 
on the protection of European taxpayers even beyond the purely substantive matters
717
. 
The Italian Constitutional Court was called upon to rule on the compatibility of such 
provision with Article 24 of the Italian Constitution, which safeguards the right of 
defence
718
. It acknowledged that in previous ordinances issued on the same matter the 
question had been judged manifeslty unfounded
719
, but noted that such conclusions needed 
to be reviewed in the light of the ‘changed normative frame’, which was basically 
constituted by the judgments of the European Court of Justice handed down on Article 19 
either on a preliminary ruling or following an infringment procedure
720
. In this renovated 
normative environment, the Court confirmed that it falls within the discretionary powers of 
the legislator establishing the reversal of the burden of proof, which is not per se in 
contrast with Article 24 of the Constitution. However, where such burden may be satisfied 
exclusively by means of a documentary proof, then the right to access the court is 
undermined. This is because the judicial protection of the right of refund is made 
conditional to a kind of proof which is usually impossible to give, as it would entail the 
                                                          
716
 In other words, it seems that the division of the burden of proof indicated by the Court has in part the 
significance of a ‘sanction’ towards the Member State concerned. 
717
 See in this regard, C. Attardi, Il ruolo della Corte europea nel processo tributario: manuale con 
massimario, Assago, Ipsoa, 2008, at p. 226 et seq. 
718
 Const. Court 21 April 2000, No 114. See the decision in Rivista di diritto tributario, II, 2001, 565 with the 
comment of F. Porporino, Disciplina legale del rimborso dei tributi sui consumi e rilevanza della 
translazione: la sentenza costituzionale n. 114 del 21 aprile 2000, Riv. Dir. Trib., 2001, 575; cf. A. Comelli, 
Sulla illegittimità costituzionale della limitazione dell’onere probatorio alla sola prova documentale, Rass. 
Trib., 2000, 1545; A. Poddighe, Prova del fatto negativo e diritto della difesa, Rass. Trib., 2001, 1691. 
719
 See ordinance No 651/1988; ordinance No 807/1988; ordinance No 172/1989; ordinance No 197/1989. In 
this ordinances the Court excluded that either the reversal of the burden of proof on the taxpayer as regards 
the passing on of the tax, or the request of the documentary proof, jeopardized the access to the court. 
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availability to the taxpayer of a document wherein the passing on of the tax (i.e. a negative 
fact) results. 
Therefore, the judgments of the EUCJ which rejected every presumption or means of proof 
rendering excessively difficult or impossible the exercise of the right of refund, led the 
Italian Constitutional Court to reconsider the compatibility of the reversal of the burden of 
proof established by the legislator in Article 19. 
In a subsequent decision
721
, the same article was found inconsistent also with Article 3 of 
the Italian Constitution, in particular under the parameter of reasonableness. The Italian 
Constitutional Court argued from the structure of the presumption of the passing on of the 
tax to third persons and from the nature of the presumed fact. It confirmed that in tax law a 
derogation from the ordinary regulation of the action for the refund of undue payments is 
in principle legitimate. Indeed, under the general rule on the repayment of sums payed but 
not due
722
, the claimant is requested to prove only the occurring of the payment and the 
circumstance that it was undue. In tax law, the right to refund may be limited in order to 
avoid the unjust enrichment of the claimant, when the latter has passed on the economic 
burden of the tax on other persons. In this event, the burden of proving the translation of 
the tax, which is a fact that impedes the exercise of the right to refund and as such should 
be proved by the tax administration, is put upon the taxpayer. Precisely such legal reversal 
of the burden of proof is, in the view taken by the Italian Constitutional Court, non-
reasonable. Indeed, it aims at alleviating the probative burden of tax authorities in a dispute 
concerning the repayment of a tax that has been unduly levied by the latter. In other words, 
there is not an interest worthy of protection which may justify a priviledged positition of 
the tax adimistration to the disadvantage of the taxpayer upon which the burden of proof is 
shifted. The Constitutional Court thus concluded that even though usually a transfer of the 
tax on other persons occurs, this circumstance cannot per se justify the reversal of the 
burden of proof on undertakings. If ever, it may be put forward by tax authorities before 
the court of the concrete case. 
At the end of the day, the EUCJ and the Italian Constitutional Court offer similar solutions, 
but with a slightly different process. The Italian Constitutional Court reconsiders the 
question of consititutional compatbility of Article 19 only after the conclusions reached at 
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 Const. Court 9 july 2002, No 332. See C. Attardi, L’inversione dell’onere della prova nelle azioni di 
rimborso e principio costituzionale di ragionevolezza, Giur. It., 2003, 1278; E. De Mita, Fisco e Costituzione, 
III (1993-2002), Milano, 2003, 896 et seq., 1284 et seq. 
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European level, where the probative settlement resulting from the national measure was 
found to hinder the effective enforcement of the Community right of refund. Based on this, 
the Constitutional Court did not deny the opposite conclusions that it had previously 
reached, where the inconsistency was excluded on the grounds that the passing on of the 
tax usually occurs and that the right of defence is guaranteed by the possibility to rebut the 
presumption
723
. Indeed, it did not discuss the legitimacy, in principle, of a reversal of the 
burden or proof in favour of the tax authorities. Instead, it noted that in the particular case 
at issue such reversal implied that the taxpayer was called to demonstrate a negative fact 
(i.e. that the passing on of the tax had not taken place) by means of documents: a proof in 
practice impossible to give; moreover, the presumed fact (the passing on of the tax) was 
not constitutive of the right of refund, but it was rather a fact impeding the exercise of that 
right: as such it was up to the defendant to demonstrate that it occurred, according to the 
general rule on the distribution of the burden of proof
724
. A derogation from the general 
rule was not reasonably justified when the tax authorities were requested to repay charges 
unduly collected. 
The EUCJ, on the other side, though arguing from the difficulty of proof of a negative fact 
and the wrongness of the fact on which the presumption of translation was based, appears 
to be guided by the aim of guaranteeing the effectiveness of the right of refund of taxes 
levied in breach of EU law. To this end, it rejects altogether every presumptive 
mechanism – irrespective of the nature of the presumption – and every procedural 
settlement of the division of the burden of proof or even of administrative burdens
725
, 
which are per se identified by the EUCJ as rendering excessively difficult the right of 
refund. 
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 See the ordinances referred to in footnote No 724. 
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 Article 2697 Italian Civil Code. 
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 Indeed, from the case-law it results that even the obligation of producing documents put upon the taxpayer 
may mask a presumption that the tax was passed on and the correlative burden of rebutting it. See, for 
instance,  ECJ 2 October 2003, case C-147/01, Weber’s Wine World (para 115-116): “It is true that in the 
case of a ‘self-assessed’ charge, proof that the charge has actually been passed on to third parties cannot be 
adduced without the cooperation of the taxable person concerned. In that regard, the tax authorities may 
demand access to the supporting documents which the taxable person was required to keep under the rules of 
national law. It is also for the national court to determine to what extent the cooperation required on the part 
of taxable persons in establishing that the economic burden of the duty on alcoholic beverages was not 
passed on amounts in practice to establishing a presumption that the duty was passed on, unless the taxable 
persons rebut such a presumption by adducing evidence to the contrary.” 
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Chapter III - Section II 
Direct Taxation 
 
 
Introduction 
Unlike indirect taxes, which are envisaged in Article 113 TFEU, direct taxes are not 
explicitly covered by any provision of the Treaty. As a consequence, their positive 
harmonization basically rests upon Article 115 TFEU, pursuant to which “Without 
prejudice to Article 114, the Council shall, acting unanimously in accordance with a 
special legislative procedure and after consulting the European Parliament and the 
Economic and Social Committee, issue directives for the approximation of such laws, 
regulations or administrative provisions of the Member States as directly affect the 
establishment or functioning of the internal market”. 
Such legal basis entails either procedural constraints or substantive constraints for possible 
measures enacted in the area of direct taxation. On the one side, it requires unanimous 
decision-making, meaning that each Member State still keeps the power to veto the 
European Commission’s initiatives; moreover, it explicitly refers to directives, which in 
fact are the privileged (binding) legal instrument for the approximation of national laws 
and practices, as they leave to Member States the choice of the means to attain the aim 
sought. On the other side, Article 115 legitimates harmonization in the extent to which 
national rules hinder the establishment and the functioning of the internal market. 
These being the conditions for enacting EU legislative measures in the domain of direct 
taxation, one cannot be surprised to see that basically so far only four direct-tax directives 
have been adopted on the basis of Article 115 TFEU (previously, Article 94 EC Treaty) on 
specific issues
726
. Member States are indeed still very much reluctant to give up their 
sovereignty in the area of direct taxation, which has been traditionally perceived as 
affecting, less than indirect taxes, the functioning of the internal market and cross-border 
trades. 
In this context, a fundamental role in view of the (negative) integration of national 
legislations in direct taxation has been played by the rulings of the EUCJ, and to a certain 
extent by the soft-law acts of the European Commission.  
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In more recent years, the European Commission has issued a number of Communications 
on specific topics, aimed at promoting the enforcement of the EUCJ’s rulings on national 
tax measures found to be inconsistent with EU law even beyond the single legal 
jurisdiction involved in the case before the EUCJ. Very often these Communications 
follow up on case-law concerning delicate direct-tax matters, such as exit taxes, cross-
border offsetting of losses or anti-abuse measures. They give a qualified reading of the 
EUCJ’s findings so as to indicate to Member States the requisites which national measures 
have to comply with in order to be in line with EU law. 
Above all, negative integration is entrusted with the EUCJ’s application and interpretation 
of Treaty freedoms and EU principles facing unharmonized domestic provisions which are 
suspected to clash with the former. Looking at the case-law in the field of direct taxes, the 
Court is mainly called upon to interpret one of the fundamental freedoms or principles set 
forth by the Treaty in order to serve the referring judge with all the necessary criteria in the 
light of which can be tested the EU consistency of the domestic provision relevant in the 
case. Instead, there are very few cases wherein the Court, similarly to indirect-tax case law, 
is asked to interpret secondary EU law on direct-tax matters facing national implementing 
measures. In other words, direct tax cases mostly imply a balance between EU principles 
and rights of movements, on the one side, and national interests which boil down to 
protective measures restrictive on the former, on the other side.  
Since its earlier case-law, the Court has reiterated that “Although, as Community law 
stands at present, direct taxation does not as such fall within the purview of the Community, 
the powers retained by the Member States must nevertheless be exercised consistently with 
Community law” 727 . Said otherwise, the Court acknowledges that in the absence of 
harmonized EU legislation, direct taxation falls within the competence of national 
jurisdictions, but the latter are prevented from introducing or maintaining legislative or 
administrative provisions which conflict with EU principles and fundamental freedoms. In 
testing domestic provisions against EU rules or principles, the Court avails itself of the rule 
of reason, which basically embodies the reasoning developed by the EUCJ for verifying 
the in(consistency) of the former with respect to the latter. In fact, once it has found the 
national measure to discriminate among comparable situations or to restrict on one of the 
fundamental freedoms, the Court goes further to verify whether an ‘overriding reasons 
related to the public interest’ exists that may justify such discrimination or restriction on 
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the exercise of an EU right, and if the case is so, whether the measure does not go beyond 
what it necessary to attain that (national) purpose.  
 
1. Tax law presumptions and direct taxation 
Turning from the question of how tax law presumptions are dealt with in the context of 
indirect taxation, to the domain of direct taxation, one would expect to face different 
solutions and a lower interference in the competence of the single Member States. Apart 
from a few provisions included in Directives in direct-tax matters, the most important 
being the anti-abuse clause set forth by the Merger Directive, there are neither rules 
establishing presumptions (like for customs duties) directly applicable in national legal 
orders, nor rules permitting under certain conditions the introduction of presumptive 
measures (like for VAT). 
Notwithstanding this, the impact of EU law, through the rulings of the EUCJ, on the 
recourse to presumptive measures by the national legislator is massive, and even merely 
procedural provisions may not escape from the minimum standards set out at EU level. 
This is a corollary of the role played by legal presumptions in the field of direct (especially 
income) taxation at national level, wherein they are introduced either in view of alleviating 
the burden of motivation and proof laying upon tax authorities, or in view of preventing tax 
evasion or avoidance. The need to simply the assessment or recovery of the tax debt as 
well as to prevent abusive practices is clearly more compelling when cross-border 
transactions, or more generally situations involving non-resident (even legal) persons, are 
at issue. These being the cases, indeed, national tax authorities are confronted with more 
difficulties in carrying on inquiries, collecting information, recovering the tax owed or 
enforcing their own provisions or decisions towards subjects placed in another national 
jurisdiction, than those that would meet with merely internal situations. Similarly, cross-
border situations and generally the exercise of one of the fundamental freedoms may 
increase the opportunities of abusive practices consisting of reducing the taxable base in 
the State of origin or shifting taxable base towards low tax jurisdictions.  
Not surprisingly, in cases before the EUCJ wherein presumptive national measures are at 
issue, two of the most recurrent justifications put forward by Member States basically 
coincide with the above needs
728
. In some, especially less recent, cases, they have argued, 
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 In the dissertation, as explained, the focus will be on some of the justifications relied on by Member States. 
For an overview of the most common justifications put forward by Member States in the area of direct 
taxation, see S. van Thiel, Justifications in Community Law for Income Tax Restrictions on Free Movement: 
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rarely successfully, that the national presumption relevant in the case was necessary in 
order to secure the ‘effectiveness of fiscal supervision”.  In other cases, they have 
contended that it is targeted at the ‘prevention of tax avoidance’ (or tax evasion, or abusive 
practices). As we will see, the latter justification has been more successfully raised than the 
first one. Indeed, along with a national interest, there is an EU interest in combating tax 
avoidance, evasion or the abuse of EU fundamental freedoms. Nonetheless, once the 
existence of ‘mandatory requirements of public interest’ is accepted, the EUCJ goes further 
to check if the means adopted by the national legislator to attain the aim sought are 
appropriate, necessary and if alternative measures may be conceivable that are less 
detrimental to a certain EU right or movement of freedom. This is very likely to be the case 
when irrebuttable presumptions of law are at issue, because rebuttable presumptions 
manifestly embody a more suitable instrument to attain the overriding interest without 
conclusively hindering the exercise of the Treaty freedoms. 
In this regard, it must be observed at the outset that similarly to other areas of EU (tax) law, 
the EUCJ deals with presumptions in such a way that the risk is to enlarge the legal 
concept further beyond its traditional meaning. Such risk is even higher in the field of 
direct taxes. In this area, indeed, the Court tends to refer to ‘general presumptions of 
avoidance’ in a broad sense, which potentially includes all those national provisions that 
provide for a less favourable tax treatment in respect of domestic situations, when a 
transnational situation is at issue. This particularly results from a series of (non-taxation) 
cases involving national measures on broadcasting television which discriminated against 
foreign broadcasters and were classified by the Court as general presumptions of abusive 
practices. These decisions have been briefly referred to above, as from them some 
indications with regard to the requisites (in terms of degree of specificity) that a 
presumption of tax avoidance should have in order to comply with the EU law may be 
inferred. Nonetheless, one should refrain from automatically classifying the national 
measures at issue as legal presumptions. In some cases they end up to be mere rules of law 
or administrative practices or decisions, which for instance prevent non-residents from 
supplying certain kinds of services and so on. 
Generally speaking, the Court employs a teleological interpretation of the national measure 
under examination and usually disregards the possible structure of the situation envisaged 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Acte Clair Rules That Can Be Readily Applied by National Courts –Part 1, European Taxation, 2008, 279; S. 
van Thiel, Justifications in Community Law for Income Tax Restrictions on Free Movement: Acte Clair Rules 
That Can Be Readily Applied by National Courts –Part 2, 2008, p.347. 
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in the norm. In other words, it looks at the aim that in its view has inspired the national 
provision (e.g. avoiding the risk of abuse) and the means used to attain such aim, but it 
does not check the demonstrative nature of the facts on which the inference is based. In 
this view, every national measure aimed at tackling abuse becomes susceptible to 
embodying a presumption of abuse. The known fact would be represented by the exercise 
of an EU freedom and the inference would be exclusively based on the territorial 
component of the situation, i.e. the transnational characteristics of the latter. More exactly, 
as will be shown, the Court takes into consideration how the situation envisaged in the 
norm is designed, but mainly in order to check if its scope is specific or rather too general 
so as to include even hypotheses where a risk of abuse does not occur and the restriction on 
the fundamental freedom may not be accepted.  
In the light of the foregoing, below the focus will be mainly on the most significant EUCJ 
judgments concerning national tax presumptions or presumptive regimes, in line with some 
of the presumptive measures taken into consideration in the second chapter. 
Given the extensive and chaotic case-law in the field of direct taxation, wherein very often 
the Court seems to be guided by considerations related to the concrete case and it is 
difficult to draw general conclusions, the analysis will be divided as follows. First, a 
number of less recent decisions, where the justification of the ‘need to safeguard the 
effective fiscal supervision’ are dealt with. Afterwards, some judgments wherein certain 
presumptive regimes (CFC; thin capitalization, transfer pricing), justified in the light of the 
‘need to prevent the risk of tax avoidance’ are examined. In this stage, the anti-abuse 
clause included in the Merger Directive and the case law on the matter are referred to. 
Then, a more recent case-law wherein a further justification was (successfully) raised is 
illustrated (SGI), that is the ‘need to preserve a balance allocation of taxing rights’. Finally, 
the case SIAT is discussed, which throws a new light on the extent to which legal 
presumptions may be admitted in the field of direct taxation and on the role played by legal 
certainty. These decisions, and SGI in particular, confirm the importance of the rationale 
founding the single presumptive measure brought before the EUCJ in view of the 
acceptance or the rejection of a certain justification. In other words, and not differently 
from what has been underlined in the field of VAT, the way in which the Member State 
presents a certain presumptive measure influences the outcome of the decision. On the 
other hand, given that legal presumptions may be restrictive on an EU right or freedom, the 
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conditions of consistency with EU law depend on their possible justifications and 
afterwards on their proportionality. 
 
2. National tax presumptions restrictive on a fundamental freedom on the grounds of 
the need for effective fiscal supervision  
Given the function of tax law presumptions, which are usually intended to face the gap of 
information on the side of tax authorities, Member States have in a number of decisions 
justified their introduction by invoking administrative difficulties where cross-border 
situations are at issue. This kind of argument has been labelled by the EUCJ under the 
format “need to secure the effectiveness of fiscal supervision”. It constitutes a sort of 
procedural justification, since it basically concerns the practical possibility of tax 
authorities to carry on the necessary checks for the purpose of determining precisely the 
tax due or the requisites for claiming a certain tax treatment and so on. 
In fact, from a merely national angle, one could understand why measures are introduced 
that make the grant of a certain tax treatment conditional to further (substantive or 
procedural) conditions when cross-border situations are at issue, whereas it is granted 
automatically to domestic situations. The enforcement of national laws, the monitoring, the 
tax assessment and the tax recovery reflect the State’s sovereignty, so that they cannot be 
exercised in another jurisdiction unless with the assistance of the latter. On the other hand, 
if Member States could systematically rely on internal administrative difficulties in 
obtaining relevant information and be consequently allowed to discriminate against 
transnational situations, the entire system of fundamental freedoms would be undermined.  
The EUCJ has reiterated that the “effectiveness of fiscal supervision constitutes an 
overriding requirement of general interest capable of justifying a restriction on the 
exercise of a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty”. But from this abstract 
statement, a concrete acceptance of such justification has rarely followed up
729
. Before 
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 Anyway, mostly in cases where the mutual assistance or recovery instruments were not applicable. See, 
for instance, as regards the similar formula ‘need to ensure the effective collection of income tax’, ECJ 3 
October 2006, C-290/04, Scorpio. Cf. with special regard to the necessary proportionality of burdens put 
upon taxpayers exercising a Treaty freedom, ECJ 15 May 1997, case C-250/95, Futura and Singer (at. para 
31 et seq.); the first decision to deal with these matters was ECJ 20 February 1979, case C-120/78, Rewe-
Zentral. Partially different considerations may be drawn for restrictions on the freedom of movement with 
third countries, as in this case the administrative cooperation instruments do not apply. See ECJ 28 October 
2010, case C-72/2009, Établissements Rimbaud.  The issue is touched by D. S. Smit, EU Fredoms, Non-EU 
Countries and Company Taxation: An Overview and Future Prospect, EC Tax Review, 2012, 233, and in 
particular at p. 243. See also E. Nijkeuter, Exchange of Information and the Free Movement of Capital 
between Member States and Third Countries, EC Tax review, 2011, 232, who underlines that indeed the free 
movement of capital between Member States and third countries “has its own dynamic that finds its 
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denying a certain tax benefit or tax treatment to a taxpayer exercising a fundamental 
freedom, tax authorities must seek to obtain the necessary information through the 
administrative cooperation instruments
730
 or ask the taxpayer himself to produce the 
probative elements that they necessitate
731
. This has been asserted in cases involving both 
direct and indirect taxes, some of which (Elisa, Teleos, Twoh, Persche) have been 
illustrated in this dissertation dealing with the impact of the procedural principle of 
effectiveness on national procedural law. Most of these cases concerned elements able to 
reduce taxation (exemptions, deductions, etc.), which usually, according to national 
procedural laws, are to be proved by the taxpayer claiming for them. Facing cross-border 
situations, tax authorities are tempted from denying a certain tax advantage on the grounds 
of the lack of the necessary information to their satisfaction, and thereby presuming (also 
by means of presumptions of fact) the non-entitlement to the advantage concerned. 
These rules on the division of the burden of proof elaborated by the EUCJ in its case-law 
hold true, to a certain extent, where national tax law presumptions reversing the burden of 
proof facing cross-border situations are at issue. In this view, a Member State may not, in 
principle, distinguish between domestic and cross-border situations by providing solely for 
the latter a legal (irrebuttable or even rebuttable) presumption as to the existence of certain 
facts on which the enjoyment of a tax treatment depends. More exactly, it may not 
introduce such a distinction on the grounds that transnational situations encompass more 
administrative difficulties in terms of possibility of conducting checks and collecting 
                                                                                                                                                                                
expression in the increased possibilities available to justify the restriction”. It is true that the Court tends to 
be more open to the use of the justification at hand when the free movement of capital involves third States. 
On the other hand, however, the increasing transparency requested internationally in the OECD model 
convention and bilateral treaties, as it has been underlined at the beginning of this chapter, let foresee that the 
Court will be less inclined to accept the justification of the ‘nees to safeguard the effectiveness of fiscal 
supervision’. 
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 For a case-law overview see S.J.C. Hemels, References to the Mutual Assistance Directive in the Case 
Law of the ECJ: A Systematic Approach, European Taxation, 2009, p. 583. 
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 In the reading of the most recent jurisrpudence given by M. Lang, The Legal and Political Context of ECJ 
Case Law on Mutual Assistance, European Taxation, 2012, 199, tax authorities are not requested to rely 
primarily on mutual assistance options, being rather permitted to demand evidence from taxpayers that they 
necessitate for assessing the taxes and duty concerned, and to deny the equal treatment where the taxpayers 
fail to provide such evidence. In his view, the pressure on Member States to make more effective use of 
mutual assistance tools (which may be inferred from older case-law) has diminished and the Court currently 
tends to pay greater attention to arguments presented by national governments, to permit additional grounds 
of justifications and to occasionally reduce the threshold when revewing proportionality. Now, in my view it 
is true that in the most recent case-law the Court implicitly allows national tax authorities to demand the 
taxpayer exercising a fundamental freedom the necessary information, and that they are not obliged, instead, 
to have recourse to administrative cooperation instruments. Nonetheless, the fact that the Court has not 
recognised the right of the taxpayer to demand tax authorities to make use of such intruments (and of the 
related obligation upon the latter) does not necessarily imply that tax authorities may primarily shift their 
administrative burden on taxpayers. If so, the proportionality principle must be taken into account.    
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information. This is because the tax administration can rely upon the mutual assistance 
instruments in order to get the necessary information and it is not prevented from asking 
for such information, apparently on a case-by-case basis and in the context of the 
administrative proceedings, from the taxpayer involved. 
In conclusion, in the view taken by the Court, Member States are not, in principle, 
permitted to exclude cross-border situations from the entitlement of a certain tax treatment 
on the grounds of administrative difficulties, either by means of irrebuttable presumptions 
of law, or similar provisions having a presumptive ratio and the ‘effect of irrebuttable 
presumption’732, or in some cases even by rebuttable presumptions of law.  
 
2.1 The Vestergaard case 
In the Vestergaard case
733
, at issue was a Danish measure which made the deduction in the 
State of residence of cross-border expenses met for professional training courses 
conditional to the proof of the professional-related nature of such expenditure, whereas the 
entitlement to the deduction was automatic when the course was held in Denmark.  
More in detail, Mr. Vestergaard was denied by tax authorities to deduct from his taxable 
income the costs incurred for a professional course organized abroad in a tourist resort
734
, 
on the grounds that, pursuant to the applicable national rules, “When a course is held in an 
ordinary tourist resort abroad, and this location cannot be justified as such on 
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 See ECJ, 8 July 1999, case C-254/97, Baxter. At issue was the French legislation that allowed the 
deduction from the taxable amount (of a special levy) of expenditure on research carried out in the State of 
taxation (France), and thereby (indirectly) discriminated between French laboratories carrying out research 
mainly in France and foreign laboratories which have their principal research unit outside France. In the case 
of the main proceedings, Baxter and the other applicants were subsidiaries of parent companies established in 
other Member States and were denied such deduction. The French Government basically justified the 
limitations to the deductibility of research costs on the grounds that tax authorities of the levying Member 
State could ascertain the nature and genuineness of such costs (see para 16). The Court rejected this 
argumentation. It recalled that ‘effectiveness of fiscal supervision’ is an overriding requirement of general 
interest that may justify a restriction on a Treaty freedom,  so that “A Member State may therefore apply 
measures which enable the amount of costs deductible in that State as research expenditure to be ascertained 
clearly and precisely” (see para 18). However, at para 19 and 20 it held that “(…) national legislation which 
absolutely prevents the taxpayer from submitting evidence that expenditure relating to research carried out 
in other Member States has actually been incurred cannot be justified in the name of effectiveness of fiscal 
supervision.  The taxpayer should not be excluded a priori from providing relevant documentary evidence 
enabling the tax authorities of the Member State imposing the levy to ascertain, clearly and precisely, the 
nature and genuineness of the research expenditure incurred in other Member States”. Cf. E. Werlauff, 
Remedies Available to Individuals under EC Law aginst Discriminatory National Laws, European Taxation, 
1999, 475. Cf. also ECJ, 29 March 2007, case C-347/04, Rewe Zentralfinanz, particularly at paras 54 to 58. 
733
 ECJ 28 October 1999, case C-55/98, Vestergaard.  
734
 Mr. Vestergaard was a certified auditor and employed by an auditing company, of which he was the sole 
shareholder. He had attended a tax training course on the Island of Crete, which had been organised solely for 
Danish participants by a firm of Danish auditors and a travel agency. He had spent one week in Greece, and 
out of the overall days, three whole days and two half days were dedicated to the course. Notably, the 
national court of first instance found that Mr Vestergaard had succeded in rebutting the presumption. 
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professional grounds, there is a presumption that the course involves such a significant 
tourism element that the course expenditure cannot be regarded as constituting deductible 
operating costs”. From the wording of the decision it results that such presumption was 
laid down in the guidelines issued by the Danish Ministry of Fiscal Affairs in accordance 
with the relevant law that generically permitted the deduction of ‘operating costs’735 and 
based on settled case-law of Danish courts
736
. Presumably, it was thus a jurisprudential 
presumption, applied within the administrative and judicial practice as if it was a 
presumption established by the law itself. According to such presumption, courses taken at 
an ordinary tourist resort abroad (in a location that could not be justified as such on 
professional grounds) were presumed to involve a significant tourism element, so that the 
related expenses were not deemed as deductible operating costs. From the decision, it 
further results that such presumption could be rebutted by producing information 
concerning the content and duration of the course and of the stay abroad. Moreover, it is 
clearly stated that such presumption did not operate when the course was held in an 
ordinary tourist resort placed in Denmark. 
After having clarified that the services at issue in the main proceedings (organisation of 
training professional courses provided to nationals of a Member State on the territory of 
another Member State) fell within the freedom to provide services, the Court found the 
national rule to be in contrast with the latter. This is because it provided a difference in 
treatment based on the place where the service was supplied, by introducing a procedural 
obstacle to the deduction of cross-border business-related expenditure and not even to the 
same costs incurred in the State of residence
737
. 
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 Article 6, para 1, let. a, Law 10 April 1922, No 149, defined the ‘operating costs’, which were to be 
deducted from the taxable income as follows: “(…) expenses which, during the course of the year, have been 
incurred with a view to acquiring, ensuring or maintaining income, including ordinary depreciation.” 
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 Reading the judgment, it results that initially the Ministry’s guidelines stipulated as follows: “Expenditure 
relating to participation in professional courses is deductible in the case of courses intended to maintain and 
update the professional knowledge and training of participants. (…) In the case where a professional 
conference or course is transferred to a foreign country (generally ordinary tourist resorts), this will have 
the effect of setting aside the right to deduct, unless the travel destination/course location can as such be 
treated as justified on professional grounds”. Following some judgments handed down by courts of merits 
and the Supreme Court, it was then added that: “It is thus presumed that the holding of the course in a 
foreign tourist resort involves such a significant tourism element that the course expenditure cannot be 
regarded as constituting deductible operating costs”. 
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 The Court stated, at paras 21 and 22 as follows: “As regards the question whether the rules of a Member 
State, such as at issue in the main proceedings, contains a restriction prohibited under Article 59 of the 
Treaty, it must be observed that, by making the right to deduct costs relating to participation in professional 
training courses held in an ordinary tourist resort abroad conditional upon the rebuttal, by the taxpayer, of a 
presumption that such courses involve such a significant tourism element that the costs cannot be treated as 
deductible operating costs, while such a presumption does not exist for courses held in ordinary tourist 
resorts located in the said Member State, those rules subject the provision of services constituted by the 
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Having stated this, the Court went to check the national justifications put forward by the 
Danish government. While it quickly rejected the ‘need to preserve the cohesion of a tax 
system
738’, it spent a few more words on the need to secure the ‘effectiveness of fiscal 
supervision’. In this regard, it held as follows (paras 25-26): 
“(…) while a Member State may, in the interests of the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, 
apply measures which allow the amount of costs deductible in that State as operating costs 
to be ascertained clearly and precisely, and in particular those incurred in taking part in 
professional training courses (…), it cannot however provide any justification for that 
Member State to make the deduction subject to different conditions according to whether 
the courses take place in that State or in another Member State. 
In that regard, it should be remembered that Council Directive 77/799/EEC of 19 
December 1977 concerning mutual assistance by the competent authorities of the Member 
States in the field of direct taxation (OJ 1977 L 336, p. 15) can be invoked by a Member 
State in order to obtain from the competent authorities of another Member State all the 
information enabling it to ascertain the correct amount of income tax. In addition, there is 
nothing to prevent the tax authorities concerned from requiring the taxpayer himself to 
produce the proof which they consider necessary to assess whether or not the deduction 
requested should be allowed  (…)” 739. 
Therefore, the Court acknowledged the national interest to make the deduction of certain 
business-related costs conditional upon the accurate assessment and reckoning of such 
costs. Nonetheless, the conditions of deductibility cannot diverge depending on the place 
                                                                                                                                                                                
organisation of professional courses to different tax arrangements depending on whether the services are 
provided in other Member States or in the Member State concerned. Rules of a Member State which, like 
those in question in the main proceedings, make it more difficult to deduct costs relating to participation in 
professional training courses organised abroad than to deduct costs relating to such corse organised in that 
Member State involve a difference in treatment, based on the place where the service is provided, prohibited 
by Article 59 of the Treaty.” 
738
 The Court agreed with the opinion of Advocate general in excluding a direct link, in the case at issue, 
between the income taxation and the deductibility of costs incurred for the participation in professional 
training courses. A direct link (between the deductibility of contributions and the taxation of sums payable by 
insurers under pension and life assurance contracts), was instead found in the cases Bachmann (ECJ 28 
January 1992, case C-204/90, Bachmann) and Commission v. Belgium (ECJ 28 January 1992, case C-300/90, 
Comm. v. Belgium) cited in the judgment under discussion. As is well known, the justification based on the 
‘need to protect fiscal coherence’ has been accepted by the Court in the above cases, but afterwards it has 
been almost systematically rejected. More recently, it seems that it reappeared under the vest of the ‘need to 
protect a balanced allocation of taxing power’ (see infra), even though the relationship between the two 
justifications is still not clear.  
739
 See also paras 27 and 28, where the Court rejected the objection of the Danish government concerning the 
inadequacy of the Directive No 77/799 for obtaining the information they need in cases like the one at hand. 
The scope of that Directive, indeed, covers all the information that appears to the requesting authorities to be 
necessary to ascertain the correct amount of revenue tax payable by the taxpayer involved, in relation to their 
own legislation. 
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where the course takes place (i.e. the service is supplied). Although a rebuttable 
presumption does not prevent the taxpayer who incurred costs for services provided abroad 
to demonstrate that he is entitled to deduct them from his taxable income, it nonetheless 
renders more difficult the enjoyment of the deduction in comparison to the situation of 
taxpayers incurring similar costs in the State of residence. In the view taken by the Court, 
this procedural obstacle to the exercise of the freedom to receive services cannot be 
justified by tax authorities on the grounds of difficulties met in ascertaining the actual 
nature and amount of the expenditure in order to recognize or deny the deduction. In fact, 
on the one side, they may have recourse to the Mutual Assistance Directive, in order to 
obtain the necessary information. On the other side, besides the instrument of the exchange 
of information, the Court asserts that tax authorities may directly ask the taxpayer for the 
necessary information for the purpose of ascertaining the existence of the right to deduct. 
In this regard, it has to be noted that the wording used by the Court, which refers to the 
possibility for tax authorities to require the taxpayer “to produce the proof which they 
consider necessary to assess whether or not the deduction requested should be”, would 
seem to suggest that rebuttable presumptions of law are admitted. Since this would be in 
contrast with the outcome of the decision, it is likely that such proof is to be intended as 
referring to the general obligation laying upon the taxpayer consisting of delivering the 
documentation on the basis of which a request for the deduction of certain costs is based, 
and in general all the information that is in his availability and may be needed by the tax 
administration.     
 
2.2 Equal procedural treatments. The Talotta case on the minimum taxable profits or 
earnings for non-residents 
In the second chapter, when dealing with estimated methods of assessment set forth by 
Belgian income tax legislation, the case Talotta
740
 has been referred to, as it has led the 
Belgian legislator to amend the scope of the minimum taxable profits originally applicable 
solely to non-residents. 
                                                          
740
 ECJ 22 March 2007, case C-383/05, Talotta. Mr. Talotta was resident in Luxembourg and ran his 
restaurant in Belgium. Since he had not established his tax domicile in Belgium, here he was taxed pursuant 
to the income tax rules concerning non-residents natural persons, namely solely in respect of the income 
earned in the State’s territory (see Article 227-228 CIR). He was late in submitting his tax reurn for the 1992 
tax year, and tax authorities had thus determined his taxable income on the basis of the minimum taxable 
profits fixed by the Royal decree 27 August 1993 for the hospitality sector. 
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In this case, at issue was Article 342, para 2 CIR, implemented by Article 182 AR/CIR, 
which facing the absence of evidence provided either by the taxpayer concerned or by the 
tax authorities, permitted the latter to determine the tax due by foreign undertakings 
operating in Belgium on the basis of the turnover and size of the workforce by referring to 
the minimum taxable profits established in the royal decree. 
The most critical part of this provision consisted of the presumptive determination of the 
tax base for foreign businesses in a fixed amount depending on the industry sector. Indeed, 
the minimum tax base did not apply when the absence of evidence concerned resident 
taxpayers: their profits could be determined by analogy with the normal profits of at least 
three similar taxpayers (Article 342, para 1 CIR) or by signs or indices that the economic 
well-being enjoyed is higher than that resulting from the income declared. As a 
consequence, the national legislation concerning the assessment of undertakings’ tax base 
discriminated against taxpayers depending on whether they were resident in Belgium or 
elsewhere. 
From the decision, it results that the Belgian government contended that resident taxpayers 
and non-resident taxpayers are not in a comparable situation “as regards the means of 
proof available to the tax authorities for the purposes of establishing the base of the 
taxable income”. The argument of the difficulty of assessment and controls on the side of 
tax authorities was thus put forward by the national government to underline that the 
national measure did not discriminate between comparable situations. In its view, these 
situations were objectively different. To argue this, it referred to the case where the non-
resident taxpayer’s operations were carried out in part in the territory of a Member State 
other than that in which he carried out his self-employed activity. In such event, neither the 
comparison-based taxation nor the exchange of information with his State of residence 
were feasible
741
.   
Such objection was rejected by the Court, which by contrast underlined that tax authorities 
meet the same difficulties when self-employed activities are in part carried out abroad, 
irrespective of whether the taxpayers concerned are resident or non-resident in Belgium, 
                                                          
741
 As regards the second instrument, the Belgian government contended that the conditions of application of 
the Mutual Assistance Directive failed. See para 27: “(…) it seems neither realistic nor effective, as a means 
of overcoming the practical problems entailed by the application of comparison-based taxation, to engage in 
an Exchange of information with the State of residence using the mechanism provided for in Council 
Directive 77/799/EEC of 19 December 1977 concerning mutual assistance by the competent authorities of 
the Member States in the field of direct taxation (OJ 1977 L 336, p. 15). In the first place, the Belgian tax 
authorities do not have the benefit, in such cases, of information sent by the State of residence in the context 
of spontaneous or automatic exchanges of information and, secondly, they do not have precise factual 
evidence, with the result that the request for exchange of information would not be admissible”. 
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and in any case they may rely on the Mutual Assistance Directive in order to obtain the 
information necessary to determine the income tax due by a certain taxpayer
742
. 
Having found that the national measure clashed with the freedom of establishment
743
, the 
Court went further to see if an overriding requirement of general interest existed that was 
capable of justifying the restriction on the fundamental freedom. In this regard, the Belgian 
Government put forward the same justification that in its view grounded the non-
comparability of non-resident undertakings and resident undertakings, namely the “need to 
ensure the effectiveness of fiscal supervision”. Yet, such argument was weak. Firstly, this 
was because of the way in which it was presented by the Member State, which generically 
claimed practical difficulties of application of the comparison-based method of assessment 
and even the impossible recourse to the Mutual Assistance Directive. Secondly, this was 
because in the case of the main proceedings the assessment did not concern the entire 
taxable income attributable to the non-resident person, but the amount of proceeds 
imputable to his self-employed activity carried out in Belgium. The hypothesis envisaged 
                                                          
742
 More in general, the Court stipulated that, at paras 25 and 26, that “It cannot be accepted that the Member 
State of establishment may apply minimum tax bases solely to non-resident taxpayers merely by reason of the 
fact that their tax residence is situated in another Member State, without depriving Article 52 of the Treaty of 
all meaning” , since “In fact, the income received by a resident taxpayer in the context of a self-employed 
activity in the territory of the Member State concerned and the income acquired by a non-resident taxpayer 
also in the context of a self-employed activity carried out in the territory of that Member State are in the 
same category of income, that is to say, income arising from self-employed activities carried out in the 
territory of the same Member State”. It also found non-relevant the circumstance that, as contended by the 
Belgian Government, the minimum tax base is often more favourable to non-resident taxpayers than the 
comparison-based taxation applied to resident taxpayers. In fact, the case may be that the minimum tax base 
is disadvantageous for non-resident taxpayers, thereby an unequal treatment in repsect of resident taxpayers 
results and a hindrance to the freedom of estabslishment (see para 31). Besides that, the Advocate General 
(see Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi delivered on 16 November 2006) noted that the national 
provisions at issue did not appear to lay down an optional method of assessment (to be used as a ‘last resort’ 
for the Belgian Government), meaning applicable only when the recourse to other presumptive methods of 
assessment, in particular the comparison-based procedure, was impossible (see paras 27-32). In this regard, it 
was not clear if and how (i.e. by what type of evidence) the taxpayer “could defeat the presumption inherent 
in the flat-rate determination of his taxable amount”.  The Advocate General further clarified that, 
irrespective of such circumstance, a difference in treatment arose. He observed at para 36 that “Whilst, when 
ascertaining the taxable amount for non-residents, the tax authority, finding it objectively difficult to apply 
the comparison-based procedure, may limit itself to applying the minimum tax bases at issue when 
determining the taxable amount of residents, it is, in contrast, required to obtain the information necessary to 
determine the taxable amount using a presumptive method. Consequently, it is only for non-residents that the 
tax authority will, at a particular stage in the process of determining the taxable amount, be relieved of the 
burden of determining, albeit by way of presumption, the income that is subject to taxation and so be able to 
apply the minimum tax bases”. 
743
 See para 32 where the Court held that “In those circumstances, legislation of a Member State, such as the 
rule resulting from Article 342(2) of the Income Tax Code 1992 and Article 182 of the Royal Decree of 27 
August 1993, which lays down minimum tax bases only for non-resident taxpayers constitutes indirect 
discrimination on grounds of nationality within the meaning of Article 52 of the Treaty. In fact, even if such 
legislation provides for a distinction on the basis of residence, in that it denies non-residents certain tax 
benefits which are, conversely, granted to persons residing within the national territory, it is liable to operate 
mainly to the detriment of nationals of other Member States, since non-residents are in the majority of cases 
foreigners (see, by analogy, Schumacher, paragraph 28)”. 
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by the national Government, i.e. the exercise of the same activity in part abroad, was able 
to concern even resident undertakings. As such, it did not embody a serious support for a 
different tax treatment for non-residents under the perspective of the procedures for 
determining the taxable base. This was indeed the view taken by the Court, according to 
which “the need to guarantee the effectiveness of fiscal supervision does not justify a 
difference in treatment, and the treatment applied to non-resident taxpayers must therefore 
be identical to that provided for resident taxpayers”744. 
Before drawing some considerations on the above decision, it must be noted, at the outset, 
that albeit the provision relevant in the main proceedings is inserted among the means of 
proof in the hands of tax authorities for the assessment of the taxable base, it in fact ends 
up to be a substantive determination of the amount of profits. It is only apparently merely 
procedural. In fact, Article 182 AR/CIR establishes a certain amount on the basis of several 
factors, such as the industry, the workforce and so on.  It then adds that the profits in this 
way determined cannot be lower than 19.000 euro. In other words, the provision may be 
classified as a presumptive method of assessment only lato sensu, as among other things it 
is not clear on the basis of what (statistical data, for instance, or other criteria), the amount 
is fixed. The impression is rather that it is an improper sanction, justified in the light of the 
unlawful situation in which a (foreign) taxpayer places himself by failing to comply with 
the obligations laying upon him. 
Having clarified this, from the decision some indications worthy of attention for our 
purpose may be inferred. 
Notably, primary EU law is able to affect not only substantive regimes or provisions, but 
even measures that within the domestic systems fall within the so-called ‘formal’ tax law, 
that is measures concerning the monitoring, inquiring and assessment powers of tax 
authorities. A discrimination against foreign taxpayers, and more in general a restriction on 
the exercise of a fundamental freedom, may well derive from a heavier burden (in terms of 
procedure that tax authorities are permitted to follow) established upon taxpayers on the 
grounds that tax authorities usually meet higher administrative and probative difficulties in 
assessing their tax position. 
This holds true as regards minimum taxable proceeds or, presumably, presumptive 
methods of assessment. As a matter of principle, Member States are prevented from 
                                                          
744
 See para 37 of the judgment. See N. Bammens, The Principle of Non-Discrimination in International and 
European Tax Law, Amsterdam, IBFD Doctoral Series, Vol. 24, 2012, p. 813. The Author notes that, as 
underlined in the text, “the Court seems to attach some weight to the applicability of the Mutual Assistance 
Directive in the comparability analysis”. 
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applying them solely to foreign persons on the grounds that they may not have the 
necessary information in order to apply the methods of assessment provided for residents. 
In the case of the main proceedings, facing the lack of evidence, tax authorities were 
entitled to rely on a presumptive method of assessment even for determining the tax base 
of resident undertakings. However, such method was based on a comparison with similar 
taxpayers and did not imply the application of a minimum taxable amount. The Court 
skipped the last step of the rule of reason, as it rejected the justification based on the 
effectiveness of the fiscal supervision. Therefore, it did not consider the measure under the 
perspective of the proportionality principle. Under such perspective, the absence of the 
possibility for the foreign taxpayer to demonstrate the actual amount of his profits would 
probably have been deemed as disproportionate with respect to the aim attained.   
 
3. National tax presumptions restrictive on fundamental freedoms on the grounds of 
the need to combat tax avoidance 
From the examination of the case-law where the ‘need to secure the effectiveness of fiscal 
supervision’ is invoked by Member States, it can be inferred that the Court is inclined to 
reject tax law presumptions, either irrebuttable or rebuttable, justified on that ground. This 
is basically because the administrative cooperation instruments and the participation of the 
taxpayer in the administrative proceedings where he may produce the necessary evidence, 
are (proportionate) means able to secure monitoring and controls.   
By contrast, the Court tends to accept as a justification for tax law presumptions the ‘need 
to combat tax avoidance’, though with limitations concerning the definition of the situation 
envisaged in the norm (i.e. the design of the known fact) and above all of the contrary 
proof
745
. 
Despite the fact that the two justifications are inextricably interrelated and in fact are often 
jointly invoked by Member States, the Court usually deals with them separately. The ‘need 
to combat tax avoidance or evasion’ is framed within the more general overriding reason of 
public interest in tackling abusive practices, which may consist either in the abuse of EU 
freedoms or rights or in the circumvention of national provisions by means of the exercise 
of an EU freedom or right. Not surprisingly, most decisions dealing with tax law 
                                                          
745
 Cf. A. Pieron, Le rôle actif de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne dans les luttes contre les 
discriminations fiscales et perspectives en droit fiscal belge, in Les dialogues de la fiscalité, (eds.) E. 
Traversa, O. Hermand, E.-J. Navez, V. Deckers, C.-A. Helleputte, Y. Hougardy, A. Lecocq, D. Lequeux and 
B. Vintras, Bruxelles, Larcier, 2012, 369, in particular at 374 et seq. 
National Tax Law Presumptions and EU Law 
 
 
397 
presumptive measures include wording similar to that referred to in this dissertation 
dealing with the application of the proportionality principle in non-taxation cases where 
abusive practices were at issue. Likewise, the EUCJ recognises that taxpayers may not 
seek to circumvent their legislation by relying on EU freedoms or rights, or to abuse EU 
law. Accordingly, Member States are not prevented from taking proper measures aimed at 
tackling such conduct. 
However, cross-border situations which reflect the exercise of a fundamental freedom or a 
right conferred to taxpayers by a Directive, cannot per se be assumed as embodying an 
abusive exercise of that freedom solely on the grounds of the transnational nature of the 
situation or the enjoyment of a more favourable tax regime. In this regard, the case-law 
concerning exit taxes is significant, and in particular the well-known case Hughs de 
Lasteyrie du Saillant
746
. At issue was the French legislation that applied an immediate 
taxation on latent increases in value of company securities to taxpayers with a substantial 
holdings who intended to transfer their residence abroad. The Court held that “the transfer 
of a physical person’s tax residence outside the territory of a Member State does not, in 
itself, imply tax avoidance. Tax avoidance or evasion cannot be inferred generally from the 
fact that the tax residence of a physical person has been transferred to another Member 
State and cannot justify a fiscal measure which compromises the exercise of a fundamental 
freedom guaranteed by the Treaty”747. 
More in general, in the context of an internal market, indeed, it is legitimate that 
commercial strategies of taxpayers aim also at minimizing the overall tax burden or 
                                                          
746
 ECJ, 11 March 2004, C-9/02, Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant. 
747
 Id., para 51. The Court continued (paras 52-53): “Article 167a of the CGI cannot, therefore, without 
greatly exceeding what is necessary in order to achieve the aim which it pursues, assume an intention to 
circumvent French tax law on the part of every taxpayer who transfers his tax domicile outside France. 
Similarly, a taxpayer who sells his securities before the expiry of the five-year period following his departure 
from France will also be liable for the tax under Article 167a of the CGI, even if he has no intention of 
returning to that Member State and continues to live abroad after the expiry of that period”. Notably, in this 
case the argument of the fiscal cohesion invoked by the Netherlands Government, was rejected by the Court 
noting that the national legislation at issue granted the exoneration where after five years from the transfer of 
residence the increases in value were not realized. In this dissertation, it is not pissible to deal in depth the 
issue of exit taxes. In general, they embody a regime based on the recovery of a certain tax on increases in 
value applied on occasion of the transfer of the residence either of individuals or of companies. By means of 
a fiction, such values are deemed as being realized on occasion of the transfer. As with other regimes, the 
way in which the provision is construed may constitute a (legal presumption of tax avoidance). Cf. 
Commission Communication of 19 December 2006 on exit taxation, COM(2006)825. Cf. ECJ 29 November 
2011, C-371/10, National Grid Indus BV. See A. Carinci, Il diritto comunitario alla prova delle exit taxes, 
tra limiti, prospettive e contraddizioni, Studi Tributari Europei, 2009, (http://www.seast.it/rivista/). 
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choosing the most favourable tax route, insofar as the arrangements entered into in order to 
pursue such aim do not amount to abusive practices
748
. 
As a result, the question shifts to the design of the situation which is presumed as 
embodying avoidance, evasion or abuse, and on the distribution of the burden of proof as 
regards the facts concerned. Under the first aspect, the Court requests legal presumptions 
to be specifically targeted at ‘wholly artificial arrangements’ or non-arm’s length 
transactions and, more generally, to be based upon objective elements, so as to comply not 
only with the principle of proportionality, but also with the principle of legal certainty. 
This entails, among other things, that, unlike when the ‘need to secure fiscal supervision’ is 
invoked, a different treatment between domestic situations and cross-border situations is 
tolerated facing certain regimes that would be meaningless if applied to merely internal 
situations. Under the second aspect, the Court tends to reject any provisions or regimes that 
assume automatically and conclusively the existence of avoidance or evasion as regards 
situations or transactions that constitute exercise of EU freedoms or rights. In fact, in the 
view often taken by the Court, rebuttable presumptions of law are less detrimental to the 
exercise of such freedoms and rights than irrebuttable presumptions of law or in general 
any other normative technique having the ‘effect of an irrebuttable presumption’. 
Accordingly, rebuttable presumptions of law as to the existence of tax avoidance or 
evasion where certain elements of fact occur, are not per se in contrast with EU law, 
insofar as the taxpayer is effectively given the possibility to rebut the presumption and 
escape the application of the anti-avoidance provision or regime. Limitations to the object 
or means for counterproof are, albeit under a different extent, looked at with disfavour by 
the EUCJ, not only when they render it excessively difficult or impossible to give the 
contrary proof, but also when they imply excessive administrative burden upon taxpayers.  
These are very general considerations, which will be tested against some of the most 
relevant presumptive provisions or regimes. Below, a number of EUCJ’s decisions handed 
down on CFC rules, thin capitalization, transfer pricing and limitation to deduction of costs 
will be illustrated, as they aim at tackling the shifting of the taxable base towards low tax 
jurisdictions by assuming certain circumstances to be indicative (or demonstrative) of tax 
avoidance, tax evasion or abusive tax schemes.  
Looking at them, the overall line of reasoning of the EUCJ is not as plain as it has been 
presented above, but it rather contains several contradictions. The first one has been 
                                                          
748
 Ex multis, ECJ 26 October 1999, C-294/97, Eurowings.  
National Tax Law Presumptions and EU Law 
 
 
399 
already underlined, and consists of the circumstance that similar justifications put forward 
by Member States appear to bring to completely different outcomes. Others will be pointed 
out below. It must be noted, though, that in the field of direct taxation the consistency of a 
certain presumption of law depends on whether the Court considers the latter as being 
proportionate with the aim sought. To this end, the EUCJ is called upon to strike a balance 
between the interests in play
749
. In a domain which is not bound by EU detailed legislative 
provisions, it is inevitably influenced by the interests surrounding the specific national 
measure relevant in the pending case. 
 
3.1 EU’s interest in combating abuse  
Tackling abusive practices carried out by taxpayers relying upon Treaty freedoms or rights 
conferred to them by Directives does not constitute a purely Member State’s interest. 
Accordingly, EU institutions have taken action in order to provide Member States with the 
tools they require for preventing more effectively tax avoidance and evasion. In this sense, 
on the one side, steps have been taken recently in view of a more efficient administrative 
cooperation between Member States, since the lack of information facing cross-border 
situations may certainly contribute to the putting into place of abusive schemes. On the 
other side, secondary EU law includes articles that legitimize Member States to introduce 
anti-abuse measures aimed at combating tax avoidance or evasion and/or simplifying the 
ascertainment of the tax due. Besides the VAT Directive, which contains several articles 
where derogations from the wording of the Directive itself are envisaged to that end, either 
the Merger Directive
750
 or the Interest and Royalty Directive
751
 permit Member States to 
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 See, on the application of the principle of proportionality in direct taxation, with particular reference to 
anti-avoidance national measures, P.L. Jezzi, Integrazione negativa e fiscalità diretta: l’impatto delle libertà 
fondamentali sui sistemi tributari dell’Unione Europea, Pisa, Pacini, 2012, 269 et seq. 
750
 Council Directive 2009/133/EC of 19 October 2009 on the common system of taxation applicable to 
mergers, divisions, partial divisions, transfer of assets and exchange of shares concerning companies of 
different Member States and to the transfer of the registered office of an SE or SCE between Member States 
(codified version). Article 15, para 1, let. a), provides that a Member State may refuse to apply or withdraw 
the benefit provided for in Articles 4 to 14 where it appears that one of the operations that enter the scope of 
the Directive (Article 1) “has as its principal objective or as one of its principal objectives tax evasion or tax 
avoidance; the fact that the operation is not carried out for valid commercial reasons such as the 
restructuring or rationalisation of the activities of the companies participating in the operation may 
constitute a presumption that the operation has tax evasion or tax avoidance as its principal objective or as 
one of its principal objectives”.  
751
 Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June 2003 on a common system of taxation applicable to interest and 
royalty payments made between associated companies of different Member States. Article 5 provides as 
follows at paras 1 and 2: “This Directive shall not preclude the application of domestic or agreement-based 
provisions required for the prevention of fraud or abuse. Member States may, in the case of transactions for 
which the principal motive or one of the principal motives is tax evasion, tax avoidance or abuse, withdraw 
the benefits of this Directive or refuse to apply this Directive”. Similarly, Council Directive 2011/96/EU of 
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deny the benefits provided thereof where the principal objective of the operation carried 
out is tax evasion, avoidance, or abuse. 
It follows that the task of combating abuse of EU law covers both harmonized and non-
harmonized sectors of tax law, and the Court itself has stated that its abuse-doctrine 
constitutes a general principle of EU law, applying throughout EU law
752
. Since the cases 
Emsland-Stärke and Halifax, the EUCJ has elaborated on an objective and subjective test 
on the basis of which abusive practices can be detected. It requires “a combination of 
objective circumstances in which, despite formal observance of the conditions laid down 
by the Community rules, the purpose of those rules has not been achieved” and “the 
intention to obtain an advantage from the Community rules by creating artificially the 
conditions laid down for obtaining it”753. 
Such text has been exported in the field of direct taxation, where however some relevant 
differences must be pointed out at the outset. Firstly, the abuse of law doctrine, if ever 
considerable as a general principle of EU law, does not play the role of general principle 
applicable in direct tax cases under primary EU law. It remains a mere justification in 
respect to a restrictive national measure and as such it is opposed to one of the fundamental 
freedoms of movement. Secondly, from the more recent case-law it results that the 
objective and subjective elements, which are difficult to separate even in non-direct tax 
cases, tend to flow into ‘objective, independent and verifiable’ elements from which the 
actual or the artificial character of the arrangement carried out may be inferred. The 
intention to obtain an advantage contrary to the purpose of EU law, which would be per se 
difficult to demonstrate, is then inherent to the concrete situation or transaction. In fact, 
from the conditions that the Court requests for national anti-abuse measures to be deemed 
proportional, it follows that the examination focuses on the absence of ‘wholly artificial 
                                                                                                                                                                                
30 November 2011, on the common system applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of 
different Member States (recast), provides in Article 1, dealing with the scope of the Directive, at para 2, that 
“This Directive shall not preclude the application of domestic or agreement-based provisions required for 
the prevention of fraud or abuse”. Cf. also Article 3, para 2, which permits Member States to make the 
benefits of the Directive conditional to certain holding period requirements. 
752
 See ECJ 5 July 2007, C-321/05, Kofoed, where the Court held (para 38) that Article 11, para 1, let. a) of 
the Merger Directive (old version), “reflects the general Community law principle that abuse of rights is 
prohibited. Individuals must not improperly or fraudulently take advantage of provisions of Community law. 
The application of Community legislation cannot be extended to cover abusive practices, that is to say, 
transactions carried out not in the context of normal commercial operations, but solely for the purpose of 
wrongfully obtaining advantages provided for by Community law”. As it will be explained in the text, the 
extent to which Member States may refuse or withdraw the benefits of the Directive is subject to a strict 
interpretation, as the wording of para 37 (“by way of exception and in specific cases”) reveal. 
753
 ECJ, 14 December 2000, C-110/99, Emsland-Stärke; ECJ, 21 February 2006, C-255/02, Halifax. Recently, 
ECJ 22 December 2010, C-277/09, RBS Deutchland Holdings, in particular at para 49. 
 
National Tax Law Presumptions and EU Law 
 
 
401 
arrangements’ that do not reflect ‘economic reality’, or transactions that would not have 
been concluded between non-related parties, and so on. Since the purpose of Treaty 
freedoms is precisely to let taxpayers participate in the economic life of a Member State 
other than the one of origin, where this effectively occurs through a real economic 
structure or transaction, there is neither circumvention of EU law nor intention of obtaining 
a certain advantage with artificial settings. The importance of the subjective element over 
the objective element may appear to re-emerge as regards the object of the proof to the 
contrary, where the Court requires Member States to allow the taxpayer to prove the ‘valid 
commercial reasons’ for the arrangement. Yet, what the taxpayer is in fact called upon to 
demonstrate is the effective settlement abroad, or that the conditions of the cross-border 
transactions are at arm’s length and so on, rather than the motives behind the operation 
carried out. 
 
3.1.1 European Commission’s guidelines on anti-abuse measures 
In the previous paragraph, a reference was made to the active role of European Institutions 
in promoting the coordination of Member States’ policy in order to cope with abusive 
practices. In this light may be read the Communication issued in 2007 by the European 
Commission on the application of anti-abuse measures in the area of direct taxation
754
. 
Generally speaking, the Communication is an instrument of soft-law which permits the 
Commission to address Member States with non-binding indications as to the requisites set 
by EU law on a certain issue, based on the settled jurisprudence of the EUCJ. In this way, 
the Commission offers its reading of the relevant judgments, which is likely to be followed 
in possible infringement procedures. Member States are thus ‘invited’ to align their 
national provisions to that requisites.  
The Communication on anti-abuse measures in the area of direct taxation is interesting 
because the Commission, while endorsing the rulings of the EUCJ handed down in the 
cases Cadbury Schweppes and Thin Cap GLO, sees in legal presumptions of tax avoidance 
a proportionate means for attaining the aim of combating the erosion of the taxable base, 
provided that they are sufficiently specific to affect only ‘wholly artificial arrangements’ 
and the taxpayer is given the right to rebut the presumption.  
From the above decisions, the Commission infers that “for the purposes of determining 
whether a transaction represents a purely artificial arrangement, national anti-abuse rules 
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 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European 
Economic and Social Committeed, 10 December 2007, No 785. 
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may comprise 'safe harbour' criteria to target situations in which the probability of abuse 
is highest”. In this regard, it shares the opinion delivered by Advocate General Geelhoed in 
Thin Cap, according to which “the setting out of reasonable presumptive criteria 
contributes to a balanced application of national anti-abuse measures as it is in the 
interest of both legal certainty for the taxpayers, and workability for tax authorities”. In 
addition, the Commission requests that where the existence of ‘wholly artificial 
arrangements’ is presumed, the taxpayer must be given the opportunity, “without being 
subject to undue administrative constraints”, to produce evidence of any commercial 
justification for the arrangement he entered into. This amounts to recognising that the 
taxpayer has the right to prove that his arrangement is justified by business objectives that 
are protected under the Treaty
755
. 
Therefore, the Commission is clear in approving rebuttable presumptions included in anti-
abuse rules, since they satisfy the need of legal certainty on the side of the taxpayer – given 
that the inference is fixed in the law - and on the side of tax authorities, which are also 
relieved from the burden of proof. 
However, when turning to the shifting of the burden of proof on the taxpayer, the 
reasoning of the Commission becomes more cryptic and difficult to translate into real 
provisions. Firstly, it refers to the proof that transactions carried out by the taxpayer 
“served bona fide purposes”, where the reference to the bona fide appears to be misleading. 
Secondly, it supports a case-by-case determination of the extent to which such burden of 
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 With regard to the supplementary conditions set by the European Commission for anti-abuse measures L. 
De Broe, Some observations on the 2007 communication from the Commission: ‘The application of anti-
abuse measures in the area of direct taxation within the EU and in relation to third countries’, EC Tax 
Review, 2008, 143, in particular at p. 145, observes that once the taxpayer has proved that his arrangment 
pursues the object and purpose of Community law of which he avails himself, it is no longer relevant the 
circumstance that such arrangment lets him minimize the tax liability in his home State. He further underlines 
that in principle the burden of proof that there is abuse of Community law and tax avoidance is incumbent on 
tax authorities, which have to satisfy it in each concrete case. The Court has thus facilitated the task of tax 
authorities by permitting Member States to enact measures including presumptions of avoidance. In the light 
of this, the Author believes that both the requisites concerning the design of the presumptive criteria and the 
counterproof should be jointly taken into account. In other words, an anti-avoidance measure containing a 
broad presumptive criteria establishing tax avoidance is not per se consistent with EU law solely because it 
permits taxpayers to rebut that presumption. Similarly, the taxpayer’s right of proving the contrary “may not 
be uncecessarily burdensome”. As to the first requisite the Authors asserts: “Where rebuttable presumptions 
of tax avoidance are couched in such general terms that they render meaningless the burden of proof of tax 
avoidance on the part of the tax authorities and shift this burden almost automatically to the taxpayer, not 
very much remains of the requirement that the rule be specific and that the tax authorities prove case-by-case 
the existence of abuse. Accordingly, anti-avoidance rules which are based on the presumption that the 
exercise of a Treaty freedom by the taxpayer is abusive unless the taxpayer proves otherwise, are likely to be 
incompatible with Community law”. With reference to the second requisite, based on the case Cadbury 
Schweppes, the Author finds the escape construed under the form of a motive test to be unsuitable, as the 
circumstance that a fundamental freedom is exercised with the intention of obtaining tax relief does not per 
se constitute abuse. 
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proof may be placed upon the taxpayer, and in view of the proportionality principle states 
that the “burden of proof should not lie solely on the side of the taxpayer and that account 
should be taken of the general compliance capacity of the taxpayer and of the type of 
arrangement in question”. Ultimately, it finds necessary to guarantee that the result of the 
assessment by tax authorities “can be made subject to an independent judicial review”. 
The question arises as to whether the right to produce counterproof in the context of the 
administrative proceedings or trial may be considered sufficient in order to comply with 
these requisites. This solution would meet the need of certainty, and also the need to take 
into consideration the circumstances of the concrete case. It remains in part unclear the 
reference to the necessity that the burden of proof does not lie solely upon the taxpayer and 
that his compliance capacity is taken into account. The Commission presumably suggests 
that the national legislator is to distribute the burden of proof, depending on the type of 
transaction or arrangement concerned (CFC; transfer pricing, thin cap, etc.) and to demand 
from tax authorities at least the proof case-by-case of the indices from which the avoidance 
is (legally) inferred.  
 
3.1.2 Anti-abuse clauses in direct tax directives. The Leur-Bloem case 
Before examining the EUCJ case-law under primary EU law, separate attention should be 
paid to anti-avoidance measures enacted by Member States based on provisions provided 
under secondary EU law. Similarly to other harmonized sectors, in this event the EUCJ is 
called upon to interpret a provision of tax law included in a Directive, against which a 
national measure transposing it into national legislation has to be tested. Consequently, the 
judgment results from the interpretation given to the wording of the EU rule in the light of 
the object and purpose pursued by the Directive concerned.  
The question of the interpretation to be given to an anti-abuse clause provided under 
secondary EU law, and in particular to Article 11 of the Merger Directive (now, Article 15) 
was dealt with for the first time by the Court in the well-known case Leur-Bloem
756
. At 
issue was the Dutch legislation transposing the Merger Directive, which departed from the 
definition of ‘merger by exchange of shares’ envisaged in Article 2 of the Directive and 
provided the condition of “merging the business of two companies permanently in a single 
unit from a financial and economic point of view”757. The provision was justified, in the 
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 ECJ 17 July 1997, C-28/95, Leur Bloem. 
757
 More in detail, in the case of the main proceedings, the Dutch legislation was potentially able to exclude 
from the scope of the Directive hypotheses where tax evasion or avoidance did not occur. It provided that a 
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arguments of the Dutch Government, by the need to prevent tax advantages being granted 
for operations that had as their principal objective tax evasion or avoidance, in accordance 
with Article 11 of the Merger Directive. The latter permitted Member States to refuse or 
withdraw the benefits of the Directive where the operation has as its principal objective (or 
as one of the principal objectives) tax evasion and abuse, and added that the absence of 
valid commercial reasons for the operations carried out may be assumed as index of the 
fact that tax avoidance or evasion is the principal (or one of the principal) objective(s)
758
. 
Once again, the EUCJ employs a teleological interpretation. Member States may introduce 
presumptions of tax avoidance or evasion based on the absence of valid commercial 
reasons, but such ‘reservation of competence’ cannot amount to undermining the 
objectives inspiring the Directive, which is to introduce tax rules that are neutral from the 
point of view of competition for the operations designated within the Directive itself
759
. By 
excluding certain categories of operations from the scope of the Directive, on the grounds 
that they are presumed to have been carried out without any valid commercial reasons, 
especially when the presumption cannot be rebutted, the objectives of the Directive are 
undermined. Such competence must then be exercised by Member States in accordance 
with the principle of proportionality, which among other things implies the recourse to 
suitable (specific) criteria indicating the absence of valid economic reasons. The Court 
held as follows (paras 43 to 45): 
“In the absence of more detailed Community provisions concerning application of the 
presumption mentioned in Article 11(1)(a), it is for the Member States, observing the 
                                                                                                                                                                                
share exchange is only exempt when it is carried out “with a view to combining in a single unit, on a 
permanent basis from an economic and financial viewpoint, the undertaking of the acquired company and 
that of another person”, thereby adding further requisites in respect of the implemented Community 
provision (Article 2, para 1, let. d) of the Merger Directive). 
758
 It provided that “A Member State may refuse to apply or withdraw the benefits of all or any part of the 
provisions of Titles II, III and IV where it appears that the merger, division, transfer of assets or exchange of 
shares: a) has as its principal objective or as one of its principal objectives tax evasion or tax avoidance; the 
fact that one of the operations referred to in Article 1 is not carried out for valid commercial reasons such as 
the restructuring or rationalization of the activities of the companies participating in the operation may 
constitute a presumption that the operation has tax evasion or tax avoidance as its principal objective or as 
one of its principal objectives.” 
759
 To be more precise, the Council Directive 2009/133/EC of 19 October 2009 (formerly, Council Directive 
90/434/EEC of 23 July 1990) concerns mergers, divisions, paratial divisions, transfers of assets and 
Exchange of shares between companies of different Member States, and aims at creating within the 
Community conditions analogous to those of an internal market for the effective functioning of the latter. As 
stipulated in the second recital in the Preamble, “Such operations ought not to be hampered by restrictions, 
disadvantages or distortions arising in particular from the tax provisions of the Member States. To that end it 
is necessary, with respect to such operations, to provide for tax rules which are neutral from the point of 
view of competition, in order to allow enterprises to adapt to the requirements of the internal market, to 
increase their productivity and to improve their competitive strength at the international level.” 
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principle of proportionality, to determine the provisions needed for the purposes of 
applying this provision. 
However, the laying down of a general rule automatically excluding certain categories of 
operations from the tax advantage, on the basis of criteria such as those mentioned in the 
second question (a) to (d), whether or not there is actually tax evasion or tax avoidance, 
would go further than is necessary for preventing such tax evasion or tax avoidance and 
would undermine the aim pursued by the Directive. This would also be the case if a rule of 
this kind were to be made subject to the mere possibility of the grant of a derogation, at the 
discretion of the administrative authority. 
Such an interpretation is consistent with the aims both of the Directive and of Article 11 
thereof. According to the first recital of its preamble, the aim of the Directive is to 
introduce tax rules which are neutral from the point of view of competition in order to 
allow enterprises to adapt themselves to the requirements of the common market, to 
increase their productivity and to improve their competitive strength at the international 
level. That same recital also states that mergers, divisions, transfers of assets and 
exchanges of shares concerning companies of different Member States ought not to be 
hampered by restrictions, disadvantages or distortions arising in particular from the tax 
provisions of the Member States. It is only when the planned operation has as its objective 
tax evasion or tax avoidance that, according to Article 11 and the last recital of the 
preamble to the Directive, the Member States may refuse to apply the Directive.”760 
In summary, Member States may introduce legal presumptions which assume the existence 
of tax evasion or avoidance, thereby the non-entitlement of the Directive’s benefits, based 
on certain facts embodying the absence of valid commercial reasons
761
. But any overkill is 
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 Cf. also para 41 of the judgment, where the Court censured the use of ‘predetermined general criteria’ by 
the competent national authorities and required a general examination of each particular case to be open to 
judicial review. 
761
 Recently, in ECJ, 20 March 2010, C-352/08, Zwijnenburg, the Court has had occasion to reiterate that the 
option envisaged in Article 11, para 1, let. a) of the Merger Directive, which sets out an exception, is subject 
to strict intepretation “regard being had to its wording, purpose and context” (para 46). Thus, the anti-abuse 
clause may not be applied for the purpose of witholding the Directive benefits from a taxpayer who has 
sought, by means of a legal stratagem involving a company merger, to avoid the levying of a tax (transaction 
tax) which is not covered by the scope of the Directive. It is held, indeed, at para 47 that Article 11, para 1, 
let. a), “By making reference, as regards valid economic reasons, to the restructuring or rationalisation of 
the activities of the companies participating in the operation in question, in which case there can be no 
presumption of tax evasion or tax avoidance, that provision is therefore clearly limited to company mergers 
and other reorganisational operations concerning them and is applicable only to taxes arising from those 
operations”. Such anti-abuse clause (which in the case of the main proceedings was implemented in the 
Dutch law on corporation tax) covers solely taxes levied on the company or its shareholders on occasion of 
cross-border restructurings of undertakings, namely capital gains tax.  
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excluded, as it would overlap the Directive and jeopardize the objectives pursued by the 
latter
762
. 
 
3.1.3 National measures implementing the anti-abuse reservation of the Merger 
Directive 
If the interpretation given by the EUCJ of the anti-abuse clause included in Article 15, para 
1, let. a) of the Merger Directive (formerly, Article 11) is plain in the abstract, difficulties 
arise on the side of Member States which decide to implement it in their legal orders, so 
that the question of the division of the burden of proof seems to be open to different 
interpretations. Under the interpretation given by the EUCJ, Member States are permitted 
to enact a presumption of tax avoidance or evasion based on the fact that a certain 
operation is not carried out for valid commercial reasons. But the automatic exclusion of 
entire categories of operations, without individual assessment, on the grounds that they are 
suspect is found to be disproportionate. 
One could thus wonder in which way a legal presumption transposing the anti-abuse 
measure should be construed in order to be judged consistent with the Directive. 
If it was formulated as a presumption of tax avoidance or evasion based on the absence of 
valid commercial reasons, then it would place upon tax authorities the proof of a negative 
fact, per se difficult to bring up. Presumably in the light of this, several Member States had 
transposed such clause by making the Directive benefits conditional to further requisites in 
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 F. Hoenjet, The Leur-Bloem judgment: the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice and the 
interpretation of the anti-abuse clause in the Merger Directive, EC Tax Review, 1997, 206, particularly at p. 
212 et seq., made a parallel between the strict and literal interpretation of Article 11, para 1, let. a), of the 
Merger Directive given by the Court in the Leur-Bloem case and the strict interpretation of Article 3, para 2, 
of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive given by the Court in the case Denkavit-VI77C-Voomeer (ECJ, 17 
October 1996, Joined cases C-283/94, C-291/94 and C-292/94), which in the view taken by the Court was 
aimed at countering a specific form of abuse. Interestingly, the Author raised the question as to whether the 
presumption envisaged in Article 11 of the Merger Directive is to be considered refutable (“The first question 
that arises is whether the presumption of tax avoidance or tax evasion where valid commercial reasons are 
absent, is refutable”). In his opinion, from the Leur-Bloem case it results that even in the absence of valid 
commercial reasons, it should be determined if there actually was tax evasion or avoidance. Thus, the role 
assigned to the presumption of tax avoidance or evasion is to shift the burden of proof upon the taxpayer in 
case valid commercial reasons are absent. In this event, the taxpayer can prove that tax evasion or avoidance 
is not the principal motive or one of the principale motives for which the transactions concerned have been 
carried out, or presumably he can give the (positive) evidence of reasons other than tax abuse. Of the same 
opinion is D. Weber, A closer look at the general anti-abuse clause in the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and 
Merger-Directive, EC Tax Review, 1996, 67. The intepretation given by the Author is in line with the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ, which rejects irrebuttable presumptions or similar normative mechanisms that 
automatically exclude certain categories of operations from the tax advantage of the Directive based on 
factors established in the national implementino legislation. It must be noted, though, that this intepretation 
does not result from the wording of Article 11, which is neutral as to the rebuttable or irrebuttable nature of 
the presumptions that Member State are allowed (and not obliged) to introduce. 
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respect to the ones laid down in the Directive. For instance, the Belgian legislation required 
the operation (merger, exchange of assets and so on) to fulfil ‘legitimate need of a financial 
or economic nature’. Provisions like that, however, in the extent to which potentially 
excluded from the scope of the Directive entire categories of cases, without a case-by-case 
assessment and the opportunity for the taxpayer to prove the existence of commercial non-
fiscal reasons, were not in line with the criteria set by Community law. 
The safest way to implement the provision remains the literal transposition of Article 15 
para 1, let.a), in the national legislation, and in fact this is the solution which several 
Member States have opted for. Amongst these, Belgium has replaced the reference to the 
legitimate financial needs with an article that is identical to Article 15, para 1, let.a), of the 
Merger Directive, save for the explicit possibility to give proof to the contrary recognised 
to taxpayers
763
. However, even in this case, the question of who has to (dis)prove what is 
not fully clear. 
Presumably, under a national provision transposing literally Article 15, para 1, let. a), tax 
authorities may deny or withdraw the Directive benefits when they show that the operation 
concretely carried out does not reflect economic reality or does not appear at first sight 
justified by reasonable financial reasons
764
. From the EUCJ case-law it results that the 
“constituent elements of the presumption of tax evasion or avoidance”, amount to a 
complex fact; that is a series of factors that show the absence of non-fiscal reasons
765
. It is 
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 Article 183-bis CIR, stipulates, in the first and second indent as follows: “Pour l'application des articles 
45, § 1er, alinéa 1er, 46, § 1er, alinéa 1er, 2°, 95, alinéa 1er, 211, § 1er, alinéa 1er, et 231, § 2, alinéa 1er, 
l'opération ne peut avoir comme objectif principal ou comme un de ses objectifs principaux la fraude ou 
l'évasion fiscales. 
Le fait que l'opération n'est pas effectuée pour des motifs économiques valables, tels que la restructuration 
ou la rationalisation des activités des sociétés participant à l'opération, permet de présumer, sauf preuve 
contraire, que cette opération a comme objectif principal ou comme un de ses objectifs principaux la fraude 
ou l'évasion fiscales.”  
764
 In the wording of Article 15, para 1, let. a) of the Directive exemplifications are given of valid commercial 
reasons: the restructuring or rationalisation of the activities of the companies participating in the operation. 
Recently, the Court has reiterated, in ECJ, 10 November 2011, C-126/10, Foggia, with regard to the meaning 
of ‘valid commercial reasons’, that “the concept involves more than the attainment of a purely fiscal 
advantage. Consequently, a merger operation based on several objectives, which may also include tax 
considerations, can constitute a valid commercial reason provided, however, that those considerations are 
not predominant in the context of the proposed transaction. Accordingly, under Article 11(1)(a) of Directive 
90/434, where the merger operation has the sole aim of obtaining a tax advantage and is not carried out for 
valid commercial reasons, such a finding may constitute a presumption that the operation has tax evasion or 
avoidance as one of its principal objectives” (paras 34-35-36).”  
765
 Id, at para 52, where the Court concluded that “(...) Article 11(1)(a) of Directive 90/434 is to be 
interpreted as meaning that, in the case of a merger operation between two companies of the same group, the 
fact that, on the date of the merger operation, the acquired company does not carry out any activity, does not 
have any financial holdings and transfers to the acquiring company only substantial tax losses of 
undetermined origin, even though that operation has a positive effect in terms of cost structure savings for 
that group, may constitute a presumption that the operation has not been be carried out for ‘valid 
commercial reasons’ within the meaning of Article 11(1)(a). It is incumbent on the national court to verify, in 
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up to the taxpayer, then, to demonstrate that neither tax evasion nor tax avoidance occur, 
by giving the positive evidence of the existence of commercial reasons for which he 
entered into that operation or of the genuineness of the latter. 
By contrast, an interpretation that placed upon the taxpayer the (negative) proof of the 
absence of any tax avoidance or evasion purposes, based on the first part of  Article 15, 
para 1, let. a), which implies that business reasons and tax avoidance reasons may coexist 
and nonetheless the Directive benefits be denied if the former are dominant, is likely to be 
deemed disproportionate.  
 
3.2 National anti-abuse measures under primary EU law 
In the previous paragraph, at issue were operations carried out by taxpayers seeking to 
obtain a favourable tax treatment by invoking the Merger Directive. The abuse, if existent, 
concerned directly EU (tax) rules, and consisted in relying on a provision of the Directive 
which has not been intended to cover those situations. More in general, abuse of EU law 
usually concerns sectors where the harmonization is far-reaching or even uniform under 
secondary EU law. In these cases, the Court employs a double test for detecting abusive 
practices, which basically occur when a certain operation is carried out with the intention 
of obtaining a tax advantage contrary to the objective and purpose of an EU rule that is in 
this way only formally observed. Remedies for combating such practices are left to the 
competence of each Member State, albeit they may neither render ineffective the EU rule 
relevant in the case nor interfere with the scope of the EU regulation beyond what is 
necessary to protect the national financial interests.  
Turning to abusive practices realized by circumventing or avoiding the application of 
national legislation, the relevance at EU level depends on the transactional character of the 
situation or operation carried out by taxpayers and by the circumstance that the latter relies 
on EU law, typically on one of the freedoms of movement. In these cases, which normally 
fall within non-harmonized domains, the situation or operation is regulated under the 
national legislation, which may presume the existence of tax avoidance or evasion. 
Nonetheless, pursuant to settled case-law, such competence must be exercised in 
accordance with EU law. In this regard, within the more recent case-law of the EUCJ, the 
double test appears to yield in favour of standard formulations that concern the artificial 
                                                                                                                                                                                
the light of all the circumstances of the dispute on which it is required to rule, whether the constituent 
elements of the presumption of tax evasion or avoidance, within the meaning of that provision, are present in 
the context of that dispute.” 
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character of the operation or transaction carried out (‘wholly artificial arrangements’)766, 
which may be labelled as a genuineness or economic reality test. It follows that, 
irrespective of the motives behind a certain arrangement, the focus is on the artificial or 
genuine character of such arrangement, which may be inferred from specific criteria. 
In fact, when ruling on legal presumptions included in national anti-abuse measures or 
regimes, the EUCJ makes the consistency of the latter with EU law conditional upon two 
main conditions: the design of the known fact by means of objective criteria verifiable by 
third parties and subject to a judicial review, and the right of the taxpayer to rebut the 
presumption by giving evidence of the genuineness of the arrangement or the arm’s length 
value of the transaction and so on. 
Below, the more significant EUCJ judgments will be illustrated, with a view to pointing 
out the set of rules elaborated by the Court under primary EU law with regard to specific 
anti-abuse measures or regimes including legal presumptions. 
 
3.2.1 The legal presumption of tax avoidance included in CFC rules  
As underlined also in the Communication of the European Commission, looking at the 
EUCJ’s more recent judgments on anti-abuse measures in the field of direct taxes, it is 
reiterated that restrictions on fundamental freedoms must be targeted at “wholly artificial 
arrangements which do not reflect economic reality, with a view to escaping the tax 
normally due on the profits generated by activities carried out on national territory”. 
This formula is further specified by the Court dealing with single regimes, such as CFC, 
thin capitalization and transfer pricing.  
Starting from the CFC rules, the degree of the non-artificial nature of the arrangement is 
given by the physical existence of the controlled foreign company in terms of premises, 
staff and equipment, as well as by its economic integration and participation within the 
host State. When these elements do not occur, and in addition the subsidiary is subject to a 
‘very favourable tax regime’, the case may be that a tax avoidance scheme is present. 
These objective factors play a pivotal role in determining the consistency rather than the 
clash of the legal presumption of avoidance included in a CFC legislation with EU law. In 
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 As to whether the Court distinguishes between combating abuse at the EU level (in harmonized sectors or 
where the law has been made uniform) or at the national level (in non-harmonized sectors, like direct 
taxation), D. Weber, Abuse of Law in European Tax Law: An Overview and Some Recent Trends in the 
Direct and Indirect Tax Case Law of the ECJ – Part 1, European Taxation, 2013, 251, in particular at p. 264, 
believes that there should not be any differences, because “the core question remains whether Community 
law allows for the presumed combating of abuse, independent of the question of whether or not the abuse 
takes place at the EU level or at the national level”. 
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fact, they are relevant at least on a double level: as regards the design of the known fact 
and the object of the contrary proof. 
Such general considerations and the ones developed below concerning the minimum 
requisites set at EU level for approving legal presumptions provided in anti-abuse rules, 
hold true irrespective of the rules on the details (type of income to be imputed, level of 
taxation in the host State, possible advance tax ruling, mechanisms to avoid double 
taxation), though the latter are surely important in order to evaluate the proportionality of 
the single regime. 
In fact, it goes without saying that CFC legislations, which are provided in several Member 
States, may diverge on several aspects. Though, the essence of the regime is represented by 
the current taxation in the hands of the parent company holding a foreign subsidiary of the 
profits generated by the latter. This is done either by considering the subsidiary as a branch 
of the resident parent company to which profits are imputed on an accrual basis, or by 
assuming the yearly distribution of such profits to the parent company irrespective of the 
circumstance that this took place or not. Therefore, if the form in which a CFC rule is 
construed within each legal order may vary, the essence and the purpose of the regime 
remain. It aims at tackling tax avoidance practices planned by resident companies, which 
consist of diverting passive income towards companies located in low-tax jurisdictions. 
From the scope and main features of the regime at hand it manifestly results how it is 
naturally targeted at cross-border situations. In the abstract, it is conceivable also for 
merely internal situations, and in fact some Member States include similar regimes, but 
usually they are directed to individual undertakings and limited partnerships (which are 
deemed as transparent entities rather than separate legal entities) in order to simplify their 
tax treatment and avoid tax deferral. By contrast, given the aim pursued by means of CFC 
rules, that is avoiding the shifting of taxable base to tax havens, the inclusion of domestic 
subsidiaries in the scope of the regime would not make much sense, there being other 
forms of anti-avoidance rules applicable. In the light of this, usually CFC legislations 
discriminate resident parent companies holding one or more subsidiaries in low tax 
jurisdictions against parent companies holding subsidiary in their State of residence. Or, at 
least, they restrict on the freedom of establishment of the former, by discouraging them 
from investing abroad through the establishment and the maintaining of a subsidiary. 
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3.2.1.1 The Cadbury Schweppes case. The facts 
The consistency of the CFC legislation with Community law, in particular with the 
freedom of establishment, has been examined by the EUCJ in the well- known case 
Cadbury Schweppes
767
. 
At issue was the UK CFC legislation, providing that the profits of a foreign company in 
which the resident parent owned a holding of more than 50% were attributed to the 
resident company and taxed in its hands ‘as they arise’, irrespective of their distribution in 
the form of dividends. This occurred when the foreign company was subject, in the State 
where it was established, to a lower level of taxation, which amounted to less than three 
quarters of the amount of tax which the CFC would have paid in the UK on the same 
taxable profits. The legislation included a system of tax credit in order to avoid double 
taxation on the same profits, and provided for a number of exceptions, which worked as 
‘carve out’, impeding the application of the regime, either because the circumstances 
envisaged were incompatible with an artificial arrangement or artificial transactions 
(acceptable distribution policy, trading activities, public quotation) or because of the 
negligible character of the latter (de minimis exception). In addition, the UK’s CFC 
legislation provided an escape, at first sight, under the form of a sort of counterproof to be 
given by the resident parent company, which was labelled as ‘motive test’. Such test was 
satisfied where two conditions jointly applied: a) when transactions giving rise to the 
CFC’s profits in a certain accounting period caused the lowering (upon a certain threshold) 
of the tax that otherwise would have been paid, the resident company was called upon 
showing that this was not the main purpose or one of the main purposes for carrying on 
those transactions; b) likewise, it had to show that the main reason or one of the main 
reasons for the existence of the CFC was not reducing the tax burden in the UK by 
diverting profits, which otherwise would have been received and taxed in the hands of  a 
UK resident. Ultimately, from the decision it results that on the basis of this legislation, tax 
authorities published a list of States wherein, provided that certain conditions were met, a 
CFC could be established without being subject to the CFC legislation. 
In the facts of the main proceedings, none of the above exceptions applied and the 
company resident in the UK was not able to fulfil to the satisfaction of the tax authorities 
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 ECJ, 12 September 2006, case C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes. See S. Whitehead, CFC Legislation and 
Abuse of Law in the Community, in The Influence of European Law on Direct Taxation, Recent and Future 
Developments, (ed.) D. Weber, Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 2007, 1 et seq.; M. Beghin, 
La sentenza Cadbury-Schweppes e il “malleabile” principio della libertà di stabilimento, Rass. Trib., 2006, 
990. 
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the motive test, therefore a tax notice was issued originating the dispute before the national 
court. Such resident company (Cadbury Schweppes) was the parent company of a group 
including numerous subsidiaries. Amongst the latter, it indirectly owned two group finance 
subsidiaries established in Ireland, wherein they were subject to a tax rate of 10%
768
. 
This being the juridical and factual background and turning to the decision, the EUCJ 
found that the UK’s CFC rules could be compatible with Community law provided that 
they were targeted at ‘wholly artificial arrangements’ aimed at circumventing national 
legislation and that the taxpayer was given the possibility to prove the absence of any 
fictitious arrangement. The main doubts concerned the ‘motive test’ and indeed the EUCJ 
referred the matter back to the national court, which was entrusted with the ascertainment 
of whether such test could be interpreted in such a way that taxation was restricted solely 
to ‘wholly artificial arrangements’. 
As usual, the EUCJ reasoning is developed through three main steps, which basically 
consist of assessing if the national measure discriminates or is restrictive on the 
fundamental freedom concerned, in checking the justifications invoked by the Member 
State involved and ultimately in the test of appropriateness and proportionality of such 
measure to reach the purpose sought. Notably, in this decision, the last two steps are 
strongly interrelated, as the analysis of whether the national measure is targeted at ‘wholly 
artificial arrangement’ implies already an evaluation of its proportionality. 
As was predictable, the EUCJ found the CFC rules to be restrictive on the freedom of 
establishment
769
, and after having quickly rejected the justifications of the need to prevent 
the reduction of tax revenue
770
, it focused on the need to prevent a form of tax avoidance 
involving the creation by a resident company of a subsidiary in a low tax jurisdiction and 
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 From the decision it seems that they carried on financing business, that is they raised finance and provided 
that finance to other members of the Cadbury Schweppes’ group of comapnies around the world. At first 
sight they were not merely ‘letterbox’ of ‘front’ subsidiaries. 
769
 Id., at paras 43. The Court observed that (paras 43-44) “it is common ground that the legislation on CFCs 
involves a difference in the treatment of resident companies on the basis of the level of taxation imposed on 
the company in which they have a controlling holding. Where the resident company has incorporated a CFC 
in a Member State in which it is subject to a lower level of taxation within the meaning of the legislation on 
CFCs, the profits made by such a controlled company are, pursuant to that legislation, attributed to the 
resident company, which is taxed on those profits. Where, on the other hand, the controlled company has 
been incorporated and taxed in the United Kingdom or in a State in which it is not subject to a lower level of 
taxation within the meaning of that legislation, the latter is not applicable and, under the United Kingdom 
legislation on corporation tax, the resident company is not, in such circumstances, taxed on the profits of the 
controlled company”. It follows a difference in treatment which creates a tax disadvantage for the resident 
companies falling under the scope of the CFC regime (as it is taxed on the profits of another legal person) 
and as such dissuade them from establishing, acquiring or maintaining a subsidiary in a Member State in 
which their subsidiaries would be subject to a lower level of taxation (see paras 45-46). 
770
 Id., para 49. 
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the carrying on of transactions in order to artificially transfer profits from the Member 
States where they are generated towards that low tax State. 
 
3.2.1.2 Core of the ruling on CFC rules 
This being the frame, the decision appears to be based on two main pillars. 
On the one side, the EUCJ reiterated its case-law concerning the circumvention of national 
law by means of abuse of Treaty rights. In the view constantly taken by the Court, the fact 
that a Community taxpayer seeks to benefit from tax advantages in force in a Member 
State other than his State of residence does not per se embody abuse and as a consequence 
may not per se deprive him of the right to rely on a fundamental freedom
771
. This entails, 
with special regard to the possible limitations to the exercise of the freedom of 
establishment, that a ‘general presumption of tax evasion’ based on the mere fact that a 
resident company establishes a subsidiary in another Member State is not in principle 
approved by the Court
772
. 
On the other hand, precisely when examining the possible justification for the restriction to 
the freedom of establishment on the grounds of prevention of abusive practices, the EUCJ 
employs a marked teleological interpretation of the content of such freedom and the 
approved limitations. In this instance, the Court notes that the freedom of establishment “is 
intended to allow a Community national to participate, on a stable and continuing basis, in 
the economic life of a Member State other than his State of origin and to profit therefrom”. 
Thus, the concept of establishment here implies “the actual pursuit of an economic activity 
through a fixed establishment in that State for an indefinite period”, which in turn 
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 The Court stated as follows (para 35-36): “It is true that nationals of a Member State cannot attempt, 
under cover of the rights created by the Treaty, improperly to circumvent their national legislation. They 
must not improperly or fraudulently take advantage of provisions of Community law (...). However, the fact 
that a Community national, whether a natural or a legal person, sought to profit from tax advantages in 
force in a Member State other than his State of residence cannot in itself deprive him of the right to rely on 
the provisions of the Treaty (...)”. From the decision making the reference it resulted, and the UK government 
contended, that the establishment of the two Irish subsidiaries in the IFSC was aimed at benefiting from the 
favourable tax regime therein. The Court specified the content of the general statements referred to above and 
objected that “As to freedom of establishment, the Court has already held that the fact that the company was 
established in a Member State for the purpose of benefiting from more favourable legislation does not in 
itself suffice to constitute abuse of that freedom” (para 37). 
772
 Id. at para 50, while the possible justifications were analysed by the Court. This is settled case-law, as it 
has been explained when dealing with the proportionality in non-taxation cases and tax avoidance under 
secondary EU law. Ex multis, ECJ, 26 September 2000, C-478/98, Commission v. Belgium, on Eurobonds, 
especially at para 50, where it is held that “As appears from Case C-28/95 Leur-Bloem v Inspecteur der 
Belastingsdienst/Ondernemingen Amsterdam 2 [1997] ECR I-4161, paragraph 44, a general presumption of 
tax evasion or tax fraud cannot justify a fiscal measure which compromises the objectives of a directive.” 
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presupposes “actual establishment of the company concerned in the host Member State and 
the pursuit of genuine economic activity there”773. 
Based on these two lines, the EUCJ gives its guidance to the national court as to the 
requisites that a legal presumption of tax avoidance included in CFC rules must meet in 
order to be justified on the grounds of preventing abuse and to be proportionate to such 
aim
774
. 
Considering that the establishment of a subsidiary in a low-tax jurisdiction cannot per se be 
deemed as an abusive conduct provided that the settlement abroad is real and so are the 
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 Id., paras 52 to 54. 
774
 The Court agreed with the Opinion given by the Advocate General. Though, the reasoning developed by 
the latter as regards the legal presumption of avoidance included in CFC rules is interesting. Notably, it is 
more articulated in explaining why, unlike previous decisions where the EUCJ prompted the use of 
administrative cooperation tools, in the case at hand the recourse to a legal presumption does not excessively 
burden the taxpayer; on the contrary, it guarantees legal certainty. From the Opinion it results that the Irish 
Government contended that the objective pursued with the CFC legislation could have been attained by 
means of less restrictive measures, among which the Exchange of informations pursuant to the Directive 
77/799, and that such legislation placed a ‘significant and disproportionate burden’ upon UK resident 
companies holding subsidiaries in Ireland (para 34). The Advocate General objected as follows (paras 135-
145): “I am not particularly persuaded by Ireland’s assessment. Admittedly, exchange of information under 
Directive 77/799 is designed to facilitate counteraction of tax avoidance and that directive has often been 
relied on by the Court as offering the Member States sufficient opportunities to overcome administrative 
obstacles associated with knowledge of a non-resident’s circumstances. (It is equally true that the United 
Kingdom legislation on CFCs sets up a presumption. Accordingly, when none of the first four conditions 
stated above applies and transactions between a subsidiary and its parent company result in reducing, by 
more than a minimum amount, the tax which would have been owed by the latter if those transactions had 
not taken place, it is for the taxpayer to prove the absence of tax avoidance. In view of the particular 
situation covered by the legislation in question, however, I am not convinced that exchange of information 
under Directive 77/799 could be as effective as the legislation at issue. Likewise, I do not share the view that 
that legislation should be regarded, owing to the presumption it introduces, of imposing an unreasonable 
burden on the companies to which it applies. First, the United Kingdom legislation on CFCs, in view of all of 
its conditions for application and exemption, is designed to apply only in very specific circumstances which 
correspond to cases in which the probability of the risk of tax avoidance is highest.(…) Thus, as the 
Commission stated at the hearing, it is much easier to establish an artificial CFC which purports to provide 
services than one which is to carry on activity producing consumer goods. (…) Further, such artificial 
arrangements are probably more to be feared when the CFC is established in a very low tax State. Finally, 
the finding that the transactions between the CFC and its parent company have resulted in a reduction of 
more than a minimum amount in the tax due in the United Kingdom and the fact that no taxable dividends 
are distributed in the State of origin constitute objective circumstances which may corroborate the inference 
of tax avoidance. In such a case, given the ease with which such services can be relocated, I do not find it 
excessive for a Member State to introduce a presumption of tax avoidance instead of relying on the 
subsequent communication of information. Second, the existence of such legislation has the advantage of 
contributing to the legal certainty of economic operators. It enables them to know in advance that, in the 
aforementioned case, there is a presumption of tax avoidance. Those operators are thus on notice that they 
must be able to show that their subsidiary is genuinely established in the host State and that the transactions 
with the subsidiary are real. Nonetheless, I do not believe that preparing that proof constitutes an 
unreasonable workload. It is reasonable to believe that such proof might also have to be adduced in an 
‘ordinary’ tax check, carried out on the basis of the ordinary national legal rules designed to counteract tax 
avoidance.  The legislation in question, since it lays down in advance the cases in which proof is to be 
provided, seems to me to be rather to the advantage of economic operators. On the other hand, what is 
important is that the presumption set up by the law in question may in fact be rebutted. (…) In accordance 
with the case-law, the taxable person must be able to provide that proof in accordance with the rules of 
evidence under national law, provided that the effectiveness of Community law is not thereby undermined.” 
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transactions carried out, a restriction on the freedom of establishment may solely be 
confined to ‘wholly artificial arrangements which do not reflect economic reality, with a 
view of escaping the tax normally due on the profits generated by activities carried out on 
national territory”. In terms of how a legal presumption (of tax avoidance) included in the 
CFC rules should be construed, this formulation means that objective circumstances must 
be assumed as indicative of tax avoidance. In addition, the EUCJ insisted on the right of 
contrary proof which must be recognised to the resident parent company. Considering that 
the CFC rules embody a regime, as such with a general scope of application, the 
counterproof is what secures a case-by-case ascertainment of the concrete situation and the 
application of the regime only to ‘fictitious establishment[s] not carrying out any genuine 
economic activity in the territory of the host Member State’. Such contrary proof cannot be 
confined solely to the ascertainment of the intention of obtaining a tax advantage, as this 
circumstance is not sufficient in order to identify an abusive conduct in the view taken by 
the Court. A quid pluris is needed
775
.  
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 Cf. Id., paras 63-64-65: “As stated by the applicants in the main proceedings and by the Belgian 
Government and the Commission, the fact that none of the exceptions provided for by the legislation on 
CFCs applies and that the intention to obtain tax relief prompted the incorporation of the CFC and the 
conclusion of the transactions between the latter and the resident company does not suffice to conclude that 
there is a wholly artificial arrangement intended solely to escape that tax. In order to find that there is such 
an arrangement there must be, in addition to a subjective element consisting in the intention to obtain a tax 
advantage, objective circumstances showing that, despite formal observance of the conditions laid down by 
Community law, the objective pursued by freedom of establishment, as set out in paragraphs 54 and 55 of 
this judgment, has not been achieved. (...) In those circumstances, in order for the legislation on CFCs to 
comply with Community law, the taxation provided for by that legislation must be excluded where, despite 
the existence of tax motives, the incorporation of a CFC reflects economic reality.” Such finding, according 
to the Court (see para 67) must be based on ‘objective factors which are ascertainable by third parties’, 
concering the physical existence of the CFC abroad in terms of premises, staff, equipment. It is not clear 
what the Court refers to in using the wording ‘verifiable by a third party’. In my opinion, it assumes a 
necessary judicial stage, before which the party may give evidence to the contrary and a concrete 
ascertainment of the relevant facts may take place. Contra, D. Weber, Abuse of Law in European Tax Law: 
An overview and Some Recent Trends in the Direct and Indirect Tax Case Law of the ECJ – Part 2, European 
Taxation, 2013, 313, in particular at p. 315, who finds this reference redundant. The crucial role played by 
objective factors in the ascertainment of the existence of a ‘wholly artificial arrangement intended to avoid 
national tax law’ is pointed out by the Advocate General in its Opinion to the case. See Opinion of Advocate 
General Léger delivered on 2 May 2006, case C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes, at paras 119-120-121, where 
referring to abusive conducts in general and afterwards to the pending case, it stated that “The competent 
national authorities which are responsible for making that finding are not therefore called upon to inquire 
into the parties’ subjective intentions, which would be very difficult to prove and would give rise to legal 
uncertainty. They are to take into account circumstances such as collusion between an exporter and an 
importer or the wholly artificial nature of the transactions in question and the links of a legal, economic 
and/or personal nature between the operators involved in the scheme for reduction of the tax burden.  If we 
apply that analysis to our case, we encounter again the objective criteria proposed by the United Kingdom 
and the Commission. We have, in fact, a situation in which a resident company has established a subsidiary 
under its control in a Member State with a more favourable tax regime than that of the State of origin and 
has entered into transactions with that subsidiary which have resulted in a reduction in its taxation in that 
State. In such a case, proof that the establishment of that subsidiary and the transactions in question could 
have no purpose other than that of obtaining a reduction in tax which would be contrary to the objective of 
freedom of establishment entails, as I have already stated, an examination of whether the subsidiary is 
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The foregoing results explicitly from the final paragraphs of the judgment, but it is a 
cornerstone in the more recent jurisprudence concerning anti-avoidance (or more in 
general anti-abuse) rules which include legal presumptions. The Court held that (paras 70-
71): 
“The resident company, which is best placed for that purpose, must be given an 
opportunity to produce evidence that the CFC is actually established and that its activities 
are genuine. 
In the light of the evidence furnished by the resident company, the competent national 
authorities have the opportunity, for the purposes of obtaining the necessary information 
on the CFC’s real situation, of resorting to the procedures for collaboration and exchange 
of information between national tax administrations introduced by legal instruments such 
as those referred to by Ireland in its written observations, namely Council Directive 
77/799/EEC of 19 December 1977 concerning mutual assistance by the competent 
authorities of the Member States in the field of direct taxation (OJ 1977 L 336, p. 15) and, 
in this case, the Convention between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Ireland for the 
avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on 
income and capital gains of 2 June 1976.” 
Testing such criteria against the UK CFC legislation, it must be observed that the latter 
assumed the existence of tax avoidance on the basis of objective circumstances (resident 
parent company holding a controlling participation in a subsidiary established in a low tax 
jurisdiction with which transactions were carried out, exemptions) and its suitability to 
attain the aim pursued could not be discussed
776
. The main issue remained the 
appropriateness of the exceptions, and above all of the ‘motive test’ to warrant that the 
CFC rules applied solely to fictitious arrangements and that actual establishment and 
genuine transactions were instead carved out.  
The Court concluded by referring again to the probative aspects of the issue (paras 72-75):  
“In this case, it is for the national court to determine whether, as maintained by the United 
Kingdom Government, the motive test, as defined by the legislation on CFCs, lends itself to 
                                                                                                                                                                                
genuinely established in the host State and whether those transactions are genuine, without there being any 
need to address the motives and subjective intentions of those concerned”.  See F. Vanistendael, Halifax and 
Cadbury Schweppes: one single European theory of abuse in tax law?, EC Tax Review, 2006, 193. 
776
 As recognised by the Court at para 59, “By providing for the inclusion of the profits of a CFC subject to 
very favourable tax regime in the tax base of the resident company, the legislation on CFCs makes it possible 
to thwart practices which have no purpose other than to escape the tax normally due on the profits generated 
by activities carried on in national territory (...).” 
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an interpretation which enables the taxation provided for by that legislation to be 
restricted to wholly artificial arrangements or whether, on the contrary, the criteria on 
which that test is based mean that, where none of the exceptions laid down by that 
legislation applies and the intention to obtain a reduction in United Kingdom tax is central 
to the reasons for incorporating the CFC, the resident parent company comes within the 
scope of application of that legislation, despite the absence of objective evidence such as to 
indicate the existence of an arrangement of that nature. 
(…) 
In the light of the preceding considerations, the answer to the question referred must be 
that Articles 43 EC and 48 EC must be interpreted as precluding the inclusion in the tax 
base of a resident company established in a Member State of profits made by a CFC in 
another Member State, where those profits are subject in that State to a lower level of 
taxation than that applicable in the first State, unless such inclusion relates only to wholly 
artificial arrangements intended to escape the national tax normally payable. Accordingly, 
such a tax measure must not be applied where it is proven, on the basis of objective factors 
which are ascertainable by third parties, that despite the existence of tax motives that CFC 
is actually established in the host Member State and carries on genuine economic activities 
there.” 
The concrete ascertainment of the national measure’s consistency with Community law 
was thus left in the hands of the national court. Nonetheless, the decision did not leave 
much doubt as to the opportunity to broaden the scope of the motive test, which was 
confined to the subjective component and to the lowering of the tax burden in the UK
777
. 
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 T. O’Shea, The UK’s CFC rules and the fredom of establishment: Cadbury Schweppes plc and its IFSC 
subsidiaries – tax avoidance or tax mitigation?, EC Tax review, 2007, 13 et seq., observed that the Court had 
expressed sufficient doubts in its judgment that it was likely that the UK CFC rules would have had to be 
radically overhauled to comply with the requirements of Community law set therein. He believed that “the 
outcome of the Cadbury Schweppes case will depend on the findings of the national court and the evidence 
offered by the parent company to rebut the presumption of ‘wholly artificial arrangements’, but it seems that 
the UK’s CFC rules are in any event disproportionate and will need to be amended”. In his analysis of the 
judgment, the Author emphasized that, besides the impact on Member States’ CFC rules and the clarification 
of the concept of ‘abuse’ of the freedom of establishment, it is noteworthy in the light of further aspects. First, 
it draws a distinction between tax avoidance and tax mitigation in line with previous decisions, by clarifying 
that the second (at time termed as ‘forum shopping’ or ‘rule shopping’) is allowed within the Internal Market 
insofar as there is a legitimate exercise of a fundamental freedom, whereas the motives behind a certain 
arrangment or transaction, “though relevant, may not trigger automatic proof of actual tax 
avoidance/evasion”. Second, it elucidates the concept of ‘establishment’ and the relation between the 
freedom of establishment, the freedom to provide services and the free movement of capital, and extends the 
reasoning given in the Marks and Spencer decision, wherein the justification of the need to ensure a balanced 
allocation of taxing rights between Member States was firstly introduced. Ultimately, it is a confirmation that 
the ‘migrant/non-migrant test’ from the origin State perspective is the correct comparison when it comes to 
ascertaining whether a discrimination or a restriction occurs when a resident in the origin Member State 
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3.2.2 The legal presumption of tax avoidance included in thin capitalization rules 
Among the regimes mentioned in the European Commission Communication on anti-abuse 
provisions there are the thin capitalization rules. Similarly to the CFC rules, they include a 
legal presumption of tax avoidance and aim at preventing the erosion of the taxable base, 
so that they are mainly targeted at cross-border situations.  
As is well known, the concept of thin capitalization refers to the situation whereby 
companies have a high proportion of loan capital in respect to equity capital. This may 
happen because of the more favourable tax treatment to which commonly the debt 
financing is subject, in respect of the equity financing. In particular, where cross-border 
situations are at issue, the case may be that a subsidiary is financed through loan capital by 
its parent company (or shareholders in general) located in a lower-tax State; in this way, 
the former is entitled to deduct the interest payment in the State where it is established and 
at the same time income may be shifted towards the Member State of the latter where it is 
subject to a more advantageous tax regime. 
In order to prevent groups from putting in place such arrangements based on the 
exploitation of excessive debt financing, several Member States have introduced over time 
rules limiting the deductibility of the interest payments or re-classifying the interests as 
dividends under certain circumstances. Generally speaking, similarly to other anti-abuse 
mechanisms, thin capitalization rules may be construed under different forms and in fact 
the regimes that are currently in force in many of the EU countries vary in several aspects. 
For instance, the discrepancy may concern the way in which the thinly capitalization of a 
company is detected. In this regards, one possibility is referring to a fixed debt/equity ratio, 
another one is to apply the arm’s length criterion, or a mixture of both of them. Once it is 
established that a certain loan falls within the thin capitalization rule, the interest payment 
may be deemed as being non-deductible or may be re-classified as a dividend, and this may 
concern the entire amount or the sole amount of debt exceeding the ratio or the arm’s 
length criterion. Finally, the scope of the thin capitalization legislation may be confined to 
international transactions, i.e. involving a borrower and a lender located in different 
countries, or may be extended to cover domestic situations as well so as to apply 
indifferently to resident and non-resident shareholders. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
exercises a fundamental freedom. In my opinion, though, the judgment under discussion does not add much 
as regards to the justification on the grounds of the need to secure the balance in the allocation of taxing 
rights, as the Court quickly refers to such justification whereas it focuses on the need to prevent abusive 
practices. A clarification results from the SGI case, to be discussed below. 
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However, the essence of the regime remains common. This allows the drawing of general 
considerations irrespective of the details characterising the different national thin 
capitalization rules, and to indicate the requirements that it should meet to comply with EU 
law as interpreted by the EUCJ. 
In this regard, it has to be said at the outset that, before the landmark case Thin Cap GLO, 
the Court had first dealt with thin capitalization in the older case Lankhorst-Hohorst
778
. At 
issue was the German thin capitalization legislation, which provided the re-characterization 
as dividend distributions of the interest exceeding a certain debt/equity ratio (3:1) paid to 
shareholders that were not entitled to a German imputation credit, unless the taxpayer 
could demonstrate that the loan capital could have been obtained from a third party under 
similar conditions. The judgment is quite straightforward. The Court found that the 
national measure  discriminated de facto against resident subsidiaries receiving a loan from 
their non-resident parent company
779
. Afterwards, it rejected all the justifications invoked 
by the Member States submitting observations, such as the coherence of the tax system, the 
need to ensure the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the reduction in tax revenue. Even 
the argumentation based on the risk of tax evasion was not convincing for the Court, as 
“the legislation at issue here does not have the specific purpose of preventing wholly 
artificial arrangements, designed to circumvent German tax legislation, from attracting a 
tax benefit, but applies generally to any situation in which the parent company has its seat, 
for whatever reason, outside the Federal Republic of Germany. Such a situation does not, 
of itself, entail a risk of tax evasion, since such a company will in any event be subject to 
the tax legislation of the State in which it is established”780.  
In the view taken by the Court, therefore, the German thin capitalization was not 
sufficiently specific, as it ‘automatically’ applied facing a transnational loan. No particular 
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 ECJ, 12 December 2002, C-324/00, Lankhorst-Hohorst. The decision, and more in general the thin 
capitalization rules in the context of EU law, are analysed by L. Brosens, Thin capitalization rules and EU 
law, EC Tax Review, 2004, 188 et seq. 
779
 Lankhorst-Hohorst, paras 27 and 32: “Article 8a(1), Head 2, of the KStG applies only to repayments in 
respect of loan capital which a company limited by shares subject to unlimited taxation has obtained from a 
shareholder not entitled to corporation tax credit’. As regards the taxation of interest paid by subsidiary 
companies to their parent companies in return for loan capital, such a restriction introduces a difference in 
treatment between resident subsidiary companies according to whether or not their parent company has its 
seat in Germany. Such a difference in treatment between resident subsidiary companies according to the seat 
of their parent company constitutes an obstacle to the freedom of establishment which is, in principle, 
prohibited by Article 43 EC. The tax measure in question in the main proceedings makes it less attractive for 
companies established in other Member States to exercise freedom of establishment and they may, in 
consequence, refrain from acquiring, creating or maintaining a subsidiary in the State which adopts that 
measure.” 
780
Lankhorst-Hohorst, para 37. 
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regard was given to the possibility that apparently the legislation envisaged for the 
taxpayer to demonstrate that the loan terms were at arm’s length, which at any rate in the 
case of the main proceedings the subsidiary was not able to substantiate given its loss 
situation. 
Confronted with the risk of a clash with Community law, following such a decision several 
Member States took measures to amend their thin capitalization rules, mostly by extending 
them to domestic situations.  
Presumably also in view of these regrettable effects, the Court revised its position, and in 
Thin Cap GLO identified in the arm’s length a suitable criterion in order to detect ‘wholly 
artificial arrangements’; said otherwise, it embodies an ‘objective and verifiable element’ 
on the grounds of which a presumption of tax avoidance may be based. 
 
3.2.2.1 The Thin Cap GLO case 
The Thin Cap GLO case
781
 originated precisely from a series of claims for restitution of 
tax or damages brought by taxpayers who contended the contrast between the UK’s thin 
capitalization legislation and the right of establishment, following the judgment in 
Lankhorst-Hohorst. The legislation at issue was quite articulated and had been subject to 
several amendments over the years, but in substance it limited the deductibility of interest 
on loans granted by a non-resident (direct or indirect) parent company to a resident 
company. Such interest was indeed re-classified into a non-deductible profit distribution 
“to the extent to which it exceeds the amount that would have been paid at arm’s length 
between the payer and the payee of the interest”. 
Similarly to the German thin cap legislation, the UK’s thin cap provisions were found 
restrictive on the freedom of establishment, as they “give rise to a difference in treatment 
between resident borrowing companies according to whether or not the related lending 
company is established in the United Kingdom” 782 . In cross-border situations, the 
borrowing company was subject to a higher tax burden, not only due to the fact that its 
taxable profits could not be reduced with the interest paid, but also because due to the 
classification of that interest as a dividend, the company could be liable to advance 
corporation tax when that transaction took place
783
. The possible compensation deriving 
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 ECJ, 13 March 2007, C-124/04, Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation. 
782
 Para 40. 
783
 See para 39. At para 61 the Court held that “(…) a difference in treatment between resident subsidiaries 
which is based on the place where their parent company has its seat constitutes a restriction on freedom of 
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from the corresponding adjustment made in the State of the group creditor pursuant to 
Article 9 of the applicable tax treaty, which the UK government invoked so as to exclude 
de facto a restriction, was not deemed by the Court as a safe tool for removing the 
difference in treatment created by the national measure. 
Unlike the German thin cap rule, though, the UK’s legislation was deemed as being 
suitable for detecting abusive practices normally put in place with intra-group loan 
financing
784
 and the Court went further to check if that legislation was also proportionate to 
attaining the objective sought
785. At this stage, it accepted the arm’s length criterion as a 
legitimate element in the light of which verifying the existence or not of the artificial 
character of the transaction carried out. In this view, the circumstance that a loan would not 
have been granted to the subsidiary or would have been granted under different conditions 
by third parties, may give rise to a legal presumption that the loan arrangement is artificial. 
However, from the decision two more requisites emerge for the thin cap rule to comply 
with EU law. One of these resulted already from the Cadbury Schweppes judgment: the 
taxpayer must be given the possibility to demonstrate the existence of any commercial 
justifications for the arrangement put in place, without being subject to undue 
administrative constraints. In addition, the Court clearly conditioned the proportionality of 
the thin cap rule to the circumstance that the ‘reaction’ of the tax system when the 
                                                                                                                                                                                
establishment, since it makes it less attractive for companies established in other Member States to exercise 
freedom of establishment and they may, in consequence, refrain from acquiring, creating or maintaining a 
subsidiary in the Member State which adopts that measure (...)”. 
784
 At paras 76 and 77 it stated as follows: “As the United Kingdom Government observes, national 
legislation such as the legislation at issue in the main proceedings is targeted at the practice of thin 
capitalisation, under which a group of companies will seek to reduce the taxation of profits made by one of 
its subsidiaries by electing to fund that subsidiary by way of loan capital, rather than equity capital, thereby 
allowing that subsidiary to transfer profits to a parent company in the form of interest which is deductible in 
the calculation of its taxable profits, and not in the form of non-deductible dividends. Where the parent 
company is resident in a State in which the rate of tax is lower than that which applies in the State in which 
its subsidiary is resident, the tax liability may thus be transferred to a State which has a lower tax rate. By 
providing that that interest is to be treated as a distribution, such legislation is able to prevent practices the 
sole purpose of which is to avoid the tax that would normally be payable on profits generated by activities 
undertaken in the national territory. It follows that such legislation is an appropriate means of attaining the 
objective underlying its adoption”. 
785
 The ECJ appeared to justify the different approach to the UK’s thin cap in respect to the German one 
based on the more specific character of the former and instead the automatic operating of the latter in cross-
border situations. At paras 79 and 80, in particular, it argued that “As the Court held in paragraph 37 of its 
judgment in Lankhorst-Hohorst, that requirement [proportionality] is not met by national legislation which 
does not have the specific purpose of preventing wholly artificial arrangements designed to circumvent that 
legislation, but applies generally to any situation in which the parent company has its seat, for whatever 
reason, in another Member State. By contrast, legislation of a Member State may be justified by the need to 
combat abusive practices where it provides that interest paid by a resident subsidiary to a non-resident 
parent company is to be treated as a distribution only if, and in so far as, it exceeds what those companies 
would have agreed upon on an arm’s-length basis, that is to say, the commercial terms which those parties 
would have accepted if they had not formed part of the same group of companies”. 
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arrangement is ascertained as artificial is confined to the interest in excess. It held as 
follows (paras 81 to 83): 
“The fact that a resident company has been granted a loan by a non-resident company on 
terms which do not correspond to those which would have been agreed upon at arm’s 
length constitutes, for the Member State in which the borrowing company is resident, an 
objective element which can be independently verified in order to determine whether the 
transaction in question represents, in whole or in part, a purely artificial arrangement, the 
essential purpose of which is to circumvent the tax legislation of that Member State. In that 
regard, the question is whether, had there been an arm’s-length relationship between the 
companies concerned, the loan would not have been granted or would have been granted 
for a different amount or at a different rate of interest. 
As the Advocate General stated at point 67 of his Opinion, national legislation which 
provides for a consideration of objective and verifiable elements in order to determine 
whether a transaction represents a purely artificial arrangement, entered into for tax 
reasons alone, is to be considered as not going beyond what is necessary to prevent 
abusive practices where, in the first place, on each occasion on which the existence of 
such an arrangement cannot be ruled out, the taxpayer is given an opportunity, without 
being subject to undue administrative constraints, to provide evidence of any commercial 
justification that there may have been for that arrangement. 
In order for such legislation to remain compatible with the principle of proportionality, it 
is necessary, in the second place, that, where the consideration of those elements leads to 
the conclusion that the transaction in question represents a purely artificial arrangement 
without any underlying commercial justification, the re-characterisation of interest paid as 
a distribution is limited to the proportion of that interest which exceeds what would have 
been agreed had the relationship between the parties or between those parties and a third 
party been one at arm’s length.”786 
                                                          
786
 The Court concluded that “Article 43 EC precludes legislation of a Member State which restricts the 
ability of a resident company to deduct, for tax purposes, interest on loan finance granted by a direct or 
indirect parent company which is resident in another Member State or by a company which is resident in 
another Member State and is controlled by such a parent company, without imposing that restriction on a 
resident company which has been granted loan finance by a company which is also resident, unless, first, 
that legislation provides for a consideration of objective and verifiable elements which make it possible to 
identify the existence of a purely artificial arrangement, entered into for tax reasons alone, and allows 
taxpayers to produce, if appropriate and without being subject to undue administrative constraints, evidence 
as to the commercial justification for the transaction in question and, secondly, where it is established that 
such an arrangement exists, such legislation treats that interest as a distribution only in so far as it exceeds 
what would have been agreed upon at arm’s length”. It thus referred back to the national court the 
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The Thin Cap GLO judgment, thus, confirms the line of reasoning that can be extracted 
from Cadbury Schweppes as regards the minimum requirements that a legal presumption 
of tax avoidance included in anti-abuse measures has to fulfil in order to be approved at 
EU level. 
With particular reference to the thin capitalization legislation, the indications given by the 
Court may be summarized as follows. Firstly, the presumptive inference which determines 
the operating of the disallowance of interest deduction or the re-classification of interest as 
dividend may be based on the arm’s length test applied to loans involving related parties 
placed in different Member States. Secondly, even when the arm’s length test is not 
satisfied, the taxpayer must always be given the opportunity to prove that the single 
transaction carried out served commercial reasons personal to its case. In this way, the real 
and effective nature of the arrangement, though not supported by the arm’s length test, can 
be put to the attention of tax authorities or, at least of the court in a possible tax litigation. 
Finally, the limitation to the interest deductibility cannot go beyond what is necessary in 
order to re-establish the situation as it would have been if the transaction would have 
implied non-related parties
787
. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
ascertainent as to whether the national provision allowed the taxpayer to produce evidence of the commercial 
justification for the transaction when the latter did not pass the arm’s lenght criterion. 
787
 The Court basically agreed with the position taken by the Advocate General. See Opinion of Advocate 
General Geelhoed delivered on 29 June 2006, Case C-524/04. Notably, he explicitly rejected fixed criteria, 
such as the debt/equity ratio, which do not allow the development of a case-by-case analysis, and he outlined 
how regrettable is the tendency showed by some Member States to extend their thin capitalization rules to 
domestic situation as a means for eliminating any risk of contrast with EU law. In particular, at paras 66 to 68 
he observed: “(…) it is my view that, depending on its formulation and application, legislation aimed at 
avoiding thin capitalisation may in principle be a proportionate anti-abuse measure. It is true that the idea 
that companies have the right to structure their affairs as they wish means that, in principle, they should be 
allowed to finance their subsidiaries by equity or debt means. However, this possibility reaches its limit when 
the company’s choice amounts to abuse of law. It seems to me that the arm’s length principle, accepted by 
international tax law as the appropriate means of avoiding artificial manipulations of cross-border 
transactions, is in principle a valid starting point for assessing whether a transaction is abusive or not. To 
use the reasoning of the Court developed in the indirect tax sphere and other non-tax spheres, the arm’s 
length test represents in this context an objective factor by which it can be assessed whether the essential aim 
of the transaction concerned is to obtain a tax advantage. Moreover, it is in my view valid, and indeed to be 
encouraged, for Member States to set out certain reasonable criteria against which they will assess 
compliance of a transaction with the arm’s length principle, and in case of non-compliance with these 
criteria for them to presume that the transaction is abusive, subject to proof to the contrary. The setting out 
of such criteria is, to my eyes, in the interests of legal certainty for taxpayers, as well as workability for tax 
authorities. This approach is to be contrasted, for example, with the use of a single fixed criterion to be 
applied in all cases – such as a fixed debt-equity ratio – which does not allow other circumstances to be 
taken into account. However, the formulation and application in practice of such a test must also satisfy the 
requirements of proportionality. This means in my view that:  It must be possible for a taxpayer to show that, 
although the terms of its transaction were not arm’s length, there were nonetheless genuine commercial 
reasons for the transaction other than obtaining a tax advantage. In other words, as the Court noted in 
its Halifax judgment, ‘the prohibition of abuse is not relevant where the economic activity carried out may 
have some explanation other than the mere attainment of tax advantages’. An example that comes to mind is 
the situation on the facts in Lankhorst-Hohorst, where the purpose of the loan, as accepted by the Court, was 
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3.2.2.2 Lemmers & Van Cleeff case and Itelcar case confirm the EUCJ’s line of 
reasoning on thin capitalization rules 
The above lines have been confirmed by the Court in two more recent cases dealing 
respectively with the (older) Belgian and Portuguese thin capitalization rules. 
In the case Lemmers & Van Cleeff
 788
, at issue was a Belgian provision that automatically 
denied the deductibility of interest paid by a Belgian subsidiary to its non-resident parent 
company/director on the basis of a 1:1 ratio, whereas the same limitation was not provided 
in merely domestic situations.   
The Court found the measure to restrict on the freedom of establishment, since it 
introduced a difference in treatment between resident subsidiaries depending on the seat 
(whether in Belgium or abroad) of their parent company that, as director, had granted them 
a loan
789
. It then went on to check if such measure, though restrictive, could be justified on 
the grounds of prevention of abusive practices and if it was proportionate. In this regard, 
after having echoed the ruling in Thin Cap GLO, the EUCJ concluded that (paras 31 to 33): 
“In the present case, it is apparent from the order for reference that the interest payments 
made by the Belgian subsidiary on a loan granted by a non-resident company which is a 
director were reclassified as dividends because the limit laid down in the second indent of 
Article 18(1), point 3, of the ITC 1992 had been exceeded, that is to say, at the beginning 
                                                                                                                                                                                
a rescue attempt of the subsidiary via minimising the subsidiary’s expenses and achieving savings on bank 
interest charges. One could imagine, however, that similar situations (i.e., where a transaction was not 
concluded on arm’s length terms, but was nonetheless made non-abusively and not purely to obtain a tax 
advantage) would be relatively exceptional;  If such commercial reasons are put forward by the taxpayer, 
their validity should be assessed on a case-by-case basis to see if the transactions should be seen as wholly 
artificia designed purely to gain a tax advantage; - The information required to be provided by the taxpayer 
in order to rebut the presumption should not be disproportionate or mean that it is excessively difficult or 
impossible to do so; - In cases where the payments are found to be abusive (disguised distributions) in the 
above sense, only the excess part of the payments over what would have been agreed on arm’s length terms 
should be re-characterised as a distribution and taxed in the subsidiary’s state of residence accordingly; and 
- The result of such examination must be subject to judicial review. Nor am I of the view that, in order to 
conform with Article 43 EC, Member States should necessarily be obliged to extend thin cap legislation to 
purely domestic situations where no possible risk of abuse exists. I find it extremely regrettable that the lack 
of clarity as to the scope of the Article 43 EC justification on abuse grounds has led to a situation where 
Member States, unclear of the extent to which they may enact prima facie ‘discriminatory’ anti-abuse laws, 
have felt obliged to ‘play safe’ by extending the scope of their rules to purely domestic situations where no 
possible risk of abuse exists. Such an extension of legislation to situations falling wholly outside its rationale, 
for purely formalistic ends and causing considerable extra administrative burden for domestic companies 
and tax authorities, is quite pointless and indeed counterproductive for economic efficiency. As such, it is 
anathema to the internal market.” 
788
 ECJ 17 January 2008, case C-105/07, Lemmers & Van Cleeff. Pursuant to Article 18, para 1, point 3, CIR, 
dividends included “interest on loans where one of the following limits is exceeded and to the extent of that 
excess: either the limit set out in Article 55; or the total of the interest-bearing loans is higher than the paid-
up capital plus taxed reserves at the beginning of the taxable period”. From the subsequent para 2, point 3, it 
resulted that such re-classification of interest as dividend did not apply where the payment was made to a 
director that was a Belgian company. 
789
 See in particular paras 20 to 24. 
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of the taxable period the total of the interest-bearing loans was higher than the paid-up 
capital plus taxed reserves. 
It is clear that, even if the application of such a limit seeks to combat abusive practices, it 
goes in any event beyond what is necessary to attain that objective. 
As the Commission of the European Communities stated in its submissions, the limit laid 
down in the second indent of Article 18(1), point 3, of the ITC 1992 also affects situations 
in which the transaction concerned cannot be regarded as a purely artificial arrangement. 
If interest payments made to non-resident companies are reclassified as dividends as soon 
as they exceed such a limit, it cannot be ruled out that that reclassification will also apply 
to interest paid on loans granted on an arm’s length basis”. 
The Belgian measure was thus deemed as being manifestly disproportional in view of the 
aim of combating abusive practices, as “[t]he mere fact that a resident company is granted 
a loan by a related company which is established in another Member State cannot be the 
basis of a general presumption of abusive practices and justify a measure which 
compromises the exercise of a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty”790. 
One could wonder if from this decision a certain preference of the Court for the arm’s 
length test in respect to the debt/equity ratio test may be inferred. In the case of the main 
proceedings, the ratio was such (1:1) that it had a wide range of application, so that it was 
unable to leave out the genuine transactions. In addition, the taxpayer was not given the 
opportunity to provide evidence of the possible commercial justification for the loan, 
which could have compensated for the mechanical disallowance of the deduction. 
The very recent case Itelcar
791
 is particularly interesting for two main reasons. Firstly, the 
Portuguese thin capitalization did not apply to domestic situations and EU Member States, 
but rather it solely covered loans granted to a resident company by a company established 
in a non-EU Member State. Secondly, the wide scope of the national presumptive measure 
was explicitly censured by the Court under the perspective of the absence of legal certainty, 
                                                          
790
 Id., para 27. 
791
 ECJ 3 October 2013, C-282/12, Itelcar. The case of the main proceedings involved a Portuguese company 
(Itelcar) running the activity of hiring out light motor vehicles. Unitl 2005 it was entirely held by a Belgian 
company, whose capital was for more than 10% held by a company resident in a non-EU country (GE 
Capital). Since 2006, the latter acquired 0.02% of the capital of Itelcar. In 2001, Itelcar and GE Capital 
signed a loan agreement for a period of 10 years, according to which the former had the use of a line of credit 
in return for a certain interest. From the decision, it results that Itelcar approached tax authorities to prove 
that the conditions of the loan were at arm’s length, but they were not satisfied with such proof and 
proceeded to make adjustments to the company’s base of assessment of tax for the years under inspection. 
After having brought two administrative appeals that were dismissed, Itelcar went before the court that 
decided to refer the question of compatibility of the national thin capitalization with the free movement of 
capital to the EUCJ. 
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which encompasses non-proportionality. In this way, the role of legal certainty as a 
requisite of proportionality in the construction of a certain presumptive inference is 
confirmed, after having been clearly asserted in the case SIAT (to be discussed below), the 
last of which is repeatedly echoed in the judgment at hand. 
The Portuguese thin capitalization legislation was an example of a mixture of approaches. 
It provided that interest applied to the part of an overall debt classified as ‘excessive’, paid 
by a resident company to a lending company established in a non-EU Member State with 
which the former had ‘special relations’, was not deductible as an expense for the purpose 
of determining the taxable profit. The debt was deemed as being excessive based on a 
debt/equity ratio 2:1
792
. Yet, the taxpayer was given the opportunity to demonstrate, taking 
into account several criteria peculiar to the concrete case, that it could have obtained the 
same level of credit under similar conditions from an independent party. This, except when 
the interest was paid to an entity resident in a country where there is a ‘significantly more 
favourable tax regime’793 which was inserted in a sort of ministerial black-list. 
In the decision, it is quite relevant for the findings of the Court the interpretation of the 
concept of ‘special relations’, which at first glance appears to cover various forms of 
relationships between the borrower and the lender, not only legal but also contractual, 
commercial, financial. On the one side, this concept led the Court to deem the case as 
falling in the scope of the free movement of capital. Indeed, though the Portuguese 
Government argued that the direct or indirect shareholding of the lending company in the 
borrowing company was always required for the thin cap rule to apply, the Court noted the 
minimum threshold fixed (10%) did not necessarily imply that the holder/lending could 
exert a definite influence over the decision of the borrower company in which it had a 
participation
794
. On the other side, the same concept led the Court to exclude the 
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 More in detail, article 61, paras 3-4-5 of the Portuguese Corporation Income Tax Code stated as follows: 
“The overall debt shall be regarded as excessive where, at any time during the tax year, the sum of the debts 
owed to each of the entities referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 exceeds double the amount of that entity’s 
holding in the taxable person’s equity capital. For the purposes of calculating overall debt, account shall be 
taken of all forms of credit, whether in cash or in kind, whatever the type of remuneration agreed, extended 
by the entity with which there are special relations, and including credit deriving from commercial 
transactions, where more than six months have passed since the debt became due. For the purposes of 
calculating equity capital, the subscribed and paid-up share capital shall be added to the other items 
categorised as such by the accounting rules in force, with the exception of those items that reflect potential or 
unrealised capital gains or capital losses, in particular those resulting from re-evaluations not permitted 
under tax legislation or from the application of the equity method of accounting.” 
793
 Article 61, para 6, of the Portuguese Corporation Income Tax Code.  
794
 See paras 20, 22, 23: “So far as concerns the rules at issue in the main proceedings, the term ‘special 
relations’, as defined in Article 58(4) of the CIRC, does not – as Itelcar and the European Commission 
observe – relate only to situations in which the lending company of a non-member country exerts a definite 
National Tax Law Presumptions and EU Law 
 
 
427 
Portuguese measure to be proportionate to the aim sought, that is combating tax evasion or 
avoidance put in place through the thin capitalization of the resident company with the 
intention to transfer taxable revenues abroad. 
In fact, after having found the thin capitalization rule to be restrictive on the freedom of 
capital, the EUCJ went on to verify if it was specifically targeted at ‘wholly artificial 
arrangements’ and if so, whether it was proportionate. The national provision was deemed 
an appropriate means of attaining the objective of combating the practices realized through 
thin capitalization, but the way in which the ‘objective and verifiable circumstances’ 
grounding the presumptive inference were drafted in the law were considered to be 
disproportionate. In this regard, after having echoed the rules extracted from the Thin Cap 
GLO judgment, The EUCJ held (paras 41-42):  
“(…) [T]he term ‘special relations’, as defined in Article 58(4) of the CIRC, encompasses 
situations that do not necessarily involve the lending company of a non-member country 
holding shares in the resident borrowing company. Where there is no such shareholding, 
the effect of the method for calculating the excess indebtedness laid down in Article 61(3) 
of the CIRC is that any credit arrangement between those two companies falls to be 
regarded as excessive. 
It is clear that, in the circumstances described in the paragraph above, the rules at issue in 
the main proceedings also affect conduct the economic reality of which cannot be disputed. 
In presuming that, in such circumstances, the basis of assessment for corporation tax 
payable by the resident borrowing company is being eroded, those rules go beyond what is 
necessary to attain their objective.” 
Therefore, in the view taken by the Court, the scope of the thin cap rule is excessively wide, 
and as such is able to affect even genuine situations. In this regard, the Court did take into 
                                                                                                                                                                                
influence, within the meaning of the abovementioned case-law of the Court, over the resident borrowing 
company by reason of its shareholding in that company. In particular, the situations listed in Article 58(4)(g) 
of the CIRC, which relate to the commercial, financial, business or legal relationships between the 
companies in question, do not necessarily involve the lending company holding shares in the borrowing 
company. (…) [E]ven if the application of the rules at issue in the main proceedings is confined to situations 
concerning dealings between a borrowing company and a lending company holding at least 10% of the 
shares or voting rights in the borrowing company, or between companies in which the same shareholders 
have such a holding, as contemplated in Article 58(4)(a) and (b) of the CIRC, it is clear that a holding of 
such a size does not necessarily imply that the holder exerts a definite influence over the decisions of the 
company of which it is a shareholder (…). It follows that a resident company may, irrespective of whether the 
lending company of the non-member country has a shareholding in it, or of the size of any such shareholding, 
rely upon the Treaty provisions on the free movement of capital in order to call into question the legality of 
such national rules (see, by analogy, Case C-35/11 Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation, 
paragraph 104). See paras 4 of the judgment where Article 58, para 4 of the Portuguese Corporation Income 
Tax Code is reported, which contains the list of hypotheses when ‘special relations’ occur.” 
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consideration the argument raised by the Portuguese Government, according to which the 
national measure applied only when the lending company had a direct or indirect 
shareholding in the borrowing company. But even in this event, the EUCJ found the thin 
cap rule likewise in contrast with the principle of proportionality, as its scope of 
application did not clearly result from the legislation and was able to create uncertainty to 
the disadvantage of taxpayers. It stated as follows (paras 43-44): 
“ (…) [T]he fact remains that such a limitation on the scope of those rules does not follow 
from their wording, which tends, on the contrary, to suggest that they do cover special 
relations where there is no such shareholding. 
That being so, the rules in question do not make it possible, at the outset, to determine their 
scope with sufficient precision. Accordingly, they do not meet the requirements of legal 
certainty, in accordance with which rules of law must be clear, precise and predictable as 
regards their effects, especially where they may have unfavourable consequences for 
individuals and companies. As it is, rules which do not meet the requirements of the 
principle of legal certainty cannot be considered to be proportionate to the objectives 
pursued (see SIAT, paragraphs 58 and 59).
795” 
Further indications as to the minimum requirements that a legal presumption included in a 
thin cap rule must have, may be inferred from this decision. The Court seems to request the 
presumption of tax avoidance to be necessarily based on the existence of specific 
circumstances that substantiate a qualified relation. In this regard, commercial or financial 
relations are not sufficient, being necessary a holding of the foreign lending company in 
the resident borrower company. The parameter of legal certainty becomes in this way a 
necessary requisite of proportionality, in the light of which are evaluated national legal 
presumptions included in anti-abuse measures. In this sense, it is possible to (fore)see a 
certain preference of the Court for legal presumptions that may be rebutted, which are 
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 The Court then concluded (para 45): “In light of the foregoing, the answer to the question referred is that 
Article 56 EC must be interpreted as meaning that, in the case of rules of a Member State which provide that, 
where interest applied to the part of an overall debt categorised as excessive has been paid by a resident 
company to a lending company established in a non-member country with which the borrowing company has 
special relations, it is not deductible as an expense for the purposes of determining taxable profit, but where 
such interest is paid to a resident lending company with which the borrowing company has special relations, 
it is deductible for those purposes, those rules are precluded where, if the lending company established in a 
non-member country does not have a shareholding in the resident borrowing company, they nevertheless 
presume that the overall debt owed by the borrowing company forms part of an arrangement designed to 
avoid the tax normally payable or where they do not make it possible, at the outset, to determine their scope 
with sufficient precision.” 
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predictable by taxpayers who are also aware of the evidence that they may be called upon 
to give. 
 
4. The balanced allocation of taxing powers between Member States read in 
conjunction with the need to prevent tax avoidance 
The ‘need to secure the balanced allocation of Member State’s taxing rights’ is a 
justification often invoked by Member States in recent EUCJ case-law concerning national 
anti-abuse measures aimed at avoiding the erosion of tax base and in this way safeguarding 
the right of each Member State to exercise its taxing power upon income generated under 
its jurisdiction. As such, it is interrelated with the need to prevent tax evasion or avoidance, 
which has been accepted by the Court on several occasions. Though the format of the 
justification might appear relatively new, similar arguments have been raised in older cases 
under a different format, such as ‘fiscal coherence’ or ‘territoriality’, though mostly 
unsuccessfully
796
. 
More recently, however, in a number of cases concerning the cross-border offsetting of 
losses and profits (Marks and Spencer
797
, Rewe Zantralfinanz
798
, Oy AA
799
, X Holding
800
) 
the ground of the ‘preservation of the allocation of the power to impose taxes between 
Member States’ has been accepted by the Court, albeit in correlation with other 
justification grounds. It has been observed that this case-law shows how “the Court 
sometimes deviates from its own case law, taking a flexible approach in order to come to 
the desired result” 801 . In fact, it basically approves the combination of the two 
justification(s) under discussion based on the consideration that if company groups could 
discretionarily determine the Member State in which their profits are to be taxed or their 
losses to be deducted, the entitlement of the Member State to levy tax on the profits 
generated in its territory, in casu by a subsidiary established therein, would be undermined. 
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 See M. Poulsen, Freedom of Establishment and the Balanced Allocation of Tax Jurisdiction, Intertax, 
2012, 200 et seq. 
797
 ECJ, 13 December 2005, case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer. 
798
 ECJ, 29 March 2007, case C-347/04, Rewe Zentralfinanz.  
799
 ECJ, 18 July 2007, case C-231/05, Oy AA. 
800
 ECJ, 25 February 2010, case C-338/08, X Holding.  
801
 D. Weber, Abuse of Law in European Tax Law: An overview and Some Recent Trends in the Direct and 
Indirect Tax Case Law of the ECJ – Part 2, cited above, 321. D. Weber and B. Da Silva, From Marks & 
Spencer to X holding: the future of cross-border group taxation, Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law 
International, 2011, at p. 6. 
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It is significant, however, that the ‘need to preserve the Member States’ taxing powers does 
not seem to embody an autonomous justification capable per se of justifying a restriction 
on a fundamental freedom. 
 
4.1 The SGI case on Belgian transfer pricing 
The general and brief considerations developed in the previous paragraph contribute to the 
reading of the judgment handed down in the case SGI, where a Belgian transfer pricing 
rule was at issue. 
Dealing with the Belgian tax system in Chapter II, Section II, some presumptive provisions 
included in the Belgian Income Tax Code (CIR) and embodying a type of transfer pricing 
rules have been discussed, amongst which there is Article 26 CIR. 
In the case SGI
802
 the Court was questioned about the consistency with the free movement 
of capital and the freedom of establishment of Article 26 CIR, where it provides (para 2, 
subparagraph 1) that ‘unusual or gratuitous advantages’ granted to a foreign taxpayer with 
which the undertaking established in Belgium is, directly or indirectly, ‘in some form of 
relationship of interdependence’, are added back to the resident undertaking’s own profits. 
The provision has a wider scope, because it also applies when such advantages are granted 
to non-related foreign taxpayers established in low tax States and to foreign taxpayers 
having common interests with the foreign taxpayer related to the resident taxpayer or with 
the foreign taxpayer established in a low tax State. Nonetheless, the case of the main 
proceedings involved companies which were related and the holdings owned were as such 
to guarantee the exercise of a definite influence over the other company’s decision. As a 
consequence, the Court decided to examine the compatibility of Article 26, para 2, 
subparagraph 1 (requesting a ‘relationship of interdependence’) with the sole freedom of 
establishment and not even with the free movement of capital
803
. 
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 ECJ 21 January 2010, case C-311/08, SGI. See A.M. Jiménez, Transfer Pricing and EU Law Following 
the ECJ Judgement  in SGI: Some Thoughts on Controversial Issues, Bullettin for International Taxation, 
2010, 271 et seq.;  
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 More in detail, the case of the main proceedings originated from the adjustments made by Belgian tax 
authorities to the taxable profits of a Belgian company (SGI). The latter had granted an interest-free loan to 
its French subsidiary (in which it had a 65% holding) and had paid a certain amount per month as 
management fee to its parent comapany (a company resident in Luxembourg with a holding of 34%) for 
management services that in the view taken by the tax administration were not actually performed. Thus, 
pursuant to Article 26 CIR tax authorities added back to SGI ‘own profits the notional interest on the loan 
granted to its French subsidiary. Moreover, pursuant to Article 49 CIR (which is not discussed in the decision) 
it disallowed the deduction of the management fee, on the grounds that it was unrelated to the economic 
benefit of the service. Notably, the revised assessment issued by tax authorities based on Article 26 was 
appealed by SGI, but the court of first instance agreed with the view of the tax authorities as it did not see 
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Admittedly, Article 26, para 1, subparagraph 2, is based on objective criteria, that is the 
‘relationship of interdependence’ and the ‘unusual or gratuitous advantages’, but these are 
formulated in a quite generic way. Yet, in the decision the Court took into great 
consideration the observations submitted by the Belgian Government concerning the 
interpretation/application of the provision by tax authorities and national courts, which was 
confirmed by how the referring court dealt with the pending case.  
The Belgian Government explained that the legislation under discussion is intended to 
combat tax avoidance by allowing adjustments, for taxation purposes, of “situations in 
which the companies concerned apply conditions to their relationships which go beyond 
what would have been agreed under fully competitive conditions”. To this end, Belgian tax 
authorities were entitled to make the adjustments of the resident company’s profits on the 
basis of the arm’s length principle, as the system of Article 26 itself was based on Article 9 
of the OECD Model and Article 4 of the Arbitration Convention. Such profit adjustments 
were allowed only when the non-resident recipient was enriched whereas the person 
granting the advantage, which was linked to the former by any direct or indirect form of 
interdependence, received no real consideration equivalent to that advantage, either 
because that consideration did not correspond to the ‘normal course of events’ and 
established practices, or because no obligation or consideration was provided
804
. 
The Court considered that the Belgian arm’s length legislation applied solely to cross-
border situations, and that in comparable domestic situations the gratuitous or unusual 
advantage was not added back to the payer (albeit on condition that such advantage was 
used to determine the taxable income of the recipient company). This amounted to a 
difference in the treatment of resident companies based on the place where the company 
receiving the advantage was resident, and as such constituted a restriction on the freedom 
of establishment
805
. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
any economic justification for the loan. The Court dismissed the arguments raised by the Belgian 
Government seeking to minimize the less favourable treatment facing cross-border situations. On the one 
hand, it relied upon some limitations to certain tax deductions for resident companies which have benefited 
from unusual or gratuitous advantages (Article 79 and 207 CIR). On the other hand, it contended that the risk 
of double taxation that a unilateral adjustment of profit could cause was reduced by the availability of the 
Convention 90/436/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the elimination of double taxation in connection with the 
adjustment of profits of associated enteprises. 
804
 See Id., paras 29, 58, 59. 
805
 Both from the perspective of resident companies and non-resident companies (paras 44-45): “Such a 
difference in the tax treatment of resident companies based on the place where the companies receiving the 
advantages in question have their registered office is liable to constitute a restriction on freedom of 
establishment within the meaning of Article 43 EC. A resident company could be deterred from acquiring, 
creating or maintaining a subsidiary in another Member State or from acquiring or maintaining a 
substantial holding in a company established in that State because of the tax burden imposed, in a 
Chapter III 
  
 
 432 
Turning to the verification of whether a compelling general interest was present, the EUCJ 
took into special consideration the importance of the measure in securing Belgium’s right 
to tax income generated in its own territory. This justification, in conjunction with the need 
to combat tax avoidance, was deemed as constituting an overriding reason in the public 
interest
806
 and as having sufficient weight to permit a general measure, meaning not 
specifically aimed at ‘wholly artificial arrangement’. The Court held as follows (paras 60-
63-66): 
“First, as regards the balanced allocation between Member States of the power to tax, it 
should be recalled that such a justification may be accepted, in particular, where the 
system in question is designed to prevent conduct capable of jeopardising the right of a 
Member State to exercise its tax jurisdiction in relation to activities carried out in its 
territory (…). 
In the present case, it must be held that to permit resident companies to transfer their 
profits in the form of unusual or gratuitous advantages to companies with which they have 
a relationship of interdependence that are established in other Member States may well 
undermine the balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes between the Member 
States. It would be liable to undermine the very system of the allocation of the power to 
impose taxes between Member States because, according to the choice made by companies 
having relationships of interdependence, the Member State of the company granting 
unusual or gratuitous advantages would be forced to renounce its right, in its capacity as 
the State of residence of that company, to tax its income in favour, possibly, of the Member 
State in which the recipient company has its establishment. 
In that context, national legislation which is not specifically designed to exclude from the 
tax advantage it confers such purely artificial arrangements – devoid of economic reality, 
created with the aim of escaping the tax normally due on the profits generated by activities 
carried out on national territory – may nevertheless be regarded as justified by the 
                                                                                                                                                                                
cross-border situation, on the grant of advantages at which the legislation at issue in the main proceedings 
is directed. Moreover, that legislation is liable to have a restrictive effect on companies established in other 
Member States. Such a company could be deterred from acquiring, creating or maintaining a subsidiary in 
Belgium or from acquiring or maintaining a substantial holding in a company established in that State 
because of the tax burden imposed there on the grant of the advantages at which that legislation is directed.” 
806
 Id., para 69. Cf. Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, delivered on 10 September 2009, case C-
311/08,SGI, who considers the need to combat abusive practices in the form of artificial arrangments aimed 
at tax avoidance to be a ‘sub-category’ of the justification of safeguarding a balanced allocation of the power 
to tax (para 63). 
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objective of preventing tax avoidance, taken together with that of preserving the balanced 
allocation of the power to impose taxes between the Member States.
807” 
Therefore, the Court admitted a general anti-avoidance measure, which it explicitly 
deemed unable to target ‘wholly artificial arrangements’, basically on the grounds that 
otherwise the Member State’s taxing power would be jeopardised808. 
This is not the only aspect that departs from the line of reasoning extracted from the cases 
Cadbury Schweppes and Thin Cap. In fact, Article 26 CIR under discussion did not 
provide for any contrary proof. The Belgian Government contended that it was interpreted 
as not precluding to the taxpayer the proof of commercial reasons for the transaction 
carried out. Surprisingly, unlike other cases (e.g. Itelcar) where the Court requested an 
explicit legislative provision, here it was satisfied with this explanation, albeit it referred 
back to the national court the verification of this point. It held (para 73): 
“According to the Belgian Government, the burden of proof as to the existence of an 
‘unusual’ or ‘gratuitous’ advantage within the meaning of the legislation at issue in the 
main proceeding rests with the national tax authorities. It states that when those 
authorities apply that legislation, the taxpayer is given an opportunity to provide evidence 
of any commercial justification that there may have been for the transaction in question. 
The taxpayer has a month, a period which may be extended, within which to establish that 
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 Id., at paras 67 and 68 the Court explained the relevance of the provision in combating tax avoidance 
when related parties are established in coutnries having quite different tax regimes in terms of taxable base 
and rates: “As regards the relevance of that ground of justification in the light of circumstances such as those 
of the main proceedings, to permit resident companies to grant unusual or gratuitous advantages to 
companies with which they have a relationship of interdependence that are established in other Member 
States, without making provision for any corrective tax measures, carries the risk that, by means of artificial 
arrangements, income transfers may be organised within companies having a relationship of 
interdependence towards those established in Member States applying the lowest rates of taxation or in 
Member States in which such income is not taxed (…). By providing that the resident company is to be taxed 
in respect of an unusual or gratuitous advantage which it has granted to a company established in another 
Member State, the legislation at issue in the main proceedings is able to prevent such practices, liable to be 
encouraged by the finding of significant disparities between the bases of assessment or rates of tax applied in 
the various Member States and designed only to avoid the tax normally due in the Member State in which the 
company granting the advantage has its seat (…)”. 
808
 In fact, national Governments invoked the need to maintain the balanced allocation of the power to tax 
between Member States, the need to prevent tax avoidance and ultimately the need to combat abusive 
practices. In this regard, interestingly, P. Baker, Transfer Pricing and Community Law: The SGI Case, 
Editorial, Intertax, No 4, 2013, 194, oberves that apparently “the Court is recognizing a difference between 
combating wholly artificial arrangements (which is a justification by itself) and combating tax avoidance 
(which is a justification when taken togeter with the need to preserved the balanced al location of the power 
to tax)”. Moreover, he points out that the ECJ seemed to deem  the burden of proof as part of the 
proportionality test. This might indicate, in his view, that similar provisions in national legislation would be 
judged proportionate if “the initial burden of proof falls on the revenue auhorities”. Finally, he notes that if 
the Court had rejected the Belgian legislation in the case SGI, this would have raised questions as to the 
maintaining of several transfer pricing legislation and cross-border anti-avoidance provisions across the 
European Union.  
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no unusual or gratuitous advantage is involved, having regard to the circumstances in 
which the transaction was effected. If, however, those authorities persist in their intention 
of issuing a revised assessment and do not accept the taxpayer’s arguments, the latter can 
challenge the assessment to tax before the national courts.” 
At the end of the day, this decision does not introduce new criteria of compatibility with 
the EU law where legal presumptions that are included in anti-avoidance measures are at 
issue. It rather confirms that the arm’s length test is deemed a suitable means for detecting 
abusive practices and reacting to them
809
. However, it appears that this decision  contains 
indications as regards the compatibility with the EU law leaning towards a more flexible 
application of those criteria when the sovereignty of Member States in direct taxation is at 
risk. In this event, the EUCJ demonstrates the application of a less strict test of specificity 
with regard to the way in which the situation envisaged in the norm is construed, thereby 
tolerating the use of (slightly more) general concepts for detecting abusive practices. This, 
however, is on condition that the adjustments are made for the part that exceeds the arm’s 
length value and the resident taxpayer is given the opportunity to demonstrate that in its 
specific case no artificial transactions have been carried out because they find a 
justification in its commercial or financial needs. The irremissible importance of the 
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 G.T.K. Meussen, The SGI Case: ECJ Approves Belgian System of Selective Profit Corrections in Relation 
to Foreign Group Companies, European Taxation 2010, 245. The Author notes that the arm’s length 
principle, on the basis of which dealings between related parties should be made as if they were unrelated 
third parties, is a well-established principle within all EU Member States. In some of these it is laid down in 
personal and corporate income tax legislations, in other words it is a non-written principle applied by national 
courts. Furthermore, from the case SGI it is possible to infer that the EUCJ accepts that such principle 
constitutes a principle of EU law that Member States may avail themselves of in order to secure their tax 
abses facing cross-border situations that involve related parties. The Authors also discusses the importance of 
the decision as regards the division of the burden of proof when transfer pricing adjustments are at issue. 
Following Article 9 of the 2008 OECD Model, and other acts issued at EU level (Resolution of the Council 
and of the representatives of the governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council, of 27 June 
2006 on a code of conduct on transfer pricing documentation for associated enterprises in the European 
Union (EU TPD), 2006/C 176/01; Communication of the Commission on the work of the EU Joint Transfer 
Pricing Forum in the field of dispute avoidance and resolution procedures and on Guidelines for Advance 
Pricing Agreements within the EU, 26 February 2007, COM (2007) 71 final), several Member States have 
enacted specific transfer pricing legislations. Some of them contemplate placing upon the taxpayer severe 
documentation fulfilments. In this way, according to the Author, they put the burden primarily upon the 
taxpayer, who is called upon to give evidence of how the price was established in the absence of a third-party 
market price. In his opinion, the burden should lie upon the party which is “best equipped to prove the 
respective situation”. Therefore: “While with regard to anti-abuse provisions to counter wholly artificial 
arrangements, such as the contested Belgian tax legislation in the SGI case, the burden of proof lies 
primarily with the tax authorities, the author finds it understandable that in transfer pricing matters the 
burden of proof lies primarily with the taxpayer. In transfer pricing matters, the taxpayer has the best 
knowledge of the companies involved, the group structure, the profit calculation concerning transactions in 
the group, market prices, etc.”. The Author seems in this way to distinguish ‘normal’ or ‘ordinary’ situations, 
and cases where there are conditions that make suspect abuse (e.g. unusual profits granted to foreign related 
party).  
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procedural guarantees for the taxpayer (proof to the contrary, but also administrative 
hearing, judicial review) finds thus a confirmation in the judgment at hand
810
.   
 
5. The Belgian SIAT case. The principle of legal certainty as a parameter of 
proportionality of national legal presumptions… 
At first sight, the SIAT case, handed down on the Belgian limitation to the deductibility of 
certain expenditure related to cross-border transactions, appears to slightly depart from the 
lines of reasoning that emerge from the cases Cadbury Schweppes, Thin Cap GLO and 
SGI. 
The case concerned Article 54 of the Belgian Income Tax Code (CIR), which has been 
discussed in Chapter II, Section II, of this dissertation, as it derogates from the general rule 
on deduction of business expenditure (Article 49 CIR) by relieving tax authorities from the 
evidence of abusive practices. More in detail, Article 54 CIR provides that payments for 
supplies or services made by Belgian taxpayers to taxpayers established in another State, in 
which the latter are not subject to tax on income or are subject as regards the relevant 
income to a ‘more advantageous tax regime’ than the one applicable in Belgium, are not 
regarded as being deductible business expenditure. This is unless the Belgian taxpayer 
proves that such payments are related to a genuine transaction and do not exceed the 
normal limits. Instead, under the general rule laid down in Article 49 CIR applicable to 
domestic situations, such payments are regarded as deductible business expenditure 
provided that they are necessary for acquiring or retaining taxable income and the taxpayer 
demonstrates the authenticity and amount of the expenditure incurred
811
. 
Given that Article 54 applies solely to cross-border payments, for the deductibility of 
which it lays down stricter conditions than those envisaged in the general provision for 
domestic payments, it was found by the Court to be restrictive on the freedom to provide 
services. In fact, it was able either to dissuade Belgian taxpayers from making use of the 
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 Cf. M. Glahe, Transfer pricing and EU Fundamental Freedoms, EC Tax Review, 2013, 222 et seq. The 
Author underlines how the decision in the SGI case leaves several issues unsolved, in particular as regards 
the arm’s length principle, which the Court apparently endorses. As underlined in the text, it is controversial 
how the requirement of the ‘evidence of any commercial justification’ to be granted to taxpayers has to be 
intepreted: whether confined to an arm’s length test or rather extended to cover a wide range of non-tax 
business reasons for a deviations from an arms’ length proce. The second intepretation is not in line with the 
purely objective and arm’s length based approach followed by the OECD and several national legislations.    
811
 For the sake of completeness, such ordinary rule must be read in conjunction with Article 53, para 1, No 
10 CIR, according to which business expenses do not included “any expenditure which exceeds business 
needs to an unreasonable extent”. 
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services of providers established in another Member State, or such providers from offering 
their services to Belgian recipients. The EUCJ reasoned as follows (para 21 to 23): 
“(…) under the general rule, the taxpayer must provide proof of the authenticity and 
amount of the expenditure incurred, there being a presumption on the part of the tax 
authority, according to the Belgian Government, that the expenditure is necessary for 
acquiring or retaining taxable income. In addition, under Article 53(10) of the 1992 
Income Tax Code, the amount of that expenditure must not exceed business needs to an 
unreasonable extent. 
By contrast, under the special rule, in order to rebut the presumption that that expenditure 
is not deductible, the taxpayer must prove, first, that it relates to genuine and proper 
transactions, which means – according to the administrative guidelines for the 1992 
Income Tax Code, to which both SIAT and the Commission have made reference before the 
Court – that he must prove that the expenditure falls within the normal framework of 
business transactions, that it meets an industrial, commercial or financial need and that, 
over time, recompense is forthcoming, or should as a rule be forthcoming, through the 
activities of the undertaking as a whole. It also follows from that commentary that it is not 
sufficient, in this connection, to submit acts and documents which meet legal requirements 
as to form, but that it is essential above all that the tax authority official be reasonably 
satisfied that the transactions in question are genuine and proper. As the Belgian 
Government notes in its written observations as submitted to the Court, in order to obtain 
a deduction, the resident taxpayer must prove that there has been no simulation of business 
transactions. 
Secondly, the taxpayer must prove that the business expenses in question do not exceed the 
normal limits, which means, according to the explanations provided by the Belgian 
Government at the hearing before the Court, that a comparison must be made between the 
transaction in question and the normal practice of operators on the market, whereas – as 
was noted in paragraph 21 above – in the case of business expenses incurred towards 
taxpayers established in Belgium, Article 53(10) of the 1992 Income Tax Code prohibits 
the deduction only of those expenses which are shown to be ‘unreasonable’.” 
Notably, already at this instance (while developing the restriction test) the EUCJ took into 
consideration the lack of certainty of the provision concerned, being absent any statutory 
definition or administrative instructions able to throw light on the formula ‘tax regime 
which is appreciably more advantageous than the applicable regime in Belgium’. This 
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might be read in the sense that legal uncertainty with regard to such formula contributes 
either to render more difficult the exercise of the deduction (compared to the clearer 
conditions of Article 49 CIR) or to dissuade from exercising the freedom to provide 
services, especially considering the room left for administrative discretion
812
. Yet, at this 
stage the Court considered the argument invoked by the Belgian, French and Portuguese 
Governments; that the Belgian taxpayer/recipient of the service ‘is better placed to produce 
evidence relating to the genuine and proper nature of the transaction’. However, such 
argument, which in other decisions, like in Cadbury Schweppes, had contributed to support 
the proportionality of the reversal of the burden of proof, was dismissed by the Court. This 
is because at issue in the main proceedings was the exercise of the freedom to provide 
services on the side of the resident recipient, which could be subject to inspections and 
checks by tax authorities; likewise resident recipients of services supplied by resident 
providers. 
Having found the national measure to be restrictive on Article 49 of the Treaty, the Court 
went further to examine possible justification grounds, and quite surprisingly accepted not 
only the need to prevent tax evasion or avoidance and to secure the balanced allocation of 
taxing rights between Member States
813
, but even the need for preserving the effectiveness 
of fiscal supervision. Article 54 was then deemed suitable for attaining such objectives
814
, 
but not proportionate to that end.  
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 In particular, at paras 25 to 27, which are then echoed by the Court in the same decision dealing with the 
proportionality of the measure, read as follows: “In addition, it should be emphasised that the special rule 
may be applied where payments are made to suppliers who, by virtue of the legislation of the Member State 
in which they are established, are not subject there to a tax on income or are subject there, in respect of the 
relevant income, to a ‘tax regime which is appreciably more advantageous than the applicable regime in 
Belgium’. As the Belgian Government acknowledges, in the absence of a statutory definition, or 
administrative instructions as to what is to be understood by ‘a tax regime which is appreciably more 
advantageous than the applicable regime in Belgium’, the assessment concerning the applicability of the 
special rule is carried out on a case-by-case basis by the tax authority, under the supervision of the national 
courts. In those circumstances, the scope of that special rule is not delimited with sufficient precision at the 
outset and, in a situation where the service provider is established in a Member State other than the 
Kingdom of Belgium and is subject there to a tax regime which is more advantageous than the applicable 
regime in Belgium, there is uncertainty as to whether the foreign regime will be considered to be a ‘regime 
which is appreciably more advantageous’ and whether, as a result, the special rule will apply.” 
813
 Notably, the Advocate General in his opinion to the case rejected the justification of the balanced 
allocation of taxing rights. See Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón, delivered on 20 September 2011, 
case C-318/10, SIAT. He observed that “the simple exercise by Belgian taxpayers of the passive freedom to 
provide services cannot be assimilated with conduct which is capable of jeopardising Belgium’s right to 
exercise its powers of taxation: otherwise, that freedom would be divested of all substance” and instead “the 
primary aim of Article 54 of the 1992 Income Tax Code is to combat tax evasion, avoidance or abuse and, 
more specifically, to protect the Belgian State against the practice of deducting business expenses which are 
not genuine, proper and normal” (paras 51-54). 
814
 Id., para 48. In particular, see paras 41-42: “In the present case, Article 54 of the 1992 Income Tax Code is 
intended to prevent conduct which consists in reducing the taxable amount applicable to resident taxpayers 
by paying for services which were never actually provided, with the sole aim of escaping the tax normally 
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The Court echoed the conditions set out in the Thin Cap GLO judgment for a national anti-
abuse measure to be deemed proportionate, namely the assessment of objective and 
verifiable elements, the opportunity for the taxpayer to give evidence of commercial 
justifications for the transaction and the consequence of a finding of  abuse confined to the 
part that exceeds the arm’s length815. Looking at the case of the main proceedings, the 
Court recognised that in the abstract, where such conditions were met, the fact that the 
proof of the genuine nature of the transaction and of the normal value of the expenditure 
incurred laid upon the taxpayer was not per se disproportionate
816
. However, Article 54 
CIR applies to payments made to providers who are established in States where they are 
not subject to income taxation or are subject to an appreciably more advantageous tax 
regime than the one applicable to the relevant income in Belgium. This is, in the view 
taken by the EUCJ, a too general and indefinite scope, and it is susceptible to having a 
direct impact on the burden of proof that concretely rests upon the taxpayer. The 
paragraphs where the Court explains such reasoning are worth being reported (paras 54 to 
58): 
“ (…) as the Advocate General noted in point 71 of his Opinion, the special rule requires 
the Belgian taxpayer to provide, as a matter of course, proof that all the services are 
genuine and proper and that all related payments are normal, without the tax authority 
being required to provide even prima facie evidence of tax evasion or avoidance. 
The special rule can be brought to bear without any objective criterion, verifiable by a 
third party, being applied to test for the existence of a wholly artificial arrangement which 
does not reflect economic reality and which has been made with the aim of escaping the 
tax normally due on the profits generated by activities carried out in the national territory, 
                                                                                                                                                                                
due on the profits generated by activities carried out on the national territory. By providing that payments 
made to non-resident providers are not to be regarded as business expenses unless the taxpayer 
demonstrates that they relate to genuine and proper transactions and do not exceed the normal limits, the 
legislation at issue in the main proceedings facilitates attaining the objective of preventing tax evasion and 
avoidance, for which that legislation was adopted”. See para 43: “Secondly, it should be noted that the 
legislation at issue in the main proceedings can be justified by the need to ensure the effectiveness of fiscal 
supervision. That legislation does not absolutely exclude the deduction, as business expenses, of payments 
made to providers who, by virtue of the legislation of the Member State in which they are established, are not 
subject there to tax on income or are subject there, in respect of the relevant income, to a tax regime which is 
appreciably more advantageous than the applicable regime in Belgium; rather, it allows the resident 
taxpayers to provide proof that the transactions carried out were genuine and proper and that the expenses 
incurred were normal”. Finally, see para 47: “(…) since the legislation at issue in the main proceedings 
impedes fraudulent conduct of the kind described in paragraph 41 above and thus enables the État Belge to 
exercise its tax jurisdiction in relation to the activities carried out in its territory, that legislation is such as to 
facilitate the protection of the balanced allocation between Member States of the power to impose taxes”. 
815
 Id., para 50. 
816
 Id., para 53. 
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since account is taken only of the level of tax imposed on the service provider in the 
Member State in which that provider is established. 
It must be stated that, as has been noted in paragraph 27 above, a rule framed in such 
terms does not make it possible, at the outset, to determine its scope with sufficient 
precision and its applicability remains a matter of uncertainty. 
Such a rule does not, therefore, meet the requirements of the principle of legal certainty, in 
accordance with which rules of law must be clear, precise and predictable as regards their 
effects, in particular where they may have unfavourable consequences for individuals and 
undertakings (…). 
As it is, a rule which does not meet the requirements of the principle of legal certainty 
cannot be considered to be proportionate to the objectives pursued.” 
 
5.1 … and impact on the division of the burden of proof 
Within the tax literature, the SIAT decision has been looked at with criticism. In particular, 
the major doubts concern the circumstance that the Court rejects the ‘appreciably more 
advantageous foreign regime test’, arguing that it is contrary to legal certainty, but it does 
not clarifies on this point, for instance by requesting further objective elements such as a 
qualified relation between the parties involved. This is in fact not fully in line with the 
previous decisions (e.g. Cadbury Schweppes) where the more favourable tax regime 
existent in the foreign State has been deemed as indicative of abuse. Moreover, whereas in 
several judgments analysed so far the EUCJ promoted a case-by-case examination of the 
concrete situation, in SIAT precisely the circumstance that the ‘appreciably more 
advantageous foreign regime test’ may be determined on a case-by-case basis has been 
deemed in contrast with the principle of legal certainty
817
. On the other hand, it has been 
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 D. Weber, Abuse of Law in European Tax Law: An overview and Some Recent Trends in the Direct and 
Indirect Tax Case Law of the ECJ – Part 2, cited above, in particular at p. 316 to 318. The Author disagrees 
under several aspects with the view taken by the Court in SIAT. First, he observes that the circumstance that 
a taxpayer makes use of an ‘appreciably more advantageous tax regime’ represents an initial proof that abuse 
is present and thus the burden shifts to the taxpayer to prove the contrary. Second, he believes that the more 
advantageous tax regime test is an ‘objective criterion’, as it implies a comparison between the foreign tax 
burden and the Belgian one. Plus, the fact that the Belgian rule requires an appreciably more advantageous 
tax regime confines the applicability of that rule to exceptional situations, rather than every situation. Third, 
he observes that the fact that such formula cannot be sufficiently determined beforehand because it 
encompasses a case-by-case evaluation, does not render it contrary to the principle of legal certainty. As a 
matter of fact, “[n]ot being able to determine the scope of a term such as “tax avoidance” is simply inherent 
to this term and the “appreciably more advantageous foreign regime” test is an integral part of this given 
the Court itself established that “escaping the tax normally due on the profits” is a condition for the 
existence of tax avoidance”. He concludes that “In SIAT, the ECJ appeared to rule that a presumption of 
abuse based on an “appreciably more advantageous tax regime” test as such is contrary to the principle of 
legal certainty because it cannot be determined in advance and can only be given substance on a case-by-
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observed that the EUCJ has accepted the Belgian legislation at issue in SGI because, unlike 
in SIAT, the ‘initial burden of proof’ (as regards the abnormal advantages) was upon tax 
authorities, as it would have been disproportionate to request the taxpayer to prove “the 
usualness of all transactions the tax administration wishes to challenge”818. 
The foregoing observations are mostly shareable and have the merit of outlining a slight 
evolution of the EUCJ’s line of reasoning as regards legal presumptions included in anti-
avoidance provisions. However, the SIAT decision has to be contextualized by paying 
particular attention to the national measure examined by the Court and with the attempt to 
reconcile such judgment with the previous case-law. 
From the conclusion of the Advocate General, it results that the provision was not 
unanimously classified as a presumption of non-deductibility of business expenses, which 
was the view taken by the referring court and the EUCJ as well. The Belgian Government 
defined it as a ‘presumption of simulation’, while the appellant (SIAT) as a ‘general 
presumption of tax evasion’. None of these labels seems fully correct. The provision lays 
down a rebuttable presumption of law. Looking at the object of the contrary proof, the 
presumed fact seems to be the abusive character of the transaction put in place by the 
resident taxpayer, while the non-deductibility of the payment appears more to be the effect. 
Saying this, speaking of the ‘initial burden of proof’ or ‘prima facie proof’ as the EUCJ 
does by referring to the wording of the Advocate General, might be misleading. When 
there is a reversal of the burden of proof as a consequence of a legal presumption, tax 
authorities are relieved from giving evidence of the unknown fact (e.g. the abusive 
practice), but when they rely on the relevant provision they are always requested to give 
evidence of the known fact on which the presumptive inference is based. In a national 
context, one would add that the known fact must have a demonstrative character, meaning 
that it has to be construed so as to indicate, based on a rule of experience, the existence of 
the unknown fact. In this regard, Article 54 does provide, similarly to other anti-avoidance 
measures, a known fact which must be proved by tax authorities when they rely on it. It is 
                                                                                                                                                                                
case basis. (...) It is hoped that, in future decisions, the Court will rule that an “appreciably more 
advantageous foreign regime” test, in itself, is allowed, but only if applied in regard to an anti-abuse 
measure to which other requirements also apply. (...) This would establish a more proportionate anti-abuse 
provision that would be based on a more specific legal presumption”. See M. Hilling, Assessment of National 
Rules for the Prevention of Tax Avoidance, Intertax, 2013, particularly at p. 303 et seq. 
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 B.J.M. Terra, P.J. Wattel, European Tax Law, cited above, 736-738. The Authors, though, add that this 
does not imply that in all transfer pricing cases (they refer in particular to the judgment SGI) in which 
national restrictive legislation applies only to cross-border situations the initial burden of proof rests always 
on tax authorities. It depends on several factors, amongst which there are the sort of legislation, of transaction 
and so on. 
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up to them, indeed, to give evidence of the inexistence or more favourable taxation of the 
income concerned in the foreign State, which implies a comparison between different tax 
regimes. In Chapter II, Section II, the excessive general character of the basis of such 
presumption has been underlined, precisely arguing from the weak demonstrative character 
of the reference to a more favourable foreign tax regime. Indeed, Article 54 operates 
irrespective of inquiries or checks carried out by tax authorities, and this puts taxpayers 
willing to claim for deduction of payments made to foreign persons in a tough situation, as 
they do not have any certain guidelines on which States may be deemed as having a 
‘considerably more favourable tax regime’819. 
At EU level, the Court looks at the provision from the perspective of the specificity of the 
situation envisaged in the norm. Under this perspective, the reference to the ‘appreciably 
more advantageous foreign regime’ is a too general and indefinite criterion, which implies 
that it is not targeted at ‘wholly artificial arrangements’, but rather it may also cover 
genuine transactions. The need for specificity is not new in the case-law of the EUCJ, 
which in older cases handed down outside the area of taxation (and referred to above) has 
constantly reiterated that the exercise of a fundamental freedom may not give rise to a 
general presumption of tax avoidance, evasion, or abuse. What might appear in part new in 
the SIAT case is that the opportunity for the taxpayer to give proof to the contrary is not 
sufficient, in the view taken by the Court, to compensate for the general character of the 
inference. Above all, the importance assigned in the decision to the principle of legal 
certainty deserves to be emphasized, though such principle does not appear to be 
completely autonomous from the principle of proportionality, being still a parameter for 
the ascertainment of the latter.  
                                                          
819
 This aspect was taken into consideration by the Advocate general in its Opinion to the case, where it 
stated that “The situation of the Belgian taxpayer is further complicated by the fact that he does not have any 
information on which Member States have tax regimes which are appreciably more advantageous than the 
Belgian regime. He is thus compelled, if he intends to use the services of a person established in another 
Member State, to carry out his own assessment as to whether taxation in that Member State is appreciably 
more advantageous than in Belgium, in order to determine which of the Belgian tax arrangements governing 
deduction of business expenses will fall to be applied in his case, which places him in a situation of legal 
uncertainty. In addition, it is particularly difficult to identify precisely the situations which the adverb 
‘appreciably’ is intended to cover. Of course, the difficulty created by this legal uncertainty could be 
dispelled if the Belgian tax authorities were able to draw up a list of tax regimes which are appreciably more 
advantageous than the ordinary Belgian regime and which are liable to be covered by Article 54 of the 1992 
Income Tax Code. However, that is not the practice. Furthermore, and whatever the case may be, it seems 
particularly difficult to foresee all possible applications of such a provision” (para 73). In his view, which 
does not differ from the one followed by the Court, the main problems posed by Article 54 was “its lack of 
specificity or, in other words, the universality of its scope”, as it relieves the Belgian tax authorities of any 
obligation to provide even prima facie evidence of tax evasion, avoidance or abuse and establishes a general 
suspicion of tax evasion and a general presumption of tax fraud, avoidance or abusive practices” (paras 70 
and 71).  
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Looking now closely at the case of the main proceedings, Article 54 made the deductibility 
of business expenditure incurred in relation to transactions with persons established in low 
tax jurisdictions conditional to the proof of the genuineness of the transaction and the 
normal nature of the amount paid. This was without requesting the existence of a qualified 
relationship between the resident and the non-resident taxpayer, which normally justifies a 
presumption of abusive practices intended to shift the taxable base towards low tax States. 
As such, the provision is vague
820
 and is not based on ‘objective and verifiable elements’ 
which are necessary for the purpose of confining the restriction on a fundamental freedom 
to artificial arrangements. It is true that in previous judgments, like Cadbury Schweppes, 
the EUCJ has found the low level of taxation in the foreign country as being an objective 
element for detecting abusive schemes, but it was accompanied by further objective 
elements, such as the group relationships. 
Such vagueness has a direct impact on the burden of proof that is placed upon the resident 
taxpayer, who is called upon to demonstrate that “all the services are genuine and proper 
and that all related payments are normal, without the tax authority being required to 
provide even prima facie evidence of tax evasion or avoidance”. Even if the reference to 
the prima facie proof may be questionable, one cannot deny that the probative burden put 
upon the resident taxpayer is quite heavy and implies compliance costs. Plus, it does not 
satisfy the rule established by the Court as regards the opportunity for the taxpayer to give 
evidence of the commercial justification of the transaction carried on: it must be 
recognised ‘without being subject to undue administrative constraints’. 
Finally, it is more difficult to reconcile the circumstance that in the SIAT case the Court 
finds a case-by-case application of the national measure in contrast with the principle of 
legal certainty with the previous judgments where such approach was instead requested to 
satisfy the proportionality test. The key may be represented by the fact that a case-by-case 
approach entails an examination of the circumstances of the concrete case (which may 
happen through the recognition of the contrary proof) and a judicial review, but it cannot 
flow into the arbitrary. Article 54 leaves too much room for administrative discretion and 
may give rise to arbitrary decisions of the tax administration, which render unattractive and 
uncertain the exercise of the freedom to provide services. 
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 Cf.. B. Peeters, European Supervision on the Use of Vague and Undetermined Concepts in Tax Laws, 
Editorial, EC Tax Review, 2013, 112. According to the Author, “the use as such of the undetermined 
(evaluative) phrasing in Article 54 ITC is not so much problematic, than the absence of statutory provisions 
and or administrative instructions, which give more directives to the tax authority for the application of this 
provision” (see p. 114).  
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Notably, the judgment concerning the Portuguese thin capitalization, which was handed 
down after the SIAT decision, contains similar indications in the sense of the need for 
more legal certainty in the construction of legal presumptions included in anti-abuse rules. 
Yet, doubts remain in this regard, as, among other things, one cannot disregard that even 
the arm’s length test might herald a certain degree of uncertainty. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The examination of the EUCJ more significant judgments concerning legal presumptions 
in the domain of direct taxation shows a number of settled rules along with a certain 
evolution which permits to foresee future developments. 
Firstly, the Court tends to reject national procedural measures, either construed as 
presumptions or similar notions having the same effects, which discriminate against cross-
border situations based on the higher difficulties in carrying out inspections, controls or in 
collecting the tax due. From the Talotta and Vestergaard cases it is possible to infer a 
certain disfavour for national measures that lay down stricter conditions or place a heavier 
probative burden upon resident/national or non-resident/non-national taxpayers exercising 
a fundamental freedom on the grounds of the ‘need to secure the effectiveness of fiscal 
supervision’. This is a confirmation of how the national procedural autonomy finds a 
limitation in the principle of effectiveness and equivalence as well as in the principle of 
proportionality. There are, in fact, more proportionate measures that enable the tax 
authorities to equally carry out controls and inquiries and at the same time are less 
detrimental to the Treaty freedoms. Tax authorities may rely on administrative cooperation 
instruments and they are not prevented from asking to the taxpayer concerned the 
information they necessitate. 
It is not completely clear if the tax administration is requested to have recourse to such 
directives prior to asking the taxpayer for the necessary information and to what extent the 
latter may be asked information or documentation without this turning out to be in fact a 
full reversal of the burden of proof. In the Persche case, the Court has not recognised a 
right of the taxpayer to oblige the tax administration to make use of the mutual assistance 
tools. Though, this does not necessarily imply that tax authorities may always 
automatically refer to the taxpayer for the information they necessitate. Presumably, a 
factor which has to be taken into consideration is who is best placed to produce the 
relevant information or documentation.  
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In this regard, it must be noted that when the need to prevent or combat tax avoidance, 
evasion or abuse, rather than merely administrative difficulties, is at issue, the Court tends 
to allow the reversal of the burden of proof upon taxpayers, though with some limits. From 
Cadbury Schweppes and Thin Cap GLO it results that legal presumptions included in anti-
abuse national legislation, like CFC rules and thin capitalization rules, are accepted 
provided that three conditions are met: a) the provision has to be targeted at ‘wholly 
artificial arrangements’; b) the taxpayer must be given the opportunity to give proof to the 
contrary ‘without being subject to undue administrative burdens’; c) the consequence of 
the finding of the abuse must be proportionate. Therefore, the ECUJ approves such 
regimes in principle, but then it goes further to check their proportionality with the aim 
sought, with a view to the conditions that are less detrimental as possible for the effective 
application of the fundamental freedom at issue. 
This implies that irrebuttable presumptions of law are in principle not approved, as they 
determine a definite, and, as such, per se disproportionate violation of Treaty rights.  
Rebuttable presumptions of law may be introduced by Member States in the context of 
their anti-avoidance legislations, insofar as the taxpayer is effectively put in condition to 
rebut the presumptions. The Court, in particular, by employing a teleological interpretation 
of the fundamental freedoms, requests that he has to be given the opportunity to show the 
genuineness of the settlement abroad, of the transaction carried out etc. He must be able to 
demonstrate ‘any commercial reasons’ that justify the arrangement. When cross-border 
transactions between related parties are at issue, in particular, this amounts to something 
different from the proof that the agreement was at arm’s length. Indeed, the arm’s length 
criterion is deemed by the EUCJ to be an objective criterion which Member States may 
refer to in order to detect abusive practices, but it seems that the contrary proof in the 
hands of the taxpayer has to have a wider scope. This is in line also with the rulings of the 
EUCJ concerning the national anti-abuse measures implementing anti-abuse clauses 
included in direct tax directives. Member States are allowed to deny the benefits envisaged 
in the Merger Directive by presuming the existence of tax avoidance or abuse based on the 
absence of valid commercial reasons.  
There are, though, some points which are unclear and that it is hoped the Court will have 
soon occasions to clarify. They concern, in particular, the design of the objective 
circumstances on which a presumption of tax avoidance may be based in the light of the 
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principle of legal certainty and the related question of the distribution of the burden of 
proof.  
The SGI case on the Belgian transfer pricing shows a slightly more flexible approach of 
the EUCJ with regard to the level of specificity requested for the presumptive measure to 
be approved, as a result of the combination of the justifications of the ‘need to combat tax 
avoidance’ and the ‘need to secure the balanced allocation of Member States’ taxing 
power’. In this case, it seems to have been decisive the distribution of the burden of proof 
in the way it was presented by the Belgian Government. It argued that tax authorities could 
make the profit’s adjustments where they proved the existence of gratuitous advantages 
granted to companies resident in low-tax States, and at this stage it was up to the taxpayer 
to prove that the transaction was genuine and it had been concluded at arm’s length. As 
underlined, this decision does not fully match with Cadbury Schweppes and Thin Cap 
GLO. In fact, the Court emphasizes the circumstance that the prima facie proof rests upon 
the tax administration. But this is not exceptional and it does not mean that the burden of 
proof is not shifted upon the taxpayer. The operating of a presumptive measure does imply, 
when it presupposes the acting of the tax administration, the burden of motivation or proof 
as to the facts on which the presumptive inference is based. Plus, the object of the contrary 
proof requested by the provision seems to necessarily imply, for the purpose of avoiding 
the profit’s adjustments, the demonstration that the transactions were agreed upon at arm’s 
length, being not sufficient the proof of commercial reasons that are to be proved in 
addition.  
Perhaps the reference to the prima facie proof resting upon tax authorities may be read as a 
certain preference of the Court for procedural presumptive measures, which concern the 
powers of assessment of tax administration, in respect to those presumptions that affect 
directly the position of the taxpayer. 
A presumption of the last kind was examined by the Court in the SIAT case, concerning 
the Belgian limitation to the deductibility of costs incurred by resident taxpayers with 
taxpayers located in low-tax States. This judgment, read in conjunction with the very 
recent decision concerning the Portuguese thin capitalization legislation, shows the 
increasing importance that the principle of legal certainty has acquired in the context of the 
test of proportionality of legal presumptions included in anti-avoidance measures. In this 
way, the Court gives further indications as to how a legal presumption should be construed 
so as to avoid any overkill and undue restrictions on the Treaty rights. A generical 
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reference to the lower level of taxation of the Member State where payments are addressed 
or to the relationships between the parties of a cross-border transaction in order 
respectively to deny the deduction of the expenditure or to re-classify the interest as 
dividend, goes beyond what is necessary to attain the objective of combating tax avoidance. 
From this one can infer that the Court may not dislike black-lists or white-lists of States in 
view of legal certainty. Furthermore, it seems that the reference to the case-by-case 
approach, which the Court has in several decisions referred to with regard to the way of 
detecting abusive practices, does not imply administrative discretion. Apparently, it is to be 
interpreted as mainly referring to the opportunity of contrary proof and judicial review. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
The aim of this third Chapter was to construe the approach of EU law to tax law 
presumptions, with a view to exploring whether and to what extent a common analytical 
scheme can be traced and thus some general criteria or standards guiding the evaluation of 
compatibility of tax law presumptions with EU law can be drawn.  
To this end, the issue of tax law presumptions in the context of EU law has been addressed 
by setting the stage with the analysis of the legal framework and by examining the EUCJ 
case-law in some of the fundamental domains of taxation. In particular, the special 
consideration of customs duties, VAT, and direct taxation has been guided by the fact that 
they embody three different ways in which the EU law impacts on national legal orders.  
The examination has revealed that the way in which tax law presumptions are approached 
reflects a common core scheme. 
Generally speaking, they are seen as possible limitations to the enforcement of a certain 
EU rule or to the enjoyment of a certain EU right. In fact, the case-law shows a common 
analytical scrutiny of the legal presumption, with a view to avoiding it being detrimental to 
the actual enforcement of EU law. Under this perspective, the principle of effectiveness, in 
combination with the principle of proportionality, embodies a general limitation to the 
adoption of legal presumptions by Member States and, at the same time, a criterion of 
control of consistency of such presumptions with EU law. 
Yet, the EUCJ case-law and more in general the EU legislation and soft-law show that 
Member States are not prevented from introducing in their legal orders presumptive 
provisions aimed at simplifying the assessment and levy of the tax or combating certain 
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forms of tax avoidance or evasion. This can be asserted with regard to each sector of tax 
law. On the other hand, some of the tasks that Member States pursue by means of legal 
presumptions are shared at EU level. For instance, the VAT Directive allows Member 
States to introduce or to maintain, under certain conditions, measures derogating from the 
Directive in order to simplify the levy of the tax and preventing tax avoidance or evasion. 
The Direct Tax Directives include anti-abuse clauses. The Merger Directive, in particular, 
entitles Member States to presume the existence of abuse on the basis of the absence of 
valid commercial reasons. Again, similar needs for simplification and rapid recovery of the 
tax seem to have inspired the presumptions included in the Customs legislation, like the 
presumption of territorial competence to collect the tax in case of irregularities and the 
presumption of representativeness of the samples. 
Therefore, the question is shifted on the conditions of compatibility of tax law 
presumptions with EU law. In this regard, a set of general criteria may be inferred from the 
general principles of EU law and from the EUCJ case-law, which hold true with regard to 
each area of tax law. In fact, irrebuttable presumptions of law that generally and 
automatically presume the existence of certain elements of (or ancillary to) taxation in 
contrast with the relevant EU rule, the absence of the conditions to benefit from a certain 
tax treatment or the abusive exercise of a certain EU right or freedoms are, in principle, not 
in line with EU law. The EUCJ is inclined to make the consistency of a presumption of law 
conditional to the opportunity for the taxpayer to rebut the presumption, and to a case-by-
case examination of his situation. 
More detailed criteria may be inferred looking at the single sector of tax law and to certain 
types of provisions or regimes. 
Thus, when it comes to Customs law, where the integration between EU law and national 
rules is far-reaching, the Court is quite strict in evaluating national presumptions that may 
affect the primacy and the uniform application of the Customs legislation. This may 
certainly happen when irrebuttable presumptions of law are at issue, whereas for rebuttable 
presumptions of law the evaluation depends on the interests in play and the room left for 
national provisions. 
In the area of VAT, Member States are permitted to have recourse to tax law presumptions 
for simplifying the levy and preventing tax avoidance or evasion, as long as the conditions 
set by the VAT Directive and stemming from the general principles of EU law are 
observed. In this area, the opportunity for the taxpayer to rebut the presumption appears to 
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be in principle essential in order to accept the limitation to a certain right or principle. This 
may not be sufficient to overcome the proportionality test, though. The Court requests the 
presumption to be formulated in such a way that does not render impossible or excessively 
difficult for the taxable person the opportunity to rebut the presumption. However, the 
case-law is at times controversial and it appears to be influenced by the concrete case and 
above all by the rationale surrounding the national measure. So that, in one case the Court 
rejects a national provision that limits the right to deduct certain expenditure on the 
grounds of a presumption of (the risk of) abuse; whereas a similar limitation, albeit 
confined to a certain percentage, is accepted on the grounds of the need for simplification. 
In this case, no contrary proof is requested, as it would undermine the objective of the 
measure. 
Rebuttable presumptions of law are not per se consistent with EU law, and this is evident 
when examining the case-law on the repayment of taxes levied in breach of EU law. When 
the contrary proof concerns a negative fact, which is impossible to demonstrate, then the 
presumption ends up to impede the exercise of the right conferred to the undertaking by 
EU law. 
Finally, the case-law in the area of direct taxation manifestly reveals the importance of the 
rationale on which the single presumptive regime or provision is based. The EUCJ is 
inclined to reject those presumptive measures that are justified in the light of the need to 
secure the effectiveness of fiscal supervision. By contrast, in the recent case-law it tends to 
accept the reversal of the burden of proof on the taxpayer, who is best placed for collecting 
the necessary information and proofs, on condition that the presumption is specific and the 
contrary proof is recognised. However, this is not always the case. As it has been broadly 
argued in Section II of this chapter, the more recent case-law leaves several questions open, 
in particular as regards the test of specificity and the division of the burden of proof. The 
Court seems to accept general presumptive provision (i.e. non specifically targeted at 
wholly artificial arrangement) where the need to combat tax avoidance is invoked in 
combination with the need to secure the balanced allocation of taxing powers. This, 
provided that the prima facie proof rests upon tax authorities and the taxpayer can give 
proof to the contrary. By contrast, a presumption of tax avoidance with regard to the 
deductibility of costs incurred with taxpayers established in low-tax jurisdictions is deemed 
to be in contrast with the proportionality principle under the aspect of legal certainty. This, 
on the grounds that the vague and indefinite scope of the provision renders the effects of its 
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application non-predictable by individuals or undertakings; as such, it impacts even on the 
concrete opportunity to give proof to the contrary on the side of the taxpayer, upon which 
the burden of proof is completely shifted. 
In conclusion, the EU approach to tax law presumptions reflects a common analytical 
framework. Nonetheless, the solutions in terms of consistency and conditions of 
consistency may differ, even within the same sector, depending on several factors. 
Amongst these, there is certainly the rationale of the national provision (as invoked by the 
Member State involved), its being in line or not with the interest deemed worthy of 
protection at EU level, appropriate and necessary to attain it. Likewise, the scope of the 
provision, the distribution of the burden of proof, the design of the contrary proof, the 
existence of further procedural guarantees (in the trial and earlier in the context of the tax 
audit prior to the issuing of a tax assessment) are relevant for the findings of the Court. 
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The purpose of this study was to investigate the concept of legal presumption under a 
twofold comparative perspective. After having provided a general overview of the 
common core concept of  presumption in the European context, an insight in the national 
approach to legal presumptions was given by examining two different national experiences, 
namely the Italian and Belgian tax systems. At this stage, the Constitutional framework 
and some of the most interesting presumptive measures were explored, with a view to 
underlining possible divergences and common grounds. The concept of (national) legal 
presumption was then investigated in the context of EU law, with the attempt to 
systematize under a uniform perspective a matter which has been traditionally dealt with 
either from the merely national point of view or, at EU level, through a fragmented form. 
In this instance, the EU law relevant framework and the most significant EUCJ case-law, 
in particular in the field of customs duties, VAT, on the issue of the repayment of taxes 
levied in breach of EU law and in the area of direct taxation, were examined so as to 
construe the overall EU approach to national legal presumptions. This was done with the 
finality of determining if and to what extent a common analytical framework may be 
identified, from which were extracted certain criteria governing the compatibility of 
national legal presumptions with EU law. 
 
Below, a brief overview of the study and general conclusions will be developed by 
confronting the EU approach to legal presumptions with the national one. Finally, the 
potential impact of EU law on national legal orders and on the protection of the taxpayer 
will be checked by testing some of the presumptive measures illustrated in Chapter II with 
the set of rules and principles that may be extracted from the examination of the EU law 
context carried out in Chapter III. 
 
1. Identifying a common concept of legal presumption in the European experience  
When comparing the approaches of different legal orders as regards a general concept, the 
first step to be taken is to set a common ground in respect of the meaning and relevance of 
that concept. To this end, in Chapter I an insight into the civil law provisions, in which the 
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roots of the notion may be found, and the legal theory, was offered. In addition, a common 
law system was considered in order to check if relevant divergences could be traced.  
At this stage, the study has revealed the existence of a shared European understanding of 
the notion of presumptions, both hominis and legal. The former are logical inferences 
drawn by the judge of a concrete litigation. The latter are commonly deemed as being 
inferences that are developed by the law in order to alleviate the burden of proof of a 
certain party and/or in view of the preference for a certain rule on the matter concerned. In 
addition, legal presumptions are generally distinguished between irrebuttable and 
rebuttable presumptions depending on the possibility or not to give the proof to the 
contrary. Though provided in the law, they are likewise requested to be based on a rule of 
experience and to be rational. 
 
2. Tax law presumptions in the Italian and Belgian tax systems 
Based on the existence of a common juridical background concerning the notion of legal 
presumption, the same concept was examined in the area of tax law, wherein it shows 
some peculiarities with respect to the general theory which justify a separate, albeit 
interrelated, discussion. In particular, the study concentrated on the manner in which tax 
law presumptions are dealt with in two significant Member States, with a view to gather 
possible differences in approaching them and with an eye to the subsequent discussion of 
the EU law context. To this end, the examination of the Constitutional framework has been 
carried out alongside the illustration of some of the most interesting presumptions in force.  
This overview has shown that there are some divergences, either in terms of the line of 
thought adopted by the respective Constitutional Court or in terms of discussion on the 
nature of single tax law presumptions and on the distinction with similar notions. 
Notwithstanding such (natural) divergences, under both tax systems legal presumptions are 
deemed as indispensable means to secure collective interests, which justify different rules 
(as the alteration of the ordinary burden of proof to the detriment of the taxpayer is) for the 
tax obligation in respect to a civil law obligation. Given the difficulties met by the tax 
authorities in ascertaining the fiscal facts realized by the taxpayer, all the more so when 
cross-border situations are at issue, legal presumptions are essential for the purpose of 
simplifying the assessment or collection of the tax concerned and the prevention of tax 
evasion or avoidance. Yet, legal presumptions cannot be arbitrary. In fact, in both legal 
systems the control as to their rationality and proportionality is entrusted with the 
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Constitutional Court, which is called upon to check if the inference is logical and based on 
the normal course of events, so that the sacrifice of the taxpayer’s interest may be deemed 
as being justified in view of the collective interest. 
 
3. Tax law presumptions in the context of EU law 
The core of this study was represented by the attempt to construe the EU approach to tax 
law presumptions, with an eye to the national experiences. To this end, the European law 
framework and the EUCJ case-law were examined, with particular regard to the domains 
of customs duties, VAT, to the issue of the repayment of taxes levied in breach of EU law 
and to the area of direct taxation. 
The analysis carried out has revealed that there is a common analytical scheme employed 
by the EUCJ when confronted with national legal presumptions. In the extent to which 
they affect the EU rules on a certain matter, or limit a right which the taxpayer is conferred 
by EU law, or restrict on a Treaty freedom, tax law presumptions are looked at with 
suspicion and checked in the light of the relevant EU rule and the overarching principles of 
effectiveness and proportionality. However, the examination of the case-law has also 
revealed that the findings concerning the consistency of legal presumptions may slightly 
differ depending on several factors, and even within the same field of tax law. As a result, 
it has been certainly possible to isolate some general criteria which appear to apply when 
tax law presumptions are under the EU scrutiny and that embody minimum standards to be 
taken into consideration by national legislators. Yet, there remain controversial issues 
related to legal presumptions, concerning the way in which the scope of the provision 
should be construed, the possibility to skip the specificity test or the provision of the 
contrary proof facing certain interests (e.g. need for simplification in the VAT areas, the 
balanced allocation of the Member States’ taxing powers in the area of direct taxes), and 
above all the extent to which the ordinary division of the burden of proof may be altered.  
 
3.1 The EU approach to tax law presumptions with respect to the national approach: 
common concept… 
In principle, legal presumptions belong to the ‘formal’ tax law or, said otherwise, to 
procedural matters, which fall within the competence of Member States. This statement 
must be mitigated when considering customs law, as the Community Customs Code 
regulates several procedural issues. Besides that, Member States’ procedural autonomy is 
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limited by the principles of equality and effectiveness, which request that national 
procedural rules governing the exercise of rights derived from EU law are not less 
favourable than those regulating the exercise of similar domestic rights and they do not 
render impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of such rights. Finally, the 
ambiguous nature of legal presumptions, which might end up having substantive effects, 
entails that they might affect directly, and not only indirectly, the effective enforcement of 
an EU principle, objective, right or fundamental freedom. 
On the other hand, when ruling on national legal presumptions, the EUCJ does not refer to 
a notion other than the one which results from the common juridical tradition of Member 
States. It shares with national legal orders the idea that legal presumptions relate to the 
ascertainment of a certain (unknown) fact (e.g. the artificial arrangement) from another 
(known) fact and above all the distinction between irrebuttable and rebuttable 
presumptions based on the opportunity of counterproof. This is, however, for general lines, 
as the Court at times uses the concept a-technically and does not seem to appreciate the 
difference between irrebuttable presumptions and similar notions (like fictions of law) or 
the procedural rather than substantive nature of the presumptive measure concerned. 
The above considerations render evident how, as confirmed by the conclusion reached in 
Chapter III, dealing with legal presumptions in EU law does not entail the comparison 
between two different models of (or for) legal presumptions, but rather tests the 
compatibility of the national presumptive measures with the relevant EU rule. That is, 
depending on the sector, with the Regulation of customs duties, or with the provisions and 
the principles of the VAT Directive or the Excise duties Directive, or with the Treaty 
freedoms and general principles of EU law for non-harmonized taxes.  
It is in the light of the foregoing that the EU approach to tax law presumptions and its 
impact on national legal orders were read in this study. 
 
3.1.1… different perspective 
In Chapter III it has been argued that the rulings of the EUCJ on tax law presumptions 
appear at times controversial and some clarifications on certain issues are hoped for. 
Nonetheless, a common analytical framework may be certainly identified for general lines. 
Indeed, in each area of tax law explored, the national presumption of law is generally 
looked at as a possible obstacle to the effective enjoyment and application of, respectively, 
EU rights/freedoms and principles, so as to request a scrutiny as to whether such possible 
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conflict may be reconciled. This may be done under certain conditions, either when the 
measure satisfies interests worthy of protection (also at EU level) or the effective 
application of the EU provision concerned is not (disproportionately) threatened. To this 
end, the ECUJ employs a teleological interpretation of the national presumptive measure 
and focuses on the effects that such measure may have on the actual enforcement of the EU 
principle/freedom/right concerned. In fact, the Court extracts the ratio from that measure, 
based on the arguments invoked by the Member State involved. Such ratio is then 
confronted both with the national aim pursued (e.g. simplification of the application of the 
tax, prevention of tax avoidance or evasion) and above all with the purpose of the EU 
relevant rule (included in the Treaty, in the Customs Code Regulation, in the VAT 
Directive, or in a Direct tax Directive), in order to check the appropriateness and necessity 
of the means used (proportionality test). In this instance, the Court verifies whether the 
outcome of the presumptive mechanism conflicts with the EU relevant rule in such a way 
that the exercise of the EU right or freedom is rendered impossible or excessively difficult. 
Even when the Court does not refer explicitly to the principle of effectiveness (intended in 
a broad sense), the latter is the main criterion that guides the evaluation of legal 
presumptions at EU level. 
In the light of this, the finding of the Court is inevitably different when facing irrebuttable 
presumptions of law rather than rebuttable ones. Both of them are approached in a similar 
way, in the sense that the Court looks at the probative implications. In other words, it 
considers the difficulties in discharging the burden of proof and the means offered by the 
national provision concerned in this regard. Such difficulties are evaluated in respect to the 
EU principle, objective or right concerned, and thereby in view of a parameter which is 
external to the presumption itself. In this way, the Court seems to engage an evaluation of 
fact, taking into consideration the conditions (e.g. timing, administrative requirements) that, 
by hindering the reversal of the burden of proof, undermine the effective exercise of the 
EU right. 
As a result, irrebuttable presumptions of law are generally looked upon with disfavour 
because of the absence of contrary proof, which implies that they ‘automatically’ limit or 
restrict on the EU right or freedom concerned. By contrast, when a rebuttable presumption 
of law is at issue, the question is whether the means of proof (and in general, the 
procedural guarantees) offered by the national jurisdiction for the purpose of rebutting it 
are appropriate and do not prevent the exercise of the EU right concerned. The case-law 
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shows that the Court does consider the scope of the national presumptive measure, but 
precisely in view of the prohibition of any overkill and of the possible difficulties of proof 
(and of compliance) that a general construction of the norm would determine. 
From this perspective, the only distinction that seems to be relevant at EU level is the one 
between presumptions which may be rebutted and presumptions which do not envisage any 
proof in rebuttal. By contrast, the Court tends to disregard the substantive or procedural 
nature of the provision concerned, i.e. the fact that it concerns the definition of (one or 
more component of) the tax (taxable event, amount, subjects) or rather the application of 
the tax (assessment, recovery). In this regard, it is remarkable that it deals with national 
provisions which are construed under a form different from an irrebuttable presumption of 
law (e.g. fictions of law, legal definitions, etc.) as if they were presumptions. Member 
States are indeed inclined to design certain provisions limiting EU rights or freedoms as 
legal definitions or similar concepts, which govern a certain matter rather than the 
ascertainment of a certain fact. This is evident, for instance, with regard to some national 
provisions that limit the right of deduction to a certain amount, or extend the range of 
persons liable to pay the tax given certain circumstances, or fix a minimum amount of 
profits for cross-border taxpayers. Precisely in view of the fact that the Court considers the 
‘effect of irrebuttable presumption’ on the exercise of the right concerned, it scrutinizes 
them under the sole aspect of the opportunity of proof to the contrary and judicial review. 
 
3.2 The general standards developed by the EUCJ  
After having drawn some general conclusions on the way in which tax law presumptions 
are approached at EU level, some lines need to be fixed concerning the general criteria of 
(in)consistency stemming from the EUCJ case-law examined in Chapter III. 
National presumptions of law may clash with EU (tax) law, either with the substantive 
rules of a tax which is uniform or harmonized at EU level, or with the ‘formal’ rules of 
such tax (i.e. concerning the application). In the former case, because they cause an effect 
which is in contrast with the design given by a Regulation or a Directive to the matter 
concerned; in the second case, because they render excessively difficult or impossible the 
exercise of a certain right conferred to the taxpayer by EU law, or more proportionate 
means are conceivable that are less detrimental to such right. 
In fact, the case-law in the field of customs duties shows that the EUCJ is quite strict where 
a national tax provision, for instance a presumption as to the commercial character of the 
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importation of certain goods, is (even solely) potentially able to jeopardize the uniform 
rules established by the relevant Customs legislation. It follows that irrebuttable 
presumptions of law or similar concepts having the same effects, which end up affecting 
the customs duty in a way that diverges from the relevant Customs legislation, are rejected. 
This may not be asserted for certain as regards rebuttable presumptions of law. Though the 
Court has manifested a preference for non-binding rules when the need for simplification 
and rapid collection of the customs duty are at issue, the case may be that a rebuttable 
presumption of law covering a non-harmonized (procedural) aspect or ancillary aspects in 
respect to the design of the customs duty, is deemed as not undermining the uniform 
application of the Community Customs Code. 
In the area of VAT, tax law presumptions enacted on the basis of the VAT Directive’s 
clauses allowing derogations in view of simplification and prevention of tax avoidance or 
evasion are requested to be proportionate to the aim sought; since they impact on 
fundamental elements of the VAT system, such as the person liable to pay, the taxable 
amount or the right of deduction, any overkill is censured. Likewise, even though 
procedural rules in principle fall within the competence of Member States, the latter may 
not make the exercise of rights conferred by the Directive to undertakings conditional to 
further requirements, for instance by presuming the existence of the conditions for 
suspending the refund of the tax credit without providing procedural guarantees. Should 
such conditions be merely provisional, they nonetheless affect the effective exercise of a 
right conferred to the undertaking by the VAT Directive in such a way that is 
disproportionate. Thus, the EUCJ tends to reject irrebuttable presumptions of law, even 
when they are concealed behind different ways of construing the national measure 
concerned, because they are disproportionate means to attain the aim sought. By contrast, 
rebuttable presumptions of law are not deemed to be per se disproportionate, but they are 
likewise enabled to hinder, albeit not in a conclusive way, the exercise of a VAT 
Directive’s right. As such, they may be introduced based on the conditions (authorization, 
need for simplification or to combat tax avoidance of evasion) laid down in the VAT 
Directive for possible derogations from the latter, which are strictly interpreted by the 
Court, and provided that the exercise of the relevant right is not rendered impossible or 
excessively difficult. 
That the difficulties of (contrary) proof are taken into great consideration by the Court, 
which consequently rejects even rebuttable presumptions of law, is evident from the case-
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law concerning national presumptions of the passing on of indirect taxes levied in 
contravention of  EU law. Where the taxpayer is de facto unable to rebut the presumption, 
the effective exercise of the EU right is indirectly undermined. In these decisions the Court 
seems to consider the (absence of) rationality of the presumptive provision, but with the 
sole view of affirming the infringement of the right to the repayment of an indirect tax 
which the Member State has unduly collected. In the view taken by the Court, charging the 
taxpayer challenging the reimbursement of such tax with the proof of a negative fact means 
rendering impossible the exercise of the right of reimbursement. As such, it is inconsistent 
with EU law, even if the presumption concerned provides the evidence in rebuttal. 
Turning to national presumptions of law covering non-harmonized taxes, like direct taxes, 
they may conflict with EU law where cross-border situations are at issue and they restrict 
on a Treaty freedom. In some of these hypotheses, they discriminate against non-
residents/non-nationals basically by presuming the inexistence of the conditions for 
benefiting from certain tax treatments and by shifting onto the taxpayer the burden of 
proving that such conditions occur. This amounts to a difference in treatment that is not 
accepted on the grounds of the mere difficulties met by tax authorities in the assessment or 
recovery of transnational situations/elements, insofar as there are less detrimental means. 
National tax authorities may in fact rely upon the administrative cooperation tools and/or 
ask the necessary information from the taxpayer involved. In most recent case-law, the 
exercise of a fundamental freedom is assumed (per se or in combination with further 
objective criteria) by national provisions to be the basis of a legal presumption of tax 
avoidance, tax evasion or abusive practice. On the grounds of certain justifications (the 
need to prevent tax evasion or avoidance, the balanced allocation of Member States’ taxing 
rights), such a restriction may be accepted, but on condition that it is proportionate and 
thereby as least detrimental as possible to the freedom concerned. Accordingly, the EUCJ 
is inclined to reject a national provision which automatically presumes the existence of 
abusive practices based on purely general criteria, such as the transnational nature of the 
situation and the more advantageous foreign tax regime. The scope of legal presumptions 
included in anti-abuse measures has to be targeted at purely artificial schemes identified by 
means of ‘objective and verifiable criteria’. Such specificity is requested also in view of 
the actual opportunity for the taxpayer concerned to rebut the presumption, so as to avoid 
the application of the restrictive national measure. 
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3.3 The impact of EU law on tax law presumptions and on the protection of the 
European taxpayer 
The examination of the European law framework carried out in Chapter III reveals that the 
EU law is having an increasing influence on (apparently merely) procedural issues
821
, 
amongst which are tax law presumptions. 
Such influence is primarily the result of the EUCJ judgments finding a certain presumptive 
measure to infringe the relevant EU rule, which oblige the Member State involved to 
amend it accordingly. On the other hand, as is well known, the EUCJ judgments influence 
the national legislation-making, even beyond the single Member State involved in a case of 
infringement of EU law. 
In other words, since the EUCJ decisions rule on the interpretation to be given to the EU 
provision concerned, they have often the effect of prompting the amendment or the repeal 
of provisions suspected to be in contrast with EU law. This is evident, for instance, looking 
at Article 59, para 1, of the Belgian VAT Code, which was abrogated shortly after Halifax; 
another self-evident example is Article 166, para 3, of the Italian Income tax legislation 
governing exit taxes for companies, which, in order to comply with the indications given 
by the Court in National Grid Indus, has been amended so as to include explicitly the 
reference to such decision. 
It may happen, though, that the fear for conflicts with EU law based on discrimination 
grounds, leads some Member States to extend their anti-abuse provisions intended to 
combat the tax base erosion even to domestic situations. This was the case, for instance, 
after the EUCJ decision in Lankhorst Hohorst concerning the German thin capitalization, 
which brought several Member States to amend their thin cap rules so as to render them 
applicable to domestic situations as well. These results are undesired, as highlighted by the 
Advocate General in the case Thin Cap GLO, because regimes of that kind do not make 
much sense in merely internal situations. Again, the extension to domestic situations of the 
national provision found inconsistent with EU law was the solution adopted by the Belgian 
Government after the Talotta case. The assessment based on minimum taxable proceeds 
(Article 342, para 3, CIR), originally provided solely for non-resident taxpayers holding an 
activity in Belgium, were extended to domestic situations.  
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 The most topical issues of procedural tax law are dealt with by A. van Eijsden and  J. van Dam, The 
impact of European Law on Domestic Procedural Tax Law: Wrongfully Underestimated?, EC Tax Review, 
2010, 199. Based on the EUCJ case-law, the Authors distinguish three directions in order to identify the 
influence on domestic procedural law: the Treaty freedoms, the principles of equivalence and effectiveness 
and ultimately the European legal principles and fundamental rights. 
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Additionally, precisely the soft-law acts issued by the European Commission, as well as 
the starting of an infringement procedure, may have a role in the Member States’ 
compliance with the minimum standards that legal presumptions should have to be in line 
with EU law. Under the first aspect, the Communication of the European Commission on 
anti-abuse measures in the area of direct taxation summarizes the criteria that anti-abuse 
national rules (possibly including legal presumptions) should meet, based on the most 
relevant and recent rulings of the EUCJ. Under the second aspect, it may be recalled, for 
example, that precisely following an infringement procedure initiated by the European 
Commission, the Italian legislator decided to repeal a presumption inserted in Article 54 of 
the Italian VAT legislation dealing with the assessment. The provision entitled the tax 
administration to infer the existence of non-declared VAT operations or the inaccurate 
indication of the operations giving rise to the right of deduction, from the divergence 
between the consideration resulting from the accounting records and the invoice, on the 
one hand, and the normal value of a certain immovable property on the other hand
822
. 
 
3.3.1 Testing some of the Italian and Belgian presumptive measures against EU law 
Given the high level of integration between customs legislation laid down at EU level and 
national implementing measures, which leaves little room for the possible introduction of  
legal presumptions in that field, in Chapter II the attention was concentrated upon a 
number of presumptive provisions concerning VAT and cross-border (direct taxation) 
situations. Dealing with them, and also with similar regimes in Chapter III, references were 
made as to the existence of doubts of inconsistency with EU law and possible solutions to 
reconcile with the latter. On the other hand, the examination of the case-law has revealed 
how a number of Italian and Belgian provisions have been ruled on by the EUCJ, which 
found them to be in contrast with EU law, save for the Belgian transfer pricing.  
In conclusion to this study, it is thus suggested to test those provisions that might give rise 
to frictions with EU law, in the light of the conclusions reached. 
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 See Chapter III, Section I, Part II, footnote 658. The Commission argued that it was “a non-proportionate 
provision as it shifts the onus of proof on the person liable to tax in the absence of any other proof of tax 
fraud”. 
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3.3.1.1 Legal presumptions in the field of VAT: persons liable to pay the tax 
Both the Italian and Belgian tax systems include in their VAT legislation a number of 
presumptions intended to simplify the assessment (of tax evasion) and to secure the 
recovery of the tax due. 
With regard to the latter, a brief mention must be made of the joint and several liability of 
persons other than the taxable subject, which Member States are permitted to introduce 
under the conditions laid down by the VAT Directive and in accordance with the general 
principle of EU law. In the Vlaamse Oliemaatschappij NV case, following the FTI 
judgment, the Court found Article 51-bis, para 3, of the Belgian VAT Code, to conflict 
with the principle of proportionality, on the grounds that it extended the liability to pay to a 
third person (the warehouse keeper) without allowing the latter to prove that he took all the 
precautions not to get involved in a tax fraud. As said when dealing with this case, 
provisions of this kind are often construed by Member States under forms other than 
presumptions (for instance, typification of a situation, legal definition, assimilation etc.). 
By contrast, the Court is inclined to consider them as irrebuttable presumptions of law (of 
non-compliance with the duties of diligence), which are disproportionate to the aim sought 
insofar as they do not envisage the proof in rebuttal (or more exactly, the proof in 
exoneration). Following the Vlaamse Oliemaatschappij NV decision, Article 51-bis, para 3, 
was amended by inserting the possibility for the third person to demonstrate his good faith, 
the absence of fault or negligence, for the purpose of avoiding the application of the joint 
and several liability to pay. 
In the light of this, Article 60-bis, of the Italian VAT legislation, which has been 
incidentally referred to when dealing with the Belgian article cited above, does not seem to 
create evident problems of inconsistency with EU law. Though, the rationale of the 
provision is more complex and the way in which the contrary proof (or escape) is designed 
might be too narrow. It provides, with regard to the goods that are to be identified in a 
ministerial decree, that when the supplier does not pay the VAT on goods sold at a price 
lower than the normal value, the transferee is jointly and severally liable to pay such VAT 
(para 2). The latter is allowed (para 3) to prove (by means of documents) that the lower 
price is due to objective and detectable circumstances, or to specific provisions of law and 
that in any event it is not related to the non-payment of the VAT debt. Thus, this provision 
assumes the normal value as a criterion on which the joint and several liability is made 
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conditional to, and confines the escape from such liability to the demonstration that the 
lower price the parties agreed upon was not related to the non-payment of the tax
823
. 
 
3.3.1.1.1 … taxable operations and chargeability 
Some doubts of consistency with the rules of the Directive may arise from the legal 
presumption established by Article 51, para 1, No 2 and 7 of the Italian VAT legislation, to 
the advantage of tax authorities carrying on an assessment based on banking transactions. 
Basically, as explained in Chapter II, the tax administration is entitled to presume the 
existence of non-declared taxable operations based on the withdrawals and deposits which 
are recorded in the banking account and not even in the books of the taxable person. The 
Italian Constitutional Court has deemed the provision to be consistent with the principle of 
reasonableness, the ability to pay principle and the right of defence. This occurs based on 
the fact that the presumptive inference grounds on objective elements and the possibility to 
submit documents and information during the tax audit is envisaged. 
It is true that such presumption may be rebutted by proving that the banking data in the 
hands of the tax administration have been taken into consideration in the tax return, or that 
they do not refer to taxable operations for VAT purposes. Moreover, the same article 
provides that he is permitted to produce documents or any information before the tax 
authorities, prior to the issuing of a notice of assessment and a possible trial. Nonetheless, 
the known fact upon which the inference is based appears a weak index of existence of 
VAT taxable operations, and the hearing of the taxpayer during the administrative 
procedure has been deemed by the Italian Supreme Court to be non-compulsory. Therefore, 
even though such legal presumption envisages the contrary proof and in general procedural 
guarantees, one cannot exclude its inconsistency with the VAT Directive. Indeed, the fact 
that certain banking transactions do not result from the books of the taxable person does 
not appear sufficiently to demonstrate the evasion. Thus, the case may be that the VAT is 
unduly recovered. Furthermore, the vagueness of the inference affects the object of the 
contrary proof, which may be difficult to give, for instance when the same bank account is 
used also for transactions which are not related to the economic activity. 
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 Moreover, with Article 1, para 164, Law 24 December 2007, No 244, a further paragraph (3-bis) has been 
inserted. It stipulates that when the amount of consideration indicated in a contract for the transfer of an 
immovable property and in the related invoice is different from the real one, the transferee (even if he does 
not operate in the quality of economic operator) is jointly liable to pay together with the supplier for the 
difference between the real amount and the amount declared as well as for the fine. 
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By contrast, there are no evident doubts of inconsistency with regard to the legal 
presumptions of transfer and purchase in the field of VAT provided for by the Italian 
legislation (Presidential decree No 441/97). Basically, the tax administration is entitled to 
presume that the goods which are purchased, imported or produced and are not situated 
where the taxpayer carries out his operations, have been supplied; similarly, it may 
presume that the goods that are in one of the places where the taxpayer conducts his 
activity are presumed to have been purchased. The proof to the contrary which may be 
given by a taxpayer challenging a notice of assessment motivated on the grounds of one of 
those presumptions is confined to certain facts established by the law (e.g. the goods have 
been lost, used for the production, delivered to third parties etc.) and to certain means of 
(documentary) proof. Notwithstanding this, the facts envisaged in the legislation end up 
covering almost all the possible justifications; moreover, the national case-law tends to 
give a broad interpretation of the object of the contrary proof.  
For these reasons, such type of presumption does not seem in principle to be inconsistent 
with the EU framework. In fact, it is based on the material ascertainment as to the absence 
or existence of the merchandise in the place where the activity is carried out. If certain 
goods that have been purchased are not located in the place where the undertaking 
conducts his activity, then it is reasonable to infer that they have been sold and a VAT 
evasion (selling without issuing the invoice) occurred. The practice shows that, at times, 
such presumption is used by the tax administration to motivate a notice of assessment 
without a material inspection conducted in the place where the activity is carried out. This 
is, however, in contrast with the formula of the legislation. 
The legal presumptions provided in Article 64 of the Belgian VAT Code have to be framed 
under a similar perspective. In particular, the last paragraph of such article (para 5, in force 
since the 1st of January 2013) states that the supply of a certain good is presumed to have 
occurred at the time when it is not in any place which is in at availability of the supplier in 
Belgium, save for the counterproof. As such, it seems to imply a material ascertainment 
conducted by the tax administration at the place where the activity is carried out. In the 
light of this, and of the opportunity for the taxpayer to give proof to the contrary, similarly 
to the presumption of supply cited above, it does not seem to create particular problems of 
inconsistency with the VAT Directive. 
By contrast, more uncertainties arise from the other paragraphs included in the same article, 
in the extent to which the known fact is designed in a general and vague way. Amongst 
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them, para 1 provides that all persons who purchase or produce certain goods in view of 
the selling are presumed to have supplied them under the condition for the VAT 
chargeability, save for the counterproof (e.g. they have been destroyed)
824
. From the 
national practice and case-law, it results that a material ascertainment by the tax 
administration is not requested, and that at times the existence of non-declared purchases 
(upon which the legal presumption is based) results from the books of the purchaser. Again, 
several doubts for similar reasons arise as regards para 4 of the same provision, which 
presumes, save for the counterproof,  the existence of supply of services behind the selling 
of a new building by a taxable person, and entitles the tax administration to require from 
the taxpayer the payment of the VAT calculated on the normal value of those services.  
 
3.3.1.2 Anti-abuse measures in cross-border situations 
Similarly to most of the EU Member States, the Italian and Belgian tax systems include 
several (semi)general and specific anti-abuse provisions, aimed at avoiding the 
circumvention of the national legislation for the purpose of obtaining undue tax advantages 
and/or at combating the erosion of the taxable base put in place by shifting income towards 
low-tax States
825
.  
Amongst these, there are certain provisions which implement the anti-abuse clause 
included in the Merger Directive, which allows Member States to presume that a certain 
operation has tax evasion or avoidance as its principal objective (or one of its principal 
objectives) where it is not carried out for valid commercial reasons. Such clause is 
interpreted quite strictly by the EUCJ: general provisions that exclude automatically entire 
categories of transactions by adding further requirements to those provided by the Merger 
Directive are rejected
826
. In this regard, the Belgian and Italian legislations are in line with 
the EU framework. Article 183-bis of the Belgian Income tax legislation, which required 
the operation (e.g. merger, exchange of assets, etc.) to fulfil a ‘legitimate need of a 
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 Para 2, Article 64 provides the same presumption for the supply of services. Article 65 CTVA entitles the 
tax administration to presume that a purchase has taken place where a taxpayer who has received certain 
goods is not able to justify on the basis of which title are at his availability. 
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 See K.-D. Drüen and D., Drissen, Burden of proof and anti-abuse provisions, in The Burden of Proof in 
Tax Law, (ed.) G. Meussen, Amsterdam, EATLP International Tax Series, Volume 10, 27 et seq. 
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 According to G. Meussen, Burden of proof and European Tax Law, in The Burden of Proof in Tax Law, 
(ed.) G. Meussen, Amsterdam, in EATLP International Tax Series, Vol. 10, 35, from the Leur-Bloem case it 
results as follows: “Member States are not allowed to have provisions in their national tax laws that deem 
certain situation to have occurred primarily as the result of tax evasion or tax avoidance, while at the same 
time allowing the taxpayer to provide proof to the contrary. This reversal of the burden of proof to the 
detriment of the taxpayer violates EC law. Transactions having the primary aim of tax avoidance or tax 
evasion have to be proven by the tax administration on a case-by-case basis”. 
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financial or economic nature’, was replaced by a formula that is identical to the one 
included in the Directive. Article 37-bis of the Italian Presidential decree No 600/73, which 
is a (semi)general anti-abuse provision, might preclude the fruition of the Merger 
Directive’s benefits (and of the Interest and Royalties Directive’s benefits as well827), 
under certain conditions that seem in line with the rules set at EU level on the division of 
the burden of proof. Article 37-bis applies solely to the transactions listed in para 3, 
amongst which the kind of operations envisaged in the Merger Directive are included. It 
entitles the tax authorities to disregard single or connected acts, facts or transactions which 
are carried out without valid economic reasons and are intended to circumvent obligations 
and limitations provided under tax law in order to obtain tax savings or refunds otherwise 
undue. The burden of proof as to the existence of an abusive scheme lies upon the tax 
administration, which is called upon to prove the constituting elements of the abuse 
(abnormal transaction in respect of a ‘standard’ one, aim of achieving an undue tax benefit). 
At any rate, the taxpayer has the opportunity to demonstrate that the transaction carried out 
is justified in view of sound business reasons and he must be guaranteed the possibility to 
be heard by the tax administration prior to the issuing of the notice of assessment. 
Speaking of anti-abuse rules that entitle the tax authorities to disregard certain acts or 
operations, Article 344, para 1, of the Belgian Income tax Code, should be mentioned. As 
said when dealing with it in Chapter II, it is currently very much debated amongst the 
Belgian scholars and the Belgian Constitutional Court has had occasion to rule on it. Given 
the existence of various anti-abuse rules targeted at cross-border situations, it is hard to see 
its application to the latter, but still possible. At any rate, the burden of proof as to the 
existence of the abuse seems to rest upon the tax administration, so that no evident clash 
with EU law may be seen
828
. 
The objective of preventing the transfer of profits towards low-tax jurisdictions, has led 
both Italy and Belgium to introduce provisions that limit the deduction of certain 
expenditure related to payment made to persons established therein. The normative 
technique used generally consists of making the enjoyment of the deduction of such costs 
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 Article 37-bis, para 3, let. f-ter), includes the payments of interests or royalties to EU recipients controlled 
directly or indirectly by one or more non-EU residents. 
828
 See on this issue C. Huylebrouck, Mise en perspective de la notion de “residence” en droit fiscal 
international, in Fiscalité internationale en Belgique, Tendances récentes, (eds.) E. Traversa and I. Richelle, 
Bruxelles, Larcier, 2013, at p.  57. In the Author’s view, when at issue is a non-merely-domestic operation, 
Article 344 CIR may apply only if the abuse concern also EU law. Cf. D. Garabedian, La nouvelle règle 
générale anti-abus et l’ “objectif” des dispositions fiscales: portée, arbre de décision, cas pratiques, T.F.R. 
2012, 753. 
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conditional to the proof that the transactions carried out or the establishment abroad are 
genuine, or that such transaction is at arm’s length. In other words, these kind of provisions 
establish a presumption of non-genuineness of costs incurred for transactions with persons 
established in low-tax States and shift the burden of proving the existence of sound 
business reasons upon the resident taxpayer. Article 54 of the Belgian Income tax Code, 
which reflects this scheme, was found inconsistent with the freedom to provide services, 
basically due to the general and vague (thus, disproportionate) scope and the related heavy 
burden of proof placed upon the taxpayer. A similar scheme may be traced in Article 110, 
para 10 and 11 of the Italian Income tax legislation, which limits the deduction of costs 
incurred with enterprises located in black-listed States
829
. However, unlike Article 54 cited 
above, it does not apply to transactions involving EU Member States. Thus, if ever, a 
question of compatibility could arise only with regard to the free movement of capital with 
third countries. Though, under these conditions the approach of the EUCJ appears to be 
more flexible, also depending on the availability of administrative cooperation tools. 
 
3.3.1.2.1 CFC-prone rules 
The Italian CFC rule included in Article 167, para 8-bis, of the Income tax legislation, and 
the Belgian specific anti-abuse clause provided for by Article 344, para 2, of the Income 
tax Code, do not appear to be fully in line with the EU framework and set of rules 
stemming from the case Cadbury Schweppes.  
 
3.3.1.2.1.1 The Italian CFC rule and the presumption of tax residence for foreign 
incorporated companies 
Paragraph 8-bis was introduced in Article 167, dealing with CFC rules, by the Law decree 
No 78/09, with the effect of extending the imputation of profits on the domestic parent 
company to the case of the holding of a controlled company in a non black-listed State (i.e. 
also EU), provided that two conditions are met. It is indeed requested that a) the foreign 
subsidiary is subject to an actual taxation which is more than 50 per cent lower than the tax 
that would have been levied if it were resident in Italy; b) the proceeds of the subsidiary 
consist of more than 50% of passive income or income from services supplied to controlled 
or controlling persons (i.e. intra-group services). The resident taxpayer has the possibility 
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 The same holds true as regards the CFC rules applicable when black-listed Member States are involved 
(Article 167 TUIR), as well as to the presumption (of tax evasion origin) on non-declared investments hold 
by Italian resident individuals in tax heavens (Article 12, Law decree No 78/2009). 
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to avoid the application of the CFC rule by giving evidence, through a (compulsory) 
advance ruling, that ‘the settlement abroad does not represent an artificial arrangement 
aiming at achieving an undue tax advantage’. 
The use of a formula that echoes the EUCJ case-law for drawing the object of the contrary 
proof, might have led the Italian legislator to feel on the safe side. In fact, in accordance 
with the indications emerging from Cadbury Schweppes, the safe harbour clause does not 
merely refer to the intention of reducing the tax burden in the State of residence. It allows 
the taxpayer to demonstrate that the localization abroad does not embody an artificial 
scheme aimed at obtaining undue tax advantages. However, from that EUCJ judgments it 
follows that the establishment of a subsidiary in a low-tax jurisdiction may not per se be 
deemed as abusive, provided that the foreign settlement is real and so are the transactions 
carried out. Accordingly, the scope of the CFC rule must be confined to ‘wholly artificial 
arrangements which do not reflect economic reality, with a view of escaping the tax 
normally due on the profits generated by activities carried out on national territory’. 
Looking at the conditions of application for the CFC rule provided by the Italian legislation, 
they do not appear to be targeted at wholly artificial arrangements
830
. They concentrate on 
the level of taxation applicable in the host State and the nature of such income. These may 
surely be indices of a tax saving, but they are not per se indices of an artificial arrangement. 
The case may be, for instance, that a subsidiary is established in a Member State where it is 
charged with a levy lower than 50 per cent of the tax that would be applied in Italy, and 
that it carries out for the most part financial or insurance services, but these circumstances 
do not mean that it is an artificial arrangement, like a letter-box would be. Moreover, there 
is not symmetry between the circumstances that ground the rebuttable presumption of 
avoidance and the object of the contrary proof. The former refer to objective elements: 
when they occur, a presumption that the arrangement has been carried out for abusive 
purposes operates, which causes the imputation on the parent company of the subsidiary’s 
profits. By contrast, the proof to the contrary which is requested from the resident taxpayer 
combines objective and subjective elements. The taxpayer has to demonstrate that the 
arrangement is not artificial, so that it embodies a genuine exercise of the freedom of 
establishment. One can wonder what the taxpayer may prove, if the legislator assumes that 
the 50 per cent lower taxation in the host state and the 50 per cent passive income indicate 
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 Contra, i.e. in the sense that the Italian CFC rule for non black-listed State is in line with EU law, P. 
Scarioni and S. Muni, The New Italian CFC Rules; EU Holding Companies Challenge the ‘Artificial 
Arrangement’ Assessment, Intertax, 2010, 527, in particular at p. 531. 
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a non-genuine arrangement. In many cases, thus, the core of the contrary proof is 
represented by the (economic) reasons for which the arrangement have been put into place. 
Besides that, from Cadbury Schweppes it results that the fact that the intention to obtain 
tax relief prompted the establishment of the subsidiary abroad, does not suffice to conclude 
that there is a wholly artificial arrangement. To this end, the existence of objective 
elements are required. As a consequence, the taxpayer should be allowed to discharge the 
burden of proof by giving evidence that one of these elements (either the objective or the 
subjective) fails. Finally, the compliance costs that Article 167 places upon the resident 
parent company may be deemed as disproportionate. In fact, the latter has to yearly (and 
for each subsidiary) verify if the circumstances envisaged by the CFC rule apply. That is, it 
has to compare the level of taxation to which the foreign subsidiary is subject in the host 
State with the one that would have applied in Italy and reckon the amount of passive 
income. If the conditions established by the law occur, it has to apply to the tax authorities 
for an advance ruling for the purpose of avoiding the application of the CFC regime. From 
a literal interpretation of the Article 167, para 8-ter and 5, the request for a ruling seems to 
be compulsory, so that a taxpayer failing to fill such ruling would be prevented from giving 
evidence later, in the context of the administrative proceedings or the trial. This would 
render the provision surely disproportionate and in conflict with the principle of 
effectiveness. However, tax authorities (in a Circular letter) have supported the 
interpretation that the taxpayer can evidence of the genuineness of the arrangement even 
beyond the advance ruling. 
It should be noted that a similar counterproof is envisaged against the presumption of 
residence for foreign companies or other entities laid down by Article 73, para 5-bis, of the 
Italian income tax legislation. It basically presumes that the administrative seat of non-
resident companies and entities holding direct controlling participations of resident 
companies and commercial entities is in Italy if they are alternatively a) controlled, even 
indirectly, by a person resident in Italy or b) administered by a board of directors who are 
for the most part resident in Italy. Thus, the provision alleviates the burden of proof of tax 
authorities as to the place where the administrative seat is actually established, which is 
relevant for the purpose of determining the place of residence and the applicable national 
tax treatment. 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
 
469 
One can discuss the reasonableness of such inference, but it does not appear to be in 
contrast with EU law
831
. This is the case, provided that, as clarified by the Italian tax 
authorities following a request of information of the European Commission, the provision 
is intended to alleviate the burden of proof on the side of the tax administration when it has 
to determine the real residence of a certain company, but it does not relieve it from proving 
the fictitious character of the foreign company. In this view, para 5-bis
832
 is part of a 
broader investigation aimed at ascertaining the intensity of the relationship between the 
foreign entity and the foreign country on the one hand, and between such entity and Italy 
on the other hand. 
 
3.3.1.2.1.2 Article 344, para 2 of the Belgian CIR 
Turning to Article 344, para 2, of the Belgian Income tax Code (CIR), it entitles the tax 
administration to disregard the transfer of a number of listed assets to a non-resident 
taxpayer who is not subject to income taxation or is subject to a remarkably more 
favourable taxation for the income generated by those assets with respect to the Belgian 
legislation. Consequently, the income generated by such assets are attributed to the 
transferring taxpayer, unless he proves that a) the operation is justified by legitimate 
financial and economic needs or b) he has received a consideration for the transfer which 
generates income that is subject to a normal tax burden with respect to that which would 
have applied failing the operation. 
As said in Chapter II, such a semi(general) anti-abuse rule has been deemed as a sort of 
CFC rule, basically because it likewise aims at combating the transfer of taxable base 
towards low-tax jurisdictions. Irrespective of this comparison, which is based on a broad 
                                                          
831
 See on this issue, M. Greggi, Recenti sviluppi e questioni di compatibilità comunitaria delle disposizioni 
di contrasto al fenomeno della cosiddetta “esterovestizione” societaria, Rass. Trib., 2009, 105, in particular 
at p. 114 and 126. The Author underlined how the evaluation of compatibility with EU law depended in part 
on the interpretation and application by administrative and judicial authorities, especially under the 
perspective of the division of the burden of proof. Cf. E.M. Bagarotto, “La residenza delle società nelle 
imposte dirette alla luce della presunzione di “esterovestizione”, Riv. Dir. Trib. 2008, in particular at 1183. 
According to A. Ballancin, The Burden of Proof in Tax Law - Italy, (ed.) G. Meussen, in EATLP 
International Tax Series, Vol. 10 , 2011, 182, the companies’ tax residence presumption may be incompatible 
with the proportionality standards set by the EUCJ, because “the control does not produce, as a mean of 
common experience, the effect of locating the place of management at the parent’s residence”. C. Bardini, 
The Fine Line between Anti-Abuse Measures and the Delimitation of a Member State’s Tax Jurisdiction: The 
Italian Case, European Taxation, 2010, 374, suggests to classify the deemed tax residence rules among anti-
abuse measures and under this perspective evaluate their restrictive effects on fundamental freedoms. 
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 Similar considerations may be developed with regard to para 5-quater, which extend the rebuttable 
presumption to the case of companies or entities that have invested more than 50 per cent of their assets in an 
Italian closed real estate fund and are controller directly or indirectly by Italian residents. 
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degree of approximation, it has to be recognised that Article 344, para 2 gives rise to 
questions similar to those analysed as regards the Italian CFC rule. 
In fact, it has only apparently a specific scope. It applies to the operations listed in the 
norm, but the inclusion of the transfer of cash contributes to broaden the range of 
transactions potentially covered. Moreover, unlike a CFC rule, it does not request any 
qualified relationship between the resident person (individual or corporation) and the non-
resident person. It follows that the main index of abuse is represented by the lower level of 
taxation to which the non-resident transferee is subject. 
As such, the provision is not in line with the case-law of the EUCJ that requests anti-abuse 
provisions to be targeted at ‘wholly artificial arrangements aimed at achieving an undue 
tax advantage’. Furthermore, even though the provision is construed as a procedural rule, 
which similarly to Article 344, para 1, entitles the tax administration to disregard certain 
acts for tax purposes, it in fact relieves the tax authorities from proving the elements of the 
abuse. In other words, the provision establishes a rebuttable presumption of  (international) 
tax avoidance and shifts onto the taxpayer the proof that the transaction is justified by 
economic reasons or that it has not caused a loss revenue for the Belgian Treasury. The tax 
administration is merely requested to ascertain that one of the operations listed occurred 
and that the non-resident taxpayer is not taxed or is subject to a remarkably more 
favourable tax regime. Finally, similarly to Article 54 of the Belgian Income tax Code, 
which has been found to be inconsistent with EU law in the SIAT case, Article 344, para 2, 
generically refers to States where the non-resident is not subject to taxation or is subject to 
a taxation remarkably lower than the one applicable in Belgium. Under this aspect, it might 
create uncertainties. 
In the light of the foregoing, Article 344, para 2, does not seem in line with the EU law, 
and in particular with the free movement of capital or with the freedom of establishment (if 
one of the parties involved holds a controlling participation). If the Court was questioned 
about its consistency with EU law, it would have several reasons to find it disproportionate 
to the aim sought
833
.  
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 See L. De Broe, International tax planning and prevention of abuse. A study under domestic tax law, tax 
treaties and EC law in relation to conduit and base companies, cited above, 990. Cf. A. Nollet, L’article 344, 
§2, du C.I.R. 1992: essai de contrôle de “constitutionnalité” et de “conventionnalité” d’une disposition 
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for Article 344, para 2, as for Article 26 CIR. However, it can be objected that Article 344, para 2, does not 
embody a transfer pricing rule, and in fact it does not request the tax authorities to re-determine the price 
according to the arm’s length principle, but it is rather entitled to disregard the transaction. 
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3.3.1.2.2 Thin capitalization rules 
The Italian tax system does not include anymore a thin capitalization rule, whereas in 
Belgium it has been recently amended for the purpose of rendering it more efficient. The 
rule is included in Article 198 of the Belgian Income tax Code, which provides for a list of 
costs that are not considered as business expenditure, and thereby non-deductible, or 
deductible under certain conditions. As illustrated in Chapter II, that article contains a 
number of legal presumptions, some of which are applicable to cross-border situations. For 
instance, the deduction is disallowed where payments are made towards low-tax States and 
either they have not been properly declared or the genuineness of the transaction and of the 
foreign addressee have not been proved. Similarly to the limitation of the deduction of 
costs provided for by Article 110, para 10 of the Italian income tax legislation, such 
provision applies only when payments are directed to certain low-tax States that do not 
include any EU Member States, so that the possible questions of compatibility with EU 
law are confined to the free movement of capital with third countries. 
The thin capitalization rule is laid down in Article 198, para 1, No 11. The deduction is 
disallowed of the interest on loans which are granted to a) a real beneficiary that is not 
subject to income tax or is, with respect to the interest, subject to a tax treatment that is 
considerably more favourable than the Belgian general tax regime; or b) a real beneficiary 
that belongs to the same group as the borrower. This occurs where, at any time during the 
taxable period, the amount of the debt exceeds five times the equity. 
Therefore, the new Belgian thin cap rule assumes that the 5:1 ratio and, alternatively, the 
more favourable tax regime in the State of the interest’s beneficiary or the intra-group 
relationship between the beneficiary and the borrower, are indices of an abusive scheme 
consisting of reducing the taxable base of the company subject to a higher level of taxation. 
As such, it is manifestly not confined to cross-border situations, but it rather applies also to 
domestic situations. 
In the EUCJ judgment Lemmens and Van Cleef, Article 18, para 2, No 3, of the Belgian 
Income tax Code, automatically denying the deductibility of interest paid by a Belgian 
subsidiary to its non-resident parent company/director on the basis of a 1:1 ratio, was 
found in contrast with the freedom of establishment. Thus, the Belgian legislator may have 
thought that the inclusion of merely internal situations is able to exclude any suspicion of 
discrimination. Yet, the condition of application of the regime when cross-border situations 
are at issue is different from the one that provided for domestic situations. In the former 
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case, a very general criterion is envisaged, which is the usual lower tax regime applicable 
in the foreign State where the beneficiary is established. In the second case, a more precise 
criterion is provided, that is an intra-group relationship, as defined in the Belgian Civil 
Code. From this, one can infer that the rationale of the provision is twofold, because in the 
first case the measure is aimed at avoiding the shifting of the taxable base towards low-tax 
jurisdictions, whereas in the latter it aims at facing the undercapitalization of companies. 
Besides that, the provision does not envisage any opportunity of contrary proof, which in 
the light of the ECUCJ case-law on thin cap rules is essential for the purpose of 
considering the measure proportionate to the aim sought. From the case cited above, the 
Thin Cap GLO case and the more recent Itelcar case, it may be inferred that the Court 
dislikes criteria (such as a fixed ratio) that operate automatically and without allowing the 
taxpayer to demonstrate the existence of any commercial reasons for the arrangement 
carried out.  
In the light of the foregoing, the compatibility of the new Belgian thin cap rule with the 
free movement of capital or, in casu, the freedom of establishment, may not be excluded 
solely on the grounds that it applies to domestic situations as well. The provision is 
construed in such a way that it seems to include two different regimes, for domestic and for 
transnational loans. Concerning the latter, the circumstance that the interest is paid to a 
beneficiary resident in a low-tax State, even if combined with the 5:1 ratio, is not per se an 
index of ‘wholly artificial arrangement’. On the other hand, it should surely be considered, 
in support of the proportionate character of the measure, that the ratio 5: 1 is quite high and 
able to guarantee the companies the possibility to obtain loans. 
 
3.3.1.2.3 Transfer pricing adjustments rules 
Currently, another difficult issue is the extent to which Member States are allowed to have 
recourse to transfer pricing rules targeted at cross-border situations. In fact, the EUCJ 
judgment in the case SGI concerning the Belgian provision (Article 26 of the Belgian 
Income tax Code) which provided the profits’ adjustment upon the resident taxpayer 
granting gratuitous or abnormal advantages to a foreign related taxpayer, has left several 
questions open. Such provision does not merely aim at guaranteeing that transactions 
between related parties are agreed upon at arm’s length, but it has also an anti-avoidance 
rationale, which consists of combating the transfer of taxable base abroad. This permitted 
the Court to deem the measure as justified in the light of both the need to secure the 
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balanced allocation of Member States’ taxing power and the need to combat tax avoidance. 
The procedural guarantees, then, were essential for passing the proportionality test. 
One can wonder if the Court would rule in the same way facing the other hypothesis 
envisaged in Article 26, that is the gratuitous or abnormal advantages granted to a foreign 
taxpayer or establishment that are not subject to income tax or are subject to a more 
favourable tax regime in respect to the one applicable to the Belgian enterprise. In this case, 
the anti-avoidance rationale seems to prevail and the reference to the lower level of 
taxation in the foreign State is designed in a very general way. However, the fact that the 
application of the provision implies, according to the observations submitted by the 
Belgian government in the SGI case, that the tax administration must prove the unusual 
advantages and that the taxpayer is given procedural guarantees, may be considered to be 
sufficient for compliance with the proportionality test. 
Notably, the Italian transfer pricing rule does not seem to be construed as a presumption of 
avoidance, and the question arises as to whether and to what extent the different rationale 
compared to the Belgian rule cited above would be relevant in a possible case before the 
EUCJ. Article 110, para 7 of the Italian Income tax legislation, states that the items of 
income that derive from transactions carried out with non-resident associated companies 
are evaluated on the basis of the goods and services concerned, that is the value that would 
apply under fair market conditions. At national level, as illustrated in Chapter II, there is 
not a settled case-law on the interpretation to be given to that provision, particularly under 
the aspect of the division of the burden of proof. Yet, recently the national courts seem 
inclined to interpret such rule as establishing the legal criterion to be adopted for the 
determination of the prices where cross-border transactions with related parties are at issue. 
In this view, the tax administration is not requested to prove that tax avoidance occurs, (e.g. 
abnormality of the prices, transactions with a person located in a low-tax State, tax 
advantage), and the taxpayer is not allowed to prove that the transaction, albeit not in line 
with the arm’s length criterion, is nonetheless justified by commercial reasons. The dispute 
is basically played on the determination of the market value
834
.  
The fact that the provision does not refer to the level of taxation applicable in the foreign 
State where the related taxpayer is established,  may support the idea that the provision is 
not classifiable as an anti-avoidance rule. But even the Belgian rule in SGI did not 
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 See P. Valente, Italy: An Outlook on the Supreme Court’s Transfer Pricing Decisions, Intertax, 2013, 256; 
P. Valente, Transfer Pricing Audits: Position of the Italian Courts, Intertax, 2013, 42; P. Mastellone, The 
Shift in the Burden of Proof in regard to Transfer Pricing, European Taxation, 2011, 211. 
  
 
 474 
envisage such an element. The main difference is that the Belgian provision was construed 
as a procedural rule and implied the proof by the tax administration that the advantages 
granted were unusual; whereas the Italian rule is designed to impose the market value 
facing certain transactions. This may not be enough for the Court to exclude the anti-
avoidance rationale, which would entail that the taxpayer must be given the opportunity to 
prove any commercial reasons justifying the non-observance of the arm’s length principle. 
On the other hand, even if the EUCJ accepted that the (possible) restriction on the freedom 
of establishment is justified by the sole need to secure the balanced allocation of Member 
States’ taxing power, then the limited room left to the taxpayer for escaping the transfer 
pricing rule may create problems under the proportionality test. 
 
4. Current stage and future developments  
At first glance, one could think that the influence of EU law on legal presumptions, which 
are generally perceived as part of procedural issues and as such falling within the 
competence of Member States, be minimal. This study has revealed how the impact of EU 
law on national presumptive provisions, which can be traced from the older EUCJ 
judgments, is currently increasing. Since the first decisions that were handed down in the 
field of customs duties, VAT, the right of reimbursement and direct taxation, the EUCJ has 
realized that the recognition of rights or freedoms could be threatened by national 
measures that, even when governing the ‘formal’ tax law (assessment, recovery), were 
nonetheless able to hinder the enforcement of the relevant EU law.  
The very recent amendments to the administrative cooperation tools, among the other 
things, indicate that procedural aspects are increasingly catching the attention of the 
European Institutions, which implicitly acknowledge the difficulties met by tax authorities 
when facing situations with cross-border elements. Likewise, in its Communication on 
anti-abuse rules in direct taxation, the European Commission appears to see legal 
presumptions of tax avoidance as proportionate means for attaining the aim of combating 
the erosion of the taxable base, provided that they are sufficiently specific and rebuttable. 
On the other hand, the EUCJ has in several occasions held that Member States are in 
principle allowed to introduce in their legal systems provisions aimed at avoiding the 
circumvention of their legislations and interests or the simplification of the assessment and 
recovery of the levy. Yet, generally speaking, they have to comply  with the principles of 
effectiveness and proportionality. 
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In this framework, and to a different extent depending on the sector concerned, legal 
presumptions are generally looked upon as possible limitations to the uniform application 
of the rules set at EU level, or to the full enjoyment of a certain right or freedom that the 
individual or legal person derives from EU law. Under this perspective, the fact that 
Member States have to confront the standards set at EU level concerning legal 
presumptions, has contributed to increase the protection of the European taxpayer’s 
position, to the disadvantage of the national tax authorities. It is significant, in this regard, 
that certain provisions (e.g. Italian legislation on refund of tax levied in breach of EU law) 
deemed as being consistent with the constitutional framework by the national 
Constitutional Court, were found in breach of EU law. On the other hand, the examination 
of the Italian and Belgian legislation shows how, even in non-harmonized sectors, the 
national legislator tends to construe provisions or regimes by taking into consideration the 
indications stemming from the EUCJ case-law. This often encompasses the recognition of 
procedural guarantees to the taxpayer, not least the opportunity to give the contrary proof. 
Precisely the fact that the EUCJ focuses on the ‘effect of (irrebuttable) presumption’, 
implies that at times the contrary proof is requested at EU level in cases (one for all, the 
joint and several liability to pay VAT) that at national level would be checked only under 
the perspective of the reasonableness. In the light of this, cases of reverse discrimination 
may not be excluded. 
Finally, it has to be observed that the evaluation of the legal presumptions’ consistency 
with EU law entails a sort of ‘ascertainment of fact’. Indeed, the way in which the burden 
of proof is concretely divided between tax authorities and taxpayer, the compliance costs 
met by the latter, the circumstances that he is allowed to prove and so on, are relevant for 
the purpose of determining the EU compatibility of the single legal presumption. In this 
regard, the role that the judge of the main proceedings plays, and will presumably 
increasingly play, is essential. The EUCJ on several occasions has left to the referring court 
the ascertainment as to whether in the concrete case the national presumptive provision 
was in contrast with EU law. To this end, the EUCJ does provide the judge of the main 
proceedings with the necessary ‘tools’ and univocal criteria. 
In the most recent case-law, on the one side, there are some further indications in that 
direction; that is, in the sense of the relevance of the role assigned to the judge of the main 
proceedings in ascertaining if the legal presumption at issue is or not proportionate, or if it 
does or not allow the taxpayer to give the proof to the contrary without placing upon him 
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undue administrative burdens. Under this aspect, the reference included in numerous 
judgments of the EUCJ to the case-by-case ascertainment of the conditions for the 
operating of the legal presumption may be mentioned. It requires the evaluation of the 
circumstances of the concrete case, which includes the evaluation of the possible proof to 
the contrary, apparently both in the administrative stage and before the court. On the other 
side, from the case-law it also stems a greater need for legal certainty with regard to the 
way in which the legal presumption is construed; this implies that its application may not 
be left to the discretion of tax authorities, and it has rather to be clear and predictable for 
the taxpayers. In this perspective, the balance between the need for a case-by-case 
ascertainment as to the conditions for the application of a certain legal presumption 
affecting an EU right or freedom, on the one side,  and the need for legal certainty on the 
other side, embodies the pivot of the evaluation of tax law presumptions’ consistency with 
EU law. 
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